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Abstract	  
	  
	  	  Transnational	  advocacy	  networks	  (TANs)	  are	  a	  rapidly	  proliferating	  phenomenon	  in	  international	  contentious	  politics.	  Widely	  known	  for	  waging	  headline-­‐grabbing	  wars	  of	  words,	  TANs	  remain	  under-­‐theorised	  on	  important	  levels	  of	  analysis.	  Unsurprisingly,	  they	  have	  been	  termed	  ‘elusive’	  in	  the	  political	  literature.	  Typically	  portrayed	  as	  vital	  service-­‐providing	  agencies	  that	  by-­‐pass	  official	  controls	  to	  relay	  civil	  society	  concerns	  to	  the	  world’s	  media	  and	  international	  policy-­‐makers,	  TANs	  are	  commonly	  assumed	  to	  be	  the	  vociferous,	  Internet-­‐enabled,	  offspring	  of	  traditional	  NGOs	  and,	  thus,	  heirs	  to	  the	  reputational	  capital	  of	  NGOs.	  However,	  despite	  this	  respected	  provenance,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  TANs	  frequently	  fail	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals.	  	  	  Knowledge	  of	  why	  some	  TAN	  strategies	  succeed	  while	  others	  fail	  is	  contested	  and	  inconclusive.	  This	  empirical	  thesis	  attempts	  to	  build	  on	  the	  international	  political	  literature	  by	  showing	  why	  the	  emerging	  NGO	  typology	  of	  TANs	  cannot	  be	  explained	  without	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  systemic	  complexity	  of	  their	  environment	  and	  the	  essentially	  communicative	  functioning	  of	  these	  globe-­‐spanning	  advocacy	  cooperatives.	  It	  seeks	  to	  demonstrate	  also	  the	  analytical	  value	  of	  applying	  complex	  realism	  in	  IR	  praxis.	  Hence,	  the	  thesis	  explicates	  a	  real-­‐world	  conundrum:	  What	  is	  the	  place	  and	  function	  of	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system	  and	  how	  effective	  are	  they	  in	  achieving	  their	  aims?	  	  	  To	  identify	  macro-­‐structural	  conditions	  and	  indicators	  of	  relationship	  quality	  —	  primarily	  involving	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  elements	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  —	  the	  thesis	  study	  reclaimed	  macro-­‐sociological	  perspective	  as	  a	  first	  stage,	  ‘top-­‐down’	  approach	  to	  this	  complex,	  multi-­‐dimensional	  problem	  space.	  The	  resultant	  data	  and	  patterns	  were	  then	  tested	  by	  way	  of	  a	  second-­‐stage,	  micro-­‐sociological,	  ‘bottom-­‐up’,	  case	  study	  exploration	  of	  the	  UN’s	  interface	  with	  three	  iconic	  TANs	  —	  Greenpeace,	  Oxfam	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Watch.	  By	  conceptualising	  these	  relationships	  as	  intersections	  between	  systemic	  elements	  constituted	  on	  different	  social	  levels	  and	  scales	  of	  complexity,	  the	  scalable	  methodology	  enabled	  the	  study	  to	  transcend	  the	  micro-­‐macro	  problems	  inherent	  in	  the	  primary	  research	  question.	  	  	  The	  results	  indicate	  that	  TANs	  are	  a	  distinctive	  typology	  of	  NGO	  that	  the	  international	  system	  is	  struggling	  to	  evaluate	  and	  accommodate	  within	  existing	  arrangements	  for	  NGO	  engagement.	  Unexpectedly,	  the	  study	  found	  plausible	  indications	  that	  the	  barriers	  many	  TANs	  encounter	  are	  endogenously	  produced.	  The	  results	  challenge	  prevailing	  assumptions	  about	  the	  place	  and	  function	  of	  grassroots	  diplomacy	  in	  the	  international	  arena;	  the	  ability	  of	  communications	  strategies	  to	  remedy	  global	  problems;	  and	  the	  reality	  and	  limitations	  of	  ‘people	  power’.	  By	  highlighting	  under-­‐exposed	  features	  of	  the	  contemporary	  international	  relational	  landscape,	  the	  thesis	  argues,	  we	  might	  better	  determine	  whether	  many	  contemporary	  TANs	  are,	  in	  fact,	  evolving	  as	  the	  best-­‐suited	  champions	  for	  the	  urgent,	  political	  quests	  they	  adopt.	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Chapter	  1	  
1.	  Introduction	  	  	  	  
I	  have	  often	  reflected	  that	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  successes	  or	  failures	  of	  men	  
depend	  upon	  their	  manner	  of	  suiting	  their	  conduct	  to	  the	  times.	  	  
	  
	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Niccoli	  Machiavelli	  (1513)	  	  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  thesis	  attempts	  to	  shed	  greater	  light	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system	  and	  a	  rapidly	  proliferating	  social	  phenomenon	  in	  world	  politics	  that	  is	  widely	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  ‘transnational	  advocacy	  networks’	  (TANs)1.	  The	  thesis	  argues	  that	  the	  need	  for	  analytical	  clarity	  of	  this	  interface	  is	  both	  important	  and	  timely	  because	  TANs,	  as	  recently	  emerging	  and	  increasingly	  spotlighted	  political	  protagonists	  —	  whose	  clamorous	  advocacy	  model	  defines	  them	  —	  are	  a	  variant	  form	  of	  the	  traditional	  NGO	  model	  that	  the	  international	  system	  is	  struggling	  to	  accommodate	  within	  the	  long-­‐standing	  institutional	  arrangements	  for	  engaging	  with	  NGOs.	  Moreover,	  the	  thesis	  attempts	  to	  show	  that	  TANs	  constitute	  a	  contemporary	  paradox,	  being	  both	  widely	  researched	  by	  modern	  political	  scholars	  and	  yet	  misjudged	  and	  under-­‐scrutinised	  in	  many	  aspects	  of	  their	  activity2.	  They	  have	  been	  notably	  termed	  ‘elusive’	  in	  the	  core	  literature	  on	  contentious	  international	  politics3.	  	  Furthermore,	  an	  initial	  impression	  on	  accessing	  this	  complex	  interface	  via	  the	  literature,	  was	  that	  objective	  macroscopic	  overviews	  of	  the	  international	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  As	  addressed	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  the	  principal	  paradigm	  for	  this	  discussion	  is	  political	  sociology,	  in	  general,	  
particularly	  aspects	  relating	  to	  contentious	  international	  politics.	  	  	  
2	  See,	  for	  example,	  Minkoff’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  advantages	  of	  analysing	  social	  movements	  at	  the	  macro-­‐
organisational	  level	  of	  industries,	  families,	  or	  sectors	  (2005:260-­‐261).	  
3	  The	  ‘elusive’	  tag	  for	  TANs	  is	  discussed	  further	  in	  Chapter	  2.	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penetrations	  and	  impacts	  of	  this	  burgeoning	  ‘forest’,	  in	  which	  thousands	  of	  TANs	  are	  currently	  embedded4,	  are	  often	  obscured	  by	  an	  overabundance	  of	  micro-­‐situational	  descriptions	  of	  the	  individual	  trees.	  Indeed,	  Klandermans,	  Staggenborg	  and	  Tarrow	  (2002:339)	  argue	  that	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  ‘transnational’	  social	  movement	  —	  ‘these	  new	  global	  phenomena’	  —	  presents	  unprecedented	  challenges	  for	  analysing	  expanding	  scope	  conditions	  that	  may	  not	  fit	  within	  the	  canon	  of	  existing	  research	  approaches.	  Additionally,	  Minkoff	  asserts	  that	  the	  organisational	  analysis	  of	  social	  movements,	  presumably	  including	  TANs,	  remains	  relatively	  underdeveloped	  both	  theoretically	  and	  methodologically	  (2002:260).	  This	  opinion	  is	  shared	  by	  Klandermans	  and	  Staggenborg,	  2002:xiv.	  It	  is	  shown	  in	  the	  following	  chapters	  that	  even	  though	  TANs	  and	  TAN-­‐type	  organisations	  are	  constantly	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  political	  literature,	  the	  defining	  parameters	  of	  TANs	  remain	  contested	  and	  blurry	  —	  a	  situation	  that	  this	  thesis	  aims	  to	  address,	  by	  offering	  an	  original,	  eight-­‐point,	  referent	  template	  specifying	  a	  set	  of	  essential	  characteristics	  for	  identifying	  contemporary	  TANs	  and	  evaluating	  their	  importance.	  This	  TAN	  model	  is	  presented	  at	  Figure	  6.	  2.	  	  	  
	  
Rationale	  and	  significance	  of	  the	  thesis	  The	  rationale	  for	  this	  study	  was	  found	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  contentious	  international	  politics	  and	  in	  mainstream	  mass	  media	  and	  civil	  society	  portrayals	  of	  the	  high	  levels	  of	  confusion,	  adversarial	  posturing	  and	  frustration	  that,	  as	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  this	  thesis,	  characterise	  some	  relationships	  between	  transnational	  civil	  society	  activist	  organisations	  and	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  In	  particular,	  this	  interface	  is	  recognised	  globally	  as	  the	  ideological	  battlefield	  on	  which	  international	  actors	  face	  each	  other	  over	  the	  growing	  range	  of	  intractable	  global	  challenges,	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘wicked	  problems’5,	  such	  as	  poverty,	  climate	  change,	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  globalisation,	  environmental	  degradation	  and	  human	  rights	  abuses.	  In	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  many	  influential	  scholars	  have	  expressed	  serious	  concerns	  about	  the	  heightened	  levels	  of	  perceived	  risk	  and	  anxiety	  in	  the	  modern	  world	  and,	  importantly,	  the	  ‘manufactured’	  aspect	  of	  much	  of	  that	  risk	  (e.g.	  Beck,	  1992,	  2007:115,	  2009;	  Adams	  and	  van	  Loon,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  See	  Number	  of	  Organisations	  in	  the	  Yearbook	  of	  International	  Organizations	  at	  Figure	  6.1.	  
5	  Contemporary	  global	  challenges,	  sometimes	  alternatively	  termed	  ‘wicked	  problems’	  are	  addressed	  in	  
Chapters	  4	  and	  6.	  ‘The	  term	  ‘wicked	  problem’	  was	  first	  coined	  by	  Horst	  Rittel	  in	  1972	  (cited	  by	  Ritchey,	  
2011:	  1,3;	  and	  AustGov,	  2007:3,	  9-­‐10)	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  category	  of	  social	  issues	  that	  are:	  seriously	  devious	  
and	  contested	  in	  regard	  to	  their	  definition	  and	  possible	  solution;	  cannot	  be	  (meaningfully)	  quantified;	  
contain	  irreducible	  uncertainties;	  are	  strongly	  stakeholder-­‐dependent;	  are	  notoriously	  susceptible	  to	  
unintended	  consequences;	  and	  are	  politically	  highly	  sensitive	  (ibid).	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2000:2-­‐3;	  Giddens,	  1991a,	  1991b,	  1999,	  2002;	  Beck,	  Giddens	  and	  Lash,	  1994;	  Lash,	  2000:47-­‐61)6.	  In	  a	  roughly	  coterminous	  period,	  TANs	  have	  emerged:	  their	  interventions	  and	  strategies	  in	  the	  international	  system	  typically	  aimed	  at	  exposing	  these	  risks	  to	  humanity	  —	  especially	  via	  the	  mass	  media	  —	  capturing	  attention	  for	  their	  agendas,	  and	  pressing	  for	  changes	  in	  the	  policies	  and	  behaviours	  of	  states	  and	  international	  organisations	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:2).	  	  But,	  the	  contentious	  debates	  have	  not	  been	  one-­‐sided	  in	  favour	  of	  TANs,	  although	  that	  impression	  has	  become	  widely	  entrenched	  in	  some	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  not	  least	  due	  to	  media	  reports	  that	  inform	  us	  about	  things	  that	  go	  badly	  wrong	  and	  threaten	  us7	  (Kuran	  and	  Sunstein,	  1999;	  Kahneman,	  2011:140-­‐142;	  300-­‐303).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  weight	  of	  scientific	  evidence	  has	  been	  advanced	  in	  recent	  years	  that	  counter-­‐argues	  that	  the	  world	  has	  never	  been	  so	  safe	  for	  human	  life	  and	  is,	  in	  fact,	  becoming	  safer	  (Human	  Security	  Report,	  2013;	  Pinker,	  2011;	  Kuper,	  2014;	  Ridley,	  2014).	  	  Meanwhile,	  authoritative	  voices	  have	  warned	  that	  the	  environmental	  campaign	  has	  stalled	  and	  global	  campaigns	  waged	  by	  thousands	  of	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks	  appear	  to	  be	  full	  of	  sound	  and	  fury	  while	  barely	  scratching	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  issues	  they	  were	  set	  up	  to	  champion	  (Secrett,	  2011a,	  2011b;	  Weyler,	  2012;	  GI	  Naidoo,	  2011;	  GI	  Annual	  Report	  2012:48;	  Helm,	  2012:ix;	  1-­‐10;	  The	  Guardian,	  2011e;	  Howell,	  2013).	  As	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  observed	  in	  their	  seminal	  work	  on	  TANs,	  these	  networks	  ‘frequently	  fail	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals’	  (1998:x).	  	  	  	  What	  is	  to	  be	  done?	  If	  today’s	  protest	  strategies	  are	  largely	  failing	  to	  effect	  significant	  change	  within	  the	  international	  policy-­‐making	  arena,	  then	  it	  seems	  apposite	  to	  examine	  the	  international	  contexts	  and	  roles	  in	  which	  civil	  society	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  A	  more	  detailed	  assessment	  of	  this	  situation	  is	  provided	  in	  the	  chapters	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  
(Chapter	  5)	  and	  its	  relationships	  with	  nongovernment	  organisations	  (Chapter	  6).	  
7	  See	  also	  Chapter	  6.	  Kahneman	  et	  al	  (2011:140-­‐141)	  discuss	  these	  inherent	  human	  behavioural	  
responses	  to	  negative	  news	  and	  threats	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘negativity	  dominance’,	  ‘loss	  aversion’	  and	  
‘availability	  cascades’.	  In	  their	  identification	  of	  ‘availability	  cascades’,	  Kuran	  and	  Sunstein	  (1999)	  discuss	  
the	  seeding	  of	  public	  fears	  and	  panic	  by	  ‘availability	  entrepreneurs’	  —	  activists	  who	  manipulate	  the	  
content	  of	  the	  public	  discourse	  in	  order	  to	  trigger	  availability	  cascades	  likely	  to	  advance	  their	  agendas.	  	  	  
8	  The	  Executive	  Director	  of	  Greenpeace	  International,	  Dr.	  Kumi	  Naidoo,	  has	  commented	  on	  how	  often	  
he	  has	  said,	  in	  speeches	  and	  interviews:	  ‘We	  are	  winning	  the	  battles,	  but	  losing	  the	  planet’.	  In	  his	  view,	  
the	  world	  is	  facing	  a	  ‘deepening	  environmental	  crisis’	  that	  efforts	  to	  date	  have	  not	  adequately	  
addressed	  (GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2012:4).	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advocates	  are	  engaged.	  In	  this	  way,	  this	  thesis	  argues,	  we	  might	  better	  determine	  whether	  contemporary	  TANs	  are,	  in	  fact,	  evolving	  as	  the	  best	  suited	  champions	  for	  the	  urgent,	  political	  quests	  they	  take	  on.	  Thus,	  the	  thesis	  seeks	  to	  examine	  the	  complaints	  from	  TANs	  that	  their	  issues	  go	  unheeded	  by	  world	  leaders	  and	  governments,	  and	  compares	  their	  often	  simplistic	  and	  adversarial	  argumentation	  with	  the	  interventions	  of	  research-­‐based	  organisations,	  such	  as	  think	  tanks,	  which	  lawmakers	  and	  government	  officials	  have	  long	  relied	  on	  to	  provide	  independent	  policy	  analysis	  and	  scholarship	  (Columbia	  U,	  2009;	  Keohane	  and	  Nye,	  1988:89;	  Stone	  and	  Denham,	  2004:13;	  Willetts,	  2011:62;	  McGann	  and	  Sabatini,	  2011:69-­‐70).	  	  	  	  Clearly,	  there	  was,	  and	  is,	  an	  urgent	  need	  for	  more	  serious	  analytical	  work	  to	  produce	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  salient	  realities	  conditioning	  these	  types	  of	  international	  socio-­‐political	  engagement.	  At	  a	  basic	  micro-­‐sociological	  level,	  involving	  small	  groups	  and	  social	  units	  within	  the	  larger	  social	  system,	  recent	  scholarship	  has	  suggested	  that	  social	  practices	  are	  always	  ‘products-­‐in-­‐process’	  and	  hence	  are	  experienced	  as	  undergoing	  constant	  change9.	  Yet	  international	  relations	  are	  not	  confined	  to	  the	  micro	  level	  of	  human	  interaction	  but	  are	  particularly	  concerned	  with	  the	  macro-­‐structural	  patterning	  of	  human	  activity.	  Indeed,	  the	  discipline	  of	  international	  relations	  deals	  almost	  exclusively	  with	  macro	  level	  issues,	  such	  as	  the	  great	  issues	  of	  continuity	  and	  change	  (Wight,	  2013:86).	  Thus,	  throughout	  the	  course	  of	  this	  research	  project	  there	  was	  a	  constant	  tension	  between	  competing	  demands	  to	  (a)	  pay	  attention	  to	  ‘breaking	  news’	  on	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  activism	  and	  (b)	  the	  satisfying	  logic	  and	  results	  from	  considering	  the	  longue	  durée	  of	  institutions	  and	  change	  (Braudel,	  1958;	  Armitage	  and	  Guldi,	  2014;	  Giddens,	  1984:60-­‐61,	  199-­‐20010).	  The	  solution	  to	  this	  dilemma	  was	  to	  do	  both,	  by	  considering	  all	  sources	  and	  noting	  distinctions	  between	  the	  accounts	  of	  reality	  they	  provided.	  This	  situation	  prompted	  the	  primary	  research	  question	  (PRQ)	  of	  the	  project,	  which	  sought	  to	  better	  understand:	  	  
What	  is	  the	  place	  and	  function	  of	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks	  
in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system	  and	  how	  effective	  are	  they	  
in	  achieving	  their	  aims?	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  This	  assertion	  is	  advanced	  in	  concurrence	  with	  Wight	  (2013:86).	  	  
10	  Giddens	  (1984:	  90-­‐92)	  also	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  tensions	  caused	  by	  differences	  in	  ‘the	  knowledge	  
that	  actors	  have	  of	  the	  societies	  which	  they	  are	  members	  (and	  others	  of	  which	  they	  are	  not);	  and	  to	  
tensions	  in	  the	  debates	  over	  whether	  methodological	  individualism,	  or	  structural	  sociology,	  is	  the	  most	  
suitable	  means	  of	  explaining	  social	  categories	  (ibid:220).	  Giddens	  concludes	  that	  these	  epistemological	  
perspectives	  are	  not	  alternatives,	  ‘such	  that	  to	  reject	  one	  is	  to	  accept	  the	  other’.	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Theoretical	  framework—Adopting	  a	  multi-­lensed	  analytical	  approach	  Following	  a	  process	  of	  theory	  development,	  by	  way	  of	  a	  literature	  review	  based	  on	  this	  question	  and	  taking	  initial	  soundings	  of	  the	  research	  terrain,	  a	  second	  objective	  was	  adopted	  for	  this	  project:	  i.e.	  to	  apply	  new	  and	  better	  tools	  to	  investigate	  the	  characteristically	  strained	  international	  political	  relationships	  involving	  TANs,	  without	  becoming	  overwhelmed	  by	  the	  dilemmas	  associated	  with	  specific	  political	  and	  normative	  debates.	  It	  was	  apparent	  that	  such	  an	  approach	  would	  need	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  that	  was	  able	  to	  grasp	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  object	  under	  study	  (i.e.	  the	  relational	  interface	  between	  the	  international	  system	  and	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks),	  and	  acknowledge	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  international	  environment	  and	  the	  critical	  communicative	  aspects	  of	  the	  interface	  between	  the	  elements.	  Hence,	  the	  study	  commenced	  with	  the	  ontology11.	  I	  emphasise	  here	  that	  the	  ensuing	  epistemological	  and	  methodological	  choices	  were	  made	  in	  order	  to	  explore	  the	  primary	  research	  question	  of	  this	  study	  and	  no	  claims	  are	  made	  regarding	  the	  applicability	  of	  these	  frameworks	  to	  other	  investigations.	  	  Drawing	  firstly	  on	  complex	  realist	  philosophy	  to	  access	  an	  ontological	  vista	  of	  fitness	  landscapes	  and	  complex	  systemic	  phenomena,	  the	  qualitative	  data	  set	  was	  assembled	  and	  tested	  using	  a	  controlled	  combination	  of	  theoretical	  insights	  from	  complexity	  science	  and	  the	  sociological	  fields	  of	  politics	  and	  communications.	  The	  principal	  reason	  for	  applying	  additional	  communications	  lenses	  to	  subject	  matter	  that	  is	  normally	  regarded	  as	  lodged	  squarely	  and	  adequately	  within	  the	  Politics/International	  Relations	  paradigm,	  arose	  from	  my	  initial	  screening	  of	  the	  data,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  following	  theories	  concerning	  the	  functioning	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs,	  namely:	  (i)	  that	  the	  advocacy	  characteristics	  of	  recently	  emerging	  transnational	  'advocacy'	  networks	  differentiate	  them	  markedly	  from	  other	  typologies	  of	  NGO	  operating	  in	  the	  international	  arena;	  and	  (ii)	  these	  important,	  differentiating,	  properties	  of	  contemporary	  TANs	  notably	  arise	  from	  the	  advocacy	  function	  of	  their	  organisations,	  are	  typically	  overlooked	  by	  political	  theorists	  and,	  therefore,	  are	  not	  problematised	  in	  Politics	  thinking	  and	  debates.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  This	  step	  is	  advised	  by	  Wight	  (2006:2-­‐4).	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Indeed,	  the	  study	  found	  that	  it	  was	  often	  a	  disturbing	  feature	  of	  the	  political	  discourses	  that	  when	  political	  theoretical	  perspectives	  alone	  had	  been	  applied	  to	  interpreting	  activism,	  government	  officials	  and	  international	  institutions,	  they	  appeared	  to	  have	  nothing	  useful	  to	  say	  about	  relationship	  qualities	  without	  throwing	  up	  some	  caricatures	  and	  superficial	  assumptions12.	  As	  an	  alternative,	  I	  venture,	  the	  communications	  lens	  is	  politically	  neutral,	  yet	  it	  provides	  a	  valuable	  tool	  for	  examining	  reality	  below	  the	  surface	  contention	  of	  actual	  political	  issues,	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  as	  a	  glass-­‐bottomed	  viewing	  boat	  permits	  a	  clearer	  focus	  on	  conditions	  underwater	  without	  the	  distraction	  of	  surface	  chop13.	  	  I	  should	  also	  emphasise	  here,	  however,	  that	  in	  considering	  limitations	  in	  the	  Politics/IR	  literature	  concerning	  TANs,	  political	  sociology	  as	  a	  discipline	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  taken	  by	  surprise	  by	  the	  virtual	  revolution	  in	  information	  communications	  technologies	  and	  their	  widespread	  deployment	  in	  political	  advocacy	  strategising.	  Although	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  the	  American	  academy,	  in	  particular,	  is	  rapidly	  gaining	  ground	  in	  researching	  the	  political-­‐advocacy-­‐communications	  domain	  (vide	  Castells,	  Negroponte,	  Morazov,	  Hindman,	  Dean,	  Tufekci,	  Carr,	  Shirky,	  et	  al14),	  I	  consider	  that	  in	  trying	  to	  paper	  over	  the	  theoretical	  cracks	  when	  called	  on	  to	  comment	  on	  political	  relationships,	  communicative	  technologies,	  practices	  and	  behaviours,	  the	  Politics/IR	  literature	  has	  a	  tendency	  to	  resort	  to	  over-­‐simplified	  assumptions	  about	  ‘human	  nature’	  that	  are	  subjective	  and	  stereotypical.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Communications	  discipline	  is	  theoretically	  rich	  and	  eminently	  fit	  to	  make	  qualitative	  analyses	  and	  comment	  on	  these	  matters.	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  thesis	  attempts	  to	  draw	  these	  two	  fields	  together	  to	  create	  better	  understandings	  of	  political	  relationships.	  	  It	  also	  appeared	  that	  there	  was	  a	  need	  to	  reclaim	  and	  reinvigorate	  three	  erstwhile	  mainstays	  of	  international	  sociological	  research	  practice,	  namely:	  (1)	  macroscopic	  perspectives	  and	  analysis	  of	  IR	  environments;	  (2)	  the	  role	  of	  deep	  social	  structural	  analysis	  in	  investigating	  international	  political	  subject	  matter	  and	  the	  situated	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  See,	  for	  example,	  derisory	  references	  in	  Chapters	  6	  and	  7	  to	  international	  negotiators,	  represented	  as	  
a	  homogeneous	  uncaring	  bloc,	  ‘sleepwalking’	  as	  the	  people	  of	  the	  world	  race	  towards	  an	  apocalyptic	  
future.	  
13	  This	  is	  in	  accordance	  with	  Durkheim	  (Giddens,	  1977:263;	  1984:229),	  who	  ‘regarded	  political	  
revolution	  as	  agitation	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  social	  life,	  incapable	  of	  giving	  rise	  to	  major	  transformations	  of	  
society	  because	  the	  evolution	  of	  basic	  social	  institutions	  is	  always	  necessarily	  slow’	  (Giddens,	  1984:ibid).	  
14	  See	  texts	  by	  these	  authors	  in	  the	  Bibliography.	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often	  unconscious	  motivations	  of	  agents15;	  and	  (3)	  reintroducing	  Thucydides	  to	  the	  debates	  on	  strained	  relationships	  between	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system,	  especially	  following	  the	  entry	  of	  new	  typologies	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  to	  this	  complex	  environment.	  As	  Nye	  has	  noted:	  ’The	  barriers	  to	  entry	  into	  world	  politics	  have	  been	  lowered,	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  now	  crowd	  the	  stage’	  (2011:xvi).	  Therefore,	  this	  thesis	  attempts	  to	  show	  how	  these	  three	  recently	  neglected	  lenses	  in	  political	  sociological	  study	  are	  invaluable	  in	  any	  serious	  attempt	  to	  account	  for	  the	  disparate	  and	  frequently	  frustrated	  fortunes	  of	  civil	  society	  agents	  involved	  in	  trying	  to	  influence	  contemporary	  international	  decision-­‐makers	  and,	  thus,	  change	  global	  policy.	  	  	  
Contributions	  to	  knowledge	  This	  thesis	  proposes	  to	  make	  three	  principal	  contributions	  to	  original	  knowledge.	  Firstly,	  it	  aims	  to	  deepen	  and	  broaden	  our	  understanding	  of	  an	  important,	  emerging	  political	  phenomenon,	  namely,	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks,	  in	  the	  global	  politics	  paradigm.	  Secondly,	  it	  tests	  my	  premise	  that	  a	  complex	  realist	  philosophical	  and	  methodological	  approach	  shows	  us	  new,	  theoretically	  rich,	  and	  cogent	  ways	  to	  understand	  the	  relationships	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system	  and	  better	  explain	  them	  in	  analytically	  useful	  ways.	  And	  thirdly,	  by	  applying	  substantive	  theoretical	  lenses	  from	  the	  Communications	  discipline	  to	  test	  whether	  TANs	  are	  different	  to	  other	  NGOs,	  and	  why	  this	  matters	  in	  any	  attempt	  to	  evaluate	  their	  inter-­‐relationships,	  contributions	  to	  international	  system	  purposes	  (thus	  effecting	  their	  ‘place’	  and	  ‘function’),	  and	  effectiveness	  in	  achieving	  their	  stated	  aims16.	  While	  the	  NGO	  advocacy	  community	  has	  long	  targeted	  media	  as	  a	  key	  conduit	  for	  publicising	  their	  positions	  on	  issues,	  I	  attempt	  to	  examine	  whether	  more	  research	  is	  needed	  in	  understanding	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  This	  is	  in	  accordance	  with	  Giddens’s	  opinion	  that	  ‘[T]he	  identification	  of	  structural	  principles,	  and	  their	  
conjunctures	  in	  intersocietal	  systems,	  represents	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  level	  of	  institutional	  analysis’	  
(1984:	  185-­‐186).	  By	  ‘structure’,	  Giddens	  is	  referring	  to	  ‘the	  rules	  and	  resources	  recursively	  implicated	  in	  
social	  reproduction	  […]’	  (ibid:	  xxxi).	  Moreover,	  Giddens	  believes	  ‘practical	  consciousness’	  must	  be	  
incorporated	  into	  research.	  This	  would	  involve	  ways	  of	  discovering	  the	  knowledge	  people	  have	  about	  
their	  motivations/actions,	  that	  is	  not	  limited	  by	  what	  they	  can	  say	  about	  them	  (ibid:xxx).	  Moreover,	  the	  
span	  of	  time-­‐space	  distanciation	  is	  relevant	  here.	  Giddens	  opines	  	  (ibid:	  171	  181)	  that,	  in	  general,	  the	  
greater	  the	  time-­‐space	  distanciation	  of	  social	  systems,	  the	  more	  their	  institutions’	  bite	  into	  space	  and	  
time’,	  the	  more	  resistant	  they	  are	  to	  manipulation	  or	  change	  by	  any	  agent.	  
16	  Wight	  (2013:92)	  is	  among	  those	  who	  have	  identified	  a	  knowledge	  gap	  in	  this	  area	  and	  specified	  a	  
need	  for	  greater	  analytical	  attention	  to	  be	  focused	  not	  only	  on	  presenting	  data	  on	  the	  recent	  increase	  in	  
global	  communication	  but	  on	  explaining	  its	  ‘meaning’	  and	  ‘impact’	  on	  social	  relations.	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effectiveness	  of	  NGO	  communications	  strategies	  in	  influencing	  the	  information	  sources	  and	  media	  habits	  of	  international	  decision-­‐makers17.	  	  	  
Operationalising	  the	  primary	  research	  question	  The	  thesis	  understands	  that	  the	  primary	  research	  question	  is	  chiefly	  concerned	  with	  investigating	  relationships	  and	  is	  complex	  and	  multidimensional	  —	  its	  implications	  having	  relevance	  for	  different	  strata	  of	  complex	  social	  reality,	  occurring	  not	  least	  on	  different	  timescales18	  and	  suffused	  with	  political	  power	  inequalities,	  which	  I	  suggest	  should	  not	  be	  conflated,	  or	  ignored,	  in	  research	  investigations.	  The	  implications	  this	  question	  held	  for	  exploring	  varying	  scales	  of	  social	  complexity	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  analysis	  —	  challengingly	  known	  as	  the	  ‘micro-­‐macro	  problematique’	  and	  arguably	  the	  central	  intellectual	  problem	  in	  sociology19	  —	  clearly	  indicated	  the	  need	  for	  pluralistic	  epistemological	  and	  methodological	  approaches,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  macro-­‐sociological	  approach	  to	  the	  international	  system,	  notwithstanding	  the	  validation	  risks	  associated	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  generality	  (van	  Meter,	  1990:180-­‐181).	  	  	  These	  research	  challenges	  were	  addressed	  by	  the	  development	  of	  a	  research	  design	  involving	  both	  ‘top-­‐down’	  macroscopic	  analysis	  of	  the	  macro-­‐sociological	  features	  of	  the	  interface	  (observed	  minimally	  in	  aggregated	  discourses,	  but	  mainly	  in	  behavioural	  patterns	  that	  reflected	  underlying	  and	  enduring	  social	  structures;	  relationship	  qualities,	  such	  as	  trust;	  powers,	  tendencies	  and	  trends),	  and	  ‘bottom-­‐up’	  case	  study	  analysis	  of	  three	  iconic	  TANs:	  Greenpeace	  International,	  Oxfam	  International	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  (Chapters	  7,	  8,	  9).	  	  	  This,	  first	  stage,	  ‘ascending’	  methodological	  approach	  follows	  Byne’s	  advice	  on	  surveying	  the	  social	  world	  by	  investigating	  the	  possible	  sources	  of	  social	  change	  at	  macro,	  meso	  and	  micro	  levels	  and	  assembling	  knowledge	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  further	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  See	  Chapter	  5	  and	  the	  Columbia	  University	  study	  on	  media	  habits	  within	  the	  UN	  context	  (Columbia	  U,	  
2009).	  
18	  This	  refers	  to	  increased	  understandings	  in	  recent	  complexity-­‐based	  scholarship	  that	  social	  and	  
political	  change	  move	  at	  a	  much	  slower	  pace	  than	  economic	  and	  technological	  change,	  and	  that	  
considerable	  divergence	  can	  occur	  between	  the	  pace	  of	  economic	  and	  technological	  transitions	  and	  the	  
more	  glacial	  pace	  of	  cultural	  and	  social	  transitions	  (Root,	  2013:1,	  36,	  Buzan	  and	  Little,	  2000:381;	  see	  
also	  Wight,	  2013:86).	  Earlier	  work	  by	  Giddens	  (1984:xxiv-­‐xxvi,	  171,	  181),	  especially	  in	  regard	  to	  ‘time-­‐
space	  distanciation’,	  appears	  to	  be	  commensurable	  with	  this	  thinking.	  Giddens	  refers	  to	  these	  varying	  
effects	  in	  more	  general	  terms,	  focusing	  the	  ‘positioning’,	  of	  an	  individual’s	  body	  in	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  social	  
relationships	  (co-­‐presences),	  scales	  and	  contexts	  that	  occur	  in	  time-­‐space.	  
19	  See	  Watts	  (2011:61-­‐67).	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interventions	  (2011:61).	  The	  strategy	  was	  guided	  also	  by	  Collins’s	  assertion	  that	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  an	  accurate	  picture	  of	  social	  reality	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  test	  macro-­‐sociological	  data	  within	  the	  context	  of	  its	  micro-­‐situational	  grounding	  —	  since,	  Collin’s	  maintains,	  ‘nothing	  has	  reality	  unless	  it	  is	  manifested	  in	  a	  situation	  somewhere’.	  Moreover,	  Collins	  advises	  that	  aggregated	  patterns	  of	  macro-­‐data	  must	  be	  found	  to	  hold	  across	  micro-­‐situations,	  or	  networks	  of	  repeated	  connections	  from	  one	  micro-­‐situation	  to	  another	  (2004:259-­‐260).	  Therefore,	  this	  research	  procedure	  was	  adopted	  to	  ensure	  the	  consistent	  validity	  of	  the	  developing	  ‘big’	  picture	  of	  the	  ‘place’,	  ‘function’	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  	  	  
Further	  theoretical	  underpinnings	  of	  the	  thesis	  	  As	  a	  contextual	  starting	  point,	  the	  thesis	  upheld	  the	  clear	  evidence20	  that	  international	  NGOs	  (INGOs),	  which	  by	  definition	  include	  TANs,	  have	  proliferated	  rapidly	  and	  become	  an	  increasingly	  assertive	  presence	  in	  the	  international	  political	  arena	  in	  the	  millennial21	  and	  post-­‐millennial	  years.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  TANs	  are	  widely	  considered	  to	  be,	  collectively,	  an	  important	  and	  well-­‐established	  social	  phenomenon,	  international	  political	  fixture	  and	  power	  base	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998;	  Tarrow,	  2005;	  Castells,	  2004b,	  2007,	  2012;	  Kellner	  2009).	  But	  alternatively,	  there	  are	  compelling	  reasons	  also	  to	  question	  the	  substance	  for	  some	  of	  these	  impressions	  since	  so	  much	  of	  the	  commentary	  and	  assumption	  concerning	  TANs	  is	  based	  on	  what	  TANs,	  as	  dedicated	  advocacy-­‐promoting	  cooperatives,	  strategically	  publicise	  competitively,	  and	  in	  vast	  quantities	  about	  themselves22.	  And,	  furthermore,	  the	  technological	  tools	  and	  techniques	  of	  modern	  communications	  have	  only	  recently	  provided	  the	  means	  for	  TANs	  to	  evolve	  as	  a	  distinctive	  model	  that	  could	  do	  this—	  i.e.	  transnationally	  advertise	  their	  activities,	  attract	  vital	  sustaining	  resources	  and	  regularly	  cite	  concrete	  outcomes	  to	  underscore	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  their	  strategic	  model.	  As	  will	  be	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  case	  studies,	  individual	  TANs	  are	  acutely	  aware	  that	  none	  of	  these	  components	  in	  their	  operating	  model	  could	  exist	  for	  long	  without	  the	  others.	  However,	  considering	  (a)	  the	  comparatively	  more	  structurally	  constrained	  spatial	  horizons	  and	  temporal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  See	  the	  graphic	  depiction	  of	  international	  organisations	  at	  Figure	  6.1.	  
21	  The	  years	  associated,	  approximately,	  with	  the	  ‘millennials’	  —	  the	  generation	  born	  between	  1980	  and	  
the	  millennium	  (OED,	  2014).	  See	  Chapter	  6	  for	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  TAN	  proliferation.	  
22	  This	  assertion	  is	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  It	  is	  axiomatic	  that	  advocacy-­‐prioritising	  organisations	  
typically	  do	  not	  emphasise	  in	  public	  their	  strategy	  shortcomings	  and	  failures.	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differences	  between	  perceptions	  of	  effects	  at	  micro-­‐organisational	  levels	  of	  complex,	  open	  systems	  (vide	  Wight,	  ibid)	  and	  (b)	  actual,	  long-­‐term,	  political	  changes,	  perceived	  effects	  and	  outcomes	  at	  macro-­‐organisational	  levels	  of	  a	  shared	  complex	  system,	  claimed	  knowledge	  of	  concluded	  outcomes	  —	  particularly	  from	  short-­‐term	  interventions	  —	  appear	  to	  be	  both	  unsound	  and	  unlikely.	  In	  other	  words	  (as	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3),	  outcomes	  in	  complex	  systems	  are	  always	  ‘outcomes-­‐in-­‐process’	  and	  credit-­‐claiming	  is	  precarious	  (Geyer	  and	  Pickering,	  2011;	  Wight,	  2013;	  Archer,	  2013;	  Holland,	  2006).	  	  
	  These	  theories	  led	  to	  the	  assumptions	  that	  due	  to	  their	  imperative	  to	  demonstrate	  potency	  and	  continuous	  effectiveness	  both	  within	  and	  without	  their	  organisations,	  TANs	  typically	  claim	  instrumental	  victories	  and	  successes	  that,	  in	  fact,	  cannot	  be	  validated	  due	  to	  the	  ‘credit	  assignment	  problem’	  identified	  by	  complexity	  scholars23	  (Holland,	  2006:2;	  Watts,	  2011:118-­‐122).	  Therefore,	  I	  argue	  that	  depending	  on	  the	  fitness	  of	  their	  constituent	  properties,	  some	  TANs	  are	  able	  to	  assist	  grassroots	  causes	  within	  international	  debates	  more	  effectively	  than	  others.	  If	  aim-­‐achievement	  is	  difficult	  to	  prove	  and	  many	  TANs	  admit	  their	  frustration	  and	  failure,	  then,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  under-­‐achieving	  TANs	  should	  rethink	  their	  strategies24.	  But,	  as	  will	  be	  examined,	  predetermined	  ideological	  commitment	  can	  be	  a	  significant	  constraint	  to	  pragmatic	  re-­‐strategising	  for	  some	  TANs.	  	  However,	  although	  TANs	  as	  a	  genus	  are	  challenging	  to	  define	  and	  are	  commonly	  referred	  to	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  bland	  labels	  for	  civil	  society	  organisations25,	  they	  are	  widely	  assumed	  also	  to	  be	  the	  natural	  offspring	  of	  traditional	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  and	  inheritors	  of	  the	  NGO	  mantle	  associated	  with	  ‘doing	  good’26.	  This	  may	  be	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  proportion	  of	  TANs	  exhibit	  characteristics	  commonly	  associated	  with	  traditional	  NGOs,	  such	  as	  providing	  international	  support	  services	  in	  humanitarian	  aid	  and	  development,	  and	  might	  be	  usefully	  considered	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  See	  Chapter	  6	  for	  a	  discussion.	  Basically,	  ‘credit	  assignment’	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  an	  inherent	  problem	  
arising	  from	  complex,	  evolving	  and	  adaptive	  systems,	  because	  information	  about	  the	  performance	  of	  
agents	  is	  generally	  irregular,	  partial	  and	  resulting	  from	  an	  intricate	  field	  of	  interactions.	  Hence,	  it	  is	  rare	  
to	  have	  information	  available	  post	  hoc	  that	  overtly	  identifies	  the	  ‘stage	  setting’	  options	  that	  influenced	  
events	  and	  apparent	  outcomes	  (Holland,	  2006:2;	  Watts,	  2011:27).	  	  
24	  See	  Ganz	  (2010)	  for	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  need	  for	  activist	  groups	  to	  develop	  strategic	  capacity.	  
25	  See	  Chapter	  5	  for	  more	  on	  the	  array	  of	  confusing	  terminology.	  
26	  See	  Fisher	  (1997)	  and	  Risse	  (2012:432)	  for	  discussions	  on	  the	  association	  of	  NGOs/TANs	  with	  ‘doing	  
good’.	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functional	  terms	  as	  NGO,	  or	  TAN,	  hybrids.	  As	  for	  NGOs	  generally	  (discussed	  in	  Chapter	  5),	  the	  term	  ‘non-­‐governmental	  organisation’	  has	  evolved	  to	  become	  such	  a	  broad,	  catch-­‐all	  term,	  that	  —	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  United	  Nations	  is	  statutorily	  committed	  to	  using	  this	  term	  and	  does	  not	  differentiate	  functionally	  among	  NGOs	  —	  the	  NGO	  label	  is	  now	  almost	  meaningless	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  connote	  the	  essential	  characteristics	  concerning	  what	  NGOs	  are,	  and	  are	  not	  (apart	  from	  their	  nongovernment-­‐ness),	  and	  what	  they	  do.	  But	  despite	  these	  unexplainable	  qualities,	  NGOs	  en	  bloc	  are	  widely	  perceived	  in	  the	  advanced	  democracies	  of	  the	  global	  North	  as	  comparatively	  more	  trustworthy	  ‘moral	  agents’,	  ‘norm-­‐promoting	  underdog[s]’	  against	  more	  powerful	  forces	  and	  information	  providing	  ‘neutral	  experts’,	  than	  elected	  governments	  (Edelman,	  2012;	  The	  Economist,	  2014;	  Risse,	  2010,	  289-­‐292;	  Ron,	  Cooley	  and	  Rodgers,	  2005).	  Consequently,	  this	  thesis	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  while	  all	  TANs	  are	  technically	  NGOs	  in	  regard	  to	  their	  social	  sector	  status,	  not	  all	  NGOs	  are	  TANs,	  and	  that	  these	  are	  key	  issues	  for	  how	  we	  might	  think	  about	  them	  —	  and,	  moreover,	  how	  international	  institutions	  might,	  and	  do,	  engage	  with	  them	  and	  how	  they	  function	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system.	  For	  this	  reason,	  I	  occasionally	  refer	  in	  the	  text	  to	  NGOs/TANs,	  where	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  support	  a	  claim	  that	  a	  reference	  applies	  exclusively	  to	  TANs.	  	  Therefore,	  I	  submit	  that	  understanding	  the	  advocacy	  function	  of	  transnational	  
advocacy	  networks,	  rather	  than	  focusing	  solely	  on	  the	  contentious	  political	  issues	  on	  which	  they	  campaign,	  is	  the	  primary	  key	  to	  understanding	  their	  international	  place	  and	  function.	  Underpinning	  this	  argument	  is	  the	  premise	  that	  adversarial	  strategies	  do	  not	  work	  for	  building	  relationships	  and	  co-­‐operative,	  productive	  engagements	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  the	  international	  arena	  —	  it	  being	  difficult	  to	  enlist	  the	  cooperation	  of	  countries	  you	  have	  just	  vilified	  globally;	  just	  as	  it	  is	  inadvisable	  for	  a	  pilot	  to	  bail	  out	  over	  an	  area	  he	  has	  just	  bombed27.	  This	  study	  also	  looks	  at	  whether	  TANs	  whose	  internal	  imperatives	  and	  dogma	  preclude	  the	  possibility	  of	  compromise,	  such	  as	  rights	  advocates,	  appear	  most	  hamstrung,	  and	  therefore	  less	  effective	  in	  deliberative	  contexts:	  unable	  to	  accommodate	  the	  opposing	  views	  of	  others,	  or	  to	  offer	  concessions	  on	  their	  own,	  as	  argued	  by	  Ignatieff	  (2001:20)	  and	  Brown	  (2008:	  510-­‐519).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Apocryphally	  attributed	  to	  US	  Air	  Force	  training	  advice.	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Argumentation	  and	  hypotheses	  This	  thesis	  attempts	  to	  shed	  analytical	  light	  on	  the	  ideology-­‐driven	  strategic	  framing	  of	  international	  political	  issues	  by	  TANs,	  which	  are	  widely	  claimed	  by	  TANs	  to	  be	  instrumental	  in	  international	  policy	  transformations.	  	  However,	  negative	  side	  effects	  and	  unintended	  consequences	  are	  also	  features	  of	  advocacy	  projects.	  A	  fundamental	  consideration	  with	  political	  issue	  framing	  is	  that	  (a)	  intended	  audiences	  should	  be	  accurately	  identified	  and	  (b)	  the	  issues	  framed	  for	  those	  audiences	  in	  ways	  that	  resonate	  with	  different	  degrees	  of	  expertise	  and	  information	  needs	  (Broom	  and	  Sha,	  2013:	  291-­‐293,	  323).	  This	  is	  a	  challenging	  area	  of	  communications	  practice.	  Whether	  TANs	  are	  generally	  effective	  in	  meeting	  this	  challenge	  is	  examined.	  These	  arguments	  are	  summarised	  in	  the	  following	  hypothesis,	  which	  is	  the	  first	  of	  five	  propositions,	  or	  themes,	  to	  be	  explored.	  It	  posits	  that:	  
	  H1:	  	  Contemporary	  TANs	  are	  an	  important	  NGO	  variant	  in	  international	  politics	  that	  
have	  unprecedented	  properties	  and	  powers	  emerging	  from	  their	  advocacy	  
communications,	  which	  are	  typically	  neglected	  in	  politics	  theorising.	  	  	  Further	  flagged	  for	  examination	  was	  a	  body	  of	  primary	  and	  secondary	  literature	  and	  discourses	  that	  suggest	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  institutions	  have	  a	  troubled	  interface	  with	  a	  proportion	  of	  modern	  TAN-­‐type	  NGOs.	  It	  was	  also	  noted	  that	  the	  differentiating	  communicative	  properties	  that	  TANs	  appeared	  to	  possess	  to	  varying	  degrees,	  could	  significantly	  influence	  the	  place,	  function	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  A	  sense	  of	  this	  argument	  is	  captured	  in	  the	  second	  hypothesis:	  	  H2:	  The	  international	  system	  is	  struggling	  to	  accommodate	  TANs	  and	  the	  elements	  of	  
the	  international	  institutions	  have	  a	  distinctively	  troubled	  interface	  with	  modern	  
TAN-­type	  NGOs.	  	  
	  In	  sharp	  contrast	  to	  the	  adversarial	  strategies	  typically	  associated	  with	  some	  TAN	  activism,	  transnational	  interactions	  in	  most	  other	  spheres	  of	  globalising	  human	  activity,	  whether	  commercial,	  political	  or	  social,	  emphasise	  relationship-­‐building	  (especially	  the	  fostering	  of	  mutual	  trust,	  respect	  and	  understanding)	  and	  conflict	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calming.	  Thucydidean	  theory28,	  arguably	  the	  foundational	  proposition	  in	  International	  Relations,	  appeared	  to	  offer	  further	  strong	  support	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  a	  barrier.	  With	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  international	  system	  to	  accommodate	  greater	  numbers	  of	  non-­‐state	  entities,	  therefore,	  Thucydidean	  theory	  nonetheless	  appears	  to	  apply	  as	  equally	  to	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  international	  politics	  as	  to	  state	  actors.	  In	  this	  situation,	  the	  results-­‐oriented	  and	  urgency	  imperatives	  of	  contemporary	  TAN	  advocacy	  appear	  to	  constitute	  additional	  impediments	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  collaborative	  outcomes	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  This	  was	  tested	  by	  the	  hypothesis:	  	  H3:	  The	  adversarial	  advocacy	  strategies	  adopted	  by	  some	  TANs	  constitute	  a	  barrier	  
to	  them	  achieving	  their	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  policy-­making	  environment.	  	  	  I	  develop	  the	  view	  that	  a	  complex	  realist	  philosophical	  and	  methodological	  approach	  had	  exemplary	  merit	  in	  approaching	  the	  subject	  area	  and	  primary	  research	  question	  of	  the	  thesis.	  Firstly,	  by	  enabling	  me	  to	  conceptualise	  the	  ontology	  of	  the	  international	  system	  and	  a	  category	  of	  international	  political	  relationships	  constituted	  on	  different	  scales	  of	  complexity,	  it	  provided	  an	  overarching	  conceptual	  framework	  that	  (a)	  reclaimed	  macro-­‐structural	  analysis	  as	  a	  first-­‐stage	  research	  approach	  to	  complex	  social	  relationships	  and	  (b)	  appeared	  also	  to	  overcome	  the	  inherent	  difficulties	  in	  explaining	  social	  tensions	  caused	  by	  hidden	  structural	  barriers	  and	  consequent	  capacity	  deficits	  in	  micro-­‐macro	  situations.	  Secondly,	  complex	  realism	  was	  seen	  as	  capable	  of	  deepening	  and	  broadening	  our	  understanding	  of	  this	  emerging	  political	  phenomenon.	  By	  adding	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  advocacy	  communication	  properties	  of	  TANs,	  I	  surmised	  that	  a	  richer	  understanding	  of	  TAN	  outcomes	  would	  become	  more	  evident	  than	  a	  single	  focus	  on	  their	  normative	  political	  concerns	  would	  allow.	  This	  feature,	  I	  argue,	  is	  a	  more	  socially	  equitable	  means	  of	  understanding	  this	  subject	  matter.	  This	  led	  to	  the	  fourth	  hypothesis:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  This	  thesis	  suggests	  that	  the	  adversarial	  postures	  frequently	  associated	  with	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  
actors	  engaged	  in	  international	  politics	  exemplify	  Thucydides’s	  warning	  that	  belief	  in	  the	  inevitability	  of	  
conflict	  can	  become	  self-­‐fulfilling.	  Each	  side,	  convinced	  that	  it	  will	  end	  up	  going	  to	  battle	  with	  the	  other	  
prepares	  itself	  militarily,	  which	  is	  then	  read	  by	  the	  other	  side	  as	  confirmation	  of	  its	  worst	  fears	  (Waltz,	  
1979:72,	  105).	  I	  posit,	  therefore,	  that	  the	  2,500-­‐year-­‐old	  insights	  of	  the	  Greek	  historian	  and	  classical	  
realist	  concerning	  inter-­‐polity	  relationships	  perennially	  shaped	  by	  degrees	  of	  distrust,	  remain	  highly	  
relevant	  in	  contemporary	  international	  political	  engagements	  between	  states	  and	  between	  states	  and	  
non-­‐state	  entities.	  See	  Thucydides	  (2009:	  xiv-­‐xv).	  Also	  Nye	  (2011:179)	  for	  his	  use	  of	  similar	  wording	  in	  
applying	  Thucydides	  to	  contemporary	  world	  politics.	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  H4:	  	  	  A	  complex	  realist	  approach	  has	  exemplary	  merit	  in	  approaching	  the	  subject	  area	  
and	  primary	  research	  question	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  	  The	  initial	  data	  also	  suggested	  the	  premise	  that	  the	  funding	  models	  TANs	  adopt	  have	  a	  determinative	  effect	  on	  their	  advocacy	  strategies	  and	  that	  this,	  in	  turn,	  has	  a	  determinative	  effect	  on	  each	  individual	  TAN’s	  place	  and	  function	  in	  the	  international	  system	  and	  on	  its	  effectiveness	  in	  achieving	  its	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  This	  led	  to	  the	  fifth	  hypothesis,	  namely,	  that:	  	  	  H5:	  The	  funding	  models	  TANs	  adopt	  have	  a	  determinative	  effect	  on	  their	  advocacy	  	  	  
strategies.	  	  Thus	  equipped,	  I	  then	  interrogated	  the	  data	  further	  for	  any	  evidence	  that	  would	  support	  these	  hypotheses.	  The	  Evidence	  Tracing	  Log	  used	  for	  testing	  the	  data	  set	  is	  included	  at	  Annex	  1.	  	  	  Of	  course,	  one	  might	  ask:	  do	  these	  arguments	  and	  hypotheses	  matter?	  Why	  should	  we	  take	  a	  critical	  analytical	  position	  on	  NGOs,	  or	  TANs?	  As	  this	  dissertation	  intends	  to	  show,	  TANs	  have	  been	  assessed	  from	  many	  vantage	  points29.	  However,	  many	  of	  these	  perspectives,	  if	  not	  most,	  have	  concentrated	  on	  examining	  individual	  TANs	  and	  have	  been	  noticeably	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  organisations	  studied	  and,	  conversely,	  noticeably	  less	  sympathetic	  to	  their	  political	  opponents,	  which	  I	  consider	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  sufficiently	  objective	  basis	  on	  which	  to	  analyse	  political	  relationships.	  By	  way	  of	  contrast,	  I	  have	  taken	  a	  macroscopic	  ontological	  approach	  that	  is	  less	  interested	  in	  the	  self-­‐understandings	  of	  individual	  TANs	  but	  enables	  me	  to	  take	  a	  perspective	  of	  ‘flying	  above	  them’,	  observing	  salient	  features	  and	  patterns	  and	  presenting	  evidence	  to	  show	  where	  they	  fit	  in	  and	  how	  effective	  they	  have	  been.	  	  
Operationalisation	  of	  the	  research	  strategy	  and	  approach	  The	  first	  step	  in	  operationalising	  the	  research	  project	  was	  to	  develop	  the	  primary	  research	  question	  by	  an	  iterative	  process	  of	  refinement	  while	  undertaking	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  literature	  review.	  This	  enabled	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  key	  actors,	  issues,	  debates	  and	  further,	  more	  focused,	  literature,	  theory	  and	  sources.	  The	  next	  stages	  were	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  See	  my	  list	  of	  analytical	  approaches	  in	  Chapter	  2.	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the	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  ontology	  of	  the	  complex,	  multidimensional	  problem	  space;	  the	  choice	  of	  a	  suitably	  eclectic	  but	  controlled	  epistemological	  approach30,	  theoretical	  lenses	  and	  appropriate	  methodological	  framework;	  and	  the	  development	  of	  five	  grounded	  hypotheses	  for	  testing	  the	  empirical	  data.	  	  	  Importantly,	  the	  lack	  of	  consistency	  and	  precision	  in	  the	  literature	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  identification	  of	  essential	  characteristics	  and	  labeling	  of	  TANs,	  led	  me	  to	  develop	  the	  original	  referent	  model	  for	  the	  TAN	  typology	  that	  I	  identify	  as	  being	  distinctively	  different	  and	  analytically	  important	  from	  the	  NGO	  model	  traditionally	  associated	  with	  civil	  society	  political	  campaigning	  (presented	  at	  Figure	  6.2).	  Moreover,	  these	  patterns	  provided	  ways	  of	  conceptualising	  the	  connections	  between	  micro	  and	  macro	  situations	  and	  explaining	  the	  proliferation	  of	  TANs	  and	  their	  greatly	  disparate	  fortunes	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  From	  these	  results	  I	  was	  able	  to	  form	  my	  premise	  that	  political	  theory	  alone	  is	  insufficient	  to	  explain	  these	  effects.	  	  
Chapter	  outline	  and	  content	  summary	  The	  chapter	  outline	  follows	  a	  standard	  academic	  logic	  sequence	  for	  a	  social	  science	  thesis31.	  This	  structure	  enables	  a	  logical	  presentation	  of	  the	  data	  and	  analysis	  while	  sequentially	  building	  the	  thesis	  towards	  the	  conclusions	  in	  Chapter	  10.	  The	  primary	  research	  question	  is	  kept	  active,	  while	  the	  five	  hypotheses,	  or	  themes,	  are	  used	  to	  interrogate	  the	  data.	  These	  themes	  are	  woven	  throughout	  the	  chapters,	  providing	  a	  consistent	  focus	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  argumentation	  and	  are	  brought	  together	  and	  reprised	  in	  the	  concluding	  chapter.	  The	  narrative	  line	  of	  presentation	  adopts	  the	  following	  logic	  sequence:	  	  
Chapter	  2:	  The	  Literature	  is	  a	  straightforward	  review	  of	  the	  salient	  texts	  that	  inform	  the	  study	  and	  provided	  its	  academic	  context,	  as	  well	  as	  identifying	  any	  omissions	  and	  	  out-­‐of-­‐field	  interpretations	  of	  communications	  matters	  by	  political	  scholars,	  which	  I	  took	  to	  be	  knowledge	  gaps	  in	  the	  political	  literature,	  there	  being	  very	  few	  texts	  that	  synthesise	  the	  two	  fields	  using	  appropriate	  scientific	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  I	  emphasise	  that	  this	  consideration	  was	  controlled,	  rather	  than	  parsimonious.	  Guided	  by	  complexity	  
insights	  (see	  Geyer	  and	  Rihani,	  2010:117	  and	  Chapter	  3)	  and	  by	  Giddens	  (1984:xviii-­‐xxxiii),	  and	  Wight’s	  
eclectic	  epistemological	  approach	  (2006:	  241-­‐242)	  and	  others,	  I	  see	  little	  value	  in	  artificial,	  self-­‐imposed,	  
theoretical	  and	  methodological	  constraints	  in	  investigating	  complex,	  macro-­‐sociological,	  subject	  matter	  
such	  as	  that	  suggested	  by	  the	  primary	  research	  question	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
31	  Adoption	  of	  this	  framework	  is	  guided	  by	  Dunleavy	  (2003:	  60-­‐62).	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theoretical	  analysis.	  The	  literature	  is	  principally	  cached	  within	  the	  	  core	  field	  of	  contentious	  international	  politics	  but	  encompasses	  additional	  bodies	  of	  literature	  from	  both	  international	  relations	  and	  policy	  studies,	  and	  political	  advocacy	  communications.	  	  
Chapter	  3:	  Theoretical	  Framework	  and	  Methodology	  explains	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  research	  project	  was	  approached	  and	  carried	  out.	  It	  presents	  and	  discusses	  the	  conceptual	  approach	  via	  complex	  realism,	  with	  additional	  theoretical	  lenses	  from	  the	  social	  science	  paradigms	  of	  Politics	  and	  Communications,	  the	  latter	  introduced	  to	  shed	  new	  light	  on	  the	  political	  and	  relational	  aspects	  of	  the	  complex	  interface	  between	  TANs	  and	  the	  international	  system.	  	  	  
Chapters	  4:	  The	  United	  Nations	  and	  5:	  The	  UN	  Interface	  with	  Civil	  Society	  	  commence	  the	  macroscopic	  discussion	  of	  the	  international	  system’s	  relational	  interface	  by	  introducing	  the	  key	  actors:	  the	  United	  Nations	  Organisation	  and	  NGOs	  involved	  in	  international	  politics.	  Firstly,	  Chapter	  4	  focuses	  on	  the	  organisation’s	  salient	  characteristics	  and	  concerns.	  Chapter	  5	  discusses	  the	  UN’s	  relationship	  with	  NGOs	  generally	  (since	  the	  world	  body	  does	  not	  differentiate	  between	  typologies	  of	  NGO).	  It	  then	  examines	  the	  context,	  or	  interface,	  in	  which	  relationships	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  occur,	  focusing	  particularly	  on	  the	  statutory	  arrangements	  that	  the	  UN	  makes	  for	  engaging	  with	  NGOs.	  	  	  
Chapter	  6:	  Transnational	  Advocacy	  Networks	  narrows	  the	  macroscopic	  perspective	  and	  presents	  a	  centerpiece	  portrait	  of	  the	  NGO	  variant	  model	  known	  as	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks.	  I	  present	  my	  referent	  template	  to	  connote	  the	  TAN	  model	  used	  in	  developing	  the	  thesis.	  This	  model	  emphasises	  eight	  important	  points	  of	  difference	  from	  traditional-­‐model	  NGOs,	  which	  the	  thesis	  asserts	  contemporary	  TANs	  possess	  to	  varying	  degrees.	  The	  chapter	  then	  applies	  socio-­‐political	  lenses	  to	  examine	  the	  contexts	  in	  which	  TANs	  have	  emerged	  and	  the	  political	  issues	  they	  adopt.	  Communications	  lenses	  are	  applied	  to	  these	  data	  to	  explain	  the	  strategic	  ways	  in	  which	  TANs	  typically	  express	  themselves.	  	  
Chapters	  7:	  Greenpeace	  International,	  8:	  Oxfam	  International	  and	  9:	  Human	  Rights	  
Watch	  are	  case	  studies	  of	  three	  iconic	  TANs	  that	  provide	  the	  grounded,	  micro-­‐
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sociological	  testing	  and	  validation	  of	  the	  macro-­‐sociological	  observations	  presented	  in	  the	  earlier	  chapters.	  In	  each	  case,	  an	  extensive	  data	  set	  was	  analysed	  using	  diachronic	  process	  tracing	  methodology,	  combined	  with	  the	  application	  of	  theoretical	  lenses	  from	  complex	  realism,	  politics	  and	  communications	  studies.	  	  
	  
Chapter	  10:	  Conclusions	  provides	  a	  summation	  of	  the	  salient	  results,	  patterns	  and	  tendencies.	  It	  proposes	  answers	  to	  the	  primary	  research	  question	  and	  hypotheses,	  distills	  the	  analyses	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  and	  presents	  the	  results.	  The	  chapter	  proffers	  the	  author’s	  claims	  to	  new	  knowledge	  and	  identifies	  a	  number	  of	  areas	  for	  further	  research.	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Chapter	  2	  
	  
2.	  The	  Literature	  	  
	  
	  
Everything	  we	  hear	  is	  an	  opinion,	  not	  a	  fact.	  	  
Everything	  we	  see	  is	  a	  perspective,	  not	  the	  truth.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Marcus	  Aurelius	  Antoninus	  (AD	  121-­‐180)	  
	  
	  	  
2.1	  Introduction	  	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  present	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  fields	  of	  literature	  that	  relate	  to	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  PRQ	  and	  five	  research	  hypotheses.	  This	  thesis	  is	  situated	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  three	  principal	  literatures:	  (1)	  contentious	  international	  politics;	  (2)	  international	  relations	  and	  policy	  studies	  (particularly	  the	  ‘globalisation’	  debates	  concerning	  the	  role	  and	  power	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  in	  international	  institutional	  processes	  and	  political	  transformations);	  and	  (3)	  political	  advocacy	  communications	  in	  the	  Information	  Age.	  This	  cross-­‐disciplinary	  combination	  reflects	  the	  complex,	  multi-­‐dimensional	  nature	  of	  the	  research	  question;	  the	  plurality	  of	  academic	  disciplines	  interested	  in	  TANs32;	  and	  widespread	  understandings	  that	  the	  politics/communication/media/technology	  nexus	  is	  now	  well	  established.33	  	  	  This	  literature	  review	  covers	  work	  written	  in	  (or	  translated	  into)	  English	  and	  published,	  chiefly,	  as	  academic	  texts	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  and	  in	  academic	  journals.	  These	  sources	  provided	  leads	  into	  the	  socio-­‐historical	  and	  international	  institutional	  contexts	  in	  which	  TANs	  have	  emerged	  and	  some	  benchmark	  academic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  During	  this	  study	  I	  encountered	  scholars	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  disciplines	  engaged	  in	  studying	  
transnational	  activism	  and	  TANs,	  each	  from	  their	  own	  distinctive	  vantage	  points.	  Mostly	  accommodated	  
in	  the	  social	  sciences	  and	  humanities,	  these	  disciplines	  included	  social	  studies,	  politics/IR,	  security	  
studies,	  human	  geography,	  anthropology	  and	  history.	  	  	  
33	  For	  example	  in	  texts	  by	  Castells,	  2007	  (see	  also	  Castells	  2004a,	  2004b,	  2007,	  2009	  and	  2012);	  
Chandler,	  2005,	  2007,	  2009;	  Bob,	  2005;	  Hindman,	  2009;	  Morazov,	  2011;	  2013;	  Prakash	  and	  Gugerty,	  
2010;	  Risse,	  2010;	  Bob,	  2010:	  133-­‐135;	  and	  Barakso,	  2010:155-­‐160).	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insights,	  especially	  those	  emanating	  from	  the	  developed	  Western	  democracies,	  about	  what	  these	  NGO	  variants	  might	  mean	  and	  how	  we	  might	  think	  about	  them.	  Importantly,	  this	  reviewing	  process	  showed	  that,	  despite	  their	  increasing	  numbers	  and	  prominence	  in	  mass	  media	  accounts	  of	  their	  activities,	  not	  least	  via	  their	  own	  publicity	  efforts,	  throughout	  the	  academic	  political	  literature	  TANs	  are	  generally	  considered	  to	  be	  an	  ill-­‐defined,	  perplexing	  and	  inadequately-­‐theorised	  social	  phenomenon	  (Tarrow,	  1998b;	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:5;	  Risse,	  2002:255;	  Diani	  and	  McAdam,	  2003:1).	  	  Although	  distinguishing	  rather	  than	  conflating	  the	  literatures	  was	  necessary,	  it	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  to	  suggest	  that	  they	  are	  separated	  by	  discrete	  boundaries,	  since	  they	  are	  as	  interwoven	  as	  the	  complex,	  real-­‐world	  social	  fabrics	  they	  typically	  portray.	  Thus,	  I	  posit	  that	  the	  three	  fields	  of	  literature	  are	  interconnected,	  although	  they	  each	  display	  distinguishing	  characteristics	  and	  perspectives	  that	  partially	  illuminate	  the	  research	  problem34.	  For	  example,	  texts	  relating	  to	  hard-­‐fought,	  civil	  society	  campaigns	  for	  social	  justice	  tend	  to	  concentrate	  on	  pivotal	  historical	  events,	  conflictual	  relationships,	  concern	  group	  development35,	  documented	  reactions	  and	  causal	  mechanisms,	  and	  are	  typically	  based	  on	  constructivist	  investigations	  among	  situated	  actors	  and	  focused	  on	  individuals	  and	  their	  personal	  experiences	  (e.g.	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:4;	  Tarrow,	  2005:20;	  Finnemore,	  and	  Sikkink,	  2001).	  Conversely,	  the	  literatures	  taking	  a	  macroscopic	  perspective	  on	  international	  politics	  and	  relations,	  governance	  and	  globalisation	  —	  which,	  today,	  involve	  many	  thousands	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations36	  —	  tend	  to	  take	  a	  more	  detached,	  objective	  approach,	  concentrating	  largely	  on	  comparative	  socio-­‐economic	  matters,	  political	  and	  historical	  contexts,	  institutional	  processes	  and	  collective	  experiences.	  They	  typically	  offer	  macroscopic	  perspectives	  based	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  A	  suitable	  analogy,	  I	  suggest,	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Saxe’s	  popular	  verse	  ‘The	  Blind	  men	  and	  the	  Elephant’,	  
based	  on	  an	  Indian	  legend	  about	  six	  blind	  men	  who	  each	  obtain	  a	  limited	  understanding	  of	  what	  an	  
elephant	  is	  by	  feeling	  only	  separate	  parts	  of	  the	  animal	  (Saxe,	  1873:259-­‐260).	  	  
35	  This	  thesis	  uses	  the	  terms	  ‘concern	  group’	  or	  ‘community	  of	  interest’	  as	  synonyms	  for	  the	  ubiquitous	  
term	  ‘social	  movement’,	  unless	  referring	  to	  works	  in	  which	  other	  writers	  have	  used	  that	  term	  ‘social	  
movements’.	  The	  rationale	  is	  that	  in	  the	  present	  era	  of	  globe-­‐spanning	  digital	  media,	  communities	  of	  
interest	  may	  be	  often	  regarded	  as	  ‘connected’	  in	  networks,	  rather	  than	  belonging	  to	  ‘collectivities’	  in	  
the	  traditional	  sense	  associated	  with	  social	  movements.	  I	  posit	  that	  the	  term	  ‘social	  movement’	  in	  
Politics	  study	  has	  connotations	  of	  geographically	  localised,	  physically	  realised	  collective	  action,	  and	  is	  
imprecise	  if	  used	  to	  explain	  the	  otherwise	  underspecified	  relationships	  between	  a	  multitude	  of	  
politically	  concerned	  individuals	  connected	  only	  by	  the	  Internet.	  	  	  	  
36	  For	  example,	  see	  Figures	  5.1	  and.	  6.1	  for	  graphs	  showing	  the	  growth	  of	  NGOs	  and	  INGOs	  in	  the	  
international	  arena.	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quantitative	  data	  analyses	  (e.g.	  Held	  and	  McGrew,	  2002;	  Scholte,	  2000,	  2002,	  2005;	  Wilkinson,	  2005;	  Weiss	  and	  Thakur,	  2010;	  Willetts,	  2011).	  	  	  As	  the	  forces	  driving	  globalisation37	  stimulated	  greater	  opportunities	  for	  cross-­‐national	  comparative	  research,	  scholars	  focusing	  on	  trans-­‐,	  or	  multi-­‐national,	  political	  activism	  have	  often	  combined	  these	  two	  approaches,	  correlating	  the	  global	  and	  the	  local	  aspects	  of	  their	  study,	  in	  order	  to	  offer	  a	  unifying	  conceptual	  framework	  in	  which	  causal	  mechanisms	  might	  be	  postulated.	  Examples	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  pioneering	  study	  on	  TANs	  (1998),	  and	  in	  texts	  by	  Imig	  and	  Tarrow	  (2001);	  Diani	  and	  McAdam	  (2003);	  Melucci,	  1996;	  Edwards	  and	  Gaventa	  (2001);	  Dakroury	  et	  al	  (2009);	  and	  Khagram	  et	  al,	  2002).	  These	  works	  commonly	  reveal	  a	  research	  format	  in	  which	  a	  selection	  of	  case	  studies	  based	  on	  indigenous	  protest	  groups	  in	  diverse	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  are	  offered	  as	  a	  representation	  of	  global	  citizens	  on	  the	  move	  and	  global	  social	  transformations.	  However,	  while	  this	  literature	  provides	  the	  core	  foundational	  data	  for	  studying	  the	  growing	  phenomenon	  of	  TANs	  in	  international	  politics,	  I	  will	  argue	  later	  that	  first-­‐stage,	  ‘bottom	  up’	  epistemologies	  do	  not,	  in	  fact,	  do	  the	  work	  of	  fully	  explaining	  the	  ontology	  of	  international	  system	  relationships	  with	  TANs,	  nor	  provide	  unifying	  frameworks	  for	  examining	  them	  —	  leaving	  important	  areas	  still	  to	  be	  addressed.	  	  	  The	  third	  literature	  used	  —	  advocacy	  communications	  in	  the	  Information	  Age	  —	  tends	  to	  reflect	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  approaches	  from	  both	  the	  natural	  and	  social	  sciences,	  especially	  segments	  devoted	  to	  new	  technologies	  and	  endeavours	  to	  understand	  what	  mass	  self-­‐communication38	  might	  mean	  for	  globe-­‐spanning	  political	  proselytising	  and	  generating	  political	  pressure	  and	  international	  influence	  (e.g.	  Castells,	  2004a,	  2004b,	  2007,	  2009,	  2012;	  Bob,	  2005,	  2012;	  Morazov,	  2011,	  2013;	  Melucci,	  1996;	  Negroponte,	  1995;	  Hindman,	  2009:3-­‐19;	  Chandler,	  2007,	  2009).	  Indeed,	  this	  body	  of	  literature	  sees	  new	  texts	  arriving	  regularly,	  typically	  from	  the	  U.S.	  academic	  and	  popular	  quasi-­‐academic	  publishing	  houses,	  each	  attempting	  to	  explain	  the	  impact	  on	  societies	  of	  new	  information	  communications	  technologies,	  especially	  the	  Internet	  and	  its	  instrumentality	  in	  mobilising	  social	  action.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Here	  I	  refer	  especially	  to	  the	  unprecedented	  growth	  of	  affordable	  communications	  technologies	  and	  
transportation	  links	  associated	  with	  the	  Information	  Age.	  
38	  This	  term	  is	  used	  by	  the	  eminent	  communications	  scholar	  Manuel	  Castells	  (2007).	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2.2	  Convergence	  of	  three	  literatures	  
2.2.1	  Contentious	  international	  politics	  	  Although	  it	  may	  be	  a	  truism	  that	  all	  politics	  is	  by	  definition	  contentious,	  the	  term	  ‘contentious	  international	  politics’	  is	  a	  recognisable	  term	  that	  has	  been	  applied	  to	  a	  particular	  category	  of	  political	  literature.	  This	  literature	  chronicles	  the	  border-­‐transcending	  political	  struggles	  and	  issues	  of	  social	  movements	  and	  civil	  society	  organisations,	  including	  many	  NGOs/TANs,	  and	  is	  typically	  associated	  with	  the	  work	  of	  Tarrow,	  Tilly,	  McAdam,	  della	  Porta,	  Diani,	  Melucci,	  Sikkink,	  Keck,	  Finnemore39,	  et	  al.	  	  The	  field	  to	  which	  these	  scholars	  contribute	  is	  dynamic:	  being	  constantly	  energised	  by	  the	  clashing	  of	  ideological	  movements	  with	  worldviews	  aimed	  at	  remodeling	  the	  world	  order	  according	  to	  their	  political	  interpretations	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:1-­‐2;	  Florini,	  2000:7).	  Owing	  to	  the	  array	  of	  terms	  commonly	  used	  to	  identify	  non-­‐state	  elements	  engaging	  in	  this	  political	  domain40	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  understand	  how	  research	  in	  the	  long-­‐established	  field	  of	  ‘social	  movements’	  has	  evolved	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  to	  accommodate	  unprecedented	  forms	  of	  transnational	  and	  deterritorialised	  civil	  society	  activism,	  which	  includes	  contemporary	  TANs.	  Nevertheless,	  many	  scholars	  researching	  in	  this	  field	  apply	  the	  term	  ‘social	  movements’	  to	  networks	  that	  also	  fit	  the	  more	  precise	  criteria	  for	  TANs	  developed	  later.	  Tarrow	  explains	  (2005:24)	  that	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  scholars	  of	  social	  movements	  have	  expanded	  their	  scope	  of	  interest	  from	  local	  and	  national	  to	  international	  forms	  of	  contention,	  and	  from	  ‘movements’	  to	  NGOs	  and	  international	  organisations,	  activist	  networks	  and	  transnational	  labour	  activism.	  There	  is	  a	  compelling	  suggestion	  in	  Tarrow’s	  overview,	  as	  in	  his	  comments	  on	  the	  methodological	  challenges	  entailed	  in	  this	  research	  (Klandermans,	  Staggenborg	  and	  Tarrow,	  2002:339),	  that	  contentious	  international	  politics	  might	  arguably	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  sociological	  paradigm	  that	  is	  trying	  to	  deal	  with	  unfamiliar	  forces	  driving	  transnationalism	  and	  shifting	  focal	  points.	  Therefore,	  while	  acknowledging	  the	  necessity	  of	  reviewing	  the	  foundational	  literature	  on	  pre-­‐90s	  social	  movements	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Although	  Sikkink,	  Keck	  and	  Finnemore	  are	  also	  associated	  with	  international	  relations	  and	  human	  
rights	  issues,	  I	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  considerable	  overlap	  in	  these	  interest	  areas	  and	  that	  they	  have	  each	  
made	  significant	  contributions	  to	  the	  contentious	  international	  politics	  literature.	  
40	  See	  Section	  5.3.1	  for	  a	  list	  of	  these	  terms	  and	  this	  discussion.	  	  
	   31	  
for	  tracing	  the	  emergence	  of	  TANs	  and	  their	  issues,	  it	  is	  now	  largely	  outdated	  in	  regard	  to	  addressing	  the	  key	  questions	  and	  hypotheses	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  This,	  I	  argue,	  leaves	  this	  sector	  of	  the	  political	  literature	  with	  a	  significant	  lacuna	  due	  to	  its	  inability	  to	  provide	  us	  with	  sophisticated,	  qualitative	  and	  scientifically	  sound	  understandings	  of	  (a)	  the	  relationships	  between	  the	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  elements	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system,	  particularly	  those	  involving	  TANs,	  seen	  as	  newly	  emergent	  participants	  in	  international	  politics41;	  and	  (b),	  the	  international	  political	  impacts	  of	  unprecedented	  levels	  of	  human	  interconnectivity	  afforded	  by	  worldwide	  digital	  communications	  technologies	  and	  tools,	  as	  utilised	  by	  TANs.	  Furthermore,	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  political	  phenomenon,	  which	  is	  defined	  by	  its	  communicative	  functions,	  has	  been	  identified	  by	  prominent	  scholars	  in	  the	  paradigm	  —	  but	  yet,	  as	  I	  will	  show,	  this	  literature	  is	  inclined	  to	  focus	  on	  an	  array	  of	  NGO/TAN	  aspects42	  and	  significant	  gaps	  remain	  in	  regard	  to	  critical	  analysis	  of	  TAN	  communications	  functions.	  The	  hypothesis-­‐formation43	  was	  thus	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  Castells’s	  assertion	  (2013:15):	  ‘[…]	  the	  networked	  social	  movements	  of	  the	  digital	  age	  represent	  a	  new	  species	  of	  social	  movement’.	  And	  by	  Tarrow’s	  finding	  (2005:136):	  	  “[…]	  the	  internet	  is	  more	  than	  a	  form	  of	  communication;	  it	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  a	  new	  movement	  form’.	  	  For	  these	  reasons,	  this	  thesis	  draws	  mainly	  on	  the	  literature	  on	  contentious	  international	  politics	  published	  since	  the	  widespread	  public	  adoption	  of	  ICTs	  	  —	  
i.e.	  between	  the	  late	  ‘90s	  and	  the	  present	  day.	  However,	  even	  this	  core	  literature	  proved	  inadequate,	  by	  itself,	  for	  the	  task	  of	  investigating	  the	  place	  and	  function	  of	  TANs	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system,	  or	  their	  effectiveness	  in	  achieving	  their	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  Thus,	  this	  thesis	  aims	  to	  make	  its	  main	  contribution	  to	  the	  contentious	  international	  political	  literature	  by	  helping	  to	  both	  fill-­‐in	  these	  gaps	  and	  offer	  alternative	  ways	  to	  think	  about	  TANs	  and	  some	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  See	  Chapter	  6	  for	  my	  examination	  of	  TANs	  as	  newly	  emergent	  actors	  in	  international	  politics.	  
42	  Towards	  the	  end	  of	  this	  chapter	  (Section	  2.2.4),	  I	  provide	  a	  list	  of	  25	  research	  approaches	  that	  I	  
identified	  in	  the	  combined	  literatures.	  
43	  This	  was	  factor	  was	  especially	  germane	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  first	  hypothesis	  —	  i.e.	  	  
H1:	  Contemporary	  TANs	  are	  an	  important	  NGO	  variant	  in	  international	  politics	  that	  have	  unprecedented	  
properties	  and	  powers	  emerging	  from	  their	  advocacy	  communications,	  which	  are	  typically	  neglected	  in	  
politics	  theorising.	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emerging	  beliefs	  concerning	  their	  political	  contributions	  and	  effectiveness	  in	  achieving	  their	  international	  aims.	  
	  
International	  politics	  seen	  as	  a	  zone	  of	  clashing	  worldviews	  involving	  TANs	  While	  the	  core	  literature	  underpinning	  this	  thesis	  is	  substantial	  and	  growing	  exponentially,	  it	  mostly	  reflects	  a	  realm	  of	  diverse	  and	  clashing	  worldviews44,	  ideologies	  and	  epistemologies	  that	  are	  focused	  on	  dynamic	  situations	  involving	  contention	  and	  conflict.	  The	  titles	  alone	  are	  a	  reflection	  of	  this	  theme.	  These	  include	  such	  explicitly	  titled	  seminal	  works	  as:	  Activists	  Beyond	  Borders:	  Advocacy	  
Networks	  in	  International	  Politics	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998);	  Dynamics	  of	  Contention	  (McAdam,	  Tarrow	  and	  Tilly,	  2001);	  The	  Politics	  of	  Collective	  Violence	  (Tilly,	  2003);	  
Contentious	  Politics	  (Tilly	  and	  Tarrow,	  2007);	  Transnational	  Protest	  and	  Global	  
Activism	  (della	  Porta	  and	  Tarrow,	  2004);	  The	  New	  Transnational	  Activism	  (Tarrow,	  2005);	  Complexity	  and	  social	  movements:	  Multitudes	  at	  the	  edge	  of	  chaos	  (Chesters	  and	  Welsh,	  2006);	  The	  Marketing	  of	  Rebellion:	  Insurgents,	  Media,	  and	  International	  
Activism	  (Bob,	  2005);	  and	  Networks	  of	  Outrage	  and	  Hope:	  Social	  Movements	  in	  the	  
Internet	  Age	  (Castells,	  2012).	  	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  literature	  and	  discourses	  on	  social	  activism	  on	  the	  world	  stage	  make	  compelling	  scholarship:	  most	  notably	  for	  their	  depictions	  of	  real-­‐world	  dramas,	  high	  tensions	  and	  strong	  emotions	  —	  predominantly	  focusing	  on	  the	  suffering	  and	  struggles	  of	  individuals	  and	  communities.	  Indeed,	  Castells	  observes	  (2013:13):	  ‘	  At	  the	  individual	  level,	  social	  movements	  are	  emotional	  movements’45.	  	  By	  drawing	  attention	  to	  different	  levels	  at	  which	  social	  interactions	  occur	  —	  in	  this	  case	  the	  ‘individual	  level’	  —	  Castells’s	  insight	  is	  valuable	  for	  conceptualising	  the	  social	  stratifications	  encompassed	  by	  the	  thesis:	  each	  analytical	  level,	  I	  suggest,	  presenting	  greater	  concentrations	  of	  competing	  interests:	  extending	  from	  individuals	  to	  groups,	  communities,	  organisations,	  governments	  and	  nations,	  to	  the	  United	  Nations.	  Castells	  also	  informs	  us	  that	  at	  the	  micro-­‐sociological	  level	  of	  analysis,	  social	  movements	  are	  characteristically	  powered	  by	  the	  emotions	  of	  individuals.	  This	  qualitative	  feature	  was	  therefore	  singled	  out	  for	  mapping	  onto	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Wight	  asserts	  that	  ‘Politics	  is	  the	  terrain	  of	  competing	  ontologies’.	  Therefore,	  ‘[P]olitics	  is	  about	  
competing	  visions	  of	  how	  the	  world	  is	  and	  how	  it	  should	  be’	  (2006:2).	  
45	  Castells	  asserts	  that	  it	  is	  the	  organisation	  of	  this	  emotion	  into	  action	  that	  constitutes	  the	  beginning	  of	  
social	  movements.	  In	  his	  colourful	  conceptualisation	  of	  this	  trigger,	  Castells	  declares:	  ‘[…]	  the	  big	  bang	  
of	  social	  movement	  starts	  with	  the	  transformation	  of	  emotion	  into	  action’	  (2013:13).	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the	  data	  set	  in	  order	  to	  test	  its	  presence	  and	  consequences	  in	  TAN	  effectiveness	  and	  relationships	  within	  the	  international	  system.	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  texts	  listed	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  section,	  contemporary	  research	  and	  discourses	  on	  social	  activism	  have	  tended	  to	  foreground	  first-­‐person	  storytelling	  that	  emphasises	  the	  emotional	  dispositions	  of	  individuals	  involved	  in	  collective	  actions	  and	  their	  understandings	  of	  their	  situations	  and	  experiences.	  Moreover,	  I	  suggest,	  this	  mainstream	  research	  model46	  reflects	  two	  powerful	  influences:	  (i)	  constructivist	  epistemology,	  which	  Finnemore	  and	  Sikkink	  (2001)	  claim	  ‘exploded’	  onto	  this	  research	  field	  during	  the	  1990s	  (and	  which	  asserts	  that	  human	  interaction	  is	  shaped	  primarily	  by	  inter-­‐subjective	  understandings);	  and	  (ii)	  methodological	  individualism,	  which	  basically	  claims	  that	  social	  phenomena	  must	  be	  explained	  by	  showing	  how	  they	  result	  from	  individual	  actions,	  which	  in	  turn	  must	  be	  explained	  through	  reference	  to	  the	  intentional	  states	  that	  motivate	  the	  individual	  actors	  (see	  Adler,	  1997;	  Finnemore	  and	  Sikkink,	  2001;	  and	  Heath,	  2011).	  Both	  of	  these	  research	  practices,	  therefore,	  usually	  involve	  researchers	  being	  closely	  involved	  in	  the	  resistance	  struggles	  of	  their	  subjects,	  often	  embedded	  in	  their	  communities,	  in	  order	  to	  win	  trust	  and	  confidences	  and	  gather	  exclusive	  data.	  	  	  Themes	  and	  ideologies	  schools	  in	  the	  area	  of	  contentious	  international	  politics	  were	  accessed	  mainly	  via	  the	  work	  of	  Tarrow,	  Tilly,	  della	  Porta,	  McAdam	  and	  Diani	  (e.g.	  Tarrow,	  1998a,	  1999,	  2001,	  2005;	  Imig	  and	  Tarrow,	  2001;	  McAdam,	  Tarrow	  and	  Tilly,	  2001;	  Tarrow	  and	  McAdam,	  2005;	  della	  Porta	  and	  Tarrow,	  2005;	  Diani	  and	  McAdam,	  2003;	  Tilly,	  2003,	  2004;	  Tilly	  and	  Tarrow,	  2007;	  and	  Melucci,	  1996).	  The	  perspective	  development	  seen	  in	  Tarrow’s	  work	  was	  especially	  valuable	  for	  tracing	  the	  development	  of	  the	  contentious	  international	  politics	  paradigm	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  TANs	  as	  prominent	  actors	  in	  international	  politics.	  From	  situated	  studies	  of	  specific	  protest	  movements	  	  (exemplified	  by	  his	  1967	  study,	  Peasant	  
Communism	  in	  Southern	  Italy),	  Tarrow’s	  work	  traces	  the	  development	  and	  increasing	  transnationalism	  of	  social	  movements	  and	  contentious	  politics	  from	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  While	  agreeing	  with	  Tarrow	  (2005:20)	  that	  three	  competing	  approaches	  have	  dominated	  studies	  in	  
international	  politics	  (neorealism,	  constructivism	  and	  liberal	  institutionalism),	  studies	  of	  transnational	  
social	  movements	  have	  been	  dominated	  by	  constructivist	  approaches	  in	  since	  the	  1980s	  (Adler,	  
2002:95-­‐118;	  Buzan,	  2004:1;	  Brown	  and	  Ainley,	  2005:48;	  Finnemore	  and	  Sikkink,	  2001).	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‘70s	  onwards	  (Tarrow,	  1998a;	  1999;	  2001;	  2005:24).	  As	  his	  subjects	  forged	  coalitions	  and	  networks	  across	  the	  globe,	  chiefly	  since	  the	  1990s,	  Tarrow’s	  research	  became	  increasingly	  global	  and	  macroscopic	  in	  perspective.	  Accordingly,	  his	  approaches	  were	  seen	  to	  become	  more	  theoretically	  eclectic,	  focusing	  on	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  actors	  in	  international	  politics	  and	  on	  processes	  and	  mechanisms	  that	  link	  the	  local	  with	  the	  global	  (2005:24).	  Significantly	  for	  this	  thesis,	  a	  byproduct	  of	  Tarrow’s	  intellectual	  journey	  was	  his	  advancement	  of	  ‘scale	  shift’	  theory	  (posited	  by	  McAdam,	  Tarrow	  and	  Tilly,	  2001:331),	  which	  holds	  that	  contentious	  political	  environments	  are	  constituted	  by	  multiple	  levels	  of	  social	  interaction47.	  Furthermore,	  Tarrow	  suggests,	  the	  different	  conditions	  encountered	  at	  these	  ‘levels’	  have	  crucial	  determinative	  effects	  on	  the	  fortunes	  of	  activists	  seeking	  the	  right	  levers	  to	  progressively	  ‘shift’	  their	  contentious	  political	  issues	  from	  initiation	  to	  resolution	  (Tarrow,	  2005:120-­‐124;	  Tarrow	  and	  McAdam,	  2005;	  McAdam,	  Tarrow	  and	  Tilly,	  2001:331).	  According	  to	  Tarrow	  (2005:121):	  	   Scale	  shift	  is	  an	  essential	  element	  of	  all	  contentious	  politics,	  without	  which	  all	  contention	  that	  arises	  locally	  would	  remain	  at	  that	  level.	  We	  can	  define	  it	  as	  a	  
change	  in	  the	  number	  and	  level	  of	  coordinated	  contentious	  actions	  to	  a	  different	  
focal	  point,	  involving	  a	  new	  range	  of	  actors,	  different	  objects,	  and	  broadened	  
claims48.	  	  Hence,	  it	  was	  important	  to	  analyse	  this	  theoretical	  development,	  which,	  in	  trying	  to	  bridge	  the	  diverse	  scales	  and	  levels	  of	  social	  interaction,	  held	  such	  clear	  implications	  for	  the	  PRQ.	  However,	  while	  ‘scale	  shift’	  theory	  makes	  an	  important	  contribution	  to	  studying	  transnational	  activism	  by	  recognising	  that	  levels-­‐of-­‐analysis	  (micro-­‐macro),	  problems	  are	  inherent	  in	  this	  subject	  matter,	  I	  suggest	  it	  does	  not	  go	  far	  enough.	  It	  does	  not	  answer	  the	  realist	  question:	  levels	  of	  what?	  (vide	  Wight,	  2006:	  110-­‐111).	  For	  example,	  the	  theory	  asserts	  the	  existence	  of	  thresholds	  between	  levels,	  or	  scales,	  of	  contentious	  actions	  but	  does	  not	  explain	  the	  nature,	  of	  these	  ‘levels’49:	  such	  as	  their	  constituent	  properties,	  origins,	  conditions,	  powers,	  or	  limits;	  the	  triggering	  mechanisms	  that	  shift	  representations	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Connections	  can	  be	  seen	  here	  with	  Giddens	  (1984:xxiv-­‐xxv)	  and	  Wight	  (2006:175)	  who	  problematise	  
the	  quest	  for	  a	  theory	  to	  explain	  relations	  between	  the	  multiple	  planes	  of	  social	  activity.	  
48	  Emphasis	  as	  in	  original.	  
49	  See	  Tarrow	  (2005:123)	  for	  a	  graphical	  representation	  of	  ‘A	  Descriptive	  Model	  of	  Scale	  Shift’.	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of	  contentious	  issues	  ‘up’	  or	  ‘down’	  (or	  in,	  or	  out	  of)	  scales	  of	  social	  engagement50;	  or,	  indeed,	  the	  relationships	  between	  the	  levels	  and	  ‘range	  of	  actors’	  at	  varying	  levels;	  and	  whether	  all	  actors	  working	  on	  an	  issue	  recognise	  the	  same	  ‘focal	  point’,	  or	  changes	  in	  it.	  Importantly,	  I	  suggest,	  ‘scale	  shift’	  prescribes	  an	  approach	  to	  contentious	  political	  encounters	  from	  one	  aspect	  of	  the	  relationships	  —	  the	  perspective	  of	  protesting	  social	  groups—	  that	  confines	  its	  applicability	  for	  comprehensively	  theorising	  complex	  inter-­‐relational	  environments,	  such	  as	  the	  international	  system51.	  Furthermore,	  ‘scale	  shift’	  theory	  does	  not	  posit	  a	  causal	  mechanism,	  or	  necessary	  conditions,	  that	  can	  help	  us	  to	  explain	  why	  some	  TANs,	  and	  not	  others,	  encounter	  barriers	  within	  the	  international	  system	  that	  hamper	  achievement	  of	  their	  aims.	  These	  issues	  contributed	  to	  the	  development	  of	  my	  hypothesis	  #4	  (H4)52	  and	  the	  adoption	  of	  complex	  realism,	  which	  interprets	  these	  ‘levels’	  as	  differentiated	  strata	  of	  social	  reality,	  of	  varying	  complexity	  and	  environmental	  properties,	  in	  which	  complex,	  intersecting,	  social	  systems	  are	  embedded.	  	  Tarrow’s	  later	  work	  was	  useful	  also	  for	  stimulating	  thinking	  about	  the	  influence	  of	  ‘the	  Internet	  as	  a	  vehicle’	  for	  the	  diffusion	  of	  collective	  action	  and	  driving	  ‘scale	  shift’	  (2005:136-­‐138),	  which	  has	  clear	  implications	  for	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs	  in	  achieving	  their	  aims.	  However,	  I	  consider	  Tarrow’s	  socio-­‐political	  theorisations	  tend	  to	  skim	  over	  differential	  capability	  considerations	  of	  how	  diverse	  TANs	  drive	  these	  strategic	  communications	  vehicles	  and	  to	  what	  effects.	  He	  also	  brings	  insights	  into	  social	  organisation	  of	  activism	  and	  inter-­‐group	  cohesion.	  Consequently,	  he	  is	  noticeably	  more	  cautious	  than	  some	  political	  scholars	  (e.g.	  Castells,	  2004b;	  Rosenau,	  2000:229)	  in	  estimating	  the	  strengths	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  Internet-­‐based	  transnational	  activism.	  While	  Tarrow	  considers	  the	  Internet	  ‘is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  a	  new	  movement	  form’	  (2005:136),	  he	  also	  believes	  all	  shifting	  and	  reticular	  movements,	  in	  fact,	  ‘reduce	  ideological	  cohesion’,	  and	  the	  Internet	  	  ‘may	  be	  extreme	  in	  its	  centrifugal	  effects’	  (ibid:	  138).	  Obvious	  implications	  for	  my	  H1	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  Tarrow	  maintains	  that:	  ‘Scale	  shift	  can	  operate	  in	  two	  directions:	  upward,	  in	  which	  case	  local	  action	  
spreads	  outward	  from	  its	  origins;	  or	  downward,	  when	  a	  generalized	  practice	  is	  adopted	  at	  a	  lower	  level’	  
(2005:121).	  
51	  See	  Tarrow	  (2005:120-­‐121)	  for	  more	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  ‘scale	  shift’.	  
52	  H4:	  A	  complex	  realist	  approach	  has	  exemplary	  merit	  in	  approaching	  the	  subject	  area	  and	  primary	  
research	  question	  of	  the	  thesis.	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the	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs	  were	  also	  seen	  in	  Tarrow’s	  finding	  (ibid):	  […]‘because	  of	  the	  technological	  gap	  between	  activists	  in	  the	  North	  and	  South,	  the	  internet	  may	  actually	  increase	  the	  inequality	  within	  a	  movement	  that	  seeks	  global	  equality’.	  	  Indeed,	  he	  expresses	  a	  view	  that	  because	  the	  ‘typical	  internet-­‐based	  unit	  of	  contention	  is	  the	  campaign’,	  rather	  than	  more	  embedded53	  struggles	  with	  recurrent	  allies	  and	  enemies,	  ‘the	  internet	  offers	  individual	  activists	  the	  opportunity	  for	  do-­‐it-­‐yourself	  ideological	  production’,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  those	  directing	  campaigning	  organisations	  ‘might	  prefer	  to	  move	  in	  another	  direction	  or	  end	  a	  campaign’54.	  This	  insight	  had	  clear	  implications	  for	  a	  TAN’s	  political	  potency	  and	  effectiveness,	  prompting	  me	  to	  explore	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  case	  study	  TANs	  in	  regard	  to	  corporate	  control	  and	  compliance,	  ideological	  consistency	  and	  strategies	  aligned	  with	  aims.	  	  
	  
Defining	  TANs	  from	  the	  contentious	  international	  politics	  literature	  Scholars	  observing	  the	  amorphous	  subject	  of	  ‘social	  movements’	  and	  ‘global	  civil	  society’	  have	  often	  described	  the	  epiphenomenon	  of	  TANs	  as	  ‘elusive’	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:5;	  Risse,	  2002:255;	  Diani	  and	  McAdam,	  2003:1).	  Calling	  transnational	  civil	  society	  networks	  (TCS)	  ‘the	  emerging	  third	  force	  in	  global	  politics’,	  Florini	  opines	  (2000:7,	  231)	  that	  these	  networks	  are	  ‘unlike	  other	  major	  collectivities	  in	  the	  world’,	  typically	  linking	  people	  in	  distant	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  who	  share	  values	  but	  neither	  history	  nor	  culture,	  and	  tending	  to	  aim	  for	  broad	  goals	  ‘based	  on	  their	  conceptions	  of	  what	  constitutes	  the	  public	  good’55.	  The	  ‘somewhat	  ungainly’	  term	  ‘transnational’	  is	  used,	  she	  observes,	  to	  emphasise	  that	  these	  networks	  cross	  borders	  but	  are	  rarely	  global.	  In	  particular,	  Florini	  observes,	  that	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  are	  ‘severely	  underrepresented’	  in	  such	  coalitions.	  	  	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  combine	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  theory	  from	  social	  movements,	  international	  relations	  and	  comparative	  politics	  to	  explore	  the	  emergence	  of	  TANs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  See	  Granovetter	  (1973)	  for	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  implications	  of	  ‘weak	  link’	  and	  strong	  link’	  ties	  in	  social	  
networks.	  
54	  In	  Chapter	  10,	  I	  point	  to	  new	  paths	  for	  research	  arising	  from	  this	  emergent	  feature	  of	  Internet-­‐based	  
transnational	  advocacy	  networking.	  I	  suggest	  that	  tensions	  are	  emerging	  between	  ideologically-­‐
predetermined	  TANs	  and	  a	  new	  genus	  of	  consensus-­‐driven	  TANs	  that	  are	  enabled	  by	  Internet	  traffic	  
monitoring	  capabilities.	  
55	  Risse	  expresses	  a	  similar	  opinion	  (2012:428).	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(1998:	  5).	  Indeed,	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  investigation	  of	  what	  they	  had	  identified	  as	  a	  new	  NGO	  phenomenon,	  emerging	  exponentially	  since	  the	  1970s,	  resulted	  in	  their	  coining	  of	  the	  neologism	  ‘transnational	  advocacy	  network’	  in	  Activists	  Beyond	  
Borders:	  Advocacy	  Networks	  in	  International	  Politics	  —	  arguably	  the	  most	  cited,	  influential,	  text	  in	  the	  field	  of	  studying	  TANs	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:ix;	  Willetts,	  2011:131-­‐132;	  Risse,	  2012:433-­‐439).	  In	  this	  work,	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  asserted	  that	  the	  TAN	  typology	  emerging	  in	  the	  1990s	  was	  a	  strategic	  information	  mobiliser	  and	  a	  ‘nontraditional’	  international	  actor	  (ibid):	  	  What	  is	  novel	  in	  these	  networks	  is	  the	  ability	  of	  nontraditional	  international	  actors	  to	  mobilize	  information	  strategically	  to	  help	  create	  new	  issues	  and	  categories	  and	  to	  persuade,	  pressure,	  and	  gain	  leverage	  over	  much	  more	  powerful	  organizations	  and	  governments.	  Activists	  in	  networks	  try	  not	  only	  to	  influence	  policy	  outcomes,	  but	  to	  transform	  the	  terms	  and	  nature	  of	  the	  debate.	  They	  are	  not	  always	  successful	  in	  the	  efforts,	  but	  they	  are	  increasingly	  relevant	  players	  in	  political	  debates.	  	  In	  his	  cover	  review	  on	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  text,	  Tarrow	  (1998b)	  remarked	  that	  TANs	  constitute	  ‘the	  most	  interesting	  and	  least	  well-­‐understood	  area	  of	  contentious	  politics	  in	  the	  world	  today’.	  Furthering	  the	  theme	  of	  puzzlement	  and	  elusiveness,	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  claim	  (ibid:	  5):	  ‘Part	  of	  what	  is	  so	  elusive	  about	  networks	  is	  how	  they	  seem	  to	  embody	  elements	  of	  agent	  and	  structure	  simultaneously’.	  	  	  It	  was	  thus	  apparent	  that	  this	  literature	  lacks	  a	  clear	  or	  internationally-­‐accepted	  definition	  for	  TANs	  that	  is	  more	  in	  tune	  with	  contemporary	  technological	  and	  social	  reality	  than	  the	  very	  basic	  definition	  sketched	  by	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  in	  1998	  (ibid,	  1998:2),	  which	  stated:	  	   A	   transnational	   advocacy	   network	   includes	   those	   relevant	   actors	   working	  internationally	   on	   an	   issue,	   who	   are	   bound	   together	   by	   shared	   values,	   a	  common	  discourse,	  and	  dense	  exchanges	  of	  information	  and	  services.	  	  Similarly,	  Florini	  (2000:7,	  231)	  advanced	  the	  basic	  definition	  that	  they	  are	  transnational	  civil	  society	  networks	  of	  individuals	  and	  groups	  with	  shared	  values	  —	  albeit	  displaying	  values	  that	  ‘vary	  tremendously’	  in	  networks	  that	  are	  organisationally	  uneven.	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Thus,	  an	  overriding	  impression	  from	  this	  literature	  is	  that	  the	  only	  feature	  scholars	  seem	  to	  agree	  on	  is	  that	  no-­‐one	  agrees	  on	  them:	  what	  they	  have	  in	  common	  that	  can	  be	  meaningfully	  theorised;	  the	  boundary	  conditions	  of	  the	  phenomenon;	  and	  how	  much	  and	  in	  what	  ways,	  they	  might	  matter	  in	  determining	  international	  political	  outcomes.	  Many	  point	  out	  that	  transnational	  advocacy	  is	  increasingly	  important	  (Held	  and	  McGrew,	  2004:11;	  Scholte,	  2005:	  322),	  while	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  (1998:217)	  are	  unequivocal	  in	  stating	  their	  opinion	  on	  the	  significance	  of	  TANs,	  asserting:	  	   The	  concept	  of	  a	   transnational	  advocacy	  network	   is	  an	   important	  element	   in	  conceptualizing	   the	   changing	   nature	   of	   the	   international	   polity	   and	  particularly	   in	  understanding	   the	   interaction	  between	  societies	  and	  states	   in	  the	  formulation	  of	  international	  policies.	  	  	  Even	  so,	  their	  TAN	  concept	  remains	  an	  elusive	  concept	  involved	  in	  ‘conceptualising’	  international	  polity	  change:	  albeit,	  an	  ‘important’	  one.	  	  	  The	  literature	  is	  clearer	  on	  whether	  TANs	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  important,	  new,	  agencies	  that	  have	  a	  place	  and	  function	  in	  the	  international	  system	  that	  merited	  investigation.	  Therefore,	  the	  fundamental	  argument	  (expressed	  in	  my	  H1)	  56	  that	  contemporary	  TANs	  are	  an	  ‘important’	  NGO	  variant	  engaging	  in	  international	  politics,	  is	  premised,	  from	  the	  outset,	  on	  the	  weight	  of	  scholarship	  on	  TANs	  and	  TAN-­‐like57	  organisations	  —	  capped	  by	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  emphatic	  finding	  that	  TANs	  have	  a	  common	  purpose	  (1998:2):	  	  ‘[…]	  their	  goal	  is	  to	  change	  the	  behavior	  of	  states	  and	  of	  international	  organizations’.	  	  	  Given	  such	  a	  commonly-­‐shared	  mission,	  and	  considering	  the	  global	  media	  prominence	  and	  vast	  resources	  amassed	  by	  some	  of	  these	  organisations	  	  —	  which,	  as	  will	  be	  shown,	  often	  rival	  or	  surpass	  those	  of	  many	  small	  states	  —	  it	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  axiomatic	  that	  TANs	  should	  be	  considered	  important	  actors	  in	  international	  politics.	  Consequently,	  this	  hypothesis	  was	  developed	  to	  further	  verify	  these	  indications.	  	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  linear,	  depiction	  of	  how	  NGOs	  (including	  TANs)	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  effective	  in	  exerting	  pressure	  on	  state	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  H1	  proposes:	  Contemporary	  TANs	  are	  an	  important	  NGO	  variant	  in	  international	  politics	  that	  have	  
unprecedented	  properties	  and	  powers	  emerging	  from	  their	  advocacy	  communications,	  which	  are	  
typically	  neglected	  in	  politics	  theorising.	  	  
57	  This	  is	  in	  accordance	  with	  my	  referent	  criteria	  for	  a	  contemporary	  TAN	  model,	  presented	  in	  Figure	  6.2.	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(ibid:13).	  Known	  as	  the	  ‘Boomerang	  Pattern’,	  their	  conceptualisation	  is	  reproduced	  in	  Section	  5.3.4	  (Figure	  5.3),	  where	  I	  discuss	  its	  insights	  and	  limitations	  in	  the	  context	  of	  understanding	  relationships	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  While	  this	  study	  is	  a	  rich	  source	  of	  background	  material	  on	  TANs	  and	  on	  the	  identification	  of	  their	  novel	  characteristics,	  I	  consider	  their	  linear	  portrayal	  of	  the	  complex	  international	  political	  realm	  and	  the	  place,	  function	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs,	  appears	  to	  be	  premised	  on	  a	  flattened,	  single-­‐dimensional	  view	  of	  the	  international	  world	  that	  is	  at	  variance	  with	  more	  recent	  complexity	  thinking.	  The	  ‘Boomerang	  Pattern’	  was	  therefore	  held	  to	  be	  useful	  conceptually	  but	  was	  excluded	  from	  a	  more	  explanatory	  role.	  	  In	  the	  main,	  writers	  on	  civil	  society	  matters	  have	  tended	  to	  consider	  that	  advocacy	  networks	  generally	  espouse	  broad,	  principled	  goals	  that	  are	  hard	  to	  object	  to	  —	  protecting	  the	  environment	  and	  human	  rights,	  combating	  poverty,	  promoting	  democracy	  and	  good	  governance,	  for	  example.	  Conversely,	  it	  is	  occasionally	  noted	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  inherent	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  civil	  society	  groups	  that	  ensures	  they	  are	  a	  force	  for	  good,	  or	  represent	  broad	  public	  interests:	  their	  legitimacy,	  ethnocentricity,	  undemocratic	  nature	  and	  lack	  of	  accountability	  to	  anyone	  except	  their	  members	  and	  funders,	  being	  among	  the	  concerns	  most	  commonly	  raised	  (Tarrow,	  2005:8;	  Florini,	  2000:231;	  Rieff,	  1999:11-­‐16;	  Risse,	  2012:428,	  432-­‐433).	  Indeed,	  Florini	  points	  out	  that	  ‘neo-­‐Nazi	  hate	  groups	  that	  exchange	  repugnant	  rhetoric	  over	  the	  Internet	  are	  just	  as	  much	  transnational	  civil	  society	  networks	  as	  are	  the	  human	  rights	  coalitions’	  (2000:231,	  7).	  Tarrow	  (2005:45)	  and	  Risse	  (2012:432-­‐433)	  express	  similar	  views	  on	  what	  they	  term	  the	  ‘dark	  side’	  of	  transnational	  relations.	  Tarrow	  also	  provides	  support	  for	  Florini’s	  argument	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  inherent	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  civil	  society,	  local	  or	  transnational,	  which	  ensures	  representation	  of	  the	  broad	  public	  interest.	  	  Although	  writers	  in	  this	  paradigm	  frequently	  describe	  the	  activities	  of	  transnational	  advocacy-­‐oriented	  NGOs	  that	  display	  some,	  or	  all,	  of	  the	  definitive	  characteristics	  first	  identified	  by	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  comparatively	  few	  scholars	  apply	  the	  exact	  term	  ‘transnational	  advocacy	  network’	  to	  this	  phenomenon.	  Thus,	  if	  one	  were	  to	  review	  only	  literature	  in	  which	  this	  term	  is	  used	  for	  TAN-­‐like	  organisations,	  the	  body	  of	  work	  would	  be	  small	  indeed.	  This	  clearly	  would	  not	  be	  a	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true	  reflection	  of	  the	  scale	  of	  this	  amorphous	  phenomenon	  in	  international	  politics.	  Furthermore,	  it	  would	  severely	  limit	  our	  ability	  to	  analyse	  them.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  limitation	  that	  contemporary	  TAN	  scholarship	  lacked	  a	  more	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  referent	  with	  universal	  resonance,	  I	  built	  on	  to	  the	  definitions	  contained	  in	  the	  foundational	  literature,	  by	  developing	  an	  eight-­‐point	  referent	  template	  for	  an	  archetypal,	  communications-­‐oriented,	  contemporary	  TAN	  to	  be	  used	  in	  this	  thesis.	  This	  is	  presented	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  disputative	  character	  of	  this	  field	  of	  literature,	  it	  was	  to	  be	  expected	  that	  the	  interface	  conditions	  between	  TANs	  and	  the	  international	  system	  would	  be	  contested	  terrain.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  key	  questions	  of	  this	  thesis	  (‘what	  is	  the	  place	  and	  function	  of	  TANs	  …	  etc.’	  and	  ‘how	  effective	  are	  they	  …	  etc.’),	  could	  not	  be	  answered	  with	  any	  certainty	  using	  only	  the	  literature	  underpinning	  the	  ‘contentious	  international	  politics’	  paradigm.	  	  
2.2.2	  International	  relations	  and	  policy	  studies,	  civil	  society	  and	  globalization	  In	  international	  relations	  analysis,	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  ‘international	  system’	  is	  also	  robustly	  contested	  (Bull,	  1998;	  Buzan	  and	  Little,	  2000:	  17-­‐18;	  Dunne,	  2005;	  2010:	  141-­‐142);	  Schmidt,	  2002:14;	  Burchill,	  Linklater	  et	  al,	  2009:1-­‐6;	  Geyer	  and	  Rihani,	  2010:110-­‐112).	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  to	  unpack	  the	  key	  questions	  of	  the	  thesis	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  examine	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  political	  landscape	  in	  which	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  realm	  relate,	  firstly,	  to	  each	  other	  and,	  secondly,	  to	  TANs.	  A	  systems	  approach,	  as	  propounded	  by	  Wallerstein	  (1974),	  Waltz	  (1979:39),	  Buzan	  and	  Little,	  (2000:	  407),	  Donnelly	  (2011)	  and	  others,	  was	  strongly	  indicated.	  	  
	  
Defining	  ‘international	  system’	  from	  the	  literature	  	  According	  to	  Buzan	  (2002:64)58,	  the	  basic	  ‘international	  system’	  debate	  revolves	  around	  (a)	  the	  structure	  of	  states-­‐systems;	  and	  (b)	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  ‘system’	  element	  (understood	  as	  interaction)	  and	  the	  ‘society’	  element	  (understood	  as	  socially	  constructed	  norms,	  rules	  and	  institutions).	  This	  reference	  to	  system/society	  arguments	  is	  the	  distinctive	  trademark	  of	  the	  English	  School	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  To	  trace	  the	  development	  of	  Buzan’s	  insights	  into	  English	  School	  theory,	  see	  also	  Buzan,	  1993;	  and	  
2004.	  See	  also	  Dunne,	  2005	  and	  2010:	  135-­‐147).	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paradigm	  in	  IR59	  —	  the	  terms	  ‘international	  system’	  and	  ‘international	  society’	  being	  employed	  to	  represent	  separate	  analytical	  areas.	  Nevertheless,	  despite	  the	  popularity	  and	  dominance	  of	  the	  English	  School’s	  ontological	  perspective	  of	  the	  international	  world,	  scholars	  are	  divided	  on	  the	  analytical	  usefulness	  of	  a	  distinction	  between	  structural	  and	  normative	  aspects	  of	  international	  relations60.	  	  	  According	  to	  Buzan	  (ibid),	  structural	  aspects	  of	  the	  international	  system	  feature	  strongly	  in	  the	  debate	  between	  neorealists,	  whose	  theory	  hangs	  on	  material	  aspects	  of	  the	  system,	  and	  constructivists,	  who	  seek	  to	  develop	  more	  social	  views	  of	  international	  structure	  as	  being	  part	  of	  a	  world	  of	  our	  making	  (vide	  Hurrell,	  2002:142;	  Brown	  and	  Ainley,	  2005:49;	  Fierke,	  2010:178-­‐180).	  Structures	  matter,	  Hurrell	  claims,	  but	  material	  structures	  cannot	  be	  understood	  outside	  of	  the	  shared	  knowledge	  and	  shared	  understandings	  held	  by	  the	  actors	  within	  them.	  This	  struck	  me	  as	  problematical	  because,	  as	  Hurrell	  points	  out,	  ‘ideas	  about	  change	  are	  embedded	  in	  a	  discourse	  of	  normative	  transformation	  that	  in	  most	  cases	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  pin-­‐down’	  (ibid).	  Clear	  links	  can	  be	  seen	  here	  to	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  observation	  (1998:	  5)	  that	  activist	  networks	  operate	  in	  social	  and	  political	  contexts	  that	  contain	  ‘stable	  and	  shared’	  understandings	  (which	  I	  take	  to	  be	  a	  reference	  to	  relatively	  enduring	  structures),	  as	  well	  as	  contested	  understandings	  that	  they	  ‘try	  to	  reshape’	  (presumably	  a	  reference	  to	  ideological	  disagreements):	  thus,	  engendering	  perceptions	  that	  they	  are	  ‘elusive’	  and	  ‘seem	  to	  embody	  elements	  of	  agent	  and	  structure	  simultaneously’.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  proponents	  of	  deep	  change,	  Hurrell	  maintains,	  ‘offer	  a	  stark	  and	  highly	  improbable	  choice:	  between	  a	  grossly	  simplified	  image	  of	  a	  Westphalian	  past	  and	  an	  invariably	  complex,	  but	  usually	  underspecified,	  post-­‐Westphalian	  present	  and	  future’.	  Here,	  Hurrell	  is	  referring	  to	  the	  historical	  foundations	  of	  the	  modern	  world	  order	  of	  nation	  states	  and	  deficient	  understandings	  that	  many	  proponents	  of	  change	  have	  about	  its	  past,	  present	  and	  future61.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Dunne	  claims	  the	  English	  School	  is	  the	  ‘dominant	  theoretical	  voice’	  in	  IR	  in	  Britain	  and	  remains	  hugely	  
influential	  in	  IR	  thinking	  worldwide	  (Dunne,	  2010:136).	  
60	  See	  Erskine	  (2010:36)	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  nornative	  theoretical	  approaches	  in	  IR.	  
61	  This	  refers	  to	  the	  Treaties	  of	  Westphalia	  (1648),	  or	  the	  ‘Peace	  of	  Westphalia’,	  which	  established	  the	  
modern	  world	  order	  of	  nation	  states	  (Reus-­‐Smit,	  2008:282).	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From	  such	  discourses,	  I	  suggest,	  we	  can	  clearly	  discern	  the	  IR	  trademark	  of	  theoretical	  disarray,	  as	  described	  by	  Smith	  (2010:2-­‐8),	  with	  scholars	  expressing	  fundamental	  uncertainties,	  incomplete	  understandings	  and	  competing	  philosophies	  over:	  (1)	  the	  interface	  conditions	  and	  possibilities	  that	  actors	  encounter	  in	  inter-­‐national	  relationships;	  (2)	  the	  relative	  capabilities	  and	  powers	  of	  actors	  to	  effect	  change;	  and	  (3)	  inadequacies	  in	  defining	  the	  interacting	  elements,	  such	  as	  TANs	  operating	  in	  the	  international	  sphere	  (as	  I	  noted	  	  earlier	  in	  the	  chapter).	  	  Taking	  a	  comparatively	  broad	  theoretical	  approach,	  Dunne	  (2005)	  offers	  a	  valuable	  encapsulation	  of	  these	  dilemmas	  and	  fault-­‐lines:	  	  	   	  [T]here	   is	   no	   a	   priori	   reason	   why	   an	   interpretive	   approach	   cannot	  incorporate	   the	  existence	  of	   systemic	   logics	   such	  as	  brute	   facts	  and	  material	  capacities,	  while	   showing	  how	   these	   impact	   on	   the	  behaviour	   or	   individuals	  and	  communities.	  	  	  	  	  	  Furthermore,	  he	  (2010:148)	  invokes	  Bull’s	  insight	  (1995)	  that	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  system	  and	  society,	  ‘it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  society	  presupposes	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  system’.	  Therefore,	  this	  thesis	  has	  no	  quarrel	  with	  either	  of	  the	  competing	  ontological	  perspectives	  propounding	  system	  versus	  society	  and,	  with	  Dunne,	  does	  not	  regard	  them	  as	  mutually	  exclusive	  alternatives.	  	  	  According	  to	  Dunne	  (2010:144),	  while	  higher	  levels	  of	  economic	  interdependence	  and	  common	  interests	  might	  precipitate	  the	  development	  of	  institutions	  to	  facilitate	  ‘society’	  between	  states,	  the	  independence	  of	  sovereign	  states	  ‘remains	  an	  important	  limiting	  factor	  in	  the	  realization	  of	  common	  goals’.	  	   For	  this	  reason,	  the	  purposes	  states	  agreed	  upon	  for	  most	  of	  the	  Westphalian	  era	   have	   had	   a	   fairly	   minimal	   character	   centred	   upon	   the	   survival	   of	   the	  system	  and	  the	  endurance	  of	  the	  dominant	  units	  within	  it.	  	  	  Observing	  the	  quandaries	  encountered	  by	  IR	  scholars	  in	  trying	  to	  evaluate	  the	  comparative	  influences	  of	  ‘system’	  and	  ‘society’	  in	  this	  debate,	  Dunne	  called	  for	  English	  School	  theorists	  to	  more	  fully	  develop	  ways	  to	  determine	  ‘how	  much	  ‘society’	  is	  present	  in	  inter-­‐state	  order’	  (ibid).	  Similarly	  open-­‐minded,	  Buzan	  and	  Little	  (2000:407)	  appreciated	  that	  the	  ‘systems’	  framework,	  provided	  an	  effective	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conceptual	  framework	  for	  theorising	  the	  international	  world	  but	  considered	  it	  did	  not	  go	  far	  enough	  and	  should	  not	  be	  the	  single	  framework	  adopted	  for	  the	  task.	  	  	  Thus	  faced	  with	  mainstream	  conceptualisations	  of	  international	  systems	  in	  IR	  that	  they	  held	  to	  be	  ‘thin’	  and	  ‘unidimensional’,	  Buzan	  and	  Little	  (ibid:43)62	  sought	  to	  reform	  the	  study	  of	  IR	  by	  advancing	  a	  pluralist	  analytical	  framework	  that	  they	  hoped	  would	  enable	  IR	  scholarship	  to	  generate	  ‘thicker’	  forms	  of	  theorising	  to	  better	  explain	  ‘a	  complex	  phenomenon	  like	  international	  systems’	  (ibid:	  17).	  	  Their	  approach	  —	  suggesting	  investigators	  take	  an	  historical	  and	  multi-­‐causal	  approach,	  as	  well	  as	  identifying	  different	  levels	  and	  sectors	  of	  analysis	  —	  appeared	  to	  reclaim	  a	  role	  for	  structural	  analysis	  in	  IR	  after	  several	  decades	  of	  	  ‘the	  normative	  turn’	  and	  was	  thus	  a	  significant	  influence	  in	  operationalising	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  From	  these	  debates,	  I	  deduced	  that	  a	  gap	  exists	  when	  the	  temporal/historical	  dimension	  in	  social	  structural	  construction	  and	  practice	  goes	  unexplained.	  Taking	  into	  account	  Bhaskar’s	  argument	  that	  all	  understandings	  and	  practical	  activities	  presuppose	  a	  realism	  ‘of	  one	  kind	  or	  another’63	  and	  social	  phenomena	  ‘are	  the	  product	  of	  a	  plurality	  of	  structures’	  (vide	  Bhaskar,	  2011:2-­‐3;	  also	  Archer,	  1998:196;	  201-­‐202;	  and	  Marx,	  1852)64	  it	  seemed	  crucial	  to	  explore	  the	  theoretical	  adequacy	  of	  the	  socially	  constructed	  world	  ‘of	  our	  making’	  as	  described	  by	  Hurrell	  
et	  al.	  If	  we	  accept	  that	  agents	  construct	  the	  world	  with	  their	  norms,	  rules	  and	  institutions	  we	  must	  also	  ask	  not	  only	  the	  obvious,	  ‘how’,	  but	  when?	  Evoking	  ‘dead	  men’s	  shoes’	  imagery	  (similar	  to	  that	  of	  Marx,	  1852),	  Archer	  offers	  insights	  into	  the	  continuum	  of	  structural	  legacies	  of	  past	  agents	  and	  the	  ‘maintain	  or	  transform’,	  dichotomies	  in	  which	  current	  agents	  find	  themselves.	  Elaborating	  this	  inescapable	  lot,	  Archer	  argues	  that	  the	  strategic	  actions	  of	  current	  agents	  are	  conditioned	  by	  inherited	  and	  cultural	  contexts,	  even	  as	  they	  themselves	  are	  ‘shaped	  and	  reshaped	  in	  their	  sequential	  attempts	  to	  remould	  the	  structures	  they	  confront	  but	  did	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  Cited	  also	  by	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden	  (2011:60-­‐61)	  
63	  This	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  commensurable	  with	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  recognition	  of	  ‘stable	  and	  shared’	  
understandings.	  (1998:5).	  
64	  This	  refers	  to	  social	  structural	  theorisation	  (vide	  Bhaskar,	  2011:2-­‐3;	  Archer,	  1998:196;	  201-­‐202;	  
Giddens;	  1984:xxiv	  –	  xviii	  and	  170-­‐172;	  and	  Marx,	  1852)	  that	  understands	  that	  all	  social	  activities,	  and	  by	  
definition	  institutions	  and	  collective	  movements,	  have	  their	  roots	  in	  earlier	  times.	  The	  above	  citation	  
refers	  to	  Marx’s	  famous	  quote:	  ‘Men	  make	  their	  own	  history	  but	  they	  do	  not	  make	  it	  just	  as	  they	  please;	  
they	  do	  not	  make	  it	  under	  circumstances	  chosen	  by	  themselves,	  but	  under	  circumstances	  directly	  
encountered,	  given	  and	  transmitted	  from	  the	  past’	  (Marx,	  1852:	  Part	  1,	  para.2).	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create’.65	  In	  Bhaskar’s	  analysis	  (2011:2-­‐3):	  ‘[…]	  we	  will	  only	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  —	  and	  so	  change	  —	  the	  social	  world	  if	  we	  identify	  the	  structures	  at	  work	  that	  generate	  [those]	  events	  or	  discourses’.	  Additionally,	  Giddens	  (1984:170-­‐172)	  points	  out	  that	  social	  structural	  facts	  have	  properties	  that	  ‘confront	  each	  single	  individual	  as	  “objective”	  features	  which	  limit	  that	  individual’s	  scope	  of	  action.	  These	  are	  not	  just	  external,	  but	  externally	  defined’.	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  significance	  and	  future	  of	  states	  as	  the	  dominant	  focus	  of	  analysis	  in	  the	  international	  system	  is	  a	  concomitant	  theme	  in	  the	  ‘system’	  debates.	  Geyer	  and	  Rihani	  (2010:114-­‐115)	  claim	  that	  although	  powers,	  capabilities,	  and	  roles	  are	  today	  diffused	  among	  a	  myriad	  of	  complex	  intersecting	  systems	  as	  international	  institutions,	  states	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  interact	  with	  each	  other,	  ‘nation	  states	  have	  been	  a	  stable	  element	  of	  the	  international	  system	  for	  hundreds	  of	  years’	  and	  remain	  powerful	  fixtures	  in	  the	  system:	  ‘potentially	  the	  most	  powerful	  elements’.	  Similarly,	  Risse	  observes	  (2002:255)	  that	  while	  transnational	  actors,	  from	  multinational	  corporations	  to	  INGOs,	  have	  left	  their	  mark	  on	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system,	  there	  is	  little	  systematic	  evidence	  to	  sustain	  claims	  that	  the	  transnational	  ‘society	  world’	  has	  somehow	  overtaken	  the	  ‘state	  world’.	  In	  fact,	  Risse	  maintains,	  TANs	  and	  INGOs	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  necessarily	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  inter-­‐state	  system	  as	  their	  work	  often	  conforms	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  states	  and	  international	  organisations:	  indeed,	  NGOs/TANs	  frequently	  act	  in	  service-­‐providing	  roles,	  supporting	  the	  interests	  of	  states,	  or	  establishment	  bodies	  (2012:	  433).	  Furthermore,	  Castells	  	  (2012:234-­‐235)	  and	  Tarrow	  (2005:3)	  both	  independently	  assert	  that	  it	  is	  through	  engagement	  with	  political	  institutions	  that	  non-­‐state	  organisations	  can	  influence	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  lead	  to	  policy	  change.	  Instead	  of	  analysing	  transnational	  and	  inter-­‐state	  relations	  in	  zero-­‐sum	  terms,	  Risse	  observes,	  it	  is	  more	  useful	  to	  study	  their	  interactions	  and	  inter-­‐penetration66.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  This	  concept	  is	  captured	  in	  Blackburn’s	  limerick	  (1999.81):	  	  
	  There	  was	  a	  young	  man	  who	  said.	  ’Damn,	  
	  It	  is	  borne	  upon	  me	  that	  I	  am	  
	  A	  creature	  that	  moves	  
	  In	  predestinate	  grooves	  —	  
	  Not	  even	  a	  bus,	  but	  a	  tram’.	  
66	  In	  stating	  this	  view,	  Risse	  reinforces	  opinions	  expressed	  by	  Keane	  (2003:92).	  The	  cross-­‐pollination	  of	  
ideas	  and	  human	  resources,	  which,	  I	  argue,	  is	  often	  overlooked	  in	  notions	  about	  neat	  but	  fictional	  
boundaries	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  the	  international	  arena,	  is	  specifically	  discussed	  in	  
Chapter	  5,	  where	  I	  examine	  the	  overlappings	  and	  interactions	  of	  the	  ‘Three	  United	  Nations’	  (see	  also	  
Willetts,	  2011:116-­‐119	  and	  Weiss,	  2009:8-­‐9).	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  Consequently,	  this	  thesis	  contends	  that	  the	  inter-­‐relational	  behaviours	  of	  elements	  in	  the	  international	  institutional	  sphere	  constitute	  not	  only	  a	  system	  	  —	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  ‘system’	  advanced	  by	  Meadows	  (2009:2,188)67	  —	  but,	  as	  I	  will	  argue,	  exhibit	  the	  hallmarks	  of	  an	  archetypal	  ‘complex	  system’,	  which	  provides	  new	  dimensions	  of	  explanatory	  value.	  In	  considering	  the	  international	  system	  to	  be	  a	  complex	  system,	  the	  thesis	  is	  guided	  by	  Buzan	  and	  Little	  (2000:17);	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden	  (2011:70-­‐73),	  Geyer	  and	  Rihani	  (2010:114-­‐115)	  and	  by	  Wight’s	  argument	  that	  (2006:294):	  	   […]	  the	  international	  system	  is	  a	  complex,	  chaotic	  and	  essentially	  open	  system	  that	  is	  causally	  overdetermined.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  patterns	  we	  observe	  are	  not	  reducible	  to,	  or	  explainable	  by,	  any	  one	  theory.	  	  Moreover,	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden	  (ibid)	  point	  out	  that	  considering	  international	  actors	  as	  complex	  adaptive	  systems	  that	  interact	  with	  each	  other	  ‘opens	  a	  route	  for	  analysing	  relations	  between	  them	  […]’.	  Such	  insights	  were	  crucial	  to	  the	  development	  of	  my	  hypothesis	  (H4)68	  concerning	  the	  suitability	  of	  applying	  a	  complex	  realist	  philosophy	  and	  methodological	  tools	  to	  this	  investigation.	  	  In	  synthesising	  the	  divergent	  IR	  perspectives	  on	  the	  international	  system,	  I	  consider	  it	  is	  relatively	  easy	  to	  hypothesise	  how	  the	  various	  actors/agents	  who	  are	  part	  of	  the	  system,	  and	  those	  who	  interact	  with	  the	  system,	  might	  place	  vastly	  different	  values	  on	  the	  way	  it	  operates	  and	  changes69;	  who	  operates	  it;	  how	  ‘global	  public	  goods’	  are	  husbanded;	  and	  whether	  the	  system	  has	  present,	  or	  future,	  relevance	  (e.g.	  Held,	  2010:248).	  Plainly,	  notions	  of	  what	  constitutes	  ‘the	  public	  good’	  can	  differ	  radically	  not	  only	  between	  national	  contexts,	  but	  from	  one	  individual	  to	  the	  next.	  Therefore,	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system	  appeared	  to	  provide	  a	  comparatively	  stable	  framework	  for	  examining	  how	  system,	  state	  and	  society	  	  ‘all	  hang	  together’	  (Dunne:2005).	  This	  decision	  was	  also	  guided	  by	  Giddens’s	  opinion	  that	  ‘[T]he	  identification	  of	  structural	  principles,	  and	  their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  Meadows	  defines	  as	  system	  as	  ‘a	  set	  of	  elements,	  or	  parts,	  that	  is	  coherently	  organised	  and	  
interconnected	  in	  a	  pattern	  or	  structure	  that	  produces	  a	  characteristic	  set	  of	  behaviours’.	  
68	  H4:	  A	  complex	  realist	  approach	  has	  exemplary	  merit	  in	  approaching	  the	  subject	  area	  and	  primary	  
research	  question	  of	  the	  thesis.	  
69	  Baker	  and	  Chandler	  (2005),	  provide	  a	  useful	  compendium	  of	  opinion	  on	  the	  contested	  futures	  for	  
global	  civil	  society.	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conjunctures	  in	  intersocietal	  systems,	  represents	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  level	  of	  institutional	  analysis’	  (1984:	  185-­‐186).	  	  	  Furthermore,	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  concede	  that	  while	  states	  remain	  the	  major	  players	  internationally,	  by	  reversing	  the	  traditional	  state-­‐centric	  analytical	  focus,	  studies	  of	  TANs	  can	  reveal	  new	  insights	  into	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system.	  These	  might	  include	  that	  (i)	  there	  are	  now	  multiple	  pathways	  into	  the	  international	  arena;	  (ii)	  domestic	  actors	  have	  an	  underestimated	  degree	  of	  international	  agency	  than	  a	  state-­‐centric	  approach	  would	  admit;	  and	  (iii)	  TANs	  provide	  domestic	  actors	  with	  allies	  outside	  their	  own	  states	  (ibid:	  217).	  	  
	  
Bringing	  NGOs/TANs	  into	  the	  ‘international	  system’	  To	  gain	  a	  fuller	  understanding	  of	  how	  TANs	  fit	  into	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system	  —	  in	  effect,	  their	  ‘place’	  and	  ‘function’	  in	  the	  complex	  interweave	  of	  interacting	  sub-­‐systems	  of	  international	  actors70	  —	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  trace	  the	  relatively	  recent	  emergence	  of	  the	  following	  three	  contingent	  factors:	  (i)	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  ‘transnational	  	  (or	  global)	  civil	  society’	  (itself	  a	  hotly	  contested	  term,	  see	  Section	  2.2.2	  and	  Chandler,	  2007);	  (ii)	  the	  development	  of	  transnational	  networking	  capabilities	  in	  social	  movements;	  and	  (iii)	  contemporary	  transnational	  activism.	  From	  this	  analysis	  of	  the	  roots	  of	  TANs,	  it	  was	  then	  possible	  to	  address	  questions	  regarding	  their	  structures,	  agency	  in	  the	  international	  arena,	  the	  social	  causes	  they	  champion,	  their	  effectiveness	  and	  fitness-­‐for-­‐purpose	  of	  the	  evolving	  TAN	  model.	  	  	  Therefore,	  the	  relevant	  literatures	  should	  encompass	  each	  of	  these	  subject	  areas	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  different	  dimensions	  interact	  and	  influence/change	  each	  other	  in	  the	  process.	  Complexity	  thinking	  regards	  this	  as	  exploring	  the	  co-­‐evolutionary	  dynamics	  of	  the	  problem	  space.	  I	  suggest	  that	  envisaging	  civil	  society	  organisations	  as	  systemic	  elements	  that	  can	  be	  attracted	  to	  exploring	  their	  ‘adjacent	  possible’	  opportunities	  is	  also	  relevant,	  especially	  when	  one	  considers	  these	  groups	  may	  be	  drawn	  to	  act	  locally,	  domestically,	  or	  transnationally;	  or	  individually	  (e.g.	  Greenpeace,	  Oxfam	  or	  Human	  Rights	  Watch),	  or	  in	  clusters	  (e.g.	  the	  environmental,	  humanitarian	  aid	  and	  human	  rights	  movements).	  This	  thesis	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  this	  thesis	  follows	  the	  complexity-­‐based	  concept	  of	  ‘international	  system’	  
suggested	  by	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden	  (2011:70-­‐81)	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holds	  that	  examining	  such	  interactions	  through	  complex	  realism	  is	  hugely	  scaleable	  and	  coherent	  arguments	  can	  only	  be	  framed	  after	  integrating	  findings	  in	  the	  respective	  literatures.	  
	  
‘Global	  civil	  society’	  debates	  	  Mainstream	  acceptance	  of	  the	  notion	  that	  a	  ‘global	  civil	  society’	  (GCS)	  exists	  is	  far	  from	  being	  a	  given	  in	  socio-­‐political	  debate.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  an	  area	  of	  intense	  study	  that	  is	  characterised	  by	  (i)	  the	  divergent	  philosophies	  and	  theories	  of	  pluralists,	  neorealists	  and	  neoliberals	  (Brown	  and	  Ainley,	  2005:41);	  and	  (ii)	  a	  lack	  of	  clear	  definitions	  concerning	  the	  nature,	  existence,	  effects,	  or	  even	  the	  possibility,	  of	  such	  underspecified	  concepts	  as	  both	  ‘global	  civil	  society’	  and	  ‘globalisation’	  (Keane,	  2003:	  xi-­xiii;	  Tarrow,	  2005:5,	  68-­‐76;	  Kaldor,	  2003:559;	  Held	  and	  McGrew,	  2002:1;	  Held,	  2010:ix-­xii;	  Buzan,	  2004:77-­‐89;	  Clark	  et	  al,	  2005:	  293;	  Friedman,	  1999:ii71).	  	  	  Criticising	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  term	  ‘global	  civil	  society’	  as	  being	  an	  imprecise	  	  —	  even	  misleading	  —	  concept	  and	  label,	  Keane	  (2003:	  94-­‐5;	  also	  Risse,	  2000)	  argues	  that	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  state-­‐centred	  realism	  there	  is	  no	  global	  state,	  no	  globalised	  politics,	  and	  therefore	  no	  global	  civil	  society.	  	  In	  Keane’s	  view	  (ibid:	  92),	  global	  civil	  society	  is	  not	  driven	  by	  a	  single	  social	  logic	  but	  is	  a	  far	  messier,	  interconnected	  ‘syndrome’	  of	  multiple	  processes	  and	  multiple	  dynamics.	  Keane	  holds	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘global	  civil	  society’	  is	  infused	  with	  too	  much	  contradiction	  and	  blurred	  parameters	  to	  be	  so	  neatly	  defined,	  therefore	  the	  term	  is	  not	  apt.	  Ergo,	  Keane	  admits	  the	  phenomenon	  is	  real,	  the	  referent	  is	  wanting.	  	  Nevertheless,	  Scholte	  is	  more	  comfortable	  with	  the	  widely-­‐accepted	  terminology,	  and	  claims:	  ‘civil	  society	  has	  moved	  centre	  stage’	  in	  current	  discussions	  of	  globalisation	  (2005:322),	  although	  he	  sees	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘globalisation’	  as	  more	  of	  an	  enigma	  —	  simultaneously	  an	  effect	  and	  a	  cause	  (ibid:	  4).	  Contra	  Melucci	  (1996:7-­‐8),	  who	  claims	  the	  tools	  of	  the	  Information	  Age	  are	  shaping	  a	  new	  reality	  in	  which	  people	  perceive	  themselves	  as	  belonging	  in	  a	  ‘unified	  social	  space’	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  This	  thesis	  rejects	  Friedman’s	  assertion	  that	  globalisation	  is	  the	  new	  ‘international	  system’	  that	  
followed	  the	  Cold	  War	  (1999:ii).	  Contra	  this	  influential	  U.S.	  writer,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  constellations	  to	  
which	  Friedman	  refers	  might	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  more	  interconnected	  and	  therefore	  transformed	  
international	  order	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  patterns	  or	  arrangements	  of	  elements),	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  system.	  The	  
notion	  of	  system	  as	  applied	  in	  this	  thesis	  considers	  the	  international	  environment	  to	  be	  constituted	  by	  
the	  intersectionality	  of	  myriad	  complex,	  open,	  and	  adaptive	  systems,	  including,	  but	  not	  limited	  to,	  those	  
of	  nation	  states.	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planetary	  scale,	  Tarrow	  sees	  nothing	  of	  the	  sort	  emerging	  from	  the	  globalisation	  discourses,	  arguing	  that	  ‘there	  is	  no	  single	  core	  process	  leading	  to	  a	  global	  civil	  society	  or	  anything	  resembling	  one’	  (2005:9),	  in	  fact:	  ‘few	  local	  citizens	  engage	  naturally	  in	  ‘global	  thinking’	  and,	  largely	  due	  to	  dissimilarities	  in	  national	  political	  cultures,	  are	  highly	  resistant	  to	  accepting	  global	  interpretations	  of	  their	  local	  claims	  (ibid:75).	  	  	  Consequently,	  conflicting	  perspectives	  on	  the	  relativity	  aspects	  of	  transnationalising,	  or	  globalising,	  political	  issues	  (such	  as	  those	  expressed	  by	  Tarrow	  (ibid),	  Melucci	  (ibid)	  and	  Chandler	  (2005,	  2007,	  2009),	  strongly	  influenced	  my	  epistemological	  approach	  to	  find	  new	  ways	  to	  investigate	  whether	  TANs	  are	  effective	  in	  their	  quests	  to	  promote	  universal	  norms	  and	  secure	  universally-­‐recognised	  victories	  via	  the	  international	  system.	  The	  GCS	  literature	  also	  revealed	  a	  lack	  of	  commonly-­‐recognised	  referents	  for	  unprecedented	  forms	  of	  deterritorialised,	  transglobal	  socio-­‐political	  phenomena,	  such	  as	  TANs.	  	  	  As	  noted	  earlier	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  contentious	  international	  politics,	  it	  was	  clear	  also	  from	  the	  GCS	  literature	  that	  political	  scholars	  typically	  view	  TANs	  as	  embedded	  in	  circumstances	  that	  are	  globally	  expansive	  and	  conceptually	  elusive	  (Risse,	  2012:426-­‐427),	  impelling	  many	  to	  rely	  on	  conventional	  constructivist	  epistemologies	  and	  methodologies	  to	  investigate	  their	  historical	  origins,	  arguably	  in	  social	  movements,	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  phenomenon	  that	  they	  have	  become72.	  However,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  discordant	  note	  in	  the	  GCS	  literature,	  with	  Keane	  voicing	  caveats	  concerning	  this	  type	  of	  hepatomancy	  (ibid:	  5-­‐8).	  	  Taking	  a	  characteristic	  mainstream,	  social	  movements	  approach	  to	  GCS,	  Sikkink	  argues	  (2005:154)	  that,	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  the	  dynamics	  of	  social	  movement	  activity	  can	  be	  analysed	  as	  groups	  operating	  rationally	  within	  international	  and	  domestic	  contexts	  of	  opportunities	  and	  constraints73.	  However,	  she	  continues:	  	  	  Social	   movement	   theorists	   have	   long	   recognized	   that	   social	   movements	   not	  only	  operate	  within	  domestic	  opportunity	  structures,	  but	  they	  can	  also	  make	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  The	  work	  of	  Klandermans,	  Staggenborg	  and	  Tarrow	  (2002:339)	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  
understanding	  the	  difficulties	  political	  analysts	  face	  in	  approaching	  GCS,	  including	  TANs.	  Risse	  provides	  a	  
comprehensive	  overview	  of	  these	  debates	  (2012:	  426-­‐452).	  
73	  This	  perspective	  is	  also	  explained	  by	  Finnemore	  and	  Sikkink	  (1998)	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or	   expand	   existing	   opportunity	   structures.	   The	   same	   is	   the	   case	   at	   the	  international	  level.	  Over	  a	  longer	  term,	  the	  goal	  of	  many	  transnational	  activists	  is	  to	  transform	  or	  recreate	  the	  very	  opportunity	  structures	  within	  which	  they	  work.	  	  	  Clearly,	  Sikkink’s	  conceptualisation	  has	  implications	  for	  exploring	  the	  relational	  interface	  between	  ‘international	  level’	  elements.	  From	  this,	  account,	  I	  developed	  an	  hypothesis	  (my	  H3)74	  that,	  in	  a	  Thucydidean	  sense,	  activist	  groups	  perceived	  to	  have	  subversive	  intentions	  are	  probably	  met	  with	  suspicion	  and	  resistance	  in	  their	  relations	  with	  the	  representatives	  of	  international	  system	  states	  and	  institutions.	  	  	  Buzan	  (2004:81)75	  relates	  how	  with	  the	  ending	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  ‘global	  civil	  society’	  (GCS)	  became	  ‘a	  kind	  of	  synonym	  for	  globalization’76,	  in	  a	  descriptive	  sense:	  the	  term	  capturing	  a	  general	  understanding	  that	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  entities	  and	  structures	  of	  all	  sorts	  were	  becoming	  a	  more	  influential	  part	  of	  international	  relations.	  Not	  everyone	  was	  convinced	  that	  this	  constituted	  a	  ‘global	  civil	  society’,	  Buzan	  admits:	  	  But	  most	   analysts,	  whether	   or	   not	   they	   advocated	   the	   continued	  primacy	   of	  the	   state,	   were	   happy	   to	   concede	   that	   the	   transnational	   domain	   was	  uncommonly	   lively,	   and	   there	   was	   little	   doubt	   that	   GCS	   in	   this	   sense	   was	  making	   a	   difference	   to	   international	   norms	   and	   rules	   through	   successful	  campaigns	  on	  issues	  ranging	  from	  landmines	  and	  famine	  relief,	   through	  debt	  and	  terms	  of	  trade,	  to	  human	  rights	  and	  the	  environment.	  	  Support	  for	  this	  perspective	  comes	  also	  from	  Sikkink	  (2005:152),	  who	  discusses	  the	  flurry	  of	  IR	  research	  activity	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  re-­‐emergent	  transnationalist	  research	  agenda,	  focusing	  on	  a	  ‘new	  transnationalism’,	  transnational	  networks,	  global	  civil	  society,	  transnational	  social	  movements,	  or	  world	  polity.	  Despite	  their	  differences,	  Sikkink	  claims,	  these	  diverse	  literatures	  all	  make	  the	  common	  point	  that	  transnational	  relations	  in	  which	  non-­‐state	  actors	  play	  a	  prominent	  role	  are	  an	  increasingly	  significant	  part	  of	  international	  relations.	  Furthermore,	  she	  says,	  the	  transnationalist	  research	  programme	  is	  intrinsically	  linked	  to	  broader	  concerns	  within	  constructivist	  IR	  theory	  (and	  some	  neoliberal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  H3:	  The	  adversarial	  advocacy	  strategies	  adopted	  by	  TANs	  constitute	  a	  barrier	  to	  them	  achieving	  their	  
aims	  in	  the	  international	  policy-­‐making	  environment.	  	  
75From	  International	  to	  World	  Society?	  English	  School	  Theory	  and	  the	  Social	  Structure	  of	  Globalisation.	  	  
76	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Archer	  (2013:2)	  holds	  that	  ‘the	  vast	  literature	  on	  globalisation	  […]	  has	  been	  
incurably	  ‘”actualist”’.	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institutionalism),	  regarding	  the	  influence	  of	  ideas,	  norms	  and	  identity	  on	  world	  politics.	  	  	  However,	  a	  contrasting	  view	  on	  the	  political	  potency	  of	  transnational	  NGOs	  at	  the	  international	  level	  is	  taken	  by	  Clark	  et	  al	  (2005:293),	  who	  states:	  	   At	   the	   international	   level,	   it	   is	   as	   yet	   unclear	   whether	   the	   increase	   in	   the	  number	   of	   NGOs	   with	   shared	   transnational	   goals	   can	   be	   equated	   with	   an	  emerging	   global	   civil	   society.	   Although	   NGO	   networks	   of	   interaction	   that	  parallel	  or	  intersect	  the	  international	  state	  system	  may	  have	  meaning	  for	  the	  participants,	  unless	  they	  are	  focused	  and	  received	  in	  particular	  ways,	  they	  do	  not	  necessarily	  affect	  states.	  	  	  The	  significance	  of	  the	  point:	  ‘[…]	  unless	  they	  are	  focused	  and	  received	  in	  particular	  
ways	  (my	  emphasis),	  they	  do	  not	  necessarily	  affect	  states’	  was	  therefore	  assessed	  as	  having	  crucial	  relevance	  for	  this	  thesis,	  supporting	  the	  development	  of	  my	  two	  hypotheses	  (H2	  and	  H3)77,	  concerning	  signs	  that	  (a)	  the	  international	  system	  is	  struggling	  to	  accommodate	  TANs	  and	  has	  a	  noticeably	  troubled	  interface	  with	  some;	  and	  (b)	  the	  adversarial	  strategies	  adopted	  by	  some	  TANs	  constitute	  a	  barrier	  to	  them	  achieving	  their	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  policy-­‐making	  environment.	  	  In	  order	  to	  acquire	  a	  fuller	  understanding	  of	  influential	  worldviews	  regarding	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  politically	  empowered	  ‘global	  civil	  society’	  and	  the	  communicative	  nature	  of	  social	  activism,	  particularly	  in	  advanced	  capitalist	  states,	  the	  philosophical	  works	  of	  Habermas	  were	  also	  reviewed.	  In	  fact,	  I	  submit	  that	  within	  the	  postmodern,	  poststructural,	  post-­‐Marxian	  milieu,	  the	  strong	  influence	  of	  Habermasian	  thought	  is	  a	  recurring	  sub-­‐text.	  Habermas’s	  widely	  cited	  study	  (1989)78,	  afforded	  new	  ways	  of	  problematising	  and	  exploring	  the	  ‘public	  sphere’	  (Crossley	  and	  Roberts,	  2004:1),	  which,	  judging	  by	  the	  demand	  for,	  ubiquity	  and	  echoing	  of	  his	  writings	  in	  this	  literature	  and	  discourses,	  has	  clearly	  appealed	  to	  many	  interested	  in	  social	  protest79.	  The	  ‘public	  sphere’,	  Habermas	  maintains,	  is	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  H2:	  The	  international	  system	  is	  struggling	  to	  accommodate	  TANs	  and	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  
institutions	  have	  a	  distinctively	  troubled	  interface	  with	  modern	  TAN-­‐type	  NGOs.	  	  
	  	  H3:	  The	  adversarial	  advocacy	  strategies	  adopted	  by	  some	  TANs	  constitute	  a	  barrier	  to	  them	  achieving	  
their	  	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  policy-­‐making	  environment.	  	  
78	  The	  Structural	  Transformation	  of	  the	  Public	  Sphere.	  
79	  Although	  Habermas	  is	  not	  particularly	  identified	  with	  the	  contentious	  international	  politics	  subset	  of	  
the	  political	  sociological	  literature,	  I	  suggest	  his	  influence	  can	  be	  recognised	  in	  the	  communications	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notional	  space,	  distinct	  from	  the	  state,	  in	  which	  citizens	  discuss	  issues	  of	  general	  interest.	  They	  also	  engage	  in	  commodity	  exchange	  and	  social	  labour	  in	  that	  sphere	  (ibid:	  1-­‐3).	  The	  notion	  of	  the	  people-­‐public	  sphere	  set	  in	  relations	  of	  permanent	  opposition	  to	  the	  two	  smaller,	  elite,	  social	  sectors	  set	  in	  relations	  of	  dominance	  over	  them	  —	  namely,	  the	  ‘private’	  sphere	  and	  the	  ‘state’	  authorities’	  sphere	  —	  is	  reified	  in	  Habermas’s	  work.80	  	  Habermas	  (1989)	  discusses	  the	  colonisation	  of	  the	  ‘lifeworld’	  (composed	  of	  the	  public	  and	  private	  spheres	  of	  everyday	  life,	  e.g.	  family,	  work,	  leisure,	  education)	  by	  ‘the	  system’	  (institutions	  of	  the	  state	  and	  economy).	  Conflicts	  in	  society	  erupt	  on	  the	  seam	  between	  ‘system’	  and	  ‘lifeworld’	  (1984:xxxvii).	  Therefore,	  I	  argue	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  conceive	  	  —	  in	  simplistic	  terms	  —	  that	  some	  seeking	  social	  reform	  envision	  that	  by	  reducing	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  system,	  the	  seam	  and	  source	  of	  social	  conflict	  will	  disappear.	  While	  Habermas’s	  writing	  reflects	  a	  particularly	  Eurocentric	  philosophy,	  I	  consider	  his	  work	  on	  colonisation	  of	  the	  lifeworld	  and	  social	  movements	  are	  vital	  to	  a	  fuller	  understanding	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  transnational	  civil	  society	  and	  many	  of	  the	  trends,	  opinions	  and	  communicative	  strategies	  circulating	  within	  contemporary	  transnational	  activism.	  Habermas’s	  assertion	  that:	  ‘Only	  political	  orders	  can	  have	  and	  lose	  legitimacy;	  only	  they	  need	  legitimation’	  
(1984:179),	  is	  a	  useful	  guide	  also	  to	  understanding	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  transnational	  civil	  society	  may,	  or	  may	  not,	  value	  the	  attribute	  of	  legitimacy.	  This	  point	  is	  especially	  telling	  in	  light	  of	  Castell’s	  observation	  (2012:235)	  that:	  	  	   Movements	   do	   not	   object	   to	   the	   principle	   of	   representative	   democracy,	   but	  denounce	  the	  practice	  of	  such	  democracy	  as	  it	  is	  today,	  and	  do	  not	  recognize	  its	  legitimacy.	  	  	  Moreover,	  Habermas	  describes	  civil	  society	  actors	  as	  operating	  in	  a	  social	  ‘sphere’	  of	  private	  life	  that	  is	  separated	  from	  both	  the	  public	  sphere	  and	  the	  state	  sphere	  (1989:3).	  However,	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘sphere’	  in	  the	  Habermasian	  conceptualisation	  —	  which,	  as	  will	  be	  shown	  in	  the	  case	  studies,	  is	  frequently	  echoed	  in	  TAN	  advocacy	  —	  entails	  connotations	  of	  there	  being	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  void	  and,	  moreover,	  one	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
strategies	  of	  many	  TANs,	  and	  hence	  on	  the	  subject	  matter	  on	  which	  many	  writers	  on	  contentious	  
international	  politics	  focus.	  Further	  study	  is	  required	  to	  substantiate	  this	  link.	  	  	  
80	  Convincing	  examples	  of	  this	  class-­‐differentiated	  thinking	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  study	  chapters	  and	  in	  
the	  Occupy	  movement’s	  key	  message	  asserting	  ‘We	  are	  the	  99%’	  (van	  Gelder,	  2011).	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is	  unoccupied	  by	  other	  entities	  and	  is	  available	  for	  appropriation.	  I	  take	  this	  to	  be	  a	  surmise	  that	  is	  not	  borne	  out	  in	  the	  international	  institutional	  realm,	  nor	  any	  other.	  Moreover,	  Habermas’s	  theorisations	  regarding	  class-­‐based	  ‘spheres’	  of	  social	  existence	  in	  a	  ‘lifeworld’	  are	  greatly	  at	  variance	  with	  the	  complexity	  theory	  used	  in	  this	  thesis,	  and	  with	  the	  multi-­‐causal	  realities	  and	  social	  mobilities	  of	  the	  contemporary	  world.	  As	  is	  shown	  in	  Chapters	  5	  and	  6,	  the	  place	  and	  function	  of	  NGOs/TANs	  in	  the	  international	  system	  are	  expanded	  in	  co-­‐evolutionary	  processes	  to	  accommodate	  non-­‐state	  actors	  as	  necessary,	  and	  do	  not	  pre-­‐exist.	  This	  literature	  supported	  the	  development	  of	  my	  hypothesis	  H481,	  concerning	  the	  value	  of	  applying	  complex	  realism	  to	  explicate	  this	  subject	  area.	  	  On	  a	  final	  note	  regarding	  ‘spheres’,	  Keane	  (2003:57-­‐66)	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  extensive	  scale	  and	  ubiquity	  of	  belief	  that	  a	  global	  civil	  society	  ‘with	  all	  its	  blurred	  self-­‐images	  and	  ambiguities’	  actually	  exists	  as	  an	  autonomous	  social	  space,	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  family,	  ‘within	  which	  individuals,	  groups,	  and	  movements	  can	  effectively	  organise	  and	  manoeuvre	  on	  a	  world	  scale	  to	  undo	  and	  transform	  existing	  power	  relations,	  especially	  those	  of	  big	  business’	  (ibid:62-­‐63).	  Noting	  the	  ‘unfortunate	  impression	  that	  global	  civil	  society	  is	  a	  (potentially)	  unified	  subject’,	  Keane	  warns	  us	  that	  a	  ‘one-­‐sided	  emphasis’	  on	  the	  voluntaristic	  choices	  of	  individuals	  ‘has	  the	  effect	  of	  obscuring	  other	  planetary	  forces	  that	  currently	  constrain	  and	  enable	  their	  actions’	  (ibid:66).	  Hence,	  Keane’s	  caveats	  and	  critical	  insights	  into	  the	  potential	  political	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs,	  operating	  under	  the	  mantle	  of	  global	  civil	  society,	  influenced	  my	  decision	  to	  explore	  them	  further	  via	  the	  hypotheses	  H1	  and	  H3.82	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Overall,	  the	  GCS	  literature	  revealed	  that	  there	  are	  elements	  of	  the	  composition,	  ideologies	  and	  strategies	  of	  transnational,	  or	  global,	  civil	  society	  activist	  networks	  that	  need	  far	  greater	  clarification,	  since	  they	  appeared	  destined	  to	  impact	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  H4:	  A	  complex	  realist	  approach	  has	  exemplary	  merit	  in	  approaching	  the	  subject	  area	  and	  primary	  
research	  question	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  
82	  H1:	  Contemporary	  TANs	  are	  an	  important	  NGO	  variant	  in	  international	  politics	  that	  have	  
unprecedented	  properties	  and	  powers	  emerging	  from	  their	  advocacy	  communications,	  which	  are	  
typically	  neglected	  in	  politics	  theorising.	  	  
	  	  	  H3:	  The	  adversarial	  advocacy	  strategies	  adopted	  by	  some	  TANs	  constitute	  a	  barrier	  to	  them	  achieving	  
their	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  policy-­‐making	  environment.	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negatively	  on	  their	  relationships	  with	  officials	  of	  state	  systems	  and	  international	  institutions.	  	  
2.2.3	  Political	  advocacy	  in	  the	  Information	  Age	  	  In	  this	  section	  I	  lay	  the	  groundwork	  for	  my	  later	  discussion	  relating	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  ‘Information	  Age’	  to	  the	  development	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs.	  This	  literature	  was	  necessary	  for	  understanding	  the	  part	  of	  the	  PRQ	  relating	  to	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs	  in	  achieving	  their	  aims,	  which	  I	  hypothesised	  was	  significantly	  influenced	  by	  their	  communications	  strategies	  and	  performance.	  In	  fact,	  Risse	  concludes	  (2012:434):	  ‘[…]	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  transnational	  advocacy	  groups	  and	  activists	  depends	  crucially	  on	  the	  strategies	  used’.	  	  Synthesising	  Risse’s	  finding	  with	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  definition	  of	  TANs	  (1998:8)	  as	  transnational	  networks	  that	  are	  uniquely	  defined	  by	  their	  ‘advocacy’	  function	  —	  
i.e.	  organising	  to	  ‘plead	  the	  causes	  of	  others	  or	  defending	  a	  cause	  or	  proposition’	  —	  illustrates	  the	  centrality	  of	  communications	  strategies	  to	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs.	  Moreover,	  these	  insights	  support	  my	  hypothesis	  that	  TAN	  communications	  strategies	  also	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  ‘place’	  and	  ‘function’	  of	  TANs	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  	  	  	  Providing	  an	  overview	  of	  contemporary	  political	  advocacy,	  Buzan	  (2004:	  83)	  explains	  that	  as	  modern,	  industrialised,	  societies	  have	  become	  better	  educated	  and	  more	  capable,	  they	  have	  also	  become	  less	  subservient	  to	  authority,	  more	  willing	  to	  define	  their	  own	  agendas,	  and	  more	  able	  to	  create	  their	  own	  nodes	  and	  networks	  in	  pursuit	  of	  those	  agendas.	  Furthermore,	  many	  people	  believe	  they	  can	  influence	  the	  world	  with	  their	  mobilisation,	  but	  doubt	  they	  can	  do	  it	  through	  normal	  political	  processes.	  This	  opinion	  is	  shared	  by	  Castells	  (2007,	  2012:234-­‐237),	  and	  by	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:32).	  	  	  Castells	  describes	  ‘The	  Network	  Society’	  (2004b),	  as	  an	  upsurge	  in	  social	  movements	  ‘in	  most	  parts	  of	  the	  world’	  in	  recent	  years.	  Appearing	  in	  very	  different	  forms	  and	  with	  sharply	  contrasting	  systems	  of	  values	  and	  beliefs	  to	  those	  of	  the	  past,	  he	  claims	  that	  these	  social	  transformation	  agendas	  are	  purposive	  collective	  
	   54	  
actions	  aimed	  at	  changing	  the	  values	  and	  interests	  institutionalised	  in	  society83.	  They	  are,	  therefore,	  tantamount	  to	  challenges	  to	  existing	  power	  relations	  (ibid),	  and	  are	  communicating	  	  (‘from	  many-­‐to-­‐many’)	  through	  a	  global	  web	  of	  horizontal	  communication	  networks:	  	   The	  emergence	  of	  mass	   self-­‐communication	  offers	  an	  extraordinary	  medium	  for	  social	  movements	  and	  rebellious	   individuals	  to	  build	  their	  autonomy	  and	  confront	   the	   institutions	  of	  society	   in	   their	  own	  terms	  and	  around	  their	  own	  projects	  […]	  they	  also	  intervene	  in	  the	  mainstream	  mass	  media	  as	  they	  try	  to	  influence	  public	  opinion	  at	  large.	  	  While	  generally	  agreeing	  with	  the	  socio-­‐political	  insights	  Castells	  offers,	  I	  consider	  his	  work	  suffers	  from	  an	  important	  oversight.	  In	  placing	  his	  focus	  on	  correlational	  aspects	  of	  the	  social	  and	  technological	  conditions	  that	  appear	  to	  have	  triggered	  the	  emergence	  of	  TANs,	  Castells	  not	  only	  perceives	  advocacy	  activists	  massively	  embracing	  new	  communications	  technologies,	  but	  uncritically	  assumes	  both	  the	  presence	  and	  uniformity	  of	  the	  high	  levels	  of	  sophisticated	  communications	  skills	  and	  techniques	  that	  are	  required	  to	  use	  ICTs	  effectively84.	  Consequently,	  the	  impressions	  gained	  from	  finding	  this	  gap	  in	  the	  political	  literature	  prompted	  me	  to	  explore	  further,	  since	  my	  empirical	  experience	  had	  led	  me	  to	  an	  alternative	  proposition:	  i.e.	  that	  while	  it	  is	  apparent	  many	  TANs	  are	  availing	  of	  the	  talents	  of	  multitudes	  of	  communications	  graduates	  entering	  the	  NGO	  and	  non-­‐profit	  world,	  only	  the	  better-­‐resourced	  organisations	  can	  afford	  to	  hire	  the	  most	  skilled	  advocacy	  practitioners	  in	  a	  highly	  competitive	  market.	  Moreover,	  I	  considered	  there	  was	  a	  case	  to	  be	  made	  that	  international	  ‘best	  practice’	  communications	  techniques	  among	  the	  most	  visible,	  mainstream,	  TANs	  are	  now	  highly	  commoditised,	  resulting	  in	  their	  increasing	  tendency	  to	  all	  look	  and	  act	  much	  the	  same.	  	  	  Overall,	  the	  literature	  seeded	  an	  argument	  that	  in	  the	  Information	  Age,	  advocacy	  communications	  theorisations	  provide	  a	  more	  coherent	  platform	  from	  which	  to	  assess	  the	  new	  ICT-­‐enabled	  political	  activist	  phenomena	  than	  does	  the	  commonly-­‐found	  alternative:	  grafting	  mismatched	  extensions	  on	  to	  pre-­‐existing	  social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	  Keane	  argues	  that	  within	  global	  movements	  generally	  (even	  anti-­‐globalisation	  groups),	  the	  existing	  
form	  of	  global	  civil	  society	  is	  held	  to	  be	  ‘a	  good	  thing’	  that	  is	  ‘in	  need	  of	  militant	  defence,	  for	  instance	  
staged	  at	  the	  feet	  of	  global	  institutions,	  before	  the	  eyes	  and	  ears	  of	  the	  world’s	  media’	  (2003:62).	  
84	  The	  term	  ’effectively’	  is	  taken	  here	  to	  mean	  having	  the	  capability	  to	  strategically	  elicit	  desired	  
responses	  from	  identified	  target	  audiences.	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movements	  theory.	  The	  results	  of	  this	  latter	  methodology,	  as	  found	  in	  the	  core	  social	  movements	  literature,	  can	  be	  confusing.	  ‘It	  is	  difficult	  to	  grasp	  the	  nature	  of	  social	  movements,’	  Diani	  (Diani	  and	  McAdam,	  2003:1)	  warns,	  	  before	  providing	  a	  long	  list	  of	  	  group	  characteristics	  from	  which	  a	  researcher	  might	  choose,	  in	  order	  to	  begin	  conceptualising	  the	  phenomenon.	  Ultimately,	  Diani	  concludes:	  ‘Social	  movements	  are	  in	  other	  words,	  complex	  and	  highly	  heterogeneous	  network	  structures’.	  Castells	  (2004:73)	  makes	  the	  claim,	  somewhat	  credulously,	  that	  social	  movements	  ‘are	  what	  they	  say	  they	  are’.	  Taking	  a	  sceptical	  view	  of	  this	  claim,	  based	  on	  receiver-­‐orientation	  aspects	  of	  communications	  theory	  (Broom	  and	  Sha,	  2013:195;	  Gregory,	  2000:91-­‐93;	  Miller,	  2005:10),	  I	  was	  prompted	  to	  propose	  instead	  that	  socio-­‐political	  movements	  are	  what	  their	  receiver	  audiences	  perceive	  them	  to	  be.	  This,	  by	  definition,	  will	  be	  the	  majority	  view,	  and	  it	  may	  be	  far	  from	  the	  self-­‐images	  social	  activist	  groups	  have	  of	  themselves85.	  	  A	  focus	  on	  TAN	  campaigns	  as	  an	  analytical	  framework,	  as	  first	  advised	  by	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  (1998:6-­‐7),	  was	  in	  my	  view	  predisposed	  to	  examining	  the	  intentionality	  and	  conduct	  of	  specific	  campaigns.	  This	  methodology,	  I	  surmised,	  provides	  a	  self-­‐limiting,	  temporally	  constrained,	  picture	  of	  complex	  political	  situations,	  and	  has	  a	  limited	  ability	  to	  reveal	  multi-­‐causality,	  inconclusiveness	  and	  unintentionality	  in	  the	  outcomes	  of	  actions.	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  quotation	  below,	  the	  campaign	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs	  cannot	  necessarily	  be	  taken	  at	  face	  value.	  The	  rationale	  given	  by	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  for	  the	  campaign	  focus	  is	  that	  it	  ‘highlights	  relationships’86	  —	  how	  connections	  are	  established	  and	  maintained	  among	  network	  actors,	  and	  between	  activists	  and	  their	  allies	  and	  opponents	  (ibid:7).	  However,	  in	  reviewing	  the	  literature	  containing	  accounts	  of	  campaigns87,	  relationships	  with	  international	  institutions	  were	  found	  to	  be	  invariably	  assessed,	  if	  at	  all,	  from	  an	  outside-­‐in	  orientation	  focusing	  on	  the	  subjective	  understandings	  of	  campaigners	  about	  what	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  As	  an	  illustration	  (albeit	  an	  extreme	  one):	  the	  violent	  activism	  of	  youthful	  Red	  Guards	  during	  China’s	  
Cultural	  Revolution	  was	  perceived	  from	  within	  the	  organisation	  as	  patriotic	  and	  morally	  irreproachable	  
in	  its	  conviction	  that	  the	  country’s	  culture	  needed	  transforming,	  although	  arguably	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  
movement	  for	  millions	  of	  others	  throughout	  the	  world	  was,	  and	  still	  is,	  that	  it	  was	  abhorrent	  and	  cruel	  
(Cheng,	  1987:	  77-­‐79;	  87-­‐89).	  This	  dramatic	  example	  is	  used	  here	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  importance	  of	  
external	  perceptions	  of	  an	  organisation,	  or	  an	  individual,	  in	  making	  meaning	  and	  reifying	  identity,	  
whether	  this	  is	  with	  majority,	  minority	  or	  oppositional	  key	  audiences.	  	  	  
86	  Emphasis	  as	  in	  original.	  
87	  Accounts	  of	  TAN	  campaigns,	  from	  a	  political	  perspective,	  were	  found	  in	  each	  of	  the	  three	  literatures	  
reviewed.	  These	  included:	  Prakash	  and	  Gugerty	  (2010);	  Florini	  (2000);	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  (1998);	  Imig	  and	  
Tarrow	  (2001);	  Diani	  and	  McAdam	  (2003);	  Melucci,	  1996;	  Edwards	  and	  Gaventa	  (2001);	  Dakroury	  et	  al	  
(2009);	  and	  Khagram	  et	  al,	  2002).	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they	  are	  doing	  and	  the	  results	  of	  their	  strategies,	  rather	  than	  an	  inside-­‐out	  orientation,	  which	  is	  the	  only	  reliable	  means	  of	  establishing	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  specific	  campaign	  strategies	  and	  their	  power	  to	  elicit	  change	  (Miller,	  2005:10)88.	  In	  fact,	  Sikkink	  (2005:152)	  admits:	  	   Few	  social	  movement	  theorists	  do	  research	  that	   looks	  inside	  of	   international	  institutions	  to	  understand	  how	  social	  movements	  work	  there	  and	  what	  kind	  of	  impact	   they	   have	   had.	   As	   studies	   of	   transnational	   campaigning	   increase,	   I	  believe	  that	  social	  movement	  theorists	  will	  find	  it	  useful	  to	  take	  international	  institutions	  more	  seriously	  as	  actual	  arenas	  for	  social	  movement	  activity,	  not	  just	  as	  targets.	  	  For	  these	  reasons,	  this	  literature	  proved	  inadequate	  for	  mining	  the	  multi-­‐party	  ontological	  reality	  of	  TAN	  relationships	  and	  influence	  in	  the	  international	  institutional	  system	  —	  creating	  an	  imperative	  to	  conduct	  deeper	  research	  into	  international	  institutional	  archives.	  In	  the	  event,	  these	  official	  sources	  enabled	  a	  range	  of	  seldom-­‐voiced,	  contrasting	  perspectives	  regarding	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  NGOs/TANs	  in	  the	  international	  system;	  the	  strengths	  and	  limitations	  of	  their	  impact	  in	  international	  fora	  and	  raise	  questions	  about	  possible	  futures	  for	  non-­‐state	  organisations	  in	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  governance.	  	  	  Importantly,	  Albertazzi	  and	  McDonnell	  (2008)	  enabled	  this	  study	  to	  identify	  striking	  similarities	  between	  the	  advocacy	  style	  and	  messages	  of	  many	  TANs	  and	  the	  simplistic	  and	  reductionist	  rhetoric	  and	  messages	  of	  modern-­‐day	  populist	  movements,	  both	  on	  the	  political	  left	  and	  the	  right.	  Similarities	  included	  the	  promotion	  of	  heightened	  senses	  of	  insecurity	  and	  urgency,	  and	  social	  boundary	  construction	  based	  on	  a	  theoretically	  sparse	  ideology	  that	  pits	  a	  virtuous	  and	  homogeneous	  ‘people’	  (which	  will	  be	  shown	  later	  to	  be	  reflected	  in	  the	  increasing	  popular	  appetite	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘people	  power’)	  against	  a	  set	  of	  elites	  and	  dangerous	  ‘others’.	  Disillusionment,	  frustration	  and	  anger	  with	  existing	  regimes	  and	  institutions	  of	  democratic	  governance	  was	  also	  a	  recurring	  theme	  among	  writers	  focusing	  on	  populism	  and	  those	  observing	  the	  emergence	  of	  transnational	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  A	  particularly	  helpful	  text	  was	  Contesting	  Global	  Governance:	  Multilateral	  Economic	  Institutions	  and	  
Global	  Social	  Movements	  (O’Brien,	  Goetz,	  Scholte	  and	  Williams,	  2000).	  This	  was	  one	  of	  the	  few	  texts	  
available	  on	  complex	  multilateralism	  that	  investigates	  the	  major	  public	  multilateral	  economic	  
institutions	  from	  an	  inside-­‐out	  perspective.	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advocacy	  nodes	  and	  networks	  and	  the	  features	  of	  their	  political	  engagements	  (see	  Pasquino,	  2008:15-­‐29;	  and	  Castells,	  2012;	  234-­‐237).	  	  It	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  the	  literature	  outlined	  in	  this	  section	  is	  voluminous	  and	  expanding	  at	  an	  astonishing	  rate,	  as	  scholars	  vie	  to	  conceptualise	  and	  record	  their	  analyses	  of	  the	  global	  political	  zeitgeist.	  However,	  by	  comparison,	  research	  on	  the	  campaigns	  developed	  and	  presented	  by	  TANs	  is	  relatively	  limited,	  often	  confined	  by	  theoretical	  approaches	  that	  leave	  questions	  unanswered,	  and	  patchy	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  issues	  studied.	  This	  situation	  is	  not	  especially	  surprising	  considering	  the	  multitude	  of	  TAN	  campaigns	  appearing	  in	  recent	  years	  and	  the	  inherent	  difficulties	  in	  studying	  them	  other	  than	  as	  individual,	  or	  small-­‐n	  comparative,	  case	  studies.	  	  
2.2.4	  Methodological	  approaches	  and	  limitations	  in	  the	  literature	  	  Research	  into	  social	  movements,	  generally—	  including	  TANs	  —	  and	  their	  projected	  intentional,	  and	  unintentional,	  messages,	  revealed	  a	  preoccupation	  with	  studying	  such	  organisations	  by	  taking	  an	  observer’s	  subjective	  perspective,	  and	  on	  defending	  one	  theoretical	  or	  methodological	  approach	  (Finnemore	  and	  Sikkink,	  2001;	  Tarrow,	  1999;	  Chandler,	  2005:166).	  As	  touched	  on	  in	  the	  preceding	  section,	  approaches	  to	  NGO/TAN	  advocacy	  has	  tended	  to	  concentrate	  on	  assessing	  campaign	  communications	  outputs,	  rather	  than	  on	  evaluating	  outcomes,	  which	  is	  seen	  by	  communications	  professionals	  as	  essential	  to	  determining	  campaign	  effectiveness	  (Broom	  and	  Sha,	  2013:333;	  Gregory,	  2000:	  171;	  Macnamara,	  2000:	  230-­‐32).	  In	  fact,	  Chandler	  (2005:162-­‐5),	  Colás	  (2002:65),	  and	  Keane	  (2003:95)	  each	  express	  caution	  regarding	  tendencies	  of	  social	  science	  researchers	  to	  exaggerate	  the	  influence	  and	  power	  of	  global	  civic	  actors	  through	  sympathetic,	  though	  often	  biased,	  empirical	  research	  methodologies.	  Finnemore	  and	  Sikkink	  (2001)	  also	  acknowledge	  that	  a	  bias	  toward	  progressive	  norms	  is	  common	  in	  constructivist	  IR	  research.	  Colás	  asserts	  (ibid):	  	   Such	   primarily	   descriptive	   accounts	   tend	   to	   conflate	   the	   self-­‐proclaimed	  aspirations	   and	   objectives	   of	   international	   social	   movements	   with	   their	  
actual89	  impact,	  thereby	  falling	  into	  the	  trap	  of	  an	  excessively	  subjectivist	  and	  therefore	  one-­‐sided	  view	  of	  the	  […]	  international	  social	  world.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  Emphasis	  as	  in	  original.	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Chandler	  also	  observes	  that,	  to	  date,	  constructivist	  approaches	  to	  global	  civil	  society	  seem	  to	  be	  driven	  more	  by	  a	  normative	  desire	  ‘to	  support	  the	  ‘principled-­‐issues’	  advocated	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors’	  than	  by	  any	  clear	  analysis	  of	  the	  complex	  relationship	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  (Chandler,	  2005:166).	  Furthermore,	  as	  a	  general	  observation,	  strategic	  aims	  and	  evaluation	  criteria	  for	  social	  movement	  campaigns	  often	  appear	  to	  be	  discussed	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  zero-­‐sum	  games	  —	  a	  position	  this	  thesis	  emphatically	  rejects	  as	  unhelpful	  in	  considering	  the	  real-­‐world	  dialectical,	  compromise-­‐dependent	  and	  conciliatory	  characteristics	  of	  the	  international	  policy-­‐making	  fora90.	  	  This	  thesis	  does	  not	  deny	  the	  usefulness	  of	  constructivist	  nor	  methodological	  individualistic	  approaches	  in	  examining	  international	  relations	  subject	  matter	  but,	  in	  view	  of	  these	  methodological	  debates,	  I	  considered	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  caution	  in	  selecting	  (a)	  the	  subject	  matter	  to	  which	  these	  methodological	  lenses	  might	  be	  applicable	  and	  (b)	  vigilance	  in	  determining	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  parts	  and	  levels	  of	  social	  relational	  reality	  that	  are	  actually	  being	  illuminated	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  explaining	  it	  that	  is	  possible.	  	  	  Clark	  et	  al	  (2005:293)	  argues	  also	  for	  the	  setting	  of	  more	  demanding	  standards	  in	  evaluating	  transnational	  political	  processes	  than	  has	  been	  applied	  in	  accounts	  of	  such	  activity	  to	  date.	  Meanwhile,	  Klandermans,	  Saggenborg	  and	  Tarrow,	  (2002:339)	  remind	  us	  that	  until	  quite	  recently	  most	  social	  movement	  research	  was	  lodged	  securely	  within	  domestic	  politics.	  Indeed,	  Klandermans	  et	  al	  point	  out	  that	  for	  some	  theorists	  the	  ‘national91	  social	  movement	  was	  the	  key	  subject	  of	  the	  study	  of	  contentious	  politics’.	  However,	  with	  the	  recent	  expansion	  of	  the	  authority	  of	  international	  institutions,	  the	  growth	  of	  INGOS	  and	  the	  ease	  with	  which	  citizens	  of	  the	  new	  century	  can	  travel	  and	  engage	  in	  contention,	  ‘social	  movement	  scholars	  are	  challenged	  to	  adapt	  their	  theories	  and	  methods	  to	  contention	  beyond	  borders’.	  Consequently,	  they	  assert:	  	   Whether	   these	   new	   global	   phenomena	   will	   fit	   within	   the	   canon	   of	   social	  	  	  	  movement	   research	   or	   require	   a	   qualitatively	   new	   theoretical	   effort	   is	   the	  most	  exciting	  issue	  in	  the	  field	  of	  contentious	  politics	  today	  (ibid).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  Evidence	  for	  this	  assessment	  is	  provided	  in	  Chapters	  4	  and	  5.	  
91	  Emphasis	  as	  in	  original.	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In	  similar	  vein,	  Wight	  (2006:	  174-­‐175)	  concludes	  that	  in	  the	  contemporary	  analysis	  of	  social	  practices,	  ranging	  across	  multiple	  planes	  of	  social	  activity	  and	  competing	  theories	  about	  the	  relative	  explanatory	  force	  of	  agents	  and	  structures:	  	  	  	  [T]he	   question	   remains	   as	   to	   whether	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   combine	   certain	  elements	   of	   them	   to	   form	   a	   social	   ontology	   able	   to	   integrate	   the	   various	  aspects	  of	  social	  life	  into	  one	  account.	  	  Because	  all	  of	  the	  dimensions	  of	  social	  life	  ‘can	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  social	  explanation’,	  Wight	  observes	  ‘[…]	  we	  need	  a	  metatheory	  able	  to	  hold	  out	  the	  potential	  of	  integration	  across	  all	  fields	  of	  activity’	  (ibid:	  175).	  	  	  These	  debates	  spotlighted	  widespread	  misgivings	  over	  the	  credibility	  of	  present	  knowledge	  on	  TANs	  and	  the	  adequacy	  of	  applying	  stock	  epistemological	  templates	  to	  studying	  them.	  This	  led	  me	  to	  search	  for	  substantive92	  theoretical	  frameworks	  and	  tools	  that	  would	  help	  me	  to	  bridge	  the	  multiple	  levels	  of	  analysis	  and	  inter-­‐disciplinary	  paradigms	  implied	  by	  the	  PRQ	  and	  hypotheses.	  In	  this	  quest,	  I	  was	  guided	  also	  by	  Giddens	  (1984:xxii),	  who	  argues	  for	  an	  eclectic	  approach	  to	  borrowing	  ideas	  from	  ‘quite	  divergent	  sources’	  and	  a	  plurality	  of	  traditions,	  sharpening	  them	  and	  demonstrating	  their	  usefulness	  to	  illuminating	  complex	  problems	  of	  social	  analysis.	  	  	  Inevitably,	  I	  encountered	  significant	  challenges	  in	  seeking	  precedents	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  were	  relevant	  to	  both	  my	  international	  system	  research	  area	  and	  the	  international-­‐level	  aims	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  suitable	  case	  study	  TANs.	  In	  many	  instances,	  the	  literature	  presented	  case	  studies	  of	  domestic	  dissident	  campaigns	  that	  were	  boosted93	  to	  another	  level	  of	  complex	  international	  interaction,	  following	  their	  adoption	  by	  various	  TANs	  (e.g.	  Risse,	  2000:177-­‐209;	  Colás,	  2005:23;	  Bourgos,	  2000;	  Florini,	  2000).	  These	  cases	  inferred	  political	  potency	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  TAN	  interventions	  and	  offered	  post	  hoc	  accounts	  of	  selected	  events	  of	  interest	  to	  researchers,	  but	  left	  vital	  questions	  unanswered	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  indigenous	  campaigns	  that	  were,	  say,	  damaged	  by	  the	  intervention	  of	  transnational	  activists,	  or	  simply	  failed	  to	  appear	  on	  the	  mainstream	  academic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  This	  thesis	  was	  constructed	  using	  applied	  substantive	  theory	  and	  empirical	  research	  and	  makes	  no	  
claims	  to	  presenting	  metatheory.	  	  
93	  See	  my	  earlier	  references	  to	  ‘scale	  shift’	  theory	  in	  Section	  2.2.1.	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radar94.	  I	  found	  such	  qualitative	  studies	  to	  be	  sources	  of	  thought-­‐provoking	  human	  interest	  and	  ethnic	  data,	  but	  to	  be	  deficient	  in	  regard	  to	  international	  comparability	  and	  the	  true	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs	  interacting	  with	  the	  international	  system.	  	  	  Meanwhile,	  others	  	  (Keane,	  2003:95;	  Chandler,	  2005:162;	  Clark	  et	  al,	  2005)	  are	  united	  in	  condemning	  the	  quantitative	  model,	  whereby	  counting	  the	  number	  of	  non-­‐state	  institutions	  and	  their	  rates	  of	  growth	  is	  alleged	  by	  some	  researchers	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  influence95.	  While	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  quantify	  specific	  policy	  changes	  as	  a	  result	  of	  international	  engagement	  between	  NGOs	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  and	  states	  and	  international	  institutions	  (Chandler,	  2005:162;	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:26),	  I	  suggest	  that	  this	  difficulty	  is	  not	  resolved	  by	  taking	  approaches	  that	  use	  empirical	  case	  studies	  that	  assign	  primary	  importance	  to	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  	  These	  considerations	  pointed	  to	  significant	  gaps	  in	  the	  methodological	  literature	  on	  ways	  to	  approach	  social	  activist	  groups,	  in	  general,	  and	  the	  research	  problem	  space	  in	  particular,	  requiring	  that	  this	  study	  take	  a	  more	  heterodox	  overall	  methodological	  approach	  and	  explore	  many	  alternative	  theories	  and	  approaches.	  	  	  There	  were	  many	  to	  choose	  from.	  Indeed,	  the	  literature	  was	  notable	  for	  the	  profusion	  of	  research	  approaches	  that	  have	  been	  applied	  to	  new	  forms	  of	  transnational	  activism	  (Tarrow,	  2005:	  20-­‐24;	  Klandermans,	  Staggenborg	  and	  Tarrow,	  2002:314-­‐322)	  —	  each	  one	  providing,	  I	  suggest,	  only	  partial	  illumination	  of	  my	  research	  area.	  In	  analysing	  how	  others	  have	  sought	  to	  capture	  and	  portray	  the	  place	  and	  function	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  generally,	  in	  the	  international	  system	  —	  including	  those	  found	  to	  fit	  some,	  or	  all,	  of	  the	  referent	  criteria	  for	  TANs96	  that	  I	  developed	  for	  this	  thesis	  —	  I	  logged	  evidence	  in	  the	  literature	  of	  each	  of	  the	  following	  analytical	  frameworks:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Tarrow	  (2005:76),	  provides	  support	  for	  this	  hypothesis	  in	  his	  identification	  of	  contradictions	  between	  
the	  ‘local’	  and	  the	  ’global’	  in	  the	  framing	  of	  issues	  by	  TANs	  interested	  in	  representing	  indigenous	  issues	  
globally.	  
95	  This	  thesis	  makes	  no	  such	  power	  claims	  for	  the	  statistical	  graphic	  representation	  at	  Figure	  5.1.	  What	  
the	  data	  is	  meant	  to	  indicate	  is	  the	  enormous	  scale	  of	  INGO	  growth;	  that	  this	  growth	  has	  occurred	  in	  a	  
relatively	  short	  space	  of	  time;	  and	  it	  supports	  Buzan’s	  observation	  that:	  ‘the	  transnational	  domain	  was	  
uncommonly	  lively’	  (2004:81).	  
96	  See	  Figure	  6.2	  for	  the	  differentiating	  referent	  criteria	  for	  TANs.	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• Actor	  Network	  Theory	  (Law,	  2004;	  Latour,	  2007);	  
• Argument	  (Risse,	  2000;	  Finnemore	  and	  Sikkink,	  2001);	  	  
• Brand	  analysis	  (Barakso,	  2010:155-­‐172);	  
• Campaigns	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998);	  
• Claim-­‐making	  and	  counter-­‐claim	  making	  (McAdam,	  Tarrow	  and	  Tilly,	  2001:138);	  	  
• Communications	  networks	  (Castells,	  2004b);	  
• Discourse	  analysis	  (Johnston,	  2002:62);	  	  
• Frame	  analysis	  (Goffman,	  1959;	  Chesters	  and	  Welsh,	  2006:13-­‐14:	  Snow	  et	  al,	  1986);	  	  
• Globalisation	  theories	  incorporating	  complexity	  theory	  (Chesters	  and	  Welsh,	  2006:1-­‐9);	  
• Issue-­‐based	  analysis	  (Willetts,	  2011:xviii);	  
• Performativity	  (Butler,	  1997;	  Goffman,	  1959:28-­‐82);	  
• Principled	  instrumentalism	  (Mitchell	  and	  Schmitz,	  2014:504)	  
• Networks	  (Diani,	  2002:188-­‐194;	  Marsh,	  1998;	  Castells,	  2012;	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:4);	  
• New	  social	  movement	  theory	  (Tarrow,	  2005);	  
• Recognition	  and	  identity	  politics	  (Taylor,	  1997;	  Castells,	  2004a);	  
• Reflexive	  framing	  (Rein	  and	  Schön,	  1995);	  	  
• Reframing	  (Laws	  and	  Rein,	  2003:174);	  	  
• Representation	  (Pitkin,	  1967);	  	  
• Representative	  claims	  (Saward,	  2010);	  	  
• Resource	  management	  (Thomas,	  2006);	  
• Rights	  marketing	  (Bob,	  2010:133-­‐134);	  
• Self-­‐interested	  firms	  (Prakash	  and	  Gugerty,	  2010:1-­‐3);	  
• Social	  movement	  theory	  (Touraine,	  1981;	  Kaldor,	  2005)	  
• Social	  network	  theory	  (Diani	  and	  McAdam,	  2003;	  Mueller	  et	  al,	  2007);	  
• Transnational	  advocacy/transnational	  civil	  society	  collective	  action	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:2-­‐4;	  Tarrow,	  2005:	  28-­‐29;	  Florini,	  2000:3-­‐12).	  
	  Although	  it	  is	  impractical	  to	  assess	  here	  each	  of	  these	  rejected	  frameworks,	  I	  found	  that	  two	  that	  were	  commonly	  applied	  are	  connected	  to:	  (a)	  their	  organisational	  configurations	  in	  ‘networks’;	  and	  	  (b)	  their	  socio-­‐political	  reach,	  as	  connoted	  by	  the	  term	  ‘transnational’.	  Despite	  its	  appeal	  ‘as	  a	  description	  of	  some	  important	  realities	  in	  contemporary	  political	  systems’,	  Peters	  argues	  that	  there	  are	  significant	  questions	  outstanding	  about	  using	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘networks’	  and	  its	  theoretical	  utility	  (1998:21-­‐22).	  Peters	  queries	  whether	  networks	  exist	  ‘in	  any	  meaningful	  sense’	  as	  a	  means	  of	  explaining	  political	  interactions	  and	  policy-­‐making,	  or	  whether	  they	  are	  ‘mere	  constructs	  imposed	  by	  researchers	  for	  their	  own	  intellectual	  convenience’.	  A	  lack	  of	  distinction	  in	  the	  literature	  between	  types	  of	  networks	  is	  also	  problematical	  in	  that	  they	  all	  appear	  to	  be	  effectively	  the	  same,	  with	  insufficient	  focus	  on	  how	  they	  exert	  influence	  (ibid:	  30).	  Meanwhile,	  the	  term	  ‘transnational’,	  in	  a	  geographical	  sense,	  has	  little	  meaning	  as	  a	  unit	  of	  analysis,	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when	  TANs	  comprise	  social	  groups	  embedded	  in	  many	  social	  ‘worlds’,	  albeit	  existing	  within	  one	  ecosphere	  but	  poles	  apart	  in	  comparability.	  They	  may,	  for	  instance,	  range	  from	  groups	  embedded	  in	  economic	  development	  situations	  characterised	  as	  ‘First	  World’,	  ‘Third	  World’,	  etc;	  or	  social	  structural	  and	  cultural	  orders	  organised	  on	  tribal,	  class-­‐divided,	  or	  advanced	  industrial	  capitalist	  lines97.	  Due	  to	  space	  considerations,	  my	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  how	  these	  two	  frameworks	  helped	  to	  inform	  this	  thesis,	  where	  they	  revealed	  weaknesses	  and	  my	  reasons	  for	  deviating	  from	  these	  norms,	  is	  presented	  at	  Annex	  3.	  	  In	  light	  of	  the	  array	  of	  investigative	  approaches	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  literature,	  I	  saw	  credible	  support	  for	  Adler’s	  opinion	  (2002:104)	  that	  the	  methodological	  debate	  on	  understanding	  the	  changing	  face	  of	  international	  contentious	  politics	  and	  transnational	  activism	  is	  ‘outstanding,	  though	  urgent’,	  as	  social	  scientists	  apply	  an	  expanding	  range	  of	  research	  approaches	  to	  the	  task.	  There	  was	  evidence	  in	  the	  literature	  also	  to	  support	  Law’s	  insight	  (2004:2),	  that	  ‘when	  social	  science	  tries	  to	  describe	  things	  that	  are	  complex,	  diffuse	  and	  messy’	  it	  ‘tends	  to	  make	  a	  mess	  of	  it’.	  This,	  Law	  asserts,	  is	  ‘because	  clear	  descriptions	  don’t	  work	  if	  what	  they	  are	  describing	  is	  itself	  not	  very	  coherent’.	  These	  apparent	  methodological	  shortcomings	  in	  researching	  the	  subject	  area	  led	  me	  to	  explore	  alternative	  approaches,	  resulting	  in	  the	  development	  of	  my	  H498,	  exploring	  complex	  realism.	  	  	  Hence,	  extensive	  reviewing	  of	  contemporary	  studies	  in	  critical	  realism,	  complexity,	  and	  complex	  realism	  was	  required	  to	  trace	  the	  development	  of	  the	  relatively	  new	  paradigm	  of	  complex	  realism,	  which	  was	  then	  adopted	  in	  this	  thesis	  as	  a	  unifying	  conceptual	  framework	  and	  methodological	  resource.	  As	  I	  demonstrate	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  complex	  realism	  and	  communication	  lenses	  are	  useful	  tools	  for	  analysing	  political	  relationships,	  even	  conflictual	  ones,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  avoiding	  the	  risk	  of	  becoming	  overwhelmed	  and	  influenced	  by	  the	  dilemmas	  associated	  with	  specific	  political	  debates.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97	  See	  Giddens	  for	  analysis	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  understanding	  these	  social	  structural	  categories	  
(1984:91-­‐92;	  180-­‐185).	  	  
98	  H4:	  A	  complex	  realist	  approach	  has	  exemplary	  merit	  in	  approaching	  the	  subject	  area	  and	  primary	  
research	  question	  of	  the	  thesis.	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2.3	  Summary	  	  After	  reviewing	  the	  theoretical	  divisions	  expressed	  in	  the	  literature,	  I	  chose	  to	  enter	  the	  micro-­‐macro	  analytical	  debate	  in	  IR	  astride	  the	  dividing	  fence:	  persuaded	  that	  the	  ontological	  understandings	  of	  complexity	  and	  neorealism	  are	  best	  suited	  to	  macroscopic	  analyses	  of	  international	  relations,	  while	  constructivist	  investigations	  are	  best	  suited	  to	  obtaining	  better	  understandings	  of	  typically	  local	  situations	  that	  are	  within	  the	  experience	  of	  situated	  local	  actors.	  Importantly,	  there	  were	  gaps	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  made	  it	  impossible	  to	  answer	  the	  PRQ	  and	  hypotheses	  without	  conducting	  further,	  original,	  research.	  These	  gaps	  were	  most	  apparent	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  (a)	  bringing	  into	  the	  contentious	  international	  politics	  paradigm	  more	  scientific	  and	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  understandings	  of	  the	  role	  of	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  communications	  in	  interpreting	  the	  interface	  between	  TANs	  and	  the	  international	  system;	  (b)	  explaining	  the	  barriers	  to	  international-­‐level	  relationships,	  roles	  and	  effectiveness	  that	  some	  TANs	  encounter;	  and	  (c)	  explaining	  the	  different	  environments	  and	  effectiveness	  conditions	  that	  TANs	  encounter	  at	  various	  levels	  of	  complex	  interaction,	  beyond	  the	  basic	  mechanism	  identified	  by	  scale-­‐shift	  theory.	  Moreover,	  these	  lacunae	  highlighted	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  unifying	  analytical	  framework	  in	  which	  micro-­‐	  and	  macro-­‐sociological	  phenomena	  could	  be	  accommodated	  and	  their	  inter-­‐relationships	  explained.	  	  I	  observed	  also	  that	  while	  writers	  in	  the	  contentious	  international	  politics	  paradigm	  frequently	  mention	  the	  work	  of	  others,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  they	  tend	  to	  be	  engaged	  in	  separate	  conversations.	  The	  body	  of	  literature	  itself	  is	  essentially	  fragmented	  due,	  perhaps,	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  research	  projects	  involving	  social	  movements	  and	  activism	  are	  based	  on	  fragmented	  case	  studies	  of	  specific	  local,	  regional,	  or	  national	  groups.	  The	  varied	  terminology	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  TANs	  and	  TAN-­‐type	  organisations	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  reflection	  of	  this	  heterogeneity.	  Chandler’s	  observation	  (2005:166),	  that	  constructivist	  (i.e.	  mainstream)	  approaches	  to	  global	  civil	  society	  seem	  to	  be	  driven	  mainly	  by	  a	  normative	  desire	  to	  support	  the	  ‘principled-­‐issues’	  advocated	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  was	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  body	  of	  work	  reviewed.	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Although	  there	  is	  abundant	  literature	  on	  the	  readily	  perceived	  aspects	  of	  NGOs/TANs99,	  little	  has	  been	  said	  on	  the	  rationality	  of	  the	  emerging	  TAN	  model	  as	  a	  communications	  vehicle	  for	  deployment	  across	  the	  multi-­‐level,	  multi-­‐dimensional	  social	  landscape	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  fact	  that	  TANs	  have	  emerged	  can	  be	  explained	  with	  reference	  to	  a	  rich	  mixture	  of	  historical	  and	  contemporary	  circumstances,	  which	  is	  adequately	  reflected	  in	  the	  literature.	  Whether	  transnational	  advocacy	  collectives	  are	  best	  suited	  to	  accomplish	  the	  goals	  they	  set	  for	  themselves,	  using	  the	  tools	  they	  select,	  appears	  open	  to	  question	  in	  light	  of	  uncertainties	  in	  the	  literature	  regarding	  their	  definition,	  common	  characteristics,	  and	  about	  their	  roles	  and	  performance	  in	  their	  interactions	  with	  the	  international	  system.	  Thus,	  the	  empirical	  exploration	  of	  TANs	  and	  their	  emergence	  and	  relationships,	  as	  assertive	  contenders	  in	  the	  international	  system,	  became	  the	  principal	  line	  of	  investigation	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  Constructivist	  narratives	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  social	  movements	  are	  helpful	  in	  explaining	  the	  motivations	  and	  rationality	  of	  contemporary	  TANs	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  interact	  with	  communications	  technologies	  in	  pursuit	  of	  their	  goals,	  but	  the	  compilation	  of	  large	  numbers	  of	  individual	  narratives	  do	  not,	  I	  argue,	  adequately	  explain	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  TANs	  interact	  with	  international	  institutions,	  leaving	  much	  to	  be	  assumed.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  seminal	  study,	  published	  1998,	  has	  been	  too	  influential	  among	  scholars,	  leading	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  critical	  attention	  by	  others	  following	  their	  groundbreaking	  path.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  These	  commonly	  include	  assessments	  of	  their	  social	  importance,	  principled	  issues,	  campaigns,	  
justification	  of	  claims	  and	  counter-­‐claims,	  impacts,	  setbacks,	  composition	  and	  possible	  futures.	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Chapter	  3	  
	  
3.	  Theoretical	  Framework	  and	  Methodology	  	  	  
Theories	  are	  nets	  cast	  to	  catch	  what	  we	  call	  ‘the	  world’.	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3.1	  Introduction	  This	  chapter	  sets	  out	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  primary	  research	  question100,	  has	  been	  approached,	  the	  theoretical	  underpinnings	  of	  the	  study	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  research	  was	  carried	  out.	  The	  format	  complies	  with	  the	  five	  sequential	  core	  components	  of	  the	  research	  process	  as	  defined	  by	  Grix	  (2002:175):	  ontology,	  epistemology,	  methodology,	  methods	  and	  sources.	  	  	  In	  the	  first	  instance,	  a	  macro-­‐analytical	  approach	  to	  the	  international	  system	  was	  clearly	  indicated	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  the	  study,	  notwithstanding	  the	  validation	  risks	  associated	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  generality	  (van	  Meter,	  1990:180-­‐181).	  This,	  first	  stage,	  ‘ascending’	  methodological	  approach	  follows	  Byne’s	  advice	  on	  surveying	  the	  social	  world	  by	  investigating	  the	  possible	  sources	  of	  social	  change	  at	  macro,	  meso	  and	  micro	  levels	  and	  assembling	  knowledge	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  further	  interventions	  (2011:61;	  Wight,	  2013:99).	  But	  equally,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  TANs	  are	  ‘effective’	  in	  achieving	  their	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  arena	  required	  examination	  by	  methods	  that	  would	  yield	  high	  levels	  of	  individual	  micro-­‐	  and	  meso-­‐level	  data,	  not	  least	  to	  ascertain	  their	  aims	  and	  effectiveness	  criteria.	  Guided	  by	  Minkoff	  (2002:260),	  I	  sought	  to	  avoid	  ‘the	  tendency	  of	  analysts	  to	  focus	  on	  specific	  social	  movements	  using	  only	  the	  case	  study	  method’,	  which	  privileges	  the	  histories	  and	  intramural	  understandings	  of	  individual	  organisations,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  ‘limiting	  the	  vantage	  point’	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  PRQ:	  What	  is	  the	  place	  and	  function	  of	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks	  in	  the	  contemporary	  
international	  system	  and	  how	  effective	  are	  they	  in	  achieving	  their	  aims?	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which	  we	  can	  comprehend	  them.	  These	  considerations	  dictated	  that	  a	  range	  of	  theoretical	  and	  analytical	  perspectives	  would	  be	  required.	  	  
	  Above	  all,	  this	  thesis	  contends	  that	  the	  primary	  research	  question	  is	  chiefly	  concerned	  with	  relationships	  in	  the	  international	  system	  at	  the	  macro-­‐organisational	  level101	  and	  is	  complex	  and	  multi-­‐dimensional,	  its	  implications	  having	  relevance	  for	  different	  strata	  of	  social	  reality,	  occurring	  not	  least	  on	  different	  levels	  of	  complexity	  and	  timescales,	  which,	  I	  argue,	  should	  not	  be	  conflated	  or	  reduced.	  Neither	  should	  the	  question	  components	  be	  investigated	  individually	  and	  apart,	  but	  linked	  and	  explained	  as	  causal	  elements	  in	  a	  constantly	  changing	  structural	  relational	  and	  complex	  systems	  account102	  (see	  Wight,	  2006:294-­‐295;	  Minkoff,	  2002:260-­‐264).	  Therefore,	  I	  resolved	  that	  Complex	  Realism	  was	  an	  appropriate	  all-­‐encompassing	  philosophical	  and	  methodological	  framework,	  providing	  for	  observing	  systemic	  behaviours,	  analysing	  relationships	  between	  international	  actors	  and	  showing	  us	  ways	  to	  consider	  systems	  as	  having	  distinct	  properties,	  powers	  and	  causal	  effects	  (Mitleton-­‐Kelly,	  2003;	  Walby,	  2009:17).	  Substantiation	  of	  this	  relatively	  recent	  theoretical	  addition	  to	  the	  international	  relations	  toolbox	  is	  presented	  in	  Section	  3.2.	  According	  to	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden	  (2011:	  72):	  	   Considering	   international	  actors	  as	  complex	  adaptive	  systems	  which	   interact	  with	   each	   other	   opens	   the	   route	   for	   analysing	   relations	   between	   them,	  whether	   they	   are,	   for	   example,	   states,	   governmental	   or	   non-­‐governmental	  international	  organizations,	  or	  transnational	  corporations.	  	  The	  suitability	  of	  the	  approach	  to	  this	  particular	  research	  problem	  space	  is	  further	  supported	  by	  the	  insights	  of	  Meadows	  (2009:13-­‐14),	  who	  argues	  that	  a	  social	  system’s	  function	  or	  purpose	  is	  not	  necessarily	  spoken,	  written,	  or	  expressed	  explicitly,	  and	  can	  best	  be	  deduced	  by	  investigating	  the	  way	  the	  system	  operates	  and	  how	  its	  various	  elements	  relate	  to	  each	  other.	  Meadows	  argues	  (ibid:14):	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  The	  macro-­‐organisational	  level	  of	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  inter-­‐organisational	  relationships,	  as	  opposed	  
to	  interpersonal	  relationships	  between	  individuals.	  Moreover,	  Minkoff	  asserts	  that	  ‘Organizational	  
dynamics	  cannot	  be	  observed	  or	  measured	  at	  the	  level	  of	  individual	  SMOs	  or	  even	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  a	  few	  
key	  actors’	  (2002:262).	  Note:	  Minkoff	  uses	  the	  acronym	  ‘SMO’	  to	  denote	  social	  movement	  
organizations.	  
102	  This	  thesis	  is	  guided	  by	  Wight’s	  insights	  into	  the	  importance,	  in	  analysing	  social	  phenomena	  and	  
practices,	  of	  considering	  both	  agential	  and	  structural	  relational	  logics	  occurring	  on	  multiple	  planes	  of	  
social	  activity	  (2006:296-­‐298).	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The	  best	  way	   to	   deduce	   the	   system’s	   purpose	   is	   to	  watch	   for	   a	  while	   to	   see	  how	  the	  system	  behaves.	  […]	  Purposes	  are	  deduced	  from	  behaviour,	  not	  from	  rhetoric	  or	  stated	  goals.	  	  Therefore,	  in	  the	  highly	  contested,	  rhetoric-­‐charged	  environment	  of	  transnational	  advocacy	  and	  international	  policy-­‐making,	  the	  availability	  of	  value-­‐neutral	  complex	  system	  analytical	  tools	  was	  crucial	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  thesis,	  generating	  new	  knowledge	  and	  being	  fair.	  The	  main	  data-­‐collecting	  period	  for	  this	  dissertation	  was	  carried	  out	  from	  2010	  to	  2014.	  	  
3.1.1	  Research	  design	  and	  approach	  rationale	  	  The	  research	  design	  was	  driven	  by	  a	  PRQ	  that	  was	  clearly	  indicative	  of	  four	  challenging	  considerations	  in	  international	  political	  research:	  (i)	  it	  pointed	  to	  a	  complex,	  multi-­‐dimensional,	  research	  problem	  space	  (or	  ontological	  landscape);	  (ii)	  it	  indicated	  the	  need	  for	  a	  progressive	  epistemological	  standpoint	  by	  containing,	  inter	  alia,	  implicit	  underlying	  connections	  to	  recent	  innovative	  sociological	  research	  approaches,	  such	  as	  complex	  realism,	  critical	  realism,	  complexity	  theorisations,	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  systems	  thinking	  in	  IR,	  and	  (in	  its	  allusion	  to	  social	  system	  change	  and	  self-­‐organising	  processes),	  social	  morphogenesis	  theory103;	  (iii)	  the	  essentially	  relational	  focus	  on	  interactions	  between	  the	  international	  system	  elements	  suggested	  that	  a	  cross-­‐disciplinary	  study	  was	  essential,	  combining	  political	  	  and	  communications	  theory;	  and	  (iv)	  the	  focus	  on	  a	  contemporary	  social	  phenomenon	  raised	  important	  methodological	  challenges,	  especially	  in	  regard	  to	  relevant	  contemporary	  literature,	  the	  social	  systemic	  levels	  of	  researcher	  perspective	  and	  intervention,	  the	  selection	  and	  validity	  of	  data	  sources	  and	  the	  critical	  requirement	  to	  keep	  abreast	  of	  on-­‐going	  developments	  within	  the	  contemporary	  international	  arena.	  	  Thus,	  the	  decision	  was	  taken	  to	  undertake	  an	  empirical	  research	  project	  to	  try	  to	  unlock	  the	  relational	  interface	  using	  (a)	  a	  broad-­‐ranging	  and	  objective	  primary	  research	  question;	  (b)	  a	  range	  of	  grounded	  hypotheses,	  or	  themes,	  employing	  complex	  realism	  as	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  and	  a	  range	  of	  theoretical	  lenses	  drawn	  principally	  from	  complexity,	  political	  and	  communications	  studies;	  (c)	  an	  inquiry	  design	  incorporating	  multiple	  case	  studies;	  and	  (d)	  an	  intensive	  diachronic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  For	  a	  succinct	  definition	  of	  morphogenesis	  theory	  see	  Archer	  2013:1-­‐2.	  For	  the	  value	  of	  this	  theory	  in	  
IR,	  see	  Wight,	  2013:86.	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process	  tracing	  exercise.	  Guided	  by	  Byrne	  (2011:61),	  I	  considered	  it	  essential	  that	  the	  data	  were	  time-­‐ordered	  to	  enable	  me	  to	  examine	  the	  processes	  of	  being	  and	  becoming	  that	  are	  necessary	  to	  understanding	  the	  emergence	  of	  TANs	  and	  locating	  them	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system.	  The	  aggregated	  results	  were	  then	  systematically	  analysed	  using	  a	  qualitative	  methodological	  framework	  involving	  substantive	  theory,	  content	  and	  discourse	  data,	  direct	  observation,	  and	  continual	  iteration	  between	  all	  of	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  research	  design.	  I	  would	  emphasise	  that	  this	  is	  an	  empirical	  thesis,	  based	  on	  my	  own	  intensive	  research	  and	  synthesis	  of	  substantive	  theory	  in	  the	  identified	  paradigms	  and,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  aspects	  of	  this	  thesis	  might	  be	  considered	  avant-­garde,	  I	  make	  no	  claims	  for	  developing	  meta-­‐theory,	  although,	  hopefully,	  some	  rich	  seams	  for	  future	  research	  are	  indicated.	  	  	  
Reflections	  on	  alternative	  epistemologies	  The	  forces	  accredited	  with	  driving	  globalisation	  in	  recent	  decades,	  particularly	  the	  advances	  in	  communications	  and	  transportation	  technologies,	  have	  increasingly	  brought	  the	  plight	  of	  suffering	  communities	  to	  new	  world	  audiences	  and,	  arguably,	  helped	  to	  generate	  social	  phenomena	  such	  as	  	  ‘cycles	  of	  contention’,	  a	  ‘global	  conscience’	  and	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  new	  NGOs	  aiming	  to	  represent	  local	  and	  domestic	  concerns	  in	  the	  international	  arena104.	  Meanwhile,	  research	  into	  ways	  to	  study	  these	  emerging	  social	  phenomena	  was	  also	  undergoing	  significant	  change.	  Since	  the	  late	  1960s,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  as	  research	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  moved	  from	  macro-­‐sociological	  perspectives	  and	  quantitative	  research	  to	  micro-­‐sociology	  with	  a	  preferred	  use	  of	  qualitative	  research	  methodologies,	  such	  as	  methodological	  individualism	  (Scheuch,	  2004:13).	  This	  development	  led	  to	  a	  waning	  of	  interest	  in	  structural	  functionalism	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  various	  forms	  of	  interpretative	  sociology,	  typically	  privileging	  the	  roles	  of	  agents,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  has	  led	  to	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  subjective	  interpretation	  of	  macro-­‐phenomena	  (ibid).	  However,	  I	  argue105	  that	  the	  limitations	  of	  an	  individual’s	  unique	  life	  experience	  and	  the	  complex	  systemic	  nature	  of	  the	  social	  world	  fundamentally	  problematise	  such	  extrapolations,	  making	  it	  impossible	  to	  inflate	  the	  micro	  perceptions	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104	  See	  Chapter	  6	  for	  textual	  references	  and	  the	  main	  discussion	  on	  these	  manifest	  expressions	  of	  social	  
unease.	  
105	  This	  argument	  is	  based,	  inter	  alia,	  on	  the	  opinions	  of	  Giddens	  (1984:90-­‐92)	  and	  Kant	  (2008/1790:49).	  
	   69	  
individuals	  to	  serve	  as	  macro	  understandings	  that	  could	  provide	  a	  valid	  basis	  for	  higher-­‐level	  ontological	  claim-­‐making106.	  	  	  	  Notwithstanding	  the	  recent	  advent	  of	  widely	  affordable	  globalised	  ICTs,	  which	  I	  consider	  unequivocally	  demolishes	  Immanuel	  Kant’s	  18th-­‐century	  argument	  concerning	  the	  impossibility	  of	  ‘universal	  communication’	  (2008/1790:49),	  my	  argument	  here	  nevertheless	  fully	  subscribes	  to	  the	  corresponding	  part	  of	  Kant’s	  philosophy	  regarding	  the	  impossibility	  of	  ‘subjective	  universality’,	  which	  highlights	  the	  impenetrable	  cognitive	  barriers	  to	  the	  dissemination	  of	  subjective	  definitions	  of	  objects	  that	  are	  universally	  valid.	  	  	  Therefore,	  this	  study	  found	  that	  complexity	  science	  has	  much	  to	  offer	  the	  epistemological	  debates	  concerning	  new	  international	  political	  actors,	  such	  as	  TANs,	  and	  how	  to	  study	  them,	  postulating	  —	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘emergence’	  —	  that	  we	  cannot	  infer	  understandings	  of	  higher	  orders	  of	  complexity	  from	  knowledge	  produced	  at	  lower	  orders	  of	  complexity,	  although	  they	  can	  be	  useful	  in	  building	  a	  picture	  (Wendt,	  2003;	  Emmeche	  et	  al,	  1997).	  This	  necessitates	  that	  in	  investigating	  social	  subject	  matter,	  macroscopic,	  ‘top-­‐down’	  and/or	  microscopic,	  ‘bottom-­‐up’,	  analytical	  processes	  be	  applied,	  as	  appropriate,	  to	  the	  specific	  research	  questions	  being	  asked107.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  primary	  research	  question	  of	  the	  thesis	  required	  the	  taking	  of	  an	  overall	  macroscopic	  analytical	  perspective	  of	  the	  macro-­‐level	  structures	  and	  boundary	  properties	  —	  or	  fitness	  landscape	  —	  that,	  I	  argue,	  largely	  condition	  the	  micro-­‐level	  struggles	  of	  individuals	  and	  groups	  (such	  as	  TANs)	  for	  recognition	  of	  their	  subjectivities108.	  Moreover,	  this	  sequence	  accords	  with	  scientific	  research	  guidance	  that	  warns	  against	  generalising	  (or	  ascending	  methodology)	  from	  single	  cases	  (Bryman,	  2008:55;	  van	  Meter,	  1990:180;	  Giddens,	  1984:90-­‐92).	  Thus,	  this	  thesis	  aims	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  in	  explaining	  the	  international	  world	  it	  is	  both	  valid	  and	  crucial	  to	  reclaim	  sociological	  perspectives	  that	  are	  suitably	  macroscopic	  in	  engaging	  with	  complex	  phenomena,	  but	  are	  also	  rigorously	  qualitative.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  This	  is	  the	  micro-­‐macro	  problematique	  in	  sociology,	  which	  is	  a	  core	  consideration	  in	  this	  thesis,	  and	  is	  
discussed	  later	  on.	  See	  Watts	  for	  a	  succinct	  overview	  of	  this	  problem	  (2011:61-­‐67).	  
107	  See	  Wendt	  (1992a;	  2003)	  and	  Emmeche	  et	  al	  (1997)	  for	  more	  on	  this	  approach.	  
108	  I	  am	  indebted	  to	  Wendt	  (2003),	  for	  these	  additional	  insights	  and	  descriptive	  terms.	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  3.1.2	  Definition	  of	  terms	  	  When	  the	  primary	  research	  question	  is	  unpacked,	  the	  object	  of	  enquiry	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  relational	  interface	  in	  which	  some	  TANs	  interact	  with	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  This	  provided	  the	  empirical	  possibility	  for	  these	  relationships	  to	  be	  (a)	  assessed	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  relationship	  properties	  and	  contexts,	  and	  consequently	  to	  advance	  propositions	  concerning	  their	  ‘place’	  orientation	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other	  system	  elements;	  and	  (b)	  be	  examined	  to	  determine	  whether,	  and	  in	  what	  ways,	  these	  entities	  perform	  recognisable	  functions	  in	  the	  system	  and	  to	  what	  effect.	  Moreover,	  I	  took	  as	  a	  given	  Byne’s	  advice	  for	  the	  conduct	  of	  social	  surveys	  that	  ‘[T]he	  significance	  of	  accurate	  description	  of	  what	  is	  and	  how	  it	  has	  become	  what	  it	  is	  cannot	  be	  overemphasised’	  (2011:62).	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  study,	  ‘place’	  is	  interpreted	  in	  a	  broad	  sense	  to	  mean	  the	  recognisable	  institutional	  links,	  behavioural	  patterns,	  or	  status,	  of	  TANs	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system.	  ‘Function’,	  is	  taken	  to	  mean	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  roles	  TANs	  perform	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system,	  over	  time,	  and	  the	  effects	  and	  outcomes	  observed.	  The	  various	  definitions	  of	  ‘international	  system’	  were	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  Section	  2.2.2.	  	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  point	  out	  here	  that	  in	  investigating	  the	  ‘place’,	  ‘function’	  and	  ‘effectiveness’	  of	  TANs,	  I	  have	  sought	  to	  focus	  on	  their	  settings,	  or	  fitness	  landscapes,	  and	  not	  those	  of	  the	  investigator.	  This	  conforms	  to	  Garner	  and	  Zald’s	  advice	  ‘[…]	  to	  understand	  the	  course	  of	  social	  movements	  we	  have	  to	  understand	  them	  as	  a	  configuration	  and	  within	  a	  determining	  environment’	  (1987:293)109.	  This	  opinion	  appears	  to	  be	  commensurable	  also	  with	  Merton’s	  ‘role	  set’	  theory	  (1968:41;	  Watts,	  2011:251),	  which	  although	  developed	  to	  analyse	  the	  social	  status	  of	  individual	  persons	  in	  a	  social	  system,	  I	  take	  to	  apply	  equally	  to	  entities	  that	  are	  collectivities.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  my	  own	  empirical	  research	  within	  diverse	  organisations,	  which	  supports	  Minkoff’s	  opinion	  (2002:263)	  that	  SMOs	  may	  be	  conceptualised	  as	  unitary	  ‘carriers	  of	  movement	  strategies,	  resources,	  goals,	  and	  collective	  identities	  […]’,	  that	  effect	  their	  relationship	  to	  their	  ‘determining	  environment’.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  Emphasis	  as	  in	  original.	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In	  essence,	  ‘role	  set’	  theory	  holds	  that	  determining	  social	  status	  calls	  for	  a	  ‘shift	  in	  the	  angle	  of	  vision’	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  each	  entity	  in	  a	  social	  system	  is	  positioned/placed	  variously,	  according	  to	  an	  acceptance,	  or	  acquiescence,	  to	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  conditions	  for	  being	  part	  of	  that	  system;	  and	  plays	  not	  one	  but	  multiple	  roles,	  each	  of	  which	  entails	  a	  set	  of	  unique	  relationships.	  Giddens	  also	  offers	  relevant	  insights	  into	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘social	  role’	  (1984:xxv).	  Although,	  like	  Merton,	  Giddens’s	  theory	  sees	  individual	  persons	  being	  positioned	  in	  a	  ‘multiple’	  way	  within	  social	  relations	  conferred	  by	  specific	  social	  identities,	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  external	  message	  projection,	  by	  each	  TAN,	  of	  an	  individualised,	  strategic,	  corporate	  identity	  and	  reputation,	  results	  in	  message	  receivers	  responding	  ‘as	  if’	  the	  organisation	  was	  an	  individual.	  Accordingly,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  case	  study	  TANs	  juggle	  the	  diverse	  stakeholder	  expectations	  associated	  with	  their	  multiple	  roles,	  especially	  by	  demonstrating	  strategic	  successes	  and	  on-­‐going	  value	  to	  their	  financial	  donor	  base,	  is	  examined	  in	  Chapters	  7	  to	  9110.	  	  In	  developing	  this	  thesis,	  it	  was	  therefore	  important	  to	  focus	  on	  examining	  the	  specific	  properties	  and	  appropriateness,	  or	  fitness-­‐for-­‐purpose,	  of	  these	  multiple	  roles	  and	  associated	  relationships	  attributable	  to	  TANs,	  in	  general,	  and	  a	  selected	  sample	  of	  TAN	  models,	  and	  observe	  the	  corresponding	  reactions	  of	  their	  relational	  counterparts	  at	  various	  levels	  of	  complex	  interaction.	  I	  argue	  that	  political	  science	  alone	  cannot	  satisfactorily	  explain	  such	  international	  relational	  matters,	  other	  than	  loosely	  in	  terms	  of,	  inter	  alia,	  alignment	  or	  incompatibility	  with	  political	  ideologies,	  precedent	  cases,	  political	  patterns	  and	  tendencies,	  and	  conformity	  with	  statutes,	  practices	  and	  relative	  norms.	  Political	  theory	  does	  not,	  for	  example,	  address	  the	  widely	  acknowledged	  principal	  element	  in	  human	  relationship	  quality:	  trust.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  I	  aim	  to	  show	  that	  communications	  science	  has	  much	  to	  say	  that	  is	  apposite	  regarding	  relationship	  quality	  assessment,	  audience	  segmentation	  (or	  targeting),	  message	  differentiation,	  rhetoric,	  persuasion	  and	  advocacy	  communications	  effectiveness	  and	  pitfalls.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  The	  importance	  of	  ‘stakeholder	  analysis’,	  including	  stakeholder	  expectations,	  is	  emphasised	  
throughout	  this	  thesis.	  Stakeholder	  analysis	  is	  a	  crucial	  aspect	  of	  contemporary	  communications	  theory.	  
It	  asserts	  the	  value	  of	  identifying	  and	  gaining	  knowledge	  of	  stakeholders	  who	  are	  in	  interdependent	  
relationships	  with	  an	  organisation	  and	  who	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  influence	  the	  organisation,	  and	  vice	  versa	  
(Broom	  and	  Sha,	  2012:270).	  Complexity	  insights	  would	  see	  this	  as	  entities	  engaged	  in	  relationships	  that	  
are	  coevolving.	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Since	  evaluations	  of	  ‘effectiveness’	  are	  very	  likely	  to	  be	  relative	  —	  and	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  later,	  credit	  assignment	  for	  efficacy	  claims	  are	  inherently	  problematical	  in	  complex	  systems	  —	  this	  thesis	  takes	  the	  ‘effectiveness’	  of	  TANs	  to	  be	  the	  achievement	  of	  their	  preferred	  outcomes	  in	  quest	  of	  their	  declared	  goals.	  I	  further	  suggest	  that,	  in	  accordance	  with	  Nye’s	  view,	  ‘effectiveness’	  is	  synonymous	  with	  having	  ‘the	  power	  to	  influence	  outcomes’	  (2011:10).	  Thus,	  to	  be	  effective	  implies	  an	  empowerment	  to	  achieve	  one,	  or	  more,	  positive	  outcomes	  that	  are	  in	  accordance	  with	  desires.	  Nye	  asserts	  that	  in	  the	  relational	  definition	  of	  power	  (as	  opposed	  to	  resources	  power),	  power	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  alter	  others’	  behaviour	  to	  produce	  preferred	  outcomes	  (ibid).	  I	  consider	  this	  to	  be	  a	  reasonable	  yardstick,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  one	  that	  I	  adopt	  in	  this	  study111.	  	  	  Although	  overcoming	  the	  challenges	  of	  defining	  NGOs	  in	  general,	  and	  TANs	  in	  particular,	  was	  a	  fundamental	  consideration	  in	  operationalising	  the	  research	  design,	  I	  have	  addressed	  this	  aspect	  at	  length	  later	  in	  the	  thesis,	  as	  follows.	  Firstly,	  since	  the	  principal	  institutions	  of	  the	  international	  system,	  notably	  the	  UN,	  do	  not	  formally	  differentiate	  between	  the	  various	  typologies	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  with	  which	  they	  have	  dealings,	  typically	  referring	  to	  them	  as	  NGOs,	  INGOs	  or	  civil	  society,	  I	  have	  discussed	  the	  difficulties	  this	  presents	  for	  the	  thesis	  in	  the	  opening	  stages	  of	  Chapter	  5:	  The	  U.N.	  Interface	  with	  Civil	  Society.	  Next,	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  I	  introduce	  TANs	  and	  present	  my	  referent	  criteria	  for	  distinguishing	  contemporary	  TANs	  from	  traditional	  model	  NGOs	  that	  continue	  to	  function	  along	  more	  familiar	  lines	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  international	  politics.	  This	  step	  is	  supported	  by	  my	  TAN	  identification	  template,	  which	  directs	  attention	  to	  characteristics	  that	  I	  hold	  to	  be	  the	  relatively	  commensurable	  aspects	  of	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks	  —	  their	  advocacy	  communications	  function	  —	  rather	  than	  following	  the	  usual	  research	  path	  of	  focusing	  predominantly	  on	  the	  contentious	  political	  issues	  on	  which	  TANs	  campaign	  and	  the	  campaign	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  that	  they	  have	  used	  that	  political	  researchers	  find	  most	  interesting.	  My	  argument	  is	  that	  in	  thus	  focusing	  on	  an	  array	  of	  disparate	  and	  unconnected	  glimpses	  of	  this	  phenomenon,	  such	  issue-­‐based	  studies	  add	  to	  the	  confusion	  associated	  with	  TANs,	  because	  they	  typically	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  Moreover,	  I	  interpret	  this	  to	  be	  also	  in	  accordance	  with	  Bhaskar’s	  views	  regarding	  the	  activity-­‐
dependent	  nature	  of	  social	  structures,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  which	  the	  mechanisms	  at	  work	  in	  society	  exist	  only	  
by	  virtue	  of	  their	  effects	  (1998a:	  229).	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underrate	  their	  most	  prominent	  shared	  determinative	  feature:	  their	  advocacy	  communications	  function.	  In	  fact,	  this	  thesis	  suggests,	  precision	  in	  defining	  —	  and	  therefore	  recognising	  —the	  communications	  choices	  of	  TANs	  is	  crucial	  to	  thinking	  about	  their	  effectiveness	  and	  futures,	  since	  the	  contemporary	  communications	  model	  of	  TANs	  that	  I	  outline	  is	  now	  becoming	  globally	  commoditised	  and	  copied.	  This,	  I	  suggest,	  may	  not	  be	  to	  their	  long-­‐term	  advantage,	  or	  effectiveness,	  in	  championing	  differentiated	  political	  interests	  and	  concerns.	  	  
3.2	  Ontology	  The	  thesis	  is	  guided	  by	  the	  proposition	  that	  ontology	  lies	  at	  heart	  of	  international	  relational	  matters	  and	  all	  attempts	  to	  understand	  and	  explain	  this	  infinitely	  complex	  and	  conflicted	  landscape	  should	  begin	  with	  ‘sustained	  ontological	  investigations’	  (Wight,	  2006:2-­‐4;	  also	  Cox,	  1996:144;	  Walker,	  1993:82;	  Wendt,	  1999:6).	  Indeed,	  Cox	  (ibid),	  argues	  that	  we	  ‘cannot	  define	  a	  problem	  in	  global	  politics	  without	  presupposing	  a	  certain	  basic	  structure	  consisting	  of	  the	  significant	  kinds	  of	  entities	  involved	  and	  the	  form	  of	  significant	  relationships	  among	  them’.	  Ergo,	  when	  we	  put	  ontological	  matters	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  analysis,	  as	  advised	  by	  Wight	  (ibid),	  we	  open	  the	  way	  for	  greater	  epistemological	  and	  methodological	  pluralism	  and	  the	  hope	  of	  achieving	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  body	  of	  knowledge	  of	  the	  dynamics,	  processes	  and	  outcomes	  of	  IR	  subject	  matter.	  	  	  These	  philosophical	  insights	  form	  the	  ontological	  foundations	  of	  this	  thesis	  and	  their	  validity	  is	  tested	  by	  my	  adoption	  of	  a	  complex	  realism	  conceptual	  framework.	  I	  posit	  that	  this	  approach	  provides	  a	  way	  to	  reclaim112	  deep	  structural	  analysis	  of	  the	  international	  landscape,	  the	  entities	  involved	  in	  it	  and	  their	  relationships.	  This	  follows	  Bhaskar’s	  assertion	  that	  social	  phenomena	  (like	  most	  natural	  phenomena)	  are	  ‘the	  product	  of	  a	  plurality	  of	  structures’	  and	  we	  will	  only	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  —	  and	  so	  change	  —	  the	  social	  world	  if	  we	  identify	  the	  underlying	  structures	  at	  work	  that	  generate	  the	  observable	  patterns	  of	  events	  and	  discourses	  in	  the	  world	  (2011:2-­‐3).	  I	  now	  present	  my	  grounds	  for	  conceptualising	  the	  research	  problem	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	  I	  explain	  later	  (Chapters	  6),	  that	  the	  socio-­‐historical	  period	  in	  which	  TANs	  emerged	  has	  been	  a	  time	  of	  
widespread	  rejection	  of	  structuralism	  and	  faith	  in	  post-­‐structuralism	  and	  methodological	  individualism.	  
This	  includes	  belief	  in	  the	  centrality	  of	  individual	  and	  collective	  agency	  in	  social	  explanations	  (chiefly	  in	  
the	  advanced	  Western	  economies),	  and	  the	  determinative	  influence	  on	  human	  agency	  of	  increased	  
information	  flows	  —	  the	  latter	  being	  visualised	  even	  as	  a	  new	  epoch,	  The	  Information	  Age.	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space	  as	  such	  a	  landscape,	  beset	  with	  competing	  and	  contested	  interpretations	  of	  its	  ontological	  reality113.	  	  
Conceptualising	  the	  interface	  as	  layers	  of	  complex	  social	  reality	  To	  demarcate	  the	  ontology	  of	  the	  research	  area	  I	  have	  conceptualised	  the	  interface	  zone	  between	  the	  international	  system	  and	  TANs	  as	  a	  dynamic	  interactive	  space	  in	  which	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  exist	  in	  reality,	  whether	  they	  are	  activated,	  latent,	  unknown,	  or	  even	  not	  yet	  imagined	  by	  human	  enquiry	  (vide	  Archer	  et	  al,	  2004:2).	  Some	  scholars,	  such	  as	  Keane	  (2005:	  1-­‐39)	  describe	  this	  interface	  as	  beset	  with	  too	  many	  contradictions	  and	  messy	  ambiguities	  to	  make	  meaningful	  claims	  about	  it	  —	  warning,	  perhaps,	  that	  we	  should	  not	  even	  try	  to	  find	  regularities	  and	  patterns	  and	  thus	  develop	  better	  knowledge	  of	  the	  social	  world.	  However,	  Dunne	  and	  Nye	  are	  two	  IR	  theorists	  that	  I	  found	  to	  have	  more	  constructive	  approaches	  to	  the	  properties	  and	  powers	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  international	  environment.	  Dunne	  (2005)	  sees	  the	  interface	  between	  the	  international	  system	  and	  international	  society	  and	  ‘world	  society’	  as	  a	  terrain	  marked	  by	  ‘fault-­‐lines’,	  which	  in	  my	  view	  is	  a	  metaphor	  that	  helps	  us	  to	  conceptualise	  the	  fact	  that	  barriers	  and	  boundaries	  are	  encountered	  by	  the	  entities	  involved	  in	  trying	  to	  regulate	  world	  affairs	  (although,	  conversely,	  it	  does	  not	  explain	  the	  enablements,	  or	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  fault-­‐lines	  and	  their	  relative	  disadvantages).	  Moreover,	  I	  consider	  Dunne’s	  perspective	  on	  this	  inhospitable	  property	  of	  the	  landscape	  assists	  my	  argument	  that	  schisms	  in	  the	  terrain	  might	  be	  usefully	  conceived	  as	  instantiations	  of	  incompatibility	  in	  social	  relational	  structures.	  	  	  In	  my	  view,	  Nye’s	  ontological	  concept	  regarding	  world	  socio-­‐political	  power	  structures	  is	  also	  useful	  and	  clear,	  if	  very	  simplistic.	  According	  to	  Nye’s	  theory,	  world	  power	  is	  distributed	  in	  an	  interactive	  pattern	  that	  can	  be	  visualised	  as	  resembling	  ‘a	  complex,	  three-­‐dimensional,	  chess	  game’	  (2011:xv).	  In	  this	  conceptual	  model,	  Nye	  envisages	  a	  top	  ‘chessboard’	  representing	  military	  power	  that	  is	  largely	  unipolar;	  a	  middle	  chessboard	  representing	  economic	  power	  that	  has	  been	  largely	  multipolar	  for	  more	  than	  a	  decade;	  and	  a	  bottom	  chessboard	  that	  represents	  transnational	  relations	  that	  cross	  borders	  outside	  government	  control.	  This	  bottom	  layer	  includes	  all	  forms	  of	  non-­‐state	  activity,	  from	  legitimate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113	  According	  to	  Wight	  (2006:2)	  and	  Žižek	  (1999:158),	  all	  politics	  is	  about	  competing	  ontologies.	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commercial	  transactions	  to	  terrorism	  and	  gun-­‐running.	  While	  not	  mentioned	  specifically	  by	  Nye,	  this	  layer	  quite	  obviously	  includes	  the	  operations	  of	  INGOs	  and	  TANs	  (see	  also	  Florini,	  2000:10-­‐11;	  Keohane	  and	  Nye,	  1970:379;	  cited	  also	  by	  Colás,	  2002:5).	  	  	  	  Although	  Nye’s	  hierarchical	  power	  model	  is	  simplistic	  in	  its	  ontological	  depiction,	  I	  suggest	  it	  is	  a	  good	  starting	  point	  for	  thinking	  about	  relative	  power	  differentials	  in	  the	  international	  landscape.	  For	  example,	  it	  proved	  to	  be	  useful	  for	  considering	  the	  powers	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs:	  why,	  for	  example,	  vehement	  protests	  by	  mass-­‐member	  TANs	  typically	  appear	  to	  have	  had	  little,	  or	  no,	  effect	  in	  halting	  hugely	  controversial	  actions	  by	  governments	  when	  those	  actions	  are	  concerned	  with	  national	  imperatives	  regarding	  security	  and/or	  their	  economy.	  Large-­‐scale	  public	  protest	  and	  petitions	  in	  foreign	  countries,	  to	  the	  UN,	  or	  online,	  have	  not	  prevented	  or	  brought	  an	  early	  cessation	  to	  recent	  warfare	  in	  Syria,	  Libya,	  Iraq,	  Afghanistan,	  Israel/Gaza,	  South	  Sudan	  or	  Ukraine;	  nor	  impinged	  on	  Russia’s	  annexation	  of	  Crimea,	  intrusion	  into	  eastern	  Ukraine	  and	  robust	  defence	  of	  its	  claims	  to	  Arctic	  oil114;	  nor	  impeded	  China’s	  autocratic	  commandeering	  of	  internationally	  disputed	  offshore	  islands	  in	  the	  South	  China	  Sea,	  also	  for	  oil.	  Similarly,	  Florini	  (2000:10)	  considers	  it	  is	  standard	  international	  relations	  thinking	  to	  assume	  a	  hierarchy	  among	  the	  instruments	  of	  power:	  military	  force	  ranking	  highest;	  then	  economic	  resources;	  then	  ‘far	  down	  the	  list,	  if	  mentioned	  at	  all,’	  such	  ‘soft’	  instruments	  as	  moral	  authority	  or	  the	  power	  of	  persuasion.	  In	  this	  judgement,	  the	  two	  main	  strategies	  of	  TANs	  —	  asserting	  moral	  authority	  and	  persuasion	  tactics	  —	  are	  thus	  held	  to	  have	  the	  least	  political	  power115.	  This	  theory	  has	  obvious	  implications	  for	  evaluating	  TANs	  and	  the	  international	  issues	  in	  which	  their	  interventions	  could	  be	  considered	  effective.	  	  In	  his	  visualisation,	  Nye	  sees	  these	  abstract	  dimensions	  of	  world	  socio-­‐political	  power	  structures	  as	  interdependent	  and	  interactive	  and,	  importantly,	  he	  does	  not	  conflate	  the	  levels	  of	  reality	  —	  a	  common	  construct	  by	  empirical	  and	  linguistic	  realists	  (Bhaskar,	  1975:56).	  It	  is	  the	  conflation	  of	  these	  multiple	  dimensions	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  See	  the	  case	  study	  on	  Greenpeace	  (Chapter	  7)	  for	  examples	  of	  Russia’s	  uncompromising	  position	  on	  
both	  its	  territorial	  sovereignty	  in	  regard	  to	  Arctic	  oil	  and	  the	  demands	  of	  a	  TAN.	  
115	  According	  to	  Florini,	  the	  ‘currency’	  of	  TAN	  power	  ‘is	  not	  force,	  but	  credible	  information	  and	  moral	  
authority’	  (ibid:11).	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social	  activity	  that	  I	  consider	  to	  be	  a	  major	  cause	  (if	  not	  the	  major	  cause)	  of	  confusion	  in	  normative	  discussions	  of	  contemporary	  international	  affairs.	  I	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  strongly	  in	  evidence	  when	  issues	  of	  valence	  and	  scandal	  at	  micro-­‐	  and	  meso-­‐levels	  of	  local	  societies	  are	  applied	  as	  theoretical	  lenses	  to	  interpret	  affairs	  in	  domains	  that	  are	  transnational,	  trans-­‐cultural,	  or	  trans-­‐worlds116	  Thus,	  multitudes	  of	  mass-­‐media	  consumers	  in	  the	  Western	  democracies	  are	  perplexed	  by	  the	  current117	  83%	  ‘record	  high’	  favorability	  rating	  that	  Russia’s	  reputedly	  hard-­‐line	  President,	  Vladimir	  Putin,	  enjoys	  in	  his	  home	  country	  (Gallup,	  2014;	  Time,	  2014).	  This	  conundrum	  is	  not	  so	  inexplicable,	  I	  suggest,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  deeply	  embedded,	  multi-­‐dimensional,	  social	  structural	  conditions	  currently	  extant	  in	  Russia.	  Therefore,	  I	  emphasise	  this	  ontological	  philosophy	  at	  this	  stage,	  before	  I	  go	  on	  to	  demonstrate	  in	  the	  case	  studies	  the	  contradictory	  signals	  —	  the	  ‘elusive’-­‐ness	  —	  that	  the	  reductionist	  conflation	  of	  micro-­‐	  and	  macro-­‐levels	  of	  complexity	  creates	  for	  our	  parochial	  understandings	  of	  the	  activities,	  aims	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs	  as	  clusters,	  sectors,	  or	  families,	  and	  individually.	  	  	  In	  general,	  the	  metaphor	  of	  ‘levels’	  is	  widely	  used	  in	  realist	  theories	  of	  science	  to	  reference	  the	  different	  ontological	  layers	  in	  the	  world	  (Patomäki	  and	  Wight,	  2000;	  Byrne,	  2011:61).	  The	  importance	  of	  differentiating118	  the	  social	  structural	  dimensions	  that	  influence	  each	  level	  has	  also	  been	  emphasised	  in	  recent	  IR	  theory	  by	  Buzan	  and	  Albert	  (2010)	  and	  by	  Donnelly	  (2006,	  2009a,	  2009b,	  2011).	  In	  this	  conception	  of	  ontology,	  the	  social	  world	  is	  a	  causally	  efficacious	  emergent	  level.	  These	  scholars	  advise,	  and	  this	  thesis	  concurs,	  that	  the	  task	  of	  the	  investigator,	  therefore,	  is	  to	  (a)	  attempt	  to	  resolve	  exactly	  where	  the	  layers	  are	  to	  be	  located	  and	  their	  interrelationships;	  (b)	  determine	  the	  different	  structural	  components	  that	  make	  up	  and	  shape	  the	  social	  focus	  of	  enquiry,	  as	  a	  whole;	  and	  (c)	  try	  to	  rank	  the	  salient	  structural	  dimensions	  and	  analyse	  any	  that	  appear	  to	  predominate.	  	  	  It	  will	  be	  shown	  in	  the	  case	  studies	  that,	  in	  accordance	  with	  Donnelly’s	  multi-­‐dimensional	  systemic	  approach	  to	  the	  social	  and	  political	  structures	  conditioning	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	  This	  refers	  to	  the	  theory	  that	  individuals	  and	  communities	  exist	  in	  many	  ‘worlds’	  that	  are	  beyond	  the	  
comprehension	  of	  non-­‐members	  —	  in	  particular,	  the	  situation	  of	  people	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  four	  
developmental	  ‘worlds’	  (First	  World,	  Second	  World,	  Third	  World,	  etc.).	  See	  Annex	  3	  for	  my	  supporting	  
data	  for	  this	  theory.	  	  	  	  
117	  As	  at	  18	  July	  2014.	  
118	  Sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘differentiation	  theory’	  to	  denote	  the	  differentiation	  of	  the	  multiple	  
dimensions	  of	  social	  reality	  (e.g.	  Buzan	  and	  Albert,	  2010;	  Donnelly,	  2011;	  Johnson,	  2000:88).	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the	  international	  relational	  domain	  (ibid),	  six	  salient	  structures	  were	  investigated.	  These	  dimensions	  are:	  stratification	  (vertical	  differentiation);	  functional	  differentiation;	  segmentation	  (unit	  differentiation);	  polarity;	  geography	  and	  technology;	  norms	  and	  institutions.	  Obviously,	  the	  first	  of	  these	  lenses	  to	  affect	  the	  relationships	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  is	  ‘stratification’,	  which	  considers	  such	  effects	  as	  relations	  of	  superordination	  and	  subordination.	  In	  fact,	  I	  argue	  that	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  order	  there	  is	  little	  to	  dispute	  Waltz’s	  reasoning	  that	  sovereign	  statehood	  is	  a	  particular	  status,	  with	  rights,	  powers,	  and	  obligations	  denied	  to	  other	  actors.	  Nor	  that	  ‘[W]	  hen	  the	  crunch	  comes,	  states	  remake	  the	  rules	  by	  which	  other	  actors	  operate’	  (Waltz,	  1979:	  94).	  In	  other	  words,	  states	  are	  differentiated	  from,	  and	  superordinate	  to,	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  Thus,	  ‘[S]tates	  are	  legally	  entitled	  to	  command	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  which	  are	  required	  to	  obey’	  (Donnelly,	  2011).	  In	  Donnelly’s	  view:	  	   Structural	   analysis	   in	   IR	   must	   ask,	   as	   an	   empirical	   question,	   who	   performs	  which	   functions	   under	   what	   authority	   —	   rather	   than	   pretend	   that	  stratification	  and	  functional	  differentiation	  do	  not	  exist.	  	  	  The	  research	  question	  formulation,	  concerning	  the	  place,	  function	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs	  in	  their	  social	  relational	  interface	  with	  the	  international	  system	  (dominated	  by	  nation	  states)	  was	  therefore	  aligned	  from	  the	  outset	  with	  the	  type	  of	  explanations	  that	  this	  theoretical	  framework	  could	  potentially	  deliver.	  
3.2.1	  Complex	  Realism	  as	  an	  ontological	  conceptual	  framework  	  Given	  that	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  PRQ	  is	  directed	  at	  a	  dynamic	  and	  complex	  realm	  of	  specific	  social	  and	  political	  relationships	  within	  the	  international	  system	  —	  and	  taking	  the	  international	  landscape	  to	  be	  ‘a	  complex	  interweave	  of	  numerous	  systems,	  nested,	  intersected,	  and	  embedded	  in	  each	  other,	  all	  undergoing	  processes	  of	  co-­‐evolution	  and	  linked	  by	  innumerable	  feedback	  loops’	  (vide	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden,	  2011:75;	  2010;	  also	  Byrne,	  2011:20-­‐21;	  Walby,	  2007;	  Reed	  and	  Harvey,	  1992;	  Urry,	  2003:122-­‐24)	  —	  it	  was	  crucial	  to	  provide	  the	  study	  with	  an	  encompassing	  theoretical	  framework	  within	  which	  relationships	  within	  complex,	  intersecting,	  open	  systems	  might	  be	  properly	  examined.	  In	  this	  light,	  complex	  realism	  was	  selected	  as	  providing	  unparalleled	  strengths	  as	  a	  conceptual,	  theoretical	  and	  methodological	  resource.	  In	  view	  of	  the	  relatively	  recent	  introduction	  of	  complex	  realism	  to	  investigate	  international	  relations	  subject	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matter,	  I	  have	  provided	  (at	  Annex	  2)	  an	  elaboration	  of	  my	  grounds	  for	  selecting	  this	  approach.	  	  	  
How	  complex	  realism	  is	  used	  in	  this	  dissertation	  Complex	  realism	  is	  used	  here	  primarily	  to	  construct	  a	  conceptual	  and	  theoretical	  framework	  from	  substantive	  and	  recognisable	  materials	  arising	  from	  the	  intellectual	  labours	  of	  others.	  Although	  it	  may	  be	  found	  to	  have	  outstanding	  analytical	  and	  explanatory	  fitness,	  there	  is	  no	  attempt	  made	  to	  add	  to	  the	  philosophical	  underpinnings	  of	  complex	  realism	  used	  here.	  Therefore,	  this	  section	  outlines	  some	  of	  the	  debts	  that	  are	  owed	  to	  scholars	  whose	  work	  has	  helped	  me	  to	  visualise	  and	  explain	  a	  specific	  set	  of	  social	  relationships	  in	  a	  complex,	  multi-­‐dimensional	  problem	  space.	  	  	  Choosing	  a	  complexity-­‐influenced	  framework	  is	  far	  from	  a	  simple	  decision	  in	  carrying	  out	  an	  empirical	  research	  project	  in	  the	  social	  sciences,	  especially	  in	  political	  science,	  where	  I	  found	  complexity	  theory	  is	  not	  well	  understood	  and	  is	  considered	  by	  some	  to	  be	  far	  from	  the	  mainstream,	  if	  not	  radical119,	  and	  therefore,	  an	  unsafe	  epistemological	  option.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  thesis	  is	  guided	  by	  Wight’s	  rationale	  (2006:289):	  	   We	  cannot	  allow	  the	  complexity	  of	   the	  social	  world	   to	   force	  us	   into	  artificial	  methodological	  retreats	  that	  manufacture	  elegant	  simplicity	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  explanatory	  power.	  If	  the	  social	  world	  is	  complex,	  and	  undoubtedly	  it	  is,	  then	  we	  should	  expect	  nothing	  less	  than	  complex,	  multi-­‐dimensional,	  and	  at	  times	  contradictory,	   social	   theories	   as	   well	   as	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   complex	  methodological	  techniques.	  	  Thus,	  I	  assessed	  complex	  realism	  to	  be	  the	  most	  viable,	  holistic,	  approach	  to	  investigating	  relationships	  occurring	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  intersecting	  and	  dynamic	  structural	  relational	  logics120	  we	  cursorily	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  ‘international	  system’.	  	  While	  drawing	  on	  the	  strengths	  of	  Buzan	  and	  Little‘s	  work	  on	  systems	  thinking	  in	  international	  relations	  (2000)	  and	  acknowledging	  that	  they	  have	  undoubtedly	  made	  a	  major	  contribution	  to	  the	  field	  —	  principally	  through	  arguing,	  as	  I	  do,	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119	  See	  Cudwoth	  and	  Hobden	  (2011:4)	  for	  more	  on	  this	  contestation	  in	  the	  social	  research	  environment.	  
120	  On	  this	  subject	  I	  share	  Wight’s	  assessment	  that	  the	  international	  political	  plane	  is	  not	  a	  realm	  of	  
independent	  states	  so	  much	  as	  ‘a	  realm	  of	  intersecting	  and	  dynamic	  structural	  relational	  logics’	  that	  
displays	  observable	  configurations	  but	  is	  constantly	  changing	  	  (2006:299).	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pluralist,	  multi-­‐lensed	  approaches	  —	  this	  thesis	  shares	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden’s	  more	  recent	  view	  (ibid:	  15)	  that	  an	  infusion	  of	  complexity	  insights	  would	  have	  added	  even	  greater	  value	  to	  Buzan	  and	  Little’s	  approaches	  and	  enabled	  them	  to	  be	  more	  theoretically	  innovative,	  particularly	  in	  regard	  to	  conceptualisations	  of	  non-­‐linearity,	  emergence	  and	  intersectionality.	  Nevertheless,	  I	  consider	  a	  particular	  strength	  of	  Buzan	  and	  Little’s	  well-­‐known	  engagement	  with	  systems	  analysis	  is	  their	  advocacy	  of	  an	  historical	  and	  multi-­‐causal	  approach121,	  which	  is	  compatible	  with	  complex	  realism	  perspectives.	  This	  comprises	  a	  theorisation	  of	  different	  levels	  of	  analysis,	  different	  sectors	  of	  analysis	  (such	  as	  my	  cross-­‐case	  qualitative	  comparison	  of	  the	  advocacy	  function	  in	  the	  case	  study	  TANs),	  and	  three	  central	  sources	  of	  explanation:	  interaction	  capacity,	  process	  and	  structure	  (ibid).	  	  	  Ergo,	  in	  order	  to	  investigate	  the	  TAN	  interface	  with	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system,	  I	  applied	  insights	  from	  complex	  realism	  to	  explore	  the	  interactions	  of	  the	  relevant	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  using	  an	  epistemological	  framework	  that	  enables	  soundings	  to	  be	  taken	  at	  multiple	  levels	  of	  analysis	  —	  in	  this	  case,	  unit,	  cluster,	  and	  system	  levels.	  Previous	  studies	  that	  have	  focused	  on	  a	  single	  element	  in	  the	  system	  (an	  individual	  TAN),	  or	  cluster	  of	  elements	  (TANs),	  and	  their	  ineluctably	  parochial	  experiences,	  can	  tell	  us	  relatively	  little	  about	  their	  place	  and	  function	  within	  the	  international	  system,	  nor	  the	  true	  value	  and	  extent	  of	  their	  influence	  on	  other	  elements	  in	  that	  shared	  system,	  nor	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  —	  both	  apparent	  and	  latent	  —	  that	  confront	  and	  influence	  their	  co-­‐evolution	  throughout	  that	  system.	  	  	  My	  approach	  embraces	  the	  recent	  scholarship	  that	  sees	  complex	  systems	  as	  intersecting,	  and	  being	  intersected	  by,	  other	  complex	  systems	  —	  thereby	  experiencing	  all	  other	  systems	  ‘as	  their	  environment’,	  or,	  in	  complex	  systems	  terminology,	  their	  fitness	  landscape122.	  By	  adopting	  this	  conceptualisation	  of	  social	  ontology,	  complexity	  scholars	  seek	  to	  expand	  and	  enrich	  the	  analytical	  framework	  for	  thinking	  about	  the	  way	  component	  parts	  of	  complex	  adaptive	  systems	  behave	  in	  their	  environments	  (i.e.	  their	  fitted-­‐ness	  to	  their	  situations);	  the	  levels	  and	  forms	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121	  See	  Section	  3.2.1	  for	  my	  discussion	  of	  multi-­‐causality	  in	  complex	  open	  systems	  (following	  Cilliers.	  
1998:ix;	  and	  Byrne,	  2011:28-­‐31).	  
122	  ‘Fitness	  landscape’	  is	  a	  term	  and	  concept	  frequently	  used	  by	  scholars	  working	  in	  complexity	  studies	  
(Cudworth	  and	  Hobden,	  2011:	  68-­‐79;	  Geyer	  and	  Pickering,	  2011;	  Geyer	  and	  Rihani,	  2012:143;	  Walby,	  
2007;	  Mitleton-­‐Kelly,	  2003;	  Kauffman,	  2000:18-­‐20).	  
	   80	  
of	  interactions	  between	  complex	  adaptive	  systems;	  intersectionality,	  change,	  time,	  context	  and	  power	  relations	  between	  different	  systems;	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  actors	  and	  systems	  co-­‐evolve	  and	  have	  impacts	  on	  each	  other.	  Considering	  its	  suitability	  to	  the	  multi-­‐dimensional	  subject	  matter	  of	  this	  thesis,	  the	  analytical	  frame	  of	  fitness	  landscapes	  has	  been	  adopted.	  By	  avoiding	  vexing	  questions	  of	  relative	  perspectivism,	  this	  conceptualisation	  permits	  the	  more	  objective	  view	  that	  an	  intersecting,	  and	  intersected,	  system	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  sub-­‐system	  of,	  nor	  wholly	  contained	  within,	  nor	  saturated	  by,	  another	  system	  (Cudworth	  and	  Hobden,	  
ibid:72-­‐79).	  Moreover,	  this	  conceptualisation	  does	  not	  preclude	  empirical	  investigations	  of	  power	  hierarchies	  and	  structure	  in	  examining	  the	  place	  and	  function	  of	  units	  interacting	  in	  complex	  systems.	  Instead,	  it	  enhances	  enquiry	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  quality	  and	  patterns	  of	  complex	  interactions	  between	  systems	  (ibid:	  79123).	  This	  seemed	  ideally	  suited	  to	  exploring	  the	  interface	  between	  TANs	  and	  the	  international	  system	  in	  a	  scientific	  manner.	  	  I	  further	  posit	  that	  investigations	  that	  ignore	  a	  complex	  systems	  approach	  to	  this	  subject	  matter	  cannot	  explore	  temporal	  questions	  about	  the	  implications	  of	  emergent	  and	  co-­‐evolutionary	  factors	  generated	  by	  the	  interactions	  of	  elements	  in	  the	  system.	  In	  this	  respect,	  complex	  realism	  can	  be	  used	  to	  capture	  ‘snapshots’	  of	  a	  constantly	  developing	  fitness	  landscape	  (Cudworth	  and	  Hobden,	  ibid:	  75).	  	  The	  notion	  of	  ‘snapshots’	  in	  time	  is	  useful	  in	  that	  it	  helps	  the	  researcher	  to	  remember	  that	  contingency	  and	  temporality	  should	  always	  be	  essential	  considerations	  in	  studying	  dynamic,	  open,	  systems	  such	  as	  the	  international	  system.	  Moreover,	  a	  systems	  approach	  enables	  the	  investigator	  to	  ask:	  What	  qualities	  define	  these	  relationships	  now,	  and	  what	  are	  they	  in	  the	  process	  of	  becoming?	  I	  make	  no	  claims	  that	  this	  approach	  can	  predict	  the	  future	  but	  it	  can	  reveal	  useful	  conditions,	  patterns	  and	  tendencies	  that	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  theorising	  possible	  futures	  for	  international	  political	  relationships.	  	  
	  
Limitations	  of	  a	  complex	  realism	  approach	  	  Complex	  realism	  does,	  however,	  have	  important	  limitations	  that	  must	  be	  acknowledged.	  I	  now	  discuss	  three	  of	  the	  most	  salient	  concerns	  I	  encountered.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden	  cite	  Capra	  (2007:13)	  for	  informing	  this	  insight.	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(1)	  As	  acknowledged	  earlier,	  the	  relatively	  recent	  arrival	  of	  complex	  realism	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  means	  that	  it	  is	  a	  far-­‐from-­‐mainstream	  approach,	  and	  one	  that	  despite	  its	  increasing	  support	  base,	  is	  not	  yet	  well	  understood.	  Furthermore,	  although	  critical	  realism	  is	  an	  intellectual	  domain	  that	  is	  not	  without	  its	  arguments	  and	  differences,	  there	  is	  more	  or	  less	  general	  agreement	  about	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  intellectual	  current.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  case	  for	  complexity	  science	  (Byrne,	  2011:21).	  	  Nor	  is	  it	  well	  recognised	  that	  complexity	  science	  is	  theoretically	  commensurable	  across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  paradigms.	  Some	  social	  scientists	  consider	  complexity	  theory	  can	  be	  used	  metaphorically;	  some	  consider	  complexity	  is	  inherent	  in	  all	  matter;	  others	  consider	  the	  presence	  of	  complex	  phenomena	  in	  both	  human	  and	  non-­‐human	  worlds	  (Cudworth	  and	  Hobden,	  2011:7;	  25-­‐51).	  My	  argument	  here	  is	  that	  ‘the	  proof	  of	  the	  pudding	  is	  in	  the	  eating’.	  It	  is	  for	  others	  to	  judge	  whether	  my	  application	  of	  complex	  realism	  proves	  to	  be	  robust	  and	  convincing.	  	  (2)	  When	  dealing	  with	  complex	  systems	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  produce	  models	  that	  are	  simplifications	  of	  the	  things	  we	  are	  seeking	  to	  understand.	  An	  adequate	  description	  would	  have	  to	  be	  as	  complex	  as	  the	  system	  itself.	  However,	  as	  Byrne	  reassures	  us	  (2011:28-­‐31),	  to	  recognise	  this	  is	  not	  to	  abandon	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  useful	  applied	  social	  science.	  According	  to	  Cilliers	  (1998:ix):	  	  […]	  there	  is	  no	  over-­‐arching	  theory	  of	  complexity	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  ignore	  the	  contingent	   aspects	   of	   complex	   systems.	   If	   something	   is	   really	   complex,	   it	  cannot	  be	  adequately	  described	  by	  means	  of	   a	   simple	   theory.	  Engaging	  with	  complexity	  entails	  engagement	  with	  specific	  complex	  systems.	  Despite	  this	  we	  can,	   at	   least	   at	   a	   very	   basic	   level,	   make	   general	   remarks	   concerning	   the	  conditions	  for	  complex	  behaviour	  and	  the	  dynamics	  of	  complex	  systems.	  	  	  	  I	  deduce	  from	  this	  that	  investigations	  into	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  underlying	  the	  complex	  behaviour	  patterns	  seen	  in	  the	  relationships	  between	  TANs	  and	  the	  international	  system	  are	  both	  possible	  and	  worthwhile.	  In	  particular,	  I	  suggest	  that	  this	  focus	  of	  enquiry	  does	  shed	  significant	  light	  on	  the	  place	  and	  function	  of	  TANs	  operating	  in	  the	  international	  political	  domain	  and	  goes	  some	  way	  towards	  revealing	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  they	  are	  effective	  and	  likely	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals.	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While	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden	  caution	  that	  the	  application	  of	  complexity	  theory	  to	  international	  relations	  offers	  no	  ‘quick	  fix’	  to	  the	  world’s	  pressing	  challenges,	  it	  does	  indicate	  and	  help	  to	  explain,	  inter	  alia,	  why	  the	  challenges	  we	  face	  are	  so	  difficult	  and	  unpredictable,	  non-­‐linear	  and	  apt	  to	  shock	  with	  large	  scale	  and	  fundamental	  change,	  and	  why	  the	  outcomes	  of	  human	  acts	  can	  be	  so	  different	  from	  our	  intentions	  (ibid:	  188;	  Byrne,	  ibid).	  I	  consider	  these	  attributes	  are	  manifest	  in	  each	  of	  the	  following	  case	  studies.	  Acknowledging	  this	  complexity	  is	  therefore	  seen	  as	  the	  first	  step	  towards	  understanding	  the	  elements	  involved	  in	  complex	  systems	  and	  developing	  more	  targeted	  and	  effective	  interventions.	  
	  	  (3)	  A	  further	  limitation	  that	  was	  faced	  initially	  in	  operationalising	  a	  complex	  realist	  approach	  was	  that	  there	  appears	  to	  be,	  as	  yet,	  no	  recognised	  model	  for	  carrying	  out	  and	  then	  presenting	  empirical	  research	  in	  this	  paradigm.	  This	  necessitated	  my	  origination	  of	  a	  results	  presentation	  format	  that	  demonstrated	  the	  testing	  of	  a	  range	  of	  theoretical	  lenses	  on	  the	  data	  set	  and	  enabled	  discussion	  of	  the	  effects	  observed,	  and	  yet	  acknowledged	  that	  in	  analysing	  complex,	  open,	  systemic	  interactions	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  ever	  evaluate	  all	  contingent	  factors	  and	  establish	  conclusive	  outcomes.	  These	  challenges	  were	  overcome	  by	  presenting	  some	  sections	  of	  the	  empirical	  results	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  in	  a	  list	  format	  and	  by	  borrowing	  valuable	  insights	  from	  morphogenetic	  theory,	  which	  also	  provides	  for	  enquiry	  into	  dynamic	  social	  change	  and	  the	  recording	  of	  ‘outcomes-­‐in-­‐process’	  in	  respect	  of	  complex,	  open,	  systems.	  	  	  The	  presentation	  of	  results	  as	  outcomes-­‐in-­‐process	  was	  informed	  by	  recent	  developments	  in	  morphogenetic	  theory,	  as	  expounded	  by	  Wight,	  Archer,	  and	  Porpora	  et	  al,	  which	  approaches	  social	  change	  by	  examining	  the	  intersectionality	  of	  	  ‘the	  structural,	  cultural	  and	  agential	  relations	  that	  constitute	  the	  social	  order	  as	  a	  whole’	  (Wight,	  2013:100).	  Furthermore,	  social	  morphogenesis	  theory	  is	  highly	  relevant	  to	  understanding	  the	  patterning	  observed	  in	  a	  complex	  subset	  of	  ongoing,	  changing,	  multi-­‐level	  relationships	  (such	  as	  that	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  within	  the	  international	  system)	  and	  the	  work	  of	  attempting	  to	  assign	  generative	  mechanism	  and	  macro-­‐level	  meanings	  to	  them.	  Archer	  points	  out	  that	  empirically	  observing	  situations	  involving	  rapid	  social	  change	  is	  ‘necessarily	  incomplete’	  because	  certain	  changes	  will	  have	  occurred	  without	  yet	  producing	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their	  full	  manifestations	  (2013:3).	  In	  similar	  vein,	  Wight	  holds	  that	  social	  practices,	  particularly	  at	  the	  micro-­‐level,	  are	  always	  ‘products-­‐in-­‐process’	  (Wight,	  2013:86).	  Meanwhile,	  Watts	  opines	  that	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  a	  well-­‐defined	  outcome	  is	  ‘a	  convenient	  fiction’	  and	  that,	  in	  reality,	  ‘the	  events	  we	  label	  as	  outcomes	  are	  never	  really	  endpoints’	  but	  are	  ‘artificially-­‐imposed	  milestones’	  (2011:128-­‐129).	  For	  these	  reasons,	  I	  have	  followed	  Archer’s	  recommendation	  and	  analysed	  the	  data	  for	  underlying	  structures	  and	  generative	  mechanisms,	  rather	  than	  directly	  inducing	  them	  from	  manifest	  outcomes,	  as	  is	  the	  usual	  empiricist	  practice	  (Archer,	  2013:4;	  Bhaskar,	  2011:2-­‐3).	  The	  results	  of	  this	  analytical	  process	  are,	  therefore,	  presented	  in	  the	  following	  chapters,	  not	  as	  conclusive,	  and	  therefore	  concluded,	  ‘Outcomes’,	  but	  as	  ‘Outcomes-­‐in-­‐process	  and	  indicative	  macroscopic	  patterns’.	  	  	  This	  style	  of	  summation	  does	  not	  shy	  away	  from	  energetically	  confronting	  the	  data	  and	  trying	  to	  extract	  social	  scientific	  meaning	  from	  it.	  Rather,	  it	  acknowledges	  the	  dynamic	  complexity	  of	  the	  subject	  matter	  and	  suggests	  restraint	  in	  the	  explication	  of	  events,	  trends	  and	  tendencies	  that	  appear	  to	  have	  significant	  and	  transformative	  properties,	  but	  might	  also	  prove	  ultimately	  to	  have	  been	  of	  relatively	  minor	  consequence	  in	  effecting	  social	  or	  political	  change124.	  Wight	  advises	  that	  in	  order	  for	  a	  perceived	  change	  to	  be	  authentic	  it	  must	  have	  verifiable	  and	  significant	  consequences	  	  —	  i.e.	  we	  need	  an	  account	  of	  how	  events	  and	  trends	  that	  have	  been	  deemed	  to	  be	  significant	  have	  led	  to	  consequential	  change	  (Wight,	  2013:92-­‐94).	  	  	  
3.3	  Epistemology	  The	  epistemological	  aim	  of	  this	  dissertation	  was	  to	  reduce	  the	  problem	  space	  by	  investigating	  a	  specific	  set	  of	  international	  system	  relationships	  and	  offering	  coherent	  and	  plausible	  explanations	  that,	  as	  Cox	  advises	  (1996:146),	  ‘help	  to	  devise	  fresh	  perspectives	  that	  are	  useful	  for	  framing	  and	  working	  on	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  present’.	  	  	  	  A	  major	  advantage	  of	  complex	  systems	  thinking	  is	  that	  it	  allows	  for	  analysing	  interactions	  and	  intersectionalities	  with	  other	  non-­‐linear,	  open,	  complex	  and	  adaptive	  systems	  and	  observing	  and	  explaining	  patterns	  (Cudworth	  and	  Hobden,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124	  Watts	  (2011:	  129-­‐131)	  also	  provides	  an	  accessible	  discussion	  on	  these	  points	  from	  a	  complexity	  
perspective.	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ibid:	  79).	  In	  this	  conceptual	  framework,	  the	  points	  of	  intersection/interface	  between	  such	  systems	  are	  regarded	  as	  significant	  points	  for	  analysis	  and,	  because	  of	  the	  non-­‐reversibility	  of	  the	  ‘arrow	  of	  time’,	  the	  developments	  within	  systems	  are	  dependent	  on	  the	  order	  in	  which	  they	  occur	  (ibid:	  80-­‐81,	  87;	  Prigogine,	  2003:56;	  Giddens,	  1984:xxxi).	  Consequently,	  systems	  are	  in	  a	  constant	  state	  of	  change	  and	  patterns	  of	  relations	  between	  actors	  will	  not	  lead	  to	  the	  same	  results	  in	  different	  time	  periods,	  because	  complex	  adaptive	  systems	  are	  in	  a	  constant	  state	  of	  flux	  as	  they	  adjust	  to,	  and	  co-­‐evolve	  with,	  other	  systems	  (ibid:	  87;	  Wight,	  2006:296-­‐298;	  Miller,	  2005:186-­‐187).	  	  	  This	  calls	  for	  the	  study	  of	  history	  to	  be	  a	  key	  element	  in	  complexity	  approaches	  and	  supported	  my	  decision	  to	  study	  the	  interface	  terrain	  using	  the	  qualitative	  method	  of	  diachronic	  process	  tracing	  and	  pattern	  analysis.	  Moreover,	  the	  ability	  to	  carry	  out	  empirical	  depth	  analysis	  of	  TANs	  at	  unit-­‐level,	  and	  to	  varying	  degrees	  at	  cluster-­‐level	  and	  system-­‐level	  in	  the	  international	  system,	  was	  also	  a	  major	  advantage	  of	  adopting	  the	  tenets	  of	  complex	  realism125.	  	  
3.3.1	  Considerations	  concerning	  alternative	  epistemological	  approaches	  	  Up	  to	  now,	  the	  bulk	  of	  political	  sociological	  research	  into	  TANs	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  organisations	  themselves	  —	  their	  structures,	  aims,	  personnel	  and	  communications	  strategies	  and	  outputs.	  Assessment	  of	  their	  effectiveness	  and	  relationships	  has,	  similarly,	  been	  conducted	  largely	  by	  internal	  and	  introspective	  measurement	  employing	  popular	  constructivist	  methodologies	  that	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  of	  individual	  choices,	  ideas	  and	  identity	  in	  shaping	  social	  reality.	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  poststructural	  approach	  has	  often	  resulted	  in	  observations	  made	  at	  the	  micro-­‐level	  of	  individuals	  and	  units	  in	  the	  international	  system	  being	  aggregated	  and	  extrapolated	  into	  insupportable	  claims	  about	  TANs	  and	  their	  interactions	  with	  macro	  phenomena	  (involving	  very	  large	  numbers	  of	  people	  and	  organisations),	  operating	  at	  higher	  levels	  of	  systemic	  complexity,	  each	  shaped	  by	  different	  contingent	  factors.	  Therefore,	  the	  fundamental	  thrust	  of	  my	  thesis	  is	  that	  this	  epistemology	  and	  this	  premise	  are	  faulty.	  Researcher	  oversight,	  or	  ignoring,	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125	  This	  variability	  in	  data	  quality	  and	  depth	  occurs	  because	  at	  unit	  level	  we	  can	  conduct	  close-­‐up	  
empirical	  research	  and	  analyse	  what	  TANs	  reveal	  about	  themselves,	  and	  what	  others	  say	  about	  them,	  
while	  at	  cluster	  and	  system	  levels	  research	  is	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  the	  availability	  of	  secondary	  sources,	  
which	  are	  invariably	  dependent	  on	  what	  others	  have	  found	  interesting	  and	  worth	  documenting.	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micro-­‐macro	  problematique	  in	  sociology126	  does	  not	  make	  this	  thorny	  consideration	  go	  away.	  Moreover,	  when	  multiple	  levels	  of	  complex	  social	  activity	  are	  conflated,	  this	  process	  invariably	  exhausts	  the	  explanatory	  capacity	  of	  the	  theories	  and	  data	  held	  to	  account	  for	  them	  (Watts,	  2011:64-­‐65)127.	  	  	  As	  a	  convincing	  alternative,	  I	  argue	  that	  complex	  realism	  provides	  the	  tools	  to	  conceptualise	  this	  landscape	  and	  enable	  analytical	  soundings	  to	  be	  taken	  at	  multiple	  levels	  of	  complex	  systems	  and	  so	  transcend	  the	  permanent	  micro-­‐macro	  obstacle.	  While	  many	  scholars	  appear	  satisfied	  in	  defense	  of	  their	  particular	  theoretical	  stance,	  it	  was	  pointed	  out	  in	  the	  literature	  review	  that	  the	  keys	  to	  unlocking	  the	  methodological	  challenges	  posed	  by	  recent	  developments	  in	  contentious	  political	  relations	  involving	  TANs	  remain	  elusive.	  A	  list	  of	  25	  alternative	  research	  frameworks,	  identified	  by	  me	  in	  the	  course	  of	  preparing	  this	  thesis,	  was	  provided.	  In	  my	  analysis	  of	  alternative	  frameworks,	  the	  least	  convincing	  research	  appeared	  to	  be	  produced	  by	  approaches	  that	  denied	  the	  possibility	  of	  ontological	  reality	  and	  structural	  causality	  in	  international	  relations	  contexts	  —	  beginning	  instead	  with	  a	  selected	  epistemology	  and	  a	  programme	  to	  work	  towards	  constructing	  explanations	  for	  macro	  social	  phenomena	  by	  aggregating	  individual	  interview	  data.	  It	  mostly	  appeared	  that,	  in	  privileging	  agent	  understandings,	  researchers	  could	  portray	  TANs	  as	  whatever	  they	  wanted	  them	  to	  be,	  which	  often	  bore	  a	  greater	  resemblance	  to	  conflict	  journalism	  than	  to	  social	  science.	  	  	  The	  study	  also	  took	  into	  account	  findings	  by	  Watts	  (2011:61-­‐67),	  which	  held	  that	  explanations	  of	  macro	  phenomena	  that	  rely	  on	  a	  ‘representative	  agent’,	  to	  denote	  the	  general	  tenor	  of	  larger	  collectives	  (e.g.	  families,	  firms,	  markets,	  political	  parties,	  demographic	  segments,	  nation	  states)	  employ	  a	  ‘convenient	  fiction’	  that	  is	  fundamentally	  flawed.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  we	  find	  such	  fuzzy	  but	  ubiquitous	  terms	  as	  ‘hardworking	  families’,	  ‘greedy	  firms’,	  ‘corrupt	  political	  parties’,	  ‘aimless	  youths’,	  ‘failed	  states/rich	  nations’,	  etc.	  In	  fact,	  many	  examples	  are	  highlighted	  in	  the	  case	  studies	  to	  show	  that	  TANs	  themselves	  typically	  use	  this	  popular	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126	  See	  Watts	  for	  a	  succinct	  overview	  of	  this	  constant	  obstacle	  to	  social	  explanation	  that	  he	  calls	  
‘arguably	  the	  central	  intellectual	  problem	  of	  sociology’	  (2011:61-­‐67).	  
127	  Watts	  notes	  that	  ‘common	  sense’	  explanations	  are	  commonly	  advanced	  to	  paper-­‐over	  theoretical	  
cracks	  in	  interpretations	  of	  complex	  realms	  (ibid:	  64-­‐65)	  .	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shorthand	  device	  in	  their	  public	  communications	  to	  portray	  themselves	  and	  those	  they	  represent:	  typically	  implying	  unity,	  solidarity,	  humanity	  and	  social	  boundaries;	  and	  targeted	  ‘others’,	  who	  are	  often	  portrayed	  as	  having	  characteristics	  generally	  associated	  with	  universally	  loathed	  or	  scandalous	  behaviors,	  especially	  abuse	  of	  power,	  bullying,	  greed,	  selfishness,	  lack	  of	  compassion,	  aloofness,	  duplicity,	  dishonesty	  and	  stealth.	  Thus,	  we	  will	  see	  in	  the	  significant	  sampling	  of	  advocacy	  publicity	  presented	  in	  Chapters	  7	  to	  9,	  such	  throwaway	  and	  emotionally	  charged	  terms	  as	  ‘the	  political	  class’,	  ‘rich	  nations’,	  ‘the	  establishment’	  and	  ‘	  political	  elites’,	  ‘the	  world’s	  poor’,	  ‘vulnerable	  communities’	  and	  ‘ordinary	  people’.	  These	  broad-­‐brush	  terms,	  I	  submit,	  ostensibly	  provide	  ways	  for	  TANs	  to	  communicate	  with	  some	  of	  their	  diverse	  audiences	  but	  are	  not	  analytically	  useful,	  either	  in	  selecting	  epistemologies	  to	  explore	  them,	  or	  in	  focusing	  critical	  attention	  on	  real,	  complex,	  global	  challenges	  and	  using	  accurate	  levers	  and	  tools	  to	  achieve	  progress	  toward	  solutions.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  this	  study	  approached	  the	  research	  problem	  afresh	  from	  the	  promising	  new	  perspective	  of	  complex	  realism.	  	  	  
3.4	  Methodology	  In	  my	  methodological	  approach,	  I	  adopted	  a	  qualitative,	  historical	  and	  case	  study	  investigation,	  while	  rejecting	  the	  alternative	  of	  computer-­‐assisted	  actor-­‐based	  modelling	  (ABM),	  which	  has	  emerged	  as	  the	  main	  methodological	  approach	  in	  regard	  to	  complexity	  thinking	  in	  IR	  (Cudworth	  and	  Hobden,	  ibid:187).	  Considering	  the	  incremental,	  trans-­‐	  and	  multi-­‐disciplinary	  development	  of	  complexity	  science,	  especially	  its	  early	  and	  influential	  adoption	  within	  the	  natural	  and	  biological	  sciences128	  (Room,	  2001:16;	  Reed	  and	  Harvey,	  ibid;	  Williams	  and	  Vogt,	  2011:12),	  the	  popularity	  of	  computer	  modelling	  is	  understandable,	  but	  also	  troubling	  for	  those	  who	  have	  doubts	  about	  the	  merits	  of	  computer	  simulations	  to	  imitate	  social	  phenomena.	  	  	  I	  argue,	  therefore,	  that	  as	  complexity	  perspectives	  gain	  ground	  in	  the	  social	  sciences,	  a	  wider	  constituency	  will	  share	  my	  doubts	  about	  the	  ability	  of	  computer	  models	  to	  capture	  the	  richness	  of	  complex	  human	  interactions,	  including	  power	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128	  Also,	  in	  organisational	  theory,	  economics,	  mathematics,	  meteorology,	  cybernetics	  and	  non-­‐
equilibrium	  thermodynamics	  (references	  as	  cited	  above).	  See	  Annex	  2	  for	  a	  further	  elaboration.	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relationships,	  underlying	  social	  structures,	  relationship	  quality,	  physical	  and	  cognitive	  attractors,	  emphasis	  and	  influence.	  I	  suggest	  that	  historical	  analysis	  provides	  a	  more	  convincing	  alternative	  than	  actor-­‐based	  modelling	  (as	  per	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden,	  ibid;	  Wight,	  2006:12,	  284129).	  This	  methodology	  involves	  analysis	  of	  the	  development	  and	  evolution	  of	  systems.	  It	  includes	  the	  investigation	  of	  structures	  and	  emergent	  properties	  by	  examining	  the	  interactions	  of	  units	  within	  a	  complex	  system,	  and	  looking	  at	  ways	  in	  which	  complex	  systems	  progress	  in	  relation	  to	  each	  other.	  	  The	  intention	  of	  this	  is	  ‘to	  attempt	  to	  understand	  how	  particular	  forms	  of	  social	  relations	  have	  come	  into	  existence,	  to	  identify	  power	  relations	  and	  inequalities,	  and	  highlight	  relations	  between	  human	  and	  non-­‐human	  systems’	  (Cudworth	  and	  Hobden,	  ibid).	  	  	  The	  basis	  for	  my	  historical	  approach	  was	  the	  description,	  mapping	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  social	  phenomenon	  that	  I	  assert	  TANs	  to	  be,	  through	  (i)	  primary	  and	  secondary	  content	  and	  discourse	  analysis,	  focusing	  particularly	  on	  macro-­‐sociological	  aspects	  of	  the	  research	  area;	  (ii)	  developing	  and	  applying	  an	  original	  identification	  template	  for	  a	  TAN	  model	  that	  could	  bring	  precision	  to	  selecting	  and	  testing	  organisations	  for	  their	  approximation	  to,	  or	  divergence	  from,	  eight	  criteria130;	  and	  (iii)	  constructing	  case	  study	  accounts	  of	  the	  formation	  and	  development	  of	  three	  iconic	  TANS	  and	  exploring	  their	  interactions	  within	  the	  international	  system131.	  	  	  Using	  insights	  from	  complex	  realism,	  I	  examined	  the	  data132	  to	  discern	  patterns	  in	  the	  interface	  between	  these	  TANs	  and	  the	  international	  institutional	  system	  that	  exhibited,	  over	  time,	  some,	  or	  all,	  of	  the	  systemic	  and	  inter-­‐relational	  behaviours	  identified	  with	  complex	  adaptive	  systems133,	  which,	  I	  held	  to	  have	  explanatory	  value	  for	  the	  thesis.	  The	  characteristic,	  patterned	  behaviours	  observed	  in	  these	  inter-­‐relationships	  included:	  emergence;	  path	  dependency	  and	  ‘lock-­‐in’;	  co-­‐evolution;	  attractors;	  exploration	  of	  adjacent	  possible’	  opportunities;	  sensitivity	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129	  Wight	  advises	  that	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  particular	  events,	  ‘structural-­‐understanding’	  needs	  to	  be	  
complemented	  by	  ‘historical-­‐explanation’	  (2006:284).	  	  
130	  According	  to	  della	  Porta,	  cases	  that	  ‘do	  not	  fit	  a	  theory’	  (the	  investigation	  of	  so-­‐called	  ‘deviant	  cases’)	  
may	  be	  extremely	  useful	  for	  specifying	  under	  which	  conditions	  a	  hypothesis	  holds	  true	  and	  under	  which	  
conditions	  it	  does	  not	  (2002:297).	  
131	  The	  validity	  of	  complex	  realism	  for	  case	  study	  approaches,	  that	  see	  case-­‐objects	  as	  subsets	  of	  
dissipative	  systems,	  is	  unequivocally	  supported	  by	  Byrne	  and	  Ragin	  (2009:	  23-­‐36).	  
132	  This	  included	  events,	  narratives	  and	  discourses,	  relationships,	  structures,	  conditions,	  processes	  and	  
behaviours.	  
133	  My	  identification	  of	  further	  common	  properties	  of	  complex	  adaptive	  systems	  is	  a	  work-­‐in-­‐progress.	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initial	  conditions	  and	  cumulative	  advantage;	  non-­‐linearity;	  the	  consequences	  of	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  feedback;	  inherent	  instability	  and	  unpredictability134.	  These	  are	  elaborated	  in	  the	  case	  studies	  and	  cross-­‐compared	  in	  Chapter	  10.	  	  Consequently,	  I	  argue	  that	  instances	  of	  these	  systemic	  effects	  may	  explain	  the	  entrenched	  path-­‐dependency	  characteristics	  of	  both	  international	  institutions,	  such	  as	  the	  UN,	  and	  the	  older	  TANs,	  such	  as	  Greenpeace;	  the	  unpredictability	  and	  unintended	  consequences	  of	  numerous,	  high-­‐profile	  TAN	  campaigns;	  and	  the	  behaviour-­‐reinforcing	  consequences	  of	  positive	  feedback	  on	  TAN	  strategies.	  Indeed,	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  that	  as	  they	  evolve,	  social	  systems	  grow	  in	  complexity	  (Johnson,	  2000:88),	  gaining	  greater	  numbers	  of	  both	  symbiotic	  and	  ancillary	  systems	  along	  the	  way	  and	  consequently	  becoming	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  change.	  Complexity	  insights	  regarding	  the	  co-­‐evolution	  of	  elements	  in	  open	  complex	  systems	  	  —	  whether	  it	  transpires	  that	  mutual	  adaptation	  is	  conflictual	  or	  harmonious	  —	  may	  help	  also	  to	  explain	  why	  we	  have	  seen	  the	  advent	  of	  TANs	  in	  international	  politics	  and	  not	  something	  else,	  and	  why	  some	  TANs	  are	  more	  effective	  than	  others	  in	  achieving	  their	  aims	  in	  their	  crowded	  and	  complex	  fitness	  landscape	  (vide	  Walby,	  2007).	  This	  approach	  also	  demonstrates	  the	  analytical	  value	  of	  using	  complexity	  insights	  —	  particularly	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘emergence’	  —	  to	  uncover	  and	  differentiate	  between	  unit-­‐level,	  cluster-­‐level	  and	  system	  level	  effects	  generated	  by	  the	  international	  institutional	  system.	  	  	  It	  would	  seem	  self–evident	  that	  complex	  social	  systems,	  such	  as	  the	  ‘international	  system’,	  are	  constituted	  by	  more	  than	  just	  the	  sum	  of	  their	  parts.	  And	  yet,	  their	  study	  has	  invariably	  been	  constrained,	  until	  recently,	  by	  scientific	  approaches	  that	  concentrate	  on	  dissection	  and	  the	  extrapolation	  of	  results	  —	  from	  the	  specific	  to	  the	  general,	  and	  from	  the	  local	  to	  the	  national	  and	  even	  the	  global	  (vide	  Chapter	  2)135.	  	  In	  opposition	  to	  reductionism,	  complexity	  approaches	  require	  that	  one	  tries	  to	  comprehend	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  whole	  and	  the	  parts	  (Morin,	  2006).	  According	  to	  (Cilliers,	  1998:2):	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134	  These	  principles	  of	  complex	  systems	  were	  accessed	  via,	  inter	  alia,	  Arthur,	  1989;	  Mitleton-­‐Kelly,	  2003;	  
Bousquet	  and	  Curtis,	  2011;	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden,	  2011;	  Geyer	  and	  Pickering,	  2011;	  Root,	  2013;	  and	  
Walby,	  2009.	  	  
135	  See	  Chapter	  2	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  debates	  involving	  observers	  holding	  different	  knowledge	  and	  
worldviews,	  as	  they	  attempt	  to	  grasp	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘globalisation’.	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If	   something	   is	   too	   complex	   to	   be	   grasped	   as	   a	   whole,	   it	   is	   divided	   into	  manageable	   units	   which	   can	   be	   analysed	   separately	   and	   then	   put	   together	  again.	  However,	  the	  study	  of	  complex	  dynamic	  systems	  has	  discovered	  a	  flaw	  in	   the	  analytical	  method.	  A	   complex	   system	   is	  not	   constituted	  merely	  by	   the	  sum	  of	  its	  components,	  but	  also	  by	  the	  intricate	  relationships136	  between	  these	  components.	   In	   cutting	   up	   a	   system,	   the	   analytical	  method	   destroys	  what	   it	  seeks	  to	  understand.	  	  	  Fortunately,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  investigation	  of	  complex	  social	  systems	  and	  phenomena	  is	  hopeless	  (ibid).	  	  
3.4.1	  Justification	  for	  a	  multi-­‐lensed	  theoretical	  model	  	  This	  section	  explains	  why	  the	  multi-­‐lensed	  analytical	  framework	  and	  tools	  applied	  in	  the	  thesis	  have	  profound	  explanatory	  strengths	  in	  certain	  situations	  —	  explicating	  subjects	  as	  if	  the	  theory	  is	  accurate	  —	  and	  were	  the	  most	  appropriate	  choice	  for	  investigating	  relationships	  in	  international	  politics.	  In	  this	  regard,	  it	  is	  appropriate	  that	  complex	  realism	  and	  one	  of	  the	  branches	  of	  its	  rootstock,	  critical	  realism,	  both	  emphasise	  ontological	  realism,	  epistemological	  relativity	  (and,	  by	  extension,	  methodological	  pluralism)	  and	  judgemental	  rationality.	  This	  accords	  with	  the	  social	  realist	  methodological	  approach	  that	  there	  are	  grounds	  for	  judging	  some	  competing	  theories	  as	  superior	  to	  others	  (Bhaskar,	  2011:24;	  Sayer,	  1999:	  47;	  Collier,	  1994:90-­‐94).	  This	  approach	  was	  followed	  in	  selecting	  a	  set	  of	  theories	  and	  hypotheses	  for	  investigating	  the	  problem	  space	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Furthermore,	  the	  theoretical	  diversity	  now	  evident	  in	  the	  field	  of	  research	  that	  broadly	  covers	  the	  TAN	  phenomenon,	  reflects	  a	  complex	  world	  situation	  in	  which	  single-­‐theory	  applications	  seem	  rarely	  able	  to	  describe	  the	  subject	  matter	  adequately,	  and	  even	  less	  so	  to	  explain	  it	  (Smith,	  ibid:	  10-­‐13).	  For	  all	  these	  reasons,	  this	  study	  required	  a	  theoretical	  multi-­‐lensed	  approach	  to	  ‘get	  at’	  under-­‐explored	  aspects	  of	  TANs,	  the	  international	  system,	  and	  the	  interface	  between	  the	  actors,	  agents	  and	  structures.	  	  
3.4.2	  Case	  Study	  methodology	  	  Case	  study	  analysis,	  in	  which	  individual	  cases	  are	  researched	  in	  depth,	  is	  the	  most	  intensive	  form	  of	  investigation	  into	  TANs,	  according	  to	  della	  Porta	  (2003:296).	  Moreover,	  when	  they	  are	  approached	  in	  a	  theoretical	  way	  and	  subjected	  to	  valid	  cross-­‐case	  comparisons,	  case	  studies	  are	  useful	  in	  building	  knowledge	  of	  particular	  phenomena.	  Thus	  (ibid):	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136	  Emphasis	  as	  in	  original.	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   When	  the	  research	  begins	  on	  a	  specific	  topic,	  case	  studies	  of	  instances	  where	  the	   phenomenon	   under	   investigation	   was	   particularly	   relevant	   may	   help	   to	  build	  up	  hypotheses	  on	  its	  causes,	  dynamics	  and	  effects.	  	  Piiparinen	  (2006:446)	  considers	  the	  critical	  realist	  approach	  (which	  informs	  the	  complex	  realism	  adopted	  throughout	  this	  thesis),	  uniquely	  allows	  a	  particular	  case	  study	  ‘to	  reveal	  the	  real	  balance	  between	  possibilities	  and	  constraints’	  in	  an	  environment.	  Similarly	  supportive,	  King,	  Keohane	  and	  Verba	  claim	  (1994:44):	  	  	   Case	  studies	  are	  essential	   for	  description,	  and	  are,	   therefore,	   fundamental	   to	  social	   science.	   It	   is	   pointless	   to	   seek	   to	   explain	  what	  we	   have	   not	   described	  with	  a	  reasonable	  degree	  of	  precision.	  	  These	  insights	  further	  informed	  my	  decision	  to	  develop	  a	  TAN	  referent	  template	  to	  bring	  precision	  to	  defining	  the	  subject	  of	  my	  investigation	  and	  also	  adopt	  a	  case	  study	  methodology	  to	  enable	  depth	  analysis	  and	  generate	  new	  knowledge	  of	  TANs.	  This	  template	  is	  presented	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  where	  I	  differentiate	  the	  TAN	  typology	  of	  NGO.	  	  
Selection	  of	  the	  ‘international	  system’	  	  	  The	  core	  epistemological	  understanding	  was	  that	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  place,	  function	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system,	  an	  investigation	  must	  take	  as	  a	  logical	  starting	  point	  the	  structural	  relationships	  between	  the	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  —	  seen	  as	  elements	  in	  a	  complex,	  emergent,	  multi-­‐dimensional	  sociopolitical	  system,	  albeit	  one	  that	  operates	  on	  a	  
sui	  generis	  international	  scale137.	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  research	  focus	  was	  centred	  on	  the	  principal	  organ	  of	  the	  international	  system,	  the	  United	  Nations,	  which	  can	  be	  usefully	  understood	  as	  the	  epitome	  of	  a	  complex	  system	  that	  is	  embedded	  in,	  and	  intersected	  by,	  countless	  other	  complex	  systems138.	  In	  such	  situations,	  I	  consider,	  reductionist,	  analytical	  methods	  are	  insufficient	  to	  explain	  outcomes	  that	  are	  produced	  by	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole,	  or	  to	  understand	  important	  systemic	  behaviours	  (evidenced,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  relative	  utility	  values,	  positioning,	  functions	  and	  possibilities	  the	  system	  imparts	  to	  its	  disparate	  components),	  merely	  by	  knowing	  the	  characteristics,	  purposes	  and	  interactions	  of	  the	  system’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137	  This	  approach	  is	  also	  guided	  by	  Wight	  (2013:99).	  Wight	  advises	  that	  researchers	  taking	  a	  
morphogenetic	  perspective	  should	  begin	  with	  the	  already	  existing	  structural	  context	  before	  proceeding	  
to	  chart	  the	  structural	  and	  cultural	  elaborations	  that	  unfold	  as	  social	  practice	  develops.	  
138	  Geyer	  and	  Rihani	  share	  this	  complex	  systemic	  approach	  to	  the	  international	  system	  (2010:114-­‐117).	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units.	  Therefore,	  reductionist	  epistemologies	  were	  rejected	  absolutely	  as	  a	  means	  of	  explaining	  this	  particular	  problem	  space.	  	  Taking	  Meadows’	  definition	  of	  a	  system	  (2009:2,188)	  as	  ‘a	  set	  of	  elements,	  or	  parts,	  that	  is	  coherently	  organised	  and	  interconnected	  in	  a	  pattern	  or	  structure	  that	  produces	  a	  characteristic	  set	  of	  behaviours’,	  the	  arrangements	  made	  by	  the	  world’s	  states	  to	  institutionalise	  their	  interactions	  with	  each	  other	  through	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  its	  ancillary	  international	  bodies,	  do	  indeed	  constitute	  a	  system.	  Moreover,	  by	  virtue	  of	  Article	  71	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Charter	  	  (UN	  Charter,	  1945a),	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  are,	  under	  certain	  conditions,	  admitted	  as	  participants,	  or	  parts,	  of	  this	  system.	  It	  will	  be	  seen	  later	  that	  some	  NGOs	  have	  maintained	  longstanding	  status	  as	  accredited	  parts	  of	  this	  system.	  However,	  how	  these	  units	  are	  placed	  or	  arranged	  in	  the	  system,	  and	  how	  they	  stand	  and	  behave	  in	  relation	  to	  one	  another,	  is	  not	  a	  property	  of	  the	  units	  themselves:	  it	  is	  a	  property	  of	  the	  system	  (Waltz,	  ibid:	  80).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  unit	  arrangements	  in	  an	  open	  system	  are	  in	  a	  constant	  state	  of	  flux	  as	  elements	  respond	  to	  exogenous,	  ever-­‐changing,	  contingencies139	  over	  time.	  This	  enables	  this	  thesis	  to	  examine	  not	  only	  what	  TANs	  are	  objectively	  but,	  importantly,	  how	  they	  distinctively	  behave	  and	  interact	  with	  other	  elements	  in	  the	  international	  system	  and	  the	  wider	  world,	  the	  consequences	  of	  these	  relationships,	  and	  what	  we	  can	  learn	  from	  them.	  Therefore,	  I	  consider,	  a	  systems	  approach,	  as	  propounded	  by	  Wallerstein	  (1974),	  Waltz	  (1979:39),	  Buzan	  and	  Little,	  (2000:	  407)	  and	  others140,	  was	  strongly	  indicated.	  	  
Selection	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  The	  three	  iconic	  TANs	  —	  Greenpeace	  International,	  Oxfam	  International	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  (Chapters	  7,	  8,	  9)	  	  —	  were	  selected	  for	  examination	  primarily	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  following	  criteria:	  firstly,	  their	  official	  listing	  as	  being	  in	  formal	  consultancy	  status	  with	  the	  UN	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2011:4,	  6,	  39),	  which	  establishes	  their	  suitability	  to	  be	  examined	  as	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  institutional	  system;	  secondly,	  their	  identification	  as	  TANs;	  and	  thirdly,	  their	  established	  status	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  been	  interacting	  with	  the	  international	  system	  over	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139	  Contingencies,	  as	  defined	  here,	  are	  future	  events	  or	  circumstances	  that	  are	  possible	  but	  cannot	  be	  
predicted	  with	  certainty.	  	  
140	  See	  also	  more	  recent	  insights	  by	  Hobson	  and	  Sharman	  (2005),	  and	  Donnelly	  (2011).	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period	  of	  time	  that	  was	  assumed	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  long	  as	  to	  afford	  them,	  and	  external	  observers,	  a	  well	  documented	  perspective	  on	  their	  relationships	  within	  the	  international	  system.	  Two	  of	  these	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations141	  —	  Greenpeace	  International	  and	  Oxfam	  International	  —	  have	  been	  granted	  General	  Consultative	  Status	  with	  the	  UN	  since	  1998	  and	  2002,	  respectively	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC	  NGO	  List,	  2011:4,	  6),	  while	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  has	  held	  Special	  Consultancy	  Status	  with	  the	  UN	  since	  1993	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC	  NGO	  List,	  2011:39).	  	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  case	  suitability	  of	  both	  Greenpeace	  and	  Oxfam	  was	  sealed	  by	  their	  having	  been	  founder	  signatories	  to	  the	  INGO	  Accountability	  Charter,	  which	  was	  established	  in	  2006	  by	  a	  group	  of	  international	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  (INGOs),	  to	  codify	  and	  foster	  a	  commitment	  to	  excellence,	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  among	  INGOs	  (INGO	  Charter,	  2012).	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  substantial	  volume	  of	  intimate	  organisational	  information	  is	  made	  readily	  available	  by	  these	  two	  global	  entities.	  This	  was	  a	  valuable	  resource	  in	  studying	  them.	  	  	  Consequently,	  the	  case	  studies	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  place,	  function	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  three	  long-­‐established	  and	  iconic	  TANs	  operating,	  simultaneously,	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  international	  institutional	  system,	  at	  the	  domestic	  level	  of	  governments	  and	  at	  the	  international	  level	  of	  states.	  This	  accords	  with	  Mearsheimer’s	  opinion	  (2010:84),	  that	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  how	  states	  act	  in	  the	  international	  system,	  we	  must	  combine	  domestic-­‐level	  and	  state-­‐level	  theories.	  These	  critical	  differences	  are	  reflected	  also	  in	  Wight’s	  assertion	  (1966:33)	  that	  ‘domestic	  politics	  is	  the	  sphere	  of	  the	  good	  life	  whereas	  international	  politics	  is	  the	  realm	  of	  security	  and	  survival’.	  Wight’s	  observation	  is	  apposite,	  I	  suggest,	  when	  I	  discuss	  later	  how	  modern	  communications	  enable	  TANs	  to	  transform	  situated	  grassroots	  concerns	  into	  agenda	  items	  for	  international	  debate	  and	  policymaking.	  	  The	  case-­‐specific	  analysis	  of	  these	  TANs	  is	  intended	  to	  substantiate	  my	  argument	  that	  the	  ‘advocacy’	  aspects	  of	  TANs	  differentiate	  them	  substantively	  from	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141	  The	  more	  general	  term	  ‘non-­‐governmental	  organisations”	  is	  used	  here,	  rather	  than	  TANs,	  as	  this	  is	  
the	  term	  used	  by	  the	  UN	  itself	  in	  granting	  this	  status.	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typologies	  of	  NGO,	  and	  from	  each	  other142,	  depending	  on	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  have	  adopted	  the	  sophisticated	  communications	  style	  and	  strategies,	  techniques	  and	  technologies	  of	  present-­‐day	  political	  advocacy.	  It	  is	  a	  central	  line	  of	  argument	  that	  NGOs	  that	  have	  availed	  themselves	  of	  the	  new	  communications	  toolbox	  have	  created	  a	  transformatory	  disturbance143	  in	  their	  relations	  within	  the	  international	  system	  that	  is	  leading	  to	  their	  emergence	  as	  a	  previously	  unknown	  element	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  It	  is	  argued,	  therefore,	  that	  those	  TANs	  that	  have	  adopted	  the	  new	  enabling	  techniques	  and	  technologies,	  and	  have	  demonstrably	  prioritised	  their	  own	  profile-­‐raising,	  voice	  amplification,	  financial	  sustainability,	  and	  social	  group	  differentiating	  strategies	  in	  their	  advocacy,	  do	  constitute	  a	  new	  socio-­‐political	  phenomenon.	  	  The	  three	  case	  study	  organisations	  are	  examined	  to	  establish	  how	  they	  fulfill	  the	  ‘international	  system’	  relationship	  criteria;	  exhibit	  characteristics	  of	  TANS	  and/or	  TAN	  hybrids	  to	  different	  degrees;	  fit	  the	  properties,	  conditions	  and	  patterns	  observed	  in	  the	  wider	  view	  of	  the	  international	  systemic	  landscape;	  and	  have	  analytically	  valuable	  differences	  in	  their	  relationships	  within	  the	  international	  realm.	  Thus,	  they	  are	  not	  advanced	  as	  providing	  the	  entire	  weight	  of	  evidence	  for	  the	  macro-­‐sociological	  arguments	  of	  the	  thesis.	  Rather,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  case	  studies	  provide	  validating	  evidence	  of	  clear	  communicative	  patterns	  connoting	  the	  status	  and	  quality	  of	  the	  on-­‐going	  relationships	  that	  each	  organisation	  experiences	  in	  its	  ‘scale-­‐shift’144	  to	  intersect/interface	  with	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  This,	  then,	  becomes	  their	  critical	  importance	  to	  answering	  the	  primary	  research	  question	  and	  hypotheses	  of	  the	  thesis,	  rather	  than	  any	  false	  assumptions	  that	  small	  n	  case	  studies,	  involving	  individual	  organisations,	  are	  generalisable.	  Furthermore,	  King,	  Keohane	  and	  Verba	  assert	  that	  case	  studies	  are	  essential	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142	  That	  NGOs,	  including	  TANs	  are	  complexly	  divided	  within	  their	  genus,	  is	  not	  generally	  contested	  (for	  
example,	  see	  Secrett,	  2011a,	  2011b;	  Moore,	  2013:	  Ch.1).	  Some	  have	  been	  known	  to	  openly	  demonise	  
others.	  Greenpeace,	  for	  example,	  published	  a	  book	  in	  1993,	  in	  which	  it	  cited	  environmental	  enemies,	  
including	  other	  organisations	  fighting	  for	  the	  same	  goals	  but	  using	  methods	  of	  which	  it	  did	  not	  approve	  
(Shaw-­‐Bond,	  2000:URL).	  
143	  Describing	  such	  an	  effect	  within	  complex	  systems	  theory,	  Urry	  (2003:35)	  asserts	  that	  in	  tightly	  
coupled,	  interactive,	  systems	  recovery	  from	  an	  initial	  disturbance	  —	  even	  one	  that	  may	  have	  seemed	  
relatively	  inconsequential,	  or	  intended	  as	  an	  improvement	  —	  can	  have	  knock-­‐on	  consequences	  
throughout	  the	  system	  that	  are	  irreversible.	  This	  thesis	  asserts	  that	  the	  international	  system,	  in	  which	  
some	  TANs	  have	  a	  formal	  consultancy	  role,	  is	  such	  a	  system.	  Furthermore,	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  
‘disturbance’	  of	  adopting	  the	  new	  communications	  toolbox	  for	  their	  advocacy	  has	  set	  TANs	  on	  a	  new	  
trajectory	  that	  is	  reconstituting	  them	  as	  a	  new	  social	  phenomenon.	  	  
144	  See	  Chapter	  6	  for	  insights	  on	  the	  important	  concept	  of	  ‘scale	  shift’	  for	  transnational	  activists.	  See	  also	  
Tarrow	  (2005:	  32,	  120-­‐122)	  and	  Tufekci	  (2014).	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description	  —	  it	  being	  pointless	  to	  seek	  to	  explain	  what	  has	  not	  been	  described	  with	  a	  reasonable	  degree	  of	  precision	  (1994:44).	  	  
	  
Defining	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  subject:	  applying	  a	  TAN	  referent	  template	  The	  way	  we	  describe	  phenomena,	  and	  the	  things	  that	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  knowing	  about	  them,	  shape	  and	  frame	  the	  methods	  and	  modes	  of	  explanation.	  Therefore,	  this	  thesis	  is	  informed	  by	  opinion	  that	  investigations	  should	  begin	  by	  first	  framing	  the	  subject	  matter	  itself	  (McIntyre,	  1994:131-­‐135;	  King,	  Keohane	  and	  Verba,	  1994:44).	  	  	  In	  approaching	  the	  subject	  matter	  implied	  by	  the	  PRQ,	  two	  main	  practical	  factors	  needed	  to	  be	  considered.	  Firstly,	  when	  we	  talk	  about	  the	  behaviour	  of	  collectives	  of	  social	  actors	  we	  immediately	  encounter	  the	  micro-­‐macro	  problem,	  relating	  to	  different	  levels	  of	  understanding.	  This	  obstacle	  impels	  us	  to	  try	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  complex	  phenomena	  and	  situations	  by	  subjectively	  interpreting	  what	  we	  see	  ‘as	  if’	  the	  group	  acts	  in	  more	  or	  less	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  individuals	  that	  comprise	  them	  do.	  In	  fact,	  Mayntz	  points	  out	  that	  explaining	  social	  macro-­‐phenomena	  ‘typically	  involves	  causal	  regression	  to	  lower-­‐level	  elements,	  as	  stipulated	  by	  methodological	  individualism’	  (2004:237).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  thesis	  maintains	  that	  complex	  realism	  engages	  with	  this	  complexity.	  Watts	  (2011:65),	  explains	  that	  although	  groups	  do	  share	  some	  common	  characteristics	  with	  individuals	  (for	  example,	  groups	  can	  ‘decide’	  on,	  ‘choose’,	  or	  ‘pursue’,	  etc.),	  there	  are	  clear	  disparities	  as	  well,	  especially	  in	  regard	  to	  psychological	  abilities	  and	  dispositions.	  Watts	  argues	  (ibid)	  that,	  subconsciously,	  we	  know	  that	  the	  ‘behaviour’	  of	  social	  actors	  is	  really	  a	  convenient	  shorthand	  for	  the	  aggregate	  behaviour	  of	  large	  numbers	  of	  individuals:	  ‘Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  so	  natural	  to	  talk	  this	  way	  that	  the	  shorthand	  has	  become	  indispensible	  to	  our	  ability	  to	  explain	  things’.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  need	  to	  have	  referents,	  however	  imperfect,	  for	  recognisable	  (often	  stereotypical)	  behaviours	  that	  we	  assign	  to	  groups	  —	  families,	  politicians,	  markets,	  societies,	  states,	  allies/enemies,	  corporations,	  etc.	  —	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  discuss	  them	  at	  all.	  Therefore,	  in	  choosing	  to	  explain	  a	  sphere	  of	  inter-­‐relational	  behaviours,	  this	  thesis	  builds	  on	  the	  pioneering	  literature	  by	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  (1989:	  ix)	  et	  al,	  which,	  in	  seeking	  to	  explain	  unprecedented	  socio-­‐historical	  events	  involving	  ‘transnational’	  political	  protest	  groups,	  identified	  a	  typology	  of	  social	  phenomena	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and	  gave	  it	  the	  collective	  name	  ‘transnational	  advocacy	  network’.	  Giving	  a	  name	  to	  these	  configurations	  has	  been	  helpful	  as	  a	  basic	  referent,	  in	  that	  it	  enables	  us	  to	  roughly	  distinguish	  the	  social	  behaviours	  of	  TANs	  from	  the	  social	  behaviours	  of	  actors	  who	  are	  not-­‐TANs.	  	  	  My	  TAN	  referent	  model	  takes	  this	  project	  further:	  shedding	  significantly	  more	  light	  on	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  contemporary	  TANs	  and	  suggesting	  both	  underlying	  causal	  mechanisms	  for	  their	  manifest	  behaviours	  and	  the	  fitness	  of	  typical	  TAN	  strategies	  in	  pursuing	  stated	  goals	  in	  the	  international	  environment145.	  Furthermore,	  I	  considered	  it	  was	  essential	  to	  develop	  referent	  criteria	  for	  the	  model	  of	  contemporary	  TANs	  to	  be	  used	  in	  this	  thesis,	  there	  being	  no	  pre-­‐existing	  model,	  theoretical	  synthesisation	  or	  similar	  conceptualisation	  of	  TANs	  by	  any	  researcher	  with	  a	  political	  and	  communications	  background.	  This	  model	  for	  contemporary,	  communications-­‐oriented	  TANs	  was	  then	  used	  as	  a	  template	  to	  generally	  appraise	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  NGOs	  and	  INGOs	  to	  determine	  which	  of	  them	  most	  closely	  resembled	  the	  TAN	  referent	  and	  characteristics	  that	  I	  was	  interested	  in	  examining.	  As	  it	  turned	  out,	  this	  step	  was	  straightforward:	  the	  most	  TAN-­‐like	  organisations	  were	  also	  the	  organisations	  that	  appeared	  to	  use	  modern	  communications	  most	  expertly	  and	  were,	  unsurprisingly,	  the	  most	  widely	  recognised.	  	  Basically,	  my	  TAN	  template	  is	  a	  simple	  test	  for	  evaluating	  whether	  eight	  statements	  apply	  to	  a	  given	  NGO	  in	  order	  to	  distinguish	  it	  as	  a	  TAN	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  answering	  the	  research	  queries	  and	  hypotheses	  of	  this	  thesis.	  It	  follows	  that	  if	  the	  TAN	  typology	  is	  assessed	  to	  be	  a	  reasonable	  fit,	  then	  the	  results	  of	  the	  study	  of	  this	  typology	  have	  validity	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  three	  case	  study	  organisations	  and	  are	  indicative	  also	  of	  general	  applicability.	  It	  is	  a	  key	  premise	  of	  the	  study	  that	  the	  TAN	  referent	  model	  is	  predictive	  of	  whether	  an	  NGO	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  TAN	  and	  whether,	  and	  to	  what	  extent,	  this	  matters	  in	  assessing	  the	  place,	  function	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  organisation	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system.	  My	  referent	  template	  for	  contemporary	  TANs	  is	  introduced	  in	  Chapter	  6	  at	  Figure	  6.2,	  where	  it	  provides	  a	  detailed	  overview	  of	  TANs	  prior	  to	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  three	  case	  studies.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145	  This	  complies	  with	  realist	  social	  research	  thinking	  concerning	  the	  vital	  importance	  of	  conceptualising	  
the	  qualitative	  nature	  of	  social	  objects	  and	  relations	  on	  which	  causal	  mechanisms	  depend	  (Sayer,	  1992:	  
2-­‐3).	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3.4.3	  Applying	  a	  Communications	  lens	  	  The	  aim	  of	  my	  focus	  on	  the	  communications	  aspects	  of	  TANs	  is	  to	  assist	  the	  reader	  to	  observe	  the	  strategic	  communicative	  behaviours	  of	  TANs,	  over	  and	  above	  their	  political	  rhetoric	  and	  stated	  goals,	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  and	  evaluate	  communicative	  expressions	  that,	  this	  thesis	  holds,	  have	  determinative	  effects	  on	  their	  interactions	  with	  international	  actors.	  While	  TANs	  are	  routinely	  described	  in	  the	  political	  literature	  and	  discourses	  as	  organisations	  involved	  in	  ‘campaigning’,	  ‘advocating’,	  ’protesting’,	  and	  ‘championing’,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  in	  the	  context	  of	  transnational	  advocacy	  these	  activities	  are	  all	  sub-­‐categories	  of	  communication.	  	  	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  a	  basic	  premise	  of	  this	  thesis	  that	  the	  communications	  outputs	  of	  purposeful	  organisations,	  such	  as	  TANs,	  can	  be	  taken	  as	  strategic	  projections	  of	  each	  organisation’s	  collective	  viewpoint	  on	  matters.	  In	  this	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  imply	  that	  there	  is	  ever	  total	  unanimity	  of	  individual	  opinions	  within	  organisations,	  or	  that	  this	  is	  even	  possible.	  However,	  my	  argument	  holds	  that	  the	  corporate	  ‘face’	  and	  publicity	  outputs	  of	  organisations	  are	  the	  result	  of	  internal	  strategic	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  and	  present	  the	  organisational	  identity	  to	  which	  other	  individuals	  and	  collective	  audiences,	  or	  publics,	  respond.	  Hence,	  I	  hold	  that	  this	  strategic	  portrayal	  is	  a	  definitive	  feature	  in	  the	  case	  of	  TANs,	  whose	  raison	  d’être	  is	  the	  assertive	  communication	  of	  their	  social	  imperatives.	  Since	  it	  is	  through	  communications	  that	  our	  relationships	  are	  forged	  or	  break	  down	  (Miller,	  2005:166-­‐167),	  I	  also	  provide,	  in	  the	  following	  sub-­‐sections,	  the	  salient	  criteria	  for	  better	  understanding	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  	  In	  taking	  this	  approach,	  I	  have	  followed	  the	  advice	  of	  della	  Porta	  et	  al	  (2002:	  286)	  that	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  phenomena	  ‘necessitates	  comparing	  the	  reality	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  with	  something	  else’	  and	  that	  this	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  any	  knowledge.	  Thus,	  in	  providing	  the	  substantive	  theoretical	  criteria	  for	  ‘relationship	  quality’	  for	  comparison,	  I	  show	  how	  this	  also	  provided	  a	  yardstick	  for	  a	  falsification/testability	  step	  in	  my	  theory	  development	  for	  the	  thesis	  by	  enabling	  me	  to	  analyse	  the	  validated	  relationship	  information	  of	  the	  data	  set	  and	  ask:	  What	  would	  a	  good	  international	  system	  relationship	  with	  a	  TAN	  look	  like?	  Political	  theory	  alone	  cannot	  countenance	  such	  a	  question.	  However,	  as	  will	  be	  shown	  in	  the	  case	  studies,	  this	  fact	  does	  not	  handicap	  the	  imaginations	  of	  political	  theoreticians.	  I	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turn	  now	  to	  highlighting	  some	  of	  the	  substantive	  communications	  theories	  that	  I	  have	  used	  to	  support	  my	  arguments.	  
	  
Advocacy	  theory	  Firstly,	  I	  wish	  to	  emphasise	  that	  the	  focus	  on	  ‘advocacy’	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  very	  much	  wider	  (and,	  I	  consider,	  is	  more	  explanatory),	  than	  the	  campaigns	  framework	  and	  constructivist	  approaches	  for	  understanding	  TANs,	  recommended	  by	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  (1998:3-­‐6).	  See	  also	  Section	  6.6	  for	  more	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  ‘advocacy’	  adopted	  in	  this	  thesis.	  In	  summary,	  my	  approach	  to	  advocacy	  communications	  theory	  accords	  with	  the	  definition	  employed	  by	  the	  world’s	  largest	  humanitarian	  network,	  the	  Red	  Cross	  and	  Red	  Crescent	  Movement	  (IFRC),	  which	  states	  (Red	  Cross,	  2012:11-­‐12):	  	  	   Advocacy	   is	   about	   persuading	   people	   to	   make	   changes,	   whether	   in	   policy,	  practice,	  systems	  or	  structures.	  For	  the	  IFRC,	  this	  means	  changes	  that	  improve	  conditions	   for	   vulnerable	   people.	   Advocacy	   is	   about	   speaking	   for	   others,	  working	  with	  others	  and	  supporting	  others	  to	  speak	  for	  themselves.	  It	  is	  a	  way	  of	  taking	  community	  voices	  to	  a	  different	  level	  of	  decision-­‐making.	  	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  world	  body	  asserts:	  ‘The	  art	  of	  advocacy	  lies	  in	  persuasion,	  not	  confrontation’.	  	  	  	  The	  point	  I	  emphasise	  here	  is	  that	  advocacy	  is	  best	  understood	  when	  it	  is	  regarded	  as	  a	  communications	  function,	  not	  a	  political	  role.	  	  	  Does	  this	  interpretation	  matter?	  I	  will	  argue	  in	  the	  case	  studies	  that	  aligning	  strategies	  with	  objectives	  is	  vital	  to	  strategic	  goal-­‐achievement,	  notwithstanding	  oddities	  such	  as	  unintended	  positive	  consequences	  and	  plain	  luck.	  In	  fact,	  it	  will	  be	  shown	  later	  that	  there	  have	  been	  renowned	  failures	  of	  TAN	  strategies	  that	  have	  nevertheless	  resulted	  in	  unexpected	  reputational	  windfalls	  that	  individual	  TANs	  were	  then	  able	  to	  reinterpret	  as	  post	  hoc	  successes.	  Unfortunately,	  I	  suggest,	  this	  habit	  of	  success	  framing	  has	  also	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  (a)	  implying	  that	  certain	  strategies	  were	  more	  fit	  and	  aligned	  with	  aims	  than	  they	  were;	  and	  (b)	  injecting	  false-­‐positive	  feedback	  into	  the	  organisations,	  mainstream	  media	  narratives	  and	  contemporary	  myth-­‐making.	  Indeed,	  one	  of	  the	  basic	  tenets	  of	  modern	  public	  communications	  theory	  holds	  that	  communications	  strategies	  require	  objectives	  of	  a	  communications	  nature	  (Palin,	  1985:4;	  Macnamara,	  2000:	  224-­‐226;	  Gregory,	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2000:43,	  168-­‐171;	  Broom	  and	  Sha,	  2013:287-­‐289).	  Often,	  organisations	  embark	  upon	  communications	  programmes,	  say,	  to	  increase	  public	  awareness,	  without	  any	  clear	  link,	  lever,	  or	  explanatory	  mechanism,	  for	  how	  generating	  publicity	  and,	  thus,	  awareness	  might	  contribute	  towards	  achieving	  a	  political	  goal	  (Broom	  and	  Sha,	  
ibid).	  Communications	  theory	  urges	  caution	  in	  making	  assumptions	  about	  how	  message	  ‘receivers’	  use	  information	  to	  progress	  to	  attitude	  and	  behaviour	  change	  and,	  ultimately,	  to	  take	  a	  desired	  action.	  Gregory	  (2002:	  91-­‐92)	  estimates	  that	  a	  domino-­‐like	  ‘simple	  progression’	  does	  not	  happen	  often,	  while	  Grunig	  and	  Hunt	  (1984)	  argue	  that	  the	  chances	  of	  someone	  progressing	  from	  the	  point	  where	  a	  message	  is	  received	  to	  behaving	  in	  a	  desired	  way	  are	  ‘4	  in	  10,000’.	  	  In	  liberal	  democratic	  electoral	  systems	  the	  influence	  of	  media-­‐generated	  political	  information	  is	  accorded	  a	  privileged,	  and	  not	  altogether	  justified146,	  status	  in	  mainstream	  thinking.	  But	  the	  international	  order	  is	  not	  such	  a	  system	  and,	  I	  suggest,	  publicity	  strategies	  directed	  at	  influencing	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  system	  often	  have	  no	  sounder	  basis	  than	  assumption.	  If	  goals	  and	  strategies	  are	  not	  aligned,	  there	  is	  the	  likelihood	  that	  energies	  and	  resources	  will	  be	  concentrated	  on	  honing	  strategies,	  instead	  of	  achieving	  goals.	  Furthermore,	  public	  communications	  programme	  goals	  must	  not	  be	  unattainable	  with	  communications	  strategies,	  otherwise	  an	  impression	  is	  created	  of	  always	  failing,	  even	  if	  superb	  work	  has	  been	  done	  (Palin,	  ibid)	  
	  In	  assessing	  the	  explosive	  growth	  in	  TANs	  during	  a	  period	  roughly	  coterminous	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  affordable,	  globe-­‐spanning	  ICTs,	  it	  was	  difficult	  not	  to	  see	  the	  development	  of	  this	  unprecedented	  advocacy	  phenomenon	  in	  ‘chicken-­‐and-­‐egg’	  terms,	  in	  regard	  to	  which	  of	  the	  components	  came	  first.	  Although	  the	  literature	  on	  contentious	  international	  politics	  has	  increasingly	  featured	  the	  term	  ‘transnational	  advocacy	  networks’	  —	  most	  noticeably	  since	  the	  publication	  of	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  seminal	  text	  in	  1998	  —	  and	  acknowledged	  the	  adoption	  of	  ICTs	  by	  NGOs	  and	  the	  revolution	  in	  transnational	  activist	  networking,	  this	  thesis	  argues	  that	  crucial	  aspects	  of	  this	  unprecedented	  technologically-­‐enabled	  phenomenon	  have	  been	  theoretically	  neglected.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	  Electoral	  studies	  reveal	  that	  media	  effects	  on	  public	  opinion	  are	  ‘generally	  small’	  according	  to	  van	  der	  
Eijk	  and	  Franklin	  (2009:150-­‐151).	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  When	  political	  scholars	  note	  that	  international	  politics	  has	  been	  changed	  dramatically	  by	  digital	  communications	  and	  the	  Internet,	  they	  typically	  focus	  on	  the	  astonishing	  scale	  of	  interpersonal	  connectivity	  that	  has	  been	  enabled	  and	  the	  presumed	  political	  consequences,	  leaving	  much	  to	  inference	  and	  assumption.	  Even	  influential	  scholars	  in	  the	  paradigm,	  such	  as	  Castells	  and	  Tarrow147,	  focus	  on	  the	  availability,	  form	  and	  acclaimed	  successes	  of	  ICTs	  in	  transnational	  activism,	  and	  skirt	  vital	  questions	  concerning	  the	  competence	  of	  the	  communications	  strategies	  deployed,	  the	  suitability	  of	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  messages	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  alternative	  causal	  factors,	  beyond	  what	  appears	  obvious	  to	  non-­‐specialists.	  This,	  I	  suggest,	  could	  be	  compared	  to	  telling	  a	  story	  about	  the	  logistics	  of	  delivering	  a	  letter	  from	  A	  to	  B	  without	  mentioning	  what	  it	  said.	  	  
	  Some	  writers	  have	  described	  recent	  tendencies	  towards	  uncritical	  over-­‐	  enthusiasm	  regarding	  the	  political	  consequences	  of	  modern	  ICTs,	  by	  such	  terms	  as	  ‘cyber-­‐utopianism’,	  ‘Internet-­‐centrism’	  (Morazov	  (2011:	  xiii-­xvii)	  and	  ‘technology	  fetishism	  ‘(Dean,	  2009:	  31-­‐33).	  Certainly,	  this	  four-­‐year	  study	  found	  no	  depth	  analyses	  of	  the	  communications	  techniques	  now	  being	  commonly	  used,	  and	  shared,	  by	  contemporary	  TANs.	  And	  yet,	  I	  argue,	  these	  techniques	  are	  the	  result	  of	  strategic	  communications	  decision-­‐making	  within	  purposeful	  organisations.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  high-­‐quality	  communications	  techniques	  are	  so	  taken	  for	  granted	  by	  lay	  audiences	  and	  the	  modern	  media	  that	  it	  is	  merely	  assumed	  that	  ‘they	  are	  what	  they	  are’.	  However,	  this	  thesis	  argues	  that	  such	  a	  judgment	  would	  be	  unsafe.	  Communications	  techniques	  are	  designed	  for	  specific	  work	  —	  from	  ‘fuzzy	  brand	  promises’	  to	  stereotypes,	  associative	  thought	  triggering,	  cues,	  priming,	  repetition,	  emotive	  graphical	  devices,	  bright	  colours,	  the	  placement	  of	  Website	  ‘hot’	  buttons,	  such	  as	  ‘Donate	  Now’,	  and	  much	  more.	  These	  tactics	  are	  identified,	  referenced	  and	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  6	  and	  in	  the	  case	  studies,	  where	  I	  emphasise	  the	  importance	  of	  analysing	  not	  only	  the	  political	  messages	  that	  TANs	  communicate,	  but	  the	  strategic	  methods	  they	  choose	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  advocacy	  communications	  lens	  is	  also	  used	  to	  illuminate	  my	  theory	  that	  the	  modern	  communications	  tools	  that	  TANs	  select	  are,	  in	  turn,	  significantly	  shaping	  these	  organisations,	  their	  reputations,	  the	  reputations	  of	  their	  adversaries,	  and	  the	  futures	  of	  both.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147	  Salient	  texts	  by	  these	  scholars	  were	  cited	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  
	   100	  
	  
Relationship	  quality	  theory	  What	  qualities	  should	  a	  mutually	  satisfying	  organisation-­‐public(s)	  relationship	  exhibit?	  Fortunately,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  speculative	  question	  in	  communications	  science,	  neither	  is	  it	  emotionally-­‐charged,	  as	  undoubtedly	  it	  would	  be	  in	  a	  political	  science	  context.	  In	  fact,	  there	  is	  a	  wide	  body	  of	  communications/PR	  literature	  focused	  specifically	  on	  organisation-­‐public	  relationships	  (e.g.	  Grunig	  et	  al,	  2002;	  Ledingham,	  2001,	  Broom	  and	  Sha,	  2013).	  Research	  in	  this	  discipline	  indicates	  that	  organisation-­‐public	  relationships	  exactly	  mimic	  interpersonal	  relationships	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  critical	  determinators	  of	  relationship	  quality.	  This	  means	  that	  we	  regard	  organisations	  as	  being	  people-­‐like	  and	  describe	  and	  think	  about	  them	  in	  interpersonal	  terms148.	  According	  to	  Ledingham	  (2004:741	  and	  2003),	  the	  salient	  determinators	  of	  relationship	  quality	  are:	  trust,	  openness,	  credibility,	  emotion,	  intimacy,	  similarity,	  immediacy,	  agreement,	  issue	  perception,	  shared	  interests,	  and	  relational	  history.	  Grunig	  et	  al	  (2002:553-­‐554)	  endorse	  Ledingham	  and	  Brunig’s	  research,	  and	  advise	  a	  focus	  on:	  control	  mutuality,	  trust,	  commitment	  and	  satisfaction.	  Kovacs	  (2001)	  claims	  the	  critical	  dimensions	  of	  relationship-­‐building	  are:	  trust,	  openness,	  mutual	  respect	  and	  access.	  Dimmick	  et	  al	  (2001:118)	  list:	  reciprocity,	  trust,	  credibility,	  mutual	  legitimacy,	  openness,	  mutual	  satisfaction	  and	  mutual	  understanding.	  	  	  Of	  these,	  the	  relationship	  quality	  most	  commonly	  mentioned	  in	  the	  literature	  and	  perhaps	  the	  most	  fundamental	  in	  relationship-­‐building,	  is	  trust.	  Giddens	  considers	  ‘trust’	  and	  ‘tact'	  to	  be	  the	  ‘basic	  properties’	  that	  people	  bring	  to	  their	  encounters:	  trust	  being	  a	  primal	  human	  instinct	  that	  develops	  in	  infancy,	  with	  tact	  being	  ‘the	  main	  mechanism	  that	  sustains	  trust’	  (1984:	  51-­‐60,	  75,	  86).	  Kohn	  (2008)	  observes	  that	  ‘to	  understand	  our	  changing	  society,	  we	  need	  to	  look	  at	  human	  relations	  at	  every	  level,	  and	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  all	  such	  relations	  lies	  trust’.	  Trust,	  he	  suggests,	  ‘is	  an	  expectation,	  or	  disposition	  to	  expect,	  that	  another	  party	  will	  act	  in	  one’s	  interests’.	  When	  public	  issues	  boil	  over,	  blame	  will	  ‘find	  its	  way	  to	  the	  government,	  as	  inevitably	  as	  water	  flows	  downhill,	  highlighting	  the	  mistrust	  of	  political	  institutions	  that	  helps	  define	  the	  modern	  political	  condition’.	  Where	  people	  feel	  that	  their	  lives	  are	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  others,	  such	  as	  officials,	  ‘mistrust	  may	  rapidly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148	  This	  will	  be	  pointed	  out	  in	  the	  case	  studies,	  where	  organisations	  are	  variously	  characterised,	  for	  
example,	  as	  greedy,	  wealthy,	  bullying,	  or	  caring.	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flare	  into	  a	  sense	  of	  betrayal’.	  According	  to	  the	  behavioural	  scientist	  Farson	  (2008)	  people	  cannot	  manufacture	  trust	  but	  they	  can	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  help	  trust	  develop	  and	  they	  can	  demonstrate	  ‘trustworthiness’.	  Thus,	  in	  developing	  the	  thesis	  I	  tested	  the	  data	  principally	  for	  evidence	  of	  ‘trust’	  in	  evaluating	  relationship	  quality	  between	  each	  of	  the	  actors	  and	  its	  diverse	  publics149	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  engagement.	  I	  also	  tested	  for	  signs	  and	  extents	  of	  the	  following	  five	  relationship	  qualities:	  mutual	  respect,	  tact,	  credibility,	  mutual	  understanding	  and	  access.	  This	  process	  led	  to	  my	  synthesis	  of	  Thucydidean	  theory	  (regarding	  mistrust	  between	  nations)	  with	  my	  direct	  observations,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  my	  grounded	  Hypothesis	  #3,	  which	  asserts:	  The	  adversarial	  advocacy	  strategies	  typically	  adopted	  by	  some	  TANs	  
constitute	  a	  barrier	  to	  them	  achieving	  their	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  policy-­making	  
environment.	  	  
Perception	  theory	  Perceptions	  regarding	  whether	  the	  above	  qualities	  are	  present	  in	  a	  relationship	  are	  relevant	  in	  the	  present	  context.	  Bennett	  (2001:56)	  contends	  that	  ‘however	  nebulous,	  image	  is	  reality	  because	  people	  can	  only	  react	  to	  what	  they	  experience	  and	  perceive’150.	  For	  this	  reason,	  organisations	  must	  deal	  with	  real	  and	  perceived	  public	  opinion,	  as	  they	  establish	  and	  maintain	  relationships	  with	  their	  diverse	  publics	  (Miller,	  2005:10;	  Bennett,	  ibid:	  207).	  Organisations	  often	  misclassify	  a	  problem,	  focusing	  on	  the	  technical	  aspects	  and	  ignoring	  issues	  of	  perception	  (Regester	  and	  Larkin,	  2002:122).	  For	  those	  receiving	  communications,	  perception	  is	  influenced	  by	  culture	  and	  establishing	  ‘a	  sense	  of	  commonness’	  with	  the	  message	  sender	  (Broom	  and	  Sha,	  2013:323151;	  Jandt,	  1995:136).	  Ultimately,	  argues	  DeVito,	  perception	  is	  central	  to	  the	  study	  of	  communication	  in	  all	  its	  forms	  and	  functions	  (2000:38).	  This	  is	  mainly	  because:	  ‘Whatever	  you	  perceive	  you	  also	  organise	  into	  a	  pattern	  that	  is	  meaningful	  to	  you.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  pattern	  that	  is	  necessarily	  true	  or	  logical	  in	  any	  objective	  sense’.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149	  Grunig	  emphasises	  that	  the	  value	  of	  public	  relations	  comes	  from	  the	  relationships	  that	  
communicators	  develop	  and	  maintain	  with	  publics,	  and	  that	  reputation	  is	  a	  product	  of	  relationships.	  
Moreover,	  the	  quality	  of	  reputation	  and	  relationships	  ‘result	  more	  from	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  
organisation	  than	  from	  the	  messages	  that	  communicators	  disseminate’	  (2002:xi).	  
150	  Emphasis	  as	  in	  original.	  
151	  Broom	  and	  Sha	  point	  out	  that	  ‘to	  communicate	  effectively,	  the	  sender’s	  words	  and	  symbols	  must	  
mean	  the	  same	  thing	  to	  the	  receiver	  that	  they	  do	  to	  the	  sender’.	  Therefore,	  ‘communication	  means	  
establishing	  a	  sense	  of	  commonness’	  (2013:323).	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Issues	  Management	  and	  Activism	  theory	  Issues	  and	  crisis	  management	  are	  areas	  of	  intense	  concern	  to	  organisations	  and	  communicators	  because	  increasing	  activism	  and	  mismanagement	  of	  issues	  ‘poses	  a	  threat	  to	  that	  most	  important	  of	  all	  assets	  –	  reputation’,	  claim	  Regester	  and	  Larkin	  (2002:ix,	  1,	  10).	  This	  theory	  was	  tested	  over	  a	  prolonged	  period	  in	  the	  case	  studies,	  where	  its	  relevance	  to	  TANs	  was	  strongly	  indicated,	  while	  its	  relevance	  to	  the	  international	  realm	  was	  debatable.	  According	  to	  Hunt	  and	  Grunig	  (1994:16),	  ‘publics	  make	  issues	  out	  of	  problems	  that	  have	  not	  been	  resolved’.	  Indeed,	  activist	  groups	  play	  a	  powerful	  role	  in	  making	  public	  issues	  out	  of	  problems.	  According	  to	  Smith	  (2004:5),	  activism	  is	  the	  process	  by	  which	  groups	  of	  people	  exert	  pressure	  on	  organisations	  or	  other	  institutions	  to	  change	  policies,	  practices	  or	  conditions	  that	  they	  find	  problematic.	  Regester	  and	  Larkin	  (ibid:10)	  observe:	  	   In	   today’s	   complex	   environment,	   organisations	   have	   to	   understand	   and	  respond	  to	  our	  rapidly	  shifting	  values,	  rising	  expectations,	  demands	  for	  public	  consultation	  and	  an	  increasingly	  intrusive	  news	  media.	  It	  is	  no	  longer	  enough	  to	  focus	  on	  internal	  objectives	  alone:	  outside-­in	  thinking152	  […]	  is	  an	  essential	  prerequisite	   for	   achieving	   the	   tacit	   acceptance	   of	   society	   to	   continue	   to	  operate.	  	  However,	  many	  organisations	  resist	  being	  ‘managed	  from	  outside’	  (Bennett,	  ibid:	  57),	  and	  so	  resist	  pressure	  from	  activists	  and	  endure	  on-­‐going	  negativity	  in	  relationships.	  Grunig	  (2006),	  cites	  research	  into	  the	  use	  of	  symmetrical,	  two-­‐way,	  communication	  by	  the	  World	  Bank,	  IMF,	  WTO	  and	  Shell	  Oil	  that	  found	  these	  organisations	  did	  engage	  in	  dialogue	  with	  their	  publics	  and	  made	  concessions	  to	  publics	  in	  their	  behaviours;	  however,	  ‘they	  changed	  just	  enough	  to	  maintain	  social	  order	  and	  preserve	  their	  own	  hegemony’.	  	  	  Testing	  the	  research	  data	  for	  signs	  of	  schemas	  and	  stereotypes	  was	  also	  important.	  This	  is	  because	  communication	  scholars	  warn	  that	  higher	  levels	  of	  persuasion	  are	  required	  once	  stakeholders	  or	  activists	  have	  formed	  heuristic/schematic	  responses	  to	  issues.	  Christen	  and	  Hallan	  (2004:661)	  contend	  that	  schemas	  are	  unique	  mental	  frameworks	  of	  knowledge,	  beliefs	  and	  expectation	  that	  people	  construct	  based	  on	  their	  personal	  history,	  current	  circumstances,	  future	  plans	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152	  This	  perspective	  is	  commonly	  referred	  to	  in	  communications	  contexts	  as	  ‘receiver-­‐orientation’,	  which	  
takes	  account	  of	  receiver	  factors	  in	  communications	  and	  makes	  allowances	  for	  their	  frames	  of	  
reference,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  egocentric	  position	  of	  ‘sender–orientation’	  (Chandler	  and	  Munday,	  
2011:356-­‐357).	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interactions	  with	  others.	  One	  form	  of	  schema,	  stereotypes,	  can	  lead	  people	  to	  habitually	  look	  for	  a	  particular	  undesirable,	  or	  desirable,	  trait	  in	  another.	  In	  many	  cases,	  people	  compare	  and	  screen	  new	  messages	  for	  relevant	  information	  already	  stored	  in	  memory	  and	  focus	  on	  inconsistencies.	  Schemas,	  once	  formed,	  are	  resistant	  to	  change	  and	  often	  form	  self-­‐confirming	  effects	  (ibid).	  Deegan	  (2001:	  42)	  claims	  that	  the	  views	  of	  activists	  and	  organisations	  are	  often	  not	  as	  disparate	  as	  either	  side	  would	  believe,	  however,	  ‘a	  lack	  of	  trust	  keeps	  both	  sides	  apart’.	  	  	  	  Thus,	  Cutlip	  et	  al	  (ibid:	  415)	  emphasises	  the	  role	  of	  good	  quality	  communications	  practices	  in	  providing	  a	  crucial	  feedback	  mechanism	  in	  society:	  	  Without	  an	  informed	  and	  active	  citizenry,	  elected	  and	  appointed	  officials	  may	  lose	  touch	  with	  the	  true	  needs	  and	  interests	  of	  their	  constituents.	  […]	  Citizen	  discontent	  may	  linger	   just	  beneath	  the	  surface,	   then	  suddenly	  appear	  and	  be	  fuelled	  by	  simplistic	  rhetoric	  in	  place	  of	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  issues.	  
	  
3.5	  Methods	  and	  Sources	  The	  data	  set	  was	  compiled	  from	  an	  extensive	  range	  of	  primary	  and	  secondary	  materials.	  The	  literature	  review	  and	  content	  analysis	  encompassed	  the	  following	  cross-­‐disciplinary	  subject	  areas:	  international	  relations	  and	  political	  science	  (particularly	  texts	  relating	  to	  contentious	  international	  politics,	  the	  UN	  and	  other	  international	  institutions,	  social	  movements,	  civil	  society	  advocacy	  and	  issues,	  globalisation	  and	  contemporary	  global	  governance	  challenges153	  and	  alternative	  worldviews);	  sociology	  and	  communications	  studies;	  cognitive	  and	  behavioural	  studies	  and	  methodology.	  	  	  Content	  analysis	  of	  primary	  sources	  included	  official	  documents,	  such	  as	  statutory	  documents	  and	  reports	  published	  by	  international	  institutional	  bodies,	  such	  as	  the	  UN	  Secretary-­‐General,	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  and	  UN	  agencies,	  treaty	  bodies	  and	  world	  conferences;	  the	  Arctic	  Council	  and	  the	  Comprehensive	  Nuclear-­‐Test-­‐Ban	  Treaty	  Organisation;	  academic	  journal	  articles	  and	  papers;	  media	  reports	  and	  commentaries	  from	  the	  legacy	  print	  media,	  electronic	  and	  online	  publishers,	  and	  an	  extensive	  array	  of	  communications	  outputs	  by	  TANs,	  including	  official	  Website	  content,	  annual	  reports,	  strategy	  documents,	  constitutional	  and	  financial	  documents	  and	  archival	  material,	  media	  releases,	  videos	  and	  podcasts.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153	  Also	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  literature	  and	  this	  thesis	  as	  ‘wicked	  problems’.	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collation	  and	  analysis	  of	  these	  materials	  was	  a	  painstaking	  undertaking	  over	  an	  extended	  period	  and	  all	  of	  the	  sources	  cited	  here	  are	  from	  reputable,	  identified	  outlets.	  Whilst	  I	  acknowledge	  that	  some	  of	  these	  latter	  materials	  are	  not	  from	  peer-­‐reviewed	  academic	  sources,	  the	  information	  they	  contain	  is	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  and,	  I	  suggest,	  is	  influential	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  widespread	  audience	  perceptions	  of	  TANs,	  as	  well	  as	  each	  TAN’s	  perception	  of	  its	  identity,	  role	  and	  effectiveness	  in	  society.	  As	  such,	  I	  submit,	  consideration	  of	  this	  material	  is	  crucial	  to	  understanding	  each	  TAN.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  contemporary	  focus	  of	  the	  research	  project,	  the	  data	  were	  collected	  and	  analysed	  in	  an	  ongoing,	  iterative	  process	  to	  refine	  the	  propositions	  and	  explanatory	  credibility	  of	  the	  thesis.	  This	  involved	  interrogating	  the	  data	  according	  to	  five	  criteria	  that	  I	  selected	  and	  ranked,	  as	  follows:	  (1).	  Relevance	  to	  the	  research	  question	  and	  hypotheses;	  (2)	  Authority	  and	  weight	  of	  the	  source	  material,	  including	  any	  added	  weight	  contingent	  on	  the	  possibility	  to	  triangulate,	  cross-­‐reference,	  or	  further	  validate	  the	  data	  in	  a	  scientific	  way;	  (3)	  Potential	  to	  make	  a	  valuable	  contribution	  to	  new	  knowledge	  and	  raise	  important	  questions;	  (4)	  Agreement,	  or	  disagreement,	  with	  the	  processed	  data	  and	  the	  theoretical	  assumptions	  and	  hypotheses	  of	  the	  thesis;	  and	  (5)	  Evidence	  of	  processes,	  patterns	  and	  trends	  leading	  to	  sound	  propositions	  regarding	  underlying	  structures	  and	  causal	  mechanisms.	  The	  large	  volume	  of	  media	  reports	  and	  commentaries	  were	  subjected	  to	  a	  further	  interpretive,	  filtering,	  test	  to	  evaluate	  whether	  the	  data	  contained	  implications	  that	  were	  ‘positive’,	  ‘negative’,	  or	  ‘neutral’	  to	  the	  organisation’s	  external	  relationships	  with	  its	  diverse	  publics.	  	  Øyen	  (1990:12)	  supports	  this	  method	  with	  her	  assertion	  that	  content	  analysis	  of	  many	  types	  of	  written	  documents	  can	  be	  used	  for	  making	  inferences	  about	  public	  opinion,	  attitudes,	  values,	  or	  the	  nature	  of	  social	  structure.	  Further	  advantages	  of	  the	  method	  lie	  in	  its	  unobtrusiveness,	  which	  eliminates	  interaction	  between	  the	  investigator	  and	  the	  data	  producer.	  Disadvantages,	  however,	  lie	  in	  the	  sampling	  and	  in	  the	  indirectness	  of	  the	  observations,	  ‘which	  assume	  knowledge	  about	  the	  translation	  from	  the	  observable’.	  Constant	  awareness	  was	  needed,	  therefore,	  regarding	  possible	  political	  or	  ideological	  agendas	  of	  sources,	  and	  self,	  in	  analysing	  data	  that	  was	  often	  politically-­‐charged.	  Nevertheless,	  I	  was	  guided	  in	  applying	  an	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interpretivist	  intervention	  in	  the	  data	  by	  Grix’s	  contentions	  that	  (2002:179):	  ‘All	  research	  necessarily	  starts	  from	  a	  person’s	  view	  of	  the	  world,	  which	  itself	  is	  shaped	  by	  the	  experience	  one	  brings	  to	  the	  research	  process’.	  Similar	  support	  for	  this	  standpoint	  was	  provided	  by	  Miller	  (2005:	  58),	  Maxwell	  (1996:17),	  and	  Cloke,	  Cook,	  et	  al	  (2004:24).	  In	  Miller’s	  view:	  ‘Personal	  and	  professional	  values	  are	  a	  lens	  through	  which	  social	  phenomena	  are	  observed’.	  	  Acceptance	  of	  the	  researcher’s	  empirical	  baggage	  —	  as	  distinct	  from	  the	  clear	  unacceptability	  of	  researcher	  bias	  —	  does	  not,	  according	  to	  these	  scholars,	  necessarily	  compromise	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  research	  process	  but,	  rather,	  constitutes	  a	  normative	  starting	  point.	  In	  this	  author’s	  case,	  the	  experiential	  base	  is	  over	  40	  years’	  professional	  involvement	  in	  media,	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  communications	  and	  public	  relations,	  mostly	  in	  international	  organisations.	  Combining	  the	  dual	  paradigms	  of	  politics	  and	  communications	  was,	  therefore,	  familiar	  terrain.	  The	  author’s	  view	  of	  the	  world	  was,	  therefore,	  utilised	  to	  underpin	  the	  methodological	  approaches	  and	  selection	  criteria.	  Attempting	  to	  purge	  oneself	  of	  personal	  goals	  and	  concerns	  is	  neither	  possible	  nor	  necessary,	  according	  to	  Maxwell	  (ibid:16):	  	   What	   is	   necessary	   is	   to	   be	   aware	   of	   these	   concerns	   and	   how	   they	   may	   be	  shaping	   your	   research,	   and	   to	   think	   about	   how	   best	   to	   deal	   with	   their	  consequences.	  	  This	  placed	  the	  onus	  for	  demonstrating	  value,	  validity	  and	  rigour	  on	  the	  author,	  guided	  by	  Holliday	  (2007:8,	  31).	  Data	  were	  verified	  wherever	  possible	  by	  triangulation	  between	  data	  sources,	  such	  as	  documents,	  authoritative	  statements	  and	  commentaries	  and	  direct	  observation.	  A	  very	  high	  component	  of	  direct	  observation	  was	  enabled	  in	  this	  research	  by	  the	  volume	  of	  material	  published	  on-­‐line	  on	  official	  Websites.	  Much	  of	  this	  material	  was	  in	  the	  form	  of	  videos,	  podcasts,	  Webcasts	  of	  conference	  and	  high-­‐level	  panel	  proceedings,	  etc.,	  which	  I	  hold	  to	  be	  primary	  sources.	  Furthermore,	  I	  consider	  the	  large	  volume	  of	  media	  releases	  and	  statements	  published	  on	  official	  Websites	  to	  be	  primary	  source	  material,	  since	  they	  are	  untouched	  by	  secondary	  intermediaries.	  	  While	  a	  few	  internal	  ‘elite’	  interviews	  might	  have	  provided	  some	  added	  interest	  and	  validation	  of	  claims,	  in	  approaching	  the	  case	  study	  organisations	  this	  research	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Visual	  data	  Owing	  to	  the	  visual	  nature	  of	  a	  large	  percentage	  of	  the	  strategic	  publicity	  outputs	  of	  TANs,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  include	  a	  number	  photographs	  in	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  three	  case	  studies.	  The	  rationale	  for	  including	  this	  material	  is	  that	  it	  demonstrates	  the	  corporate	  communications	  strategies	  of	  these	  organisations,	  depicting	  how	  they	  perform	  their	  public	  face	  to	  their	  intended	  audiences	  and,	  by	  extension,	  desire	  to	  be	  seen154.	  I	  suggest	  that	  a	  range	  of	  sophisticated	  advocacy	  communications	  tactics	  are	  readily	  apparent	  in	  these	  displays	  and	  their	  appropriateness,	  or	  ‘fitness’	  to	  achieving	  the	  declared	  aims	  of	  each	  TAN,	  or	  TAN-­‐hybrid,	  can	  be	  discussed	  using	  actual	  visual	  aids.	  	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  discuss	  the	  United	  Nations	  Organisation	  and	  highlight	  some	  of	  the	  evolutionary	  factors	  that	  have	  shaped	  both	  its	  present	  form	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  UN	  mediates	  the	  boundaries	  between	  a	  multitude	  of	  competing	  social	  groups	  for	  recognition	  of	  their	  particular	  worldviews	  and	  resolution	  of	  their	  concerns155.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154	  For	  more	  on	  ‘performativity’	  see	  Butler	  (1997)	  and	  Goffman	  (1959:28-­‐82).	  
155	  See	  Wendt	  (2003)	  for	  insights	  on	  the	  macro-­‐level	  systemic	  boundary	  conditions	  that,	  inter	  alia,	  shape	  
the	  evolutionary	  paths	  of	  micro-­‐level	  entities.	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Chapter	  4	  
4.	  The	  United	  Nations	  	  	  	  	  
This	  organization	  is	  created	  to	  prevent	  you	  from	  going	  to	  hell.	  	  





4.1.	  Introduction	  	  This	  chapter	  and	  the	  following	  chapter	  support	  the	  main	  thesis	  by	  introducing	  the	  key	  actors:	  the	  United	  Nations	  organisation	  and	  NGOs157	  involved	  in	  international	  politics.	  I	  then	  elaborate	  salient	  aspects	  of	  the	  structural	  context	  in	  which	  they	  are	  engaged.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  this	  chapter	  should	  be	  read	  in	  close	  conjunction	  with	  the	  following	  chapter	  (Chapter	  5),	  which	  puts	  a	  more	  human	  face,	  rather	  than	  an	  institutional	  one,	  on	  the	  UN’s	  relationships	  with	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  	  	  
	  Most	  importantly,	  this	  chapter	  demonstrates	  my	  ontological	  argument	  that	  the	  international	  system	  as	  exemplified	  by	  its	  principal	  organ,	  the	  United	  Nations	  system,	  can	  be	  usefully	  understood	  as	  the	  epitome	  of	  a	  complex	  system	  that	  is	  embedded	  in,	  and	  intersected	  by,	  countless	  other	  complex	  systems158.	  Moreover,	  I	  argue,	  many	  of	  the	  institutional	  characteristics	  that	  are	  widely	  associated	  with	  the	  United	  Nations	  organisation	  are	  manifestations	  of	  complex	  systemic	  ‘path-­‐dependent’	  behaviours	  set	  up	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  UN’s	  history.	  Instances	  of	  this	  may	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  enduring	  primacy	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter	  of	  1945	  (UN	  Charter	  (1945a)	  and	  the	  perturbations	  introduced	  by	  large-­‐scale	  decolonisation	  after	  World	  War	  II,	  when	  over	  100	  new	  Member	  States	  joined	  the	  world	  body.	  Thus,	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156	  Henry	  Cabot	  Lodge	  Jr.	  biodata.	  See	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  data	  (2014).	  
157	  This	  term,	  rather	  than	  TANs,	  is	  widely	  used	  in	  this	  chapter,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  one	  used	  by	  the	  UN.	  	  
158	  This	  assertion	  was	  elaborated	  earlier	  in	  Chapter	  3.	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analysing	  the	  UN	  and	  its	  relational	  behaviours,	  I	  tested	  a	  range	  of	  complexity	  lenses	  that	  demonstrate	  also	  the	  complexity	  insight	  that	  the	  more	  complex	  the	  system,	  the	  more	  ancillary	  systems	  it	  supports	  and	  the	  more	  difficult	  it	  is	  to	  change	  —	  those	  involved	  having	  so	  much	  invested	  in	  maintaining	  the	  existing	  arrangements159.	  Inevitably,	  then,	  those	  involved	  in	  extremely	  complex	  national,	  regional	  and	  international	  systems	  of	  policy-­‐making	  and	  implementation,	  developed	  through	  painstaking	  collaboration	  and	  compromise	  over	  time,	  have	  much	  invested	  in	  established	  orders	  either	  not	  changing,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  changing	  disruptively,	  or	  in	  ways	  that	  might	  harm	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  system	  or	  their	  interests.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  UN	  Members,	  who	  by	  definition	  are	  the	  recognised	  governments	  of	  nation	  states,	  responsibility	  to	  accurately	  evaluate	  arguments	  and	  risks	  in	  order	  to	  safeguard	  the	  interests	  and	  future	  security	  of	  entire	  populations,	  is	  a	  paramount	  consideration	  and	  constraint.	  This	  is	  particularly	  consequential	  in	  advanced	  economies	  where	  the	  machinery	  of	  liberal	  democracy	  is	  mature	  and	  well-­‐oiled	  and	  elected	  representatives	  are	  publicly	  accountable.	  	  An	  historical	  perspective	  matters	  also	  in	  this	  thesis	  because,	  as	  I	  show	  later,	  various	  factors	  in	  the	  UN’s	  past	  have	  had	  profound	  and	  enduring	  consequences	  for	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  organisation	  can,	  and	  does,	  interact	  with	  civil	  society.	  Milestones	  that	  this	  thesis	  considers	  to	  have	  had	  —	  and	  still	  have	  —	  implications	  for	  the	  international	  body’s	  relationships	  with	  NGOs160	  are	  addressed	  in	  the	  sub-­‐sections	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  	  From	  its	  outset	  in	  1942161,	  the	  United	  Nations	  has	  provided	  for	  an	  official	  interface	  with	  both	  international	  and	  national	  non-­‐government	  organisations.	  It	  does	  this	  per	  Article	  71	  of	  its	  original	  Charter	  and	  enabling	  mechanisms	  arranged	  by	  the	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Council,	  which	  is	  one	  of	  the	  UN’s	  six	  established	  principal	  organs	  (UN	  Charter,	  1945a).	  	  The	  constitutional	  provision	  for	  this	  engagement	  with	  NGOs	  is,	  as	  follows:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159	  I	  am	  indebted	  to	  Prof.	  Eve	  Mitleton-­‐Kelly	  for	  this	  valuable	  insight.	  See	  also	  Root,	  2013:	  20.	  
160	  A	  similar	  assessment	  of	  salient	  milestones	  in	  UN-­‐NGO	  relations	  is	  contained	  in	  the	  UN	  Background	  
Paper	  for	  the	  Secretary-­‐General’s	  Panel	  of	  Eminent	  Persons	  in	  United	  Nations	  Relationships	  with	  Civil	  
Society,	  of	  May	  2003	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  2003c).	  	  
161	  The	  formal	  birth	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  was	  not,	  as	  might	  be	  assumed,	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter	  
on	  26	  June,	  1945,	  but	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  ‘Declaration	  by	  the	  United	  Nations’	  in	  Washington,	  DC,	  on	  1	  
January,	  1942	  (Weiss,	  2008:xiii;	  UN	  data,	  2014).	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Article	  71	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Council	  may	  make	  suitable	  arrangements	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  for	  consultation	  with	  non-­governmental	  organizations	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  which	  are	  concerned	  with	  matters	  within	  its	  competence.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Such	  arrangements	  may	  be	  made	  with	  international	  organizations	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  and,	  where	  appropriate,	  with	  national	  organizations	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  after	  consultation	  with	  the	  Member	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  concerned.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  (1945)	  	  
	  
	  Despite	  the	  obvious	  latitude	  for	  interpretation	  this	  statement	  is	  the	  UN’s	  bedrock	  for	  legitimising	  consultation	  with	  non-­‐Members.	  Therefore,	  this	  thesis	  argues	  that	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  UN	  and	  identifying	  key	  actors,	  study	  areas,	  moments	  and	  statutes	  in	  the	  UN’s	  relationships	  with	  the	  thousands	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  currently	  present	  in	  the	  international	  system,	  it	  is	  possible	  to:	  (a)	  capture	  non-­‐state162	  actors	  in	  both	  logic	  and	  systemic	  frameworks	  for	  the	  study	  of	  international	  relations;	  and	  (b)	  advance	  explanations	  and	  theories	  about	  the	  place	  and	  function	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  actors	  (including	  TANs)	  within	  those	  relationships	  and	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system163	  as	  a	  whole.	  This	  is	  not	  just	  because	  the	  UN	  itself	  is	  the	  primary	  focus	  of	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  NGO	  political	  activity,	  providing	  one	  of	  the	  most	  accessible	  vantage	  points	  from	  which	  to	  observe	  some	  of	  the	  most	  active	  NGOs	  in	  the	  world,	  but	  also	  because	  UN	  policy	  and	  practice	  have	  together	  been	  a	  major	  influence	  on	  all	  other	  international	  institutions164.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  only	  an	  understanding	  of	  state	  actors	  can	  provide	  the	  principal	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  any	  account	  of	  a	  non-­‐state	  actor;	  and	  one	  can	  only	  identify	  non-­‐state	  actors	  on	  some	  or	  other	  account	  of	  the	  state	  (Wight,	  2009:109).	  This	  sequence	  of	  argumentation	  lays	  the	  groundwork	  for	  my	  later	  analysis	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs	  in	  achieving	  their	  goals.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162	  The	  term	  ‘non-­‐state’	  actor	  is	  employed	  here	  as	  an	  analytical	  device	  and	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  to	  imply	  
that	  states	  are	  dominant	  in	  the	  relationships,	  or	  that	  other	  actors	  are	  of	  secondary	  importance.	  Indeed,	  
many	  NGOs,	  including	  trade	  unions,	  churches	  and	  many	  human	  rights	  and	  environmental	  campaigning	  
groups,	  number	  their	  memberships	  in	  the	  millions,	  whereas	  41	  of	  the	  193	  states	  in	  the	  UN	  have	  
populations	  of	  fewer	  than	  one	  million.	  Of	  these,	  13	  have	  fewer	  than	  100,000	  people	  (UN	  data,	  2011a	  
and	  CIA	  data,	  2011).	  
163	  This	  is	  a	  paraphrasing	  of	  the	  primary	  research	  question:	  What	  is	  the	  place	  and	  function	  of	  
transnational	  advocacy	  networks	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system	  and	  how	  effective	  are	  they	  in	  
achieving	  their	  aims?	  
164	  	  This	  line	  of	  reasoning	  is	  supported	  by	  Weiss	  and	  Gordenker	  (1996:17)	  and	  by	  Willetts	  (2011:3).	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4.2	  Identity	  and	  Aims	  The	  United	  Nations	  is	  widely	  assumed	  to	  be	  a	  mature	  and	  powerful,	  globally-­‐recognised	  organ	  of	  international	  cooperation	  and	  management,	  albeit	  one	  with	  a	  mixed	  record	  of	  successes	  and	  failures	  (Weiss,	  2008:8;	  Kennedy,	  2007:243-­‐4).	  Constituted	  by	  193	  sovereign	  States	  of	  the	  world,	  it	  is	  acknowledged	  as	  a	  key	  player	  in	  security	  issues;	  an	  influential	  mediator	  in	  conflict	  zones;	  a	  mobiliser	  and	  provider	  of	  services	  and	  other	  aid	  in	  humanitarian	  crises.	  To	  some	  it	  is	  a	  unique	  and	  indispensable	  evolving	  project,	  and	  with	  a	  history	  of	  a	  mere	  69	  years,	  a	  relatively	  recent	  international	  model	  for	  Man’s	  attempt	  to	  live	  in	  harmony	  with	  his	  own	  and	  other	  species.	  Living	  up	  to	  the	  scrutiny	  and	  expectations	  of	  the	  entire	  world	  is	  undoubtedly	  a	  tall	  order,	  and	  yet	  amid	  the	  critical	  hubbub	  some	  of	  the	  UN’s	  most	  important	  contributions	  have	  gone	  largely	  unrecognised	  (Emmerij	  et	  al,	  2010:ix;	  Krasno,	  2004:xi,	  260).	  The	  UN’s	  moral	  voice	  has	  often	  been	  underestimated	  by	  its	  detractors;	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  UN’s	  work	  has,	  at	  its	  best,	  been	  considered	  to	  be	  outstanding;	  its	  intellectual	  work	  has	  often	  been	  ahead	  of	  the	  times;	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  impact,	  the	  UN’s	  leading	  contributions	  have	  literally	  changed	  history	  (ibid;	  Weiss	  and	  Thakur,	  2010:10;	  Willetts,	  2001:374;	  2008:	  332).	  	  It	  has	  been	  said	  that	  ‘ideas’165	  have	  been	  among	  the	  UN’s	  most	  valuable	  contributions	  to	  the	  world	  (Jolly	  et	  al,	  2004:257)	  —	  prompting	  questions,	  such	  as	  those	  asked	  in	  this	  study,	  regarding	  how,	  and	  from	  whom,	  the	  UN	  gathers	  and	  assimilates	  ideas	  and	  how	  the	  movement	  of	  ideas	  not	  only	  affects	  political	  agendas	  but	  also	  political	  outcomes.	  Such	  questions	  have	  direct	  relevance	  in	  determining	  the	  place,	  function	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks,	  since	  these	  collectivities	  form	  specifically	  to	  implant	  transformational	  ideas	  and	  values	  in	  an	  international	  audience	  by	  building	  multiple	  channels	  of	  access	  to	  the	  international	  system.166	  In	  this	  pursuit,	  I	  submit,	  TANs	  —	  as	  a	  variant	  form	  of	  NGO	  —	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  distinctively	  employ	  the	  currency	  of	  ideas	  and	  information	  to	  obtain	  their	  influence,	  strategic	  direction	  and	  network	  cohesion167.	  It	  is	  therefore	  important	  to	  ask:	  If	  the	  primary	  target	  audience	  for	  transnational	  advocacy	  is	  the	  international	  system,	  then	  how	  do	  TANs	  achieve	  this	  vital	  interaction?	  If	  they	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165	  Exchanges	  in	  the	  currency	  of	  ideas	  between	  officials	  of	  states,	  secretariats	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  the	  UN	  system,	  is	  a	  key	  focus	  of	  examination	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  	  
166	  This	  conceptualisation	  of	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks,	  as	  a	  differentiated	  form	  of	  civil	  society	  
activism,	  is	  advanced	  by	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  (1998:1).	  
167	  See	  Chapter	  6	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  the	  distinctive	  characteristics	  of	  TANs.	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effective	  in	  achieving	  their	  strategic	  connection	  to	  international	  audiences	  then	  what	  are	  the	  impacts	  when	  they	  do?	  What	  are	  the	  consequences	  when	  they	  do	  not?	  	  	  With	  over	  4,000	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  currently168	  in	  consultative	  status	  with	  the	  United	  Nations,	  and	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  NGOs	  seeking	  to	  obtain	  it,169	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  NGOs	  find	  consultative	  status	  to	  be	  of	  value170.	  However,	  the	  usefulness	  and	  level	  of	  participation	  of	  NGOs	  in	  the	  UN	  has	  been	  hotly	  debated	  since	  NGOs	  were	  first	  granted	  consultative	  status,	  which,	  according	  to	  the	  UN	  Department	  of	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Affairs	  ‘has	  led	  to	  a	  number	  of	  barriers’171.	  These	  ‘barriers’	  in	  the	  relationship,	  along	  with	  the	  more	  symbiotic	  aspects,	  are	  discussed	  further	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  states	  also	  continue	  to	  find	  recognition	  by,	  and	  participation	  in,	  international	  society	  at	  the	  United	  Nations	  to	  be	  of	  value,	  despite	  the	  plethora	  of	  recent	  International	  Relations	  and	  ‘globalisation’	  literature	  speculating	  on	  the	  diffusion	  of	  power	  away	  from	  states	  to	  non-­‐state	  actors	  and	  the	  continued	  relevance	  of	  Westphalian	  sovereignty172.	  As	  evidence	  of	  the	  attraction	  of	  UN	  recognition	  and	  membership	  in	  today’s	  international	  order	  —	  especially	  for	  new,	  small,	  and/or	  vulnerable	  states	  —	  the	  new	  state	  of	  South	  Sudan	  declared	  its	  independence	  on	  9	  July,	  2011173	  and	  was	  admitted	  as	  a	  new	  Member	  State	  of	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  only	  five	  days	  later	  on	  14	  July,	  2011174.	  Similarly,	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  National	  Authority,	  Mahmoud	  Abbas,	  began	  a	  politically-­‐charged	  bid	  to	  gain	  UN	  entry	  for	  Palestine	  in	  September	  2011,	  declaring:	  ‘We	  need	  to	  have	  full	  membership	  at	  the	  U.N	  […]	  We	  need	  a	  state,	  a	  seat	  at	  the	  United	  Nations’	  (NY	  Times,	  2011).	  For	  many	  small	  and	  vulnerable	  states,	  international	  recognition	  is	  their	  only	  substantial	  power	  resource	  (Donnelly,	  2011).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168	  UN	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Council	  (ECOSOC)	  statistic	  as	  of	  September	  2013	  (UN	  ECOSOC,	  2013).	  An	  
additional	  157	  member	  NGOs	  were	  on	  suspension	  at	  that	  time.	  	  
169	  In	  2012,	  a	  statement	  by	  the	  UN	  ECOSOC	  Committee	  on	  NGOs	  revealed	  that	  the	  number	  of	  NGO	  
applications	  for	  consultative	  status	  had	  increased	  almost	  four-­‐fold	  in	  four	  years	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2012).	  
Costoya	  (2007)	  also	  describes	  this	  trend.	  
170	  This	  view	  is	  shared	  by	  Zettler	  (2009),	  and	  Martens	  (2004).	  
171	  UN-­‐ECOSOC	  (2011).	  This	  factor	  is	  also	  described	  by	  Zettler	  (2009.)	  
172	  Among	  those	  speculating	  on	  these	  trends	  are	  Held,	  2010:122;	  Donnelly,	  2006,	  Tarrow,	  2005:3,	  27;	  
Castells,	  2012:	  234-­‐237;	  and	  Shadian,	  2010.	  
173	  According	  to	  Foreign	  and	  Commonwealth	  Office	  data	  (FCO,	  2011).	  
174	  According	  to	  United	  Nations	  data	  (UN	  data,	  2011a).	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4.3	  Socio-­‐historical	  context	  and	  milestones	  The	  United	  Nations	  story	  is	  impossible	  to	  understand,	  asserts	  UN	  historian	  Paul	  Kennedy,	  unless	  one	  understands	  the	  tension	  between	  sovereignty	  and	  internationalism	  that	  is	  ‘inherent,	  persistent	  and	  unavoidable’	  in	  the	  organisation	  and	  has	  been	  ‘built	  into	  the	  system	  since	  its	  beginning’	  (UN	  Report,	  2004a;	  Kennedy,	  2007:xi;	  Ruggie,	  2010:	  xv).	  To	  develop	  this	  understanding	  it	  is	  also	  crucial	  to	  note	  that	  no	  ‘government’	  apparatus	  exists	  at	  the	  global	  level.	  Although	  states	  have	  sovereignty	  individually	  in	  the	  Westphalian	  world	  order	  model,	  no	  overarching,	  sovereign	  authority,	  with	  powers	  of	  coercion,	  exists	  at	  the	  planetary	  level.	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  emphasise	  that	  the	  UN	  was	  not	  designed	  for	  the	  sovereign	  global	  governance	  role,	  although	  as	  the	  principal	  organ	  in	  the	  international	  system	  it	  has	  frequently	  been	  viewed	  as	  such	  and	  has	  been	  widely	  assumed	  to	  have	  powers	  and	  resources	  that	  it	  lacks.	  Hence,	  the	  natural	  condition	  of	  states	  in	  the	  
inter-­‐national	  system	  is	  regarded	  by	  many	  scholars	  to	  be	  one	  of	  anarchy	  (Brown	  and	  Ainley,	  2005:3-­‐4;	  Weiss	  and	  Thakur,	  2010:	  xv;	  Weiss,	  2009:11;	  Ruggie,	  ibid;	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden,	  2010175),	  or	  at	  least	  anarchy	  with	  some	  vertical	  structural	  stratification,	  in	  effect,	  a	  ‘hierarchy	  in	  anarchy’	  (Donnelly,	  2011),	  if	  this	  is	  not	  read	  too	  literally	  as	  a	  nonsensical	  contradiction	  in	  terms.	  	  	  How,	  then,	  are	  we	  to	  understand	  the	  UN	  and	  the	  human	  agency	  that	  animates	  and	  navigates	  its	  passage	  through	  a	  myriad	  of	  complex,	  multi-­‐level,	  relationships	  across	  the	  world	  and	  over	  time?	  Quite	  simply,	  it	  may	  be	  deduced	  that	  the	  United	  Nations	  is	  a	  voluntary	  association	  of	  sovereign	  States	  of	  the	  world,	  established	  by	  states	  principally	  to	  maintain	  international	  peace	  and	  security;	  solve	  international	  problems	  of	  an	  economic,	  social,	  cultural	  or	  humanitarian	  character;	  and	  to	  protect	  and	  promote	  basic	  human	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  (Article	  1,	  Ch.1,	  UN	  Charter	  (1945);	  Bull,	  1995:44;	  Gold,	  2004:4).	  It	  is	  not	  a	  world	  government	  and	  it	  has	  no	  sovereign	  powers	  of	  coercion.	  The	  UN	  was	  created	  also	  to	  facilitate	  cooperation	  and	  regulate	  the	  interaction	  of	  states	  with	  each	  other:	  such	  co-­‐operation	  as	  exists,	  being	  assumed	  (in	  the	  dominant	  realism	  of	  the	  era)	  to	  be	  conditioned	  by	  self-­‐interest,	  with	  each	  state	  expressing,	  and	  primarily	  intent	  on	  securing,	  its	  national	  self-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden	  (2010)	  argue	  for	  reconceptualising	  ‘anarchy’	  in	  IR	  theory	  using	  insights	  from	  
complexity	  theory.	  Thus,	  when	  the	  international	  system	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  ‘complex	  adaptive	  system	  with	  a	  
tendency	  to	  self-­‐organise’	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  theorise	  both	  the	  manifest	  behaviours	  of	  the	  system,	  and	  
extant	  theory,	  in	  a	  new	  light.	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interest	  and	  priorities,	  especially	  in	  regard	  to	  security	  (Jackson,	  2000:170;	  Burchill	  and	  Linklater	  et	  al,	  2009:9).	  	  	  Today,	  the	  UN’s	  work	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  two	  broad	  categories:	  peace	  and	  security;	  and	  economic	  and	  social	  development	  (Emmerij	  et	  al,	  2010:x).	  Although	  the	  United	  Nations	  is	  constitutionally	  one	  large	  organ	  and	  is	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  if	  it	  were	  a	  monolith	  (Weiss,	  ibid:	  2),	  in	  practice,	  the	  system	  gives	  the	  impression	  that	  there	  are	  many	  UNs.	  According	  to	  Kennedy	  (2007:	  xiv):	  	  	  To	   some	  observers	   it	   is	  best	  known	  as	   the	  UN	  of	  peacekeeping	  and	  Security	  Council	  resolutions;	  to	  others	  it	  is	  the	  UN	  of	  economic	  development;	  to	  others	  it	   is	   the	  UN	  of	  advancing	  civil	   rights	  worldwide;	  and	   to	  others,	   it	   is	   the	  body	  chiefly	   responsible	   for	   rebuilding	   the	   social	   fabric	   of	   broken	  down	   societies,	  protecting	   the	   environment,	   and	   encouraging	   cultural	   understanding	   among	  people.	  	  In	  this	  depiction,	  the	  UN	  is	  a	  massive,	  complex,	  organisation	  that	  functions,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  world	  government,	  as	  the	  best	  mankind	  has	  been	  able	  to	  do	  to	  provide	  a	  global	  governance	  forum,	  but	  whose	  workings	  and	  structures	  are	  considered	  by	  many	  analysts	  to	  be	  in	  dire	  need	  of	  varying	  degrees	  of	  overhaul	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  2011;	  UN	  Report,	  2004a;	  Kennedy,	  2007:277-­‐8).	  	  	  
4.3.1	  Post-­‐War	  self-­‐organisation	  and	  emergence	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  	  Conceived	  in	  1942,	  the	  UN	  was	  set	  up	  by	  the	  Allies	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  World	  War	  II	  in	  a	  very	  particular	  set	  of	  historical	  circumstances,	  crucial	  to	  any	  understanding	  of	  the	  thinking	  and	  priorities	  on	  which	  the	  organisation	  is	  founded	  (Weiss,	  ibid:2;	  Gold,	  2004:25).	  U.S.	  President	  Frankin	  D.	  Roosevelt	  was	  a	  driving	  force,	  and	  some	  saw	  the	  UN	  as	  an	  American	  idea,	  set	  up	  to	  promote	  American	  values	  and	  principles	  on	  a	  global	  scale	  (Gold,	  ibid).	  Perhaps	  a	  more	  reasoned	  historical	  account	  might	  attribute	  the	  founding	  motives	  to	  a	  deep	  conviction	  that	  there	  was	  a	  need	  for	  collective	  action	  at	  the	  global	  level,	  particularly	  by	  the	  five	  major	  powers,	  to	  oppose	  aggression	  and	  ensure	  political	  stability	  (UN	  Charter,	  Chapter	  1,	  Article	  1,	  1945b;	  Krasno,	  2004:4;	  Stiglitz,	  2002:12).	  It	  had	  an	  initial	  membership	  of	  51	  countries176.	  While	  historical	  accounts	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  politically	  neutral	  in	  any	  event	  (Brown	  and	  Ainley,	  2005:3)	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  recounting	  the	  early	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176	  Although	  50	  states	  signed	  the	  UN	  Charter	  in	  San	  Francisco	  on	  26	  June	  1945,	  Poland	  was	  allowed	  to	  
sign	  as	  an	  original	  member	  in	  the	  months	  that	  followed	  (Krasno,	  2004:40).	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days	  invariably	  describes	  the	  initiators	  as	  ‘principled’	  and	  ‘idealistic’	  and	  their	  project	  as	  ‘noble’,	  ‘lofty’,	  ‘visionary’,	  ‘utopian’,	  ‘a	  dream’.	  The	  organisation	  they	  envisaged	  was	  a	  three-­‐pillared	  structure	  for	  promoting	  peace,	  development	  and	  democracy	  throughout	  the	  world	  (Kennedy,	  2007:278).	  	  	  The	  founding	  fathers	  were	  anxious	  also	  to	  avoid	  recreating	  the	  flawed	  model	  of	  international	  cooperation	  provided	  by	  the	  defunct	  League	  of	  Nations,	  which	  had,	  
inter	  alia,	  failed	  to	  counter	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Axis	  powers	  in	  the	  1930s,	  the	  invasions	  of	  Ethiopia,	  Manchuria	  and	  the	  Rhineland,	  and	  ultimately,	  the	  outbreak	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  lesson	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  planners	  of	  the	  new	  body	  was	  providing	  for	  the	  different	  capacities,	  or	  qualities,	  of	  large	  versus	  small	  states	  within	  one	  organisation	  (UN	  Charter,	  Chapter	  1,	  Article	  2,	  1945b;	  Kennedy,	  2006:	  28).	  They	  achieved	  this	  structurally	  through	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  sovereign	  equality	  of	  all	  States,	  non-­‐intervention	  in	  the	  sovereign	  affairs	  of	  any	  Member	  State,	  General	  Assembly	  membership	  for	  all	  Member	  States,	  and	  the	  one-­‐country-­‐one-­‐vote	  mechanism	  in	  the	  General	  Assembly	  (UN	  Charter,	  1945b).	  	  	  The	  planners	  were	  also	  acutely	  aware	  of	  the	  need	  to	  anticipate	  the	  possibility	  of	  future	  aggression	  by	  Germany	  and	  Japan,	  or	  any	  others.	  Separate	  structural	  provisions	  were	  therefore	  adopted	  for	  the	  Security	  Council.	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  these	  constitutional	  and	  structural	  arrangements	  have	  had	  profound	  effects	  on	  world	  affairs,	  including	  the	  UN’s	  relationships	  with	  both	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  and	  have	  proven	  to	  be	  notoriously	  resistant	  to	  transformation.	  Complexity	  theorisations	  see	  this	  characteristic	  not	  necessarily	  in	  terms	  of	  individual	  Member	  State	  waywardness,	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  complex	  systemic	  elements	  greatly	  constrained	  by	  their	  embedded	  positions	  within	  a	  myriad	  of	  other	  complex	  systems,	  arrangements	  and	  relationships	  that	  cannot	  be	  disrupted	  without	  incurring	  consequences,	  many	  of	  which	  will	  eventuate	  as	  unintended,	  unpredictable	  outcomes	  in	  the	  distant	  future177.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177	  For	  example,	  the	  arbitrary	  redrawing	  of	  territorial	  boundaries	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  under	  the	  Anglo-­‐
French	  Sykes-­‐Picot	  Agreement	  in	  1916	  have	  recently	  been	  cited	  as	  the	  trigger	  for	  almost	  a	  century	  of	  
simmering	  anger	  underlying	  the	  recent	  brutal	  conflicts	  in	  Syria	  and	  Iraq,	  leading	  to	  the	  recent	  
declaration	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Caliphate	  (BBC,	  2013;	  IBT,	  2014).	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4.3.2	  Bretton	  Woods	  and	  the	  nascent	  ‘international	  system’	  	  Another	  lesson	  from	  the	  interwar	  years	  related	  to	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  collapse	  of	  the	  open	  market	  system	  in	  the	  1930s	  —	  the	  Great	  Depression	  —	  to	  which	  was	  attributed	  the	  political	  unrest	  and	  extremism	  that	  led	  to	  world	  war.	  In	  response,	  schemes	  for	  rebuilding	  a	  devastated	  Europe	  and	  designing	  a	  new,	  depression-­‐proof,	  international	  financial	  system	  were	  explored	  in	  parallel	  with	  negotiations	  to	  construct	  a	  postwar	  security	  order.	  The	  first	  fruits	  of	  these	  efforts	  were	  the	  formal	  establishment	  of	  the	  UN	  in	  1942,	  followed	  in	  1944	  by	  the	  UN	  Monetary	  and	  Financial	  Conference	  at	  Bretton	  Woods,	  New	  Hampshire,	  at	  which	  an	  agreement	  was	  signed	  to	  found	  an	  international	  financial	  system	  based	  on	  twin	  institutions	  —	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  (Stiglitz,	  2002:11).	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  emphasis	  at	  the	  time	  was	  on	  hard-­‐nosed	  arrangements	  for	  economic	  cooperation	  and	  fiscal	  responsibility	  rather	  than	  improving	  the	  lot	  of	  humanity	  regardless	  of	  cost	  (Kennedy,	  ibid:	  30).	  The	  vastly	  different	  institutions	  seen	  today	  are	  the	  result	  of	  countless	  adjustments	  and	  reforms	  over	  time.	  The	  ‘third	  leg’	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system,	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization,	  was	  added	  in	  1995	  (ibid:	  140)178.	  Together,	  the	  United	  Nations,	  the	  IMF,	  World	  Bank	  and	  WTO	  formed	  the	  hub	  of	  what	  has	  come	  to	  be	  generally	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘international	  system’.	  	  
4.3.3	  Human	  rights	  concerns	  	  In	  1945,	  amid	  the	  prevailing	  mood	  of	  relative	  optimism	  that	  followed	  the	  grim	  years	  of	  war,	  the	  United	  Nations	  Charter	  was	  infused	  with	  human	  values	  and	  human	  concerns	  (Jolly	  et	  al,	  2004:5),	  reflecting	  international	  hopes	  for	  a	  better	  world.	  Concerns	  about	  human	  rights,	  which	  had	  been	  intensified	  by	  the	  emergence	  of	  fascism	  and	  revulsion	  at	  the	  recent	  demonstration	  of	  human	  savagery	  in	  war,	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  Although	  it	  was	  proposed	  much	  earlier	  as	  the	  ‘third	  leg’	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  institutions,	  it	  was	  not	  
until	  1995	  that	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  (WTO)	  replaced	  the	  General	  Agreement	  on	  Tariffs	  and	  
Trade	  (GATT),	  which	  was	  set	  up	  in	  1947	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  the	  UN’s	  ECOSOC	  apparatus	  (Kennedy,	  
2006:120,	  140-­‐142;	  Weiss	  and	  Thakur,	  2010:177-­‐182).	  Established	  as	  an	  independent	  body	  —	  and	  no	  
longer	  a	  part	  of	  the	  UN	  system	  —	  the	  WTO	  was	  given	  more	  teeth	  than	  the	  GATT	  and	  a	  much	  wider	  
remit	  to	  administer	  the	  world’s	  trading	  arrangements.	  Today,	  the	  UN	  continues	  to	  remain	  mainly	  on	  the	  
sidelines	  in	  crucial	  matters	  concerning	  trade	  and	  many	  of	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  developing	  countries	  are	  
but	  marginal	  issues	  in	  the	  WTO	  (Weiss	  and	  Thakur,	  ibid:	  182).	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  WTO	  is	  a	  generator	  
of	  controversies	  and	  a	  focal	  point	  for	  violent	  confrontations	  over	  the	  equitable	  handling	  of	  international	  
economic	  and	  trade	  matters	  (Kennedy,	  ibid:	  140).	  As	  will	  be	  shown	  in	  Sections	  4.3.6	  and	  8.4.2,	  TANs	  are	  
often	  engaged	  in	  these	  conflicts.	  	  
	   117	  
were	  suddenly	  higher	  on	  the	  political	  agenda.	  Many	  UN	  observers	  still	  consider	  human	  rights	  to	  be	  the	  boldest	  idea	  in	  the	  UN’s	  Charter:	  documenting	  the	  compelling	  claim	  that	  all	  individuals	  have	  inalienable	  human	  rights	  (Weiss	  and	  Thakur,	  2010:260-­‐1;	  UN	  Charter,	  1945b).	  Such	  ideas	  were	  far	  ahead	  of	  the	  times	  in	  a	  world	  in	  which	  half	  the	  global	  population	  then	  lived	  in	  colonies	  and	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  the	  rest	  lived	  under	  conditions	  of	  dictatorship	  (Jolly	  et	  al,	  ibid:	  6).	  	  The	  Charter	  was	  soon	  followed	  by	  one	  of	  the	  UN’s	  major	  accomplishments,	  the	  promulgation	  of	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  in	  1948	  (UDHR,	  1948).	  Both	  documents	  expressed	  grand	  aspirations	  for	  overcoming	  problems	  and	  effecting	  international	  leadership	  and	  decision-­‐making	  in	  a	  world	  of	  self-­‐interested	  states.	  But	  the	  UN	  Charter	  was	  of	  many	  parts,	  each	  with	  varying	  capacities	  for	  achieving	  positive	  outcomes	  —	  or,	  conversely,	  facilitating	  gridlock	  and	  paralysis	  (Kennedy,	  2006:45).	  As	  referenced	  earlier,	  it	  also	  enshrined	  the	  principles	  of	  one-­‐country-­‐one-­‐vote	  in	  the	  General	  Assembly,	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  states,	  and	  non-­‐intervention	  by	  other	  Members	  in	  the	  domestic	  affairs	  of	  any	  state.	  Throughout	  the	  UN’s	  history,	  these	  provisions	  —	  which,	  this	  thesis	  argues,	  have	  constantly	  served	  to	  redraw	  the	  fracture	  lines	  between	  pluralist	  (characteristically,	  state)	  and	  solidarist	  (characteristically,	  non-­‐state)	  thinking	  —	  have	  ignited	  contention	  and	  lie	  at	  the	  core	  of	  much	  of	  the	  criticism	  leveled	  at	  the	  UN	  over	  its	  perceived	  failures	  and	  powerlessness.	  	  	  The	  feature	  of	  the	  UN	  architecture	  that	  I	  consider	  of	  most	  relevance	  to	  this	  thesis	  is	  the	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Council	  (ECOSOC),	  set	  up	  under	  the	  General	  Assembly	  in	  1945,	  to	  provide	  for	  international	  cooperation	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  economic,	  social,	  health,	  environmental,	  human	  rights	  and	  cultural	  advancement	  (ibid:	  43).	  Some	  believe	  this	  was	  an	  overambitious	  remit	  for	  the	  body	  (ibid),	  and	  that,	  having	  achieved	  their	  privileged	  positions	  on	  the	  Security	  Council	  and	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  institutions,	  the	  Great	  Powers	  were	  amenable	  to	  seeing	  an	  ECOSOC	  composed	  of	  18	  rotating	  members	  (now	  54),	  reporting	  to	  the	  General	  Assembly	  and	  taking	  directions	  from	  it,	  but	  drafting	  its	  own	  rules	  and	  largely	  acting	  with	  considerable	  autonomy	  in	  setting	  up	  its	  own	  commissions	  and	  partnerships,	  calling	  conferences,	  and	  consulting	  with	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations.	  And	  yet,	  this	  body	  only	  convenes	  once	  each	  year	  for	  four	  weeks	  and	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  much	  criticism	  for	  its	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alleged	  feebleness,	  and	  the	  patchy	  quality	  of	  its	  splintered	  assortment	  of	  agencies.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  one	  critic	  it	  is	  ‘a	  coordinating	  body	  that	  can’t	  coordinate’	  (Kennedy,	  2006:270).	  	  	  It	  is	  to	  this	  body	  that	  NGOs	  have	  their	  consultative	  status,	  their	  input	  screened	  by	  an	  ECOSOC	  standing	  committee,	  which	  considers	  requests	  for	  consultative	  status	  and	  receives	  requests	  from	  NGOs	  for	  items	  to	  be	  put	  on	  the	  ECOSOC	  ‘s	  agenda	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2011a).	  Direct	  access	  to	  the	  General	  Assembly,	  let	  alone	  the	  Security	  Council,	  is	  not	  possible	  for	  non-­‐governmental	  actors	  —	  leading	  cynics	  to	  wonder	  whether	  the	  ECOSOC’s	  role,	  at	  least	  in	  this	  regard,	  is	  to	  simply	  act	  as	  a	  UN	  gatekeeper	  to	  civil	  society’s	  concerns	  and	  agitations	  (ibid).	  The	  processes	  and	  mechanisms	  that	  the	  UN,	  through	  ECOSOC,	  employs	  to	  engage	  with	  NGOs	  are	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  	  
4.3.4	  Decolonisation	  and	  changing	  dynamics	  of	  the	  international	  order	  	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  UN’s	  establishment	  there	  were	  sharp	  differences	  between	  the	  major	  powers	  with	  colonies	  and	  the	  80	  or	  so	  countries	  that	  were,	  or	  had	  recently	  been,	  colonies	  (Jolly	  et	  al,	  2004:4).	  After	  the	  War,	  the	  process	  of	  decolonisation	  shifted	  the	  West’s	  relations	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  from	  unequal	  and	  coercive	  to	  legally	  equal	  and	  diplomatic	  (Buzan	  and	  Little,	  2000:317).	  Decolonisation	  created	  an	  onslaught	  of	  newly	  independent	  countries	  whose	  acceptance	  as	  members	  of	  the	  UN	  had	  special	  meaning	  in	  that	  it	  signified	  final	  recognition	  of	  their	  sovereign	  statehood179	  (Weiss	  and	  Thakur,	  2010:155).	  	  	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1960s,	  some	  100	  new	  Member	  States	  had	  joined	  the	  original	  Charter-­‐signatories.	  However,	  the	  new	  members	  did	  not	  just	  boost	  the	  membership	  dramatically,	  they	  also	  placed	  their	  own	  concerns	  on	  the	  UN’s	  agenda.	  Those	  located	  in	  what	  was	  becoming	  known	  as	  the	  ‘Third	  World’	  were	  mainly	  interested	  in	  state-­‐building,	  nation-­‐building,	  and	  economic	  development	  to	  raise	  their	  people	  out	  of	  subsistence,	  poverty	  and	  unemployment	  (ibid).	  The	  addition	  of	  so	  many	  new	  states	  was	  seen	  as	  challenging,	  not	  because	  of	  race,	  religion	  or	  nationality,	  but	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  As	  evidenced	  in	  the	  recent	  accession	  of	  South	  Sudan	  and	  in	  aspirations	  by	  the	  Palestinian	  National	  
Authority	  for	  the	  UN	  to	  recognise	  Palestine	  as	  a	  sovereign	  state	  (referred	  to	  in	  Section	  4.2),	  this	  aspect	  
of	  UN	  Member	  status	  has	  been	  enduring.	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because	  of	  the	  clash	  of	  political	  ideologies	  (Gold,	  2005:33):	  many	  of	  the	  new	  states	  wanting	  international	  rules	  more	  suited	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  political	  arrangements	  other	  than	  those	  of	  democracies.	  Ideological	  pluralism	  was	  felt	  also	  in	  debates	  over	  human	  rights.	  According	  to	  Gold	  (ibid:	  31),	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Afro-­‐Asian	  bloc	  was	  asserting	  that	  human	  rights	  was	  a	  Western	  liberal	  invention	  and,	  as	  such,	  had	  nothing	  to	  offer	  countries	  whose	  values	  were	  derived	  from	  tribal	  wisdom	  and	  other	  communal	  traditions.	  Even	  today,	  only	  60%	  of	  the	  world’s	  countries	  are	  estimated	  to	  be	  electoral	  democracies	  (Freedom	  House,	  2013:	  29).	  Fewer	  still	  can	  be	  classed	  as	  ‘liberal	  democracies’,	  with	  their	  implied	  presence	  of	  an	  array	  of	  civil	  liberties	  (ibid).	  	  The	  internal	  political	  dynamics	  of	  the	  UN	  thus	  changed	  profoundly	  during	  its	  first	  few	  decades,	  and	  distinctively	  different	  voting	  patterns	  became	  a	  feature	  of	  the	  new	  power	  blocs.	  At	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  1950s,	  the	  ‘Third	  World’	  lobby	  was	  just	  beginning	  to	  gather	  strength	  and,	  from	  1964,	  this	  pressure	  was	  represented	  in	  the	  UN	  system	  by	  the	  Group	  of	  77	  (G-­‐77),	  a	  working	  caucus	  of	  77	  developing	  countries.	  But	  decolonisation	  in	  the	  ensuing	  decades	  rapidly	  boosted	  the	  numbers	  and,	  today,	  there	  are	  over	  133	  UN	  Member	  States	  in	  the	  bloc	  (G-­‐77,	  2014)	  According	  to	  Weiss	  and	  Thakur	  (2010:177):	  	  	  The	  crystallization	  of	  developing	  countries	  into	  a	  single	  bloc	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	   international	   economic	   negotiations	   represented	   a	   direct	   challenge	   to	  industrialized	   countries.	   In	   parallel	   with	   the	   Non-­‐Aligned	  movement,	   which	  initially	   focused	  more	  on	  security	   issues,	   the	  Third	  World’s	  “solidarity”,	  or	  at	  least	  its	  cohesion	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  many	  international	  debates,	  meant	  that	  developing	   countries	  were	   in	   a	  better	  position	   to	   champion	   the	  NIEO180	   and	  policies	  that	  aimed	  to	  challenge	  the	  distribution	  of	  benefits	   from	  growth	  and	  trade	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s.	  
	  According	  to	  Gareau	  (2001:122),	  much	  of	  the	  1970s	  was	  characterised	  by	  this	  power	  struggle	  by	  a	  majority	  bloc	  of	  developing	  countries,	  as	  they	  sought	  to	  challenge	  the	  ‘First	  World’	  economic	  hegemony	  by	  promoting	  their	  model	  for	  more	  favourable	  economic	  arrangements	  —	  a	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order.	  But	  the	  ‘Third	  World’	  suffered	  economic	  decline	  in	  the	  years	  following	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  demands	  set	  out	  in	  the	  NIEO	  and	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  ‘70s	  decade	  the	  project	  had	  failed,	  defeated	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  factors,	  including	  nature,	  counter-­‐measures	  by	  the	  West,	  and	  dwindling	  cohort	  support	  (ibid,	  125-­‐6).	  A	  further	  aspect,	  identified	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  New	  International	  Economic	  Order.	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by	  Van	  Rooy	  (2004:48)	  was	  the	  inadequate	  message	  framing	  of	  the	  NIEO	  for	  a	  Northern	  public,	  which	  in	  turn	  did	  not	  exert	  sufficient	  pressure	  on	  Northern	  governments	  to	  support	  the	  proposal.	  In	  1991,	  the	  General	  Assembly	  passed	  a	  resolution	  endorsing	  arrangements	  for	  a	  distinctively	  liberal	  new	  economic	  order.	  Gareau	  (ibid:126)	  notes	  somewhat	  ominously:	  	  	  	  But	  the	  new	  neo-­‐liberal	  hegemony	  and	  the	  death	  of	  the	  NIEO	  do	  not	  imply	  that	  the	   grievances	   of	   the	   third	   world181	   have	   disappeared.	   Like	   festering	   sores,	  they	  burst	  open	  to	  reveal	  themselves	  from	  time	  to	  time.	  	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  advocacy	  lessons	  learnt	  during	  the	  failed	  NIEO	  campaign,	  development	  NGOs	  adopted	  markedly	  different	  campaign	  tactics	  during	  the	  80’s	  and	  onwards	  (Van	  Rooy,	  ibid,	  citing	  Clark,	  1992:198).	  Framing	  of	  issues	  became	  more	  sophisticated	  and	  targeting	  was	  focused	  specifically	  on	  aid,	  trade,	  international	  finance	  and	  foreign	  policy,	  rather	  than	  on	  more	  general	  moral	  and	  ideological	  issues.	  Closer	  links	  were	  forged	  between	  lobbying	  and	  public	  education	  and	  much	  closer	  attention	  was	  given	  to	  the	  strategic	  use	  of	  the	  world’s	  mass	  media	  (ibid).	  
4.3.5	  The	  Cold	  War	  and	  aftermath	  	  In	  the	  era	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  differences	  between	  the	  Western	  bloc	  and	  the	  Soviet	  bloc	  were	  a	  major	  polarising	  factor	  within	  the	  UN	  (Jolly	  et	  al,	  2004:4).	  Containment	  of	  communism	  became	  the	  focus	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  as	  the	  two	  rival	  superpowers	  —	  the	  USA	  and	  the	  USSR	  —	  sought	  to	  expand	  their	  spheres	  of	  influence	  in	  various	  regions	  of	  the	  world.	  	  The	  security	  crises,	  conflicts,	  economic	  sanctions	  and	  ‘Cold	  War’	  tensions	  of	  that	  long,	  troubled,	  era	  were	  reflected	  on	  to	  the	  world	  stage	  at	  the	  UN	  (Krasno,	  2004:242).	  	  Washington	  scorned	  the	  UN	  as	  a	  bastion	  of	  Third	  World	  nationalism	  and	  pro-­‐communism	  and	  carried	  out	  a	  policy	  of	  non-­‐cooperation	  with	  the	  UN,	  even	  withholding	  its	  funding	  at	  various	  times.	  Confrontations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  resulted	  in	  Central	  America,	  the	  Horn	  of	  Africa,	  much	  of	  southern	  Africa,	  and	  parts	  of	  Asia	  becoming	  battlegrounds	  for	  the	  two	  superpowers,	  or	  their	  proxies.	  This	  standoff	  continued	  until	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  when	  the	  world	  witnessed	  the	  Soviet	  system	  gradually	  crumbling	  from	  the	  inside	  (Weiss,	  Forsythe	  and	  Coate,	  2004:42).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181	  Gareau	  does	  not	  use	  capitals	  to	  denote	  the	  proper	  noun,	  although	  he	  does	  imply	  	  they	  are	  a	  
particular	  category	  of	  world	  citizen.	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  The	  Cold	  War	  is	  widely	  considered	  to	  have	  ended	  in	  November	  1989,	  when	  the	  Berlin	  Wall	  was	  brought	  down.	  	  According	  to	  Krasno	  (2004:244),	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Wall	  marked	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Soviet	  empire,	  and	  the	  beginning	  of	  ‘a	  paradigm	  shift	  of	  major	  proportions’.	  The	  UN,	  which	  had	  been	  to	  a	  great	  extent	  frozen	  out	  from	  playing	  an	  intermediary	  role	  by	  Cold	  War	  vetoes	  in	  the	  Security	  Council,	  now	  took	  on	  a	  greatly	  increased	  number	  of	  new	  peacekeeping	  roles	  in	  the	  transition	  countries	  to	  assist	  their	  reconstruction.	  UN	  peacekeepers	  were	  also	  deployed	  in	  situations	  of	  conflict	  and	  failed	  states.	  Not	  only	  had	  the	  Security	  Council	  overcome	  its	  bi-­‐polar	  deadlock,	  its	  ability	  to	  reach	  agreement	  on	  any	  number	  of	  issues	  had	  increased	  (ibid,	  246).	  	  But	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  UN	  in	  the	  period	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  is	  a	  highly	  controversial	  topic:	  its	  role	  as	  a	  positive	  force	  for	  world	  order,	  stability,	  or	  global	  justice	  being	  vociferously	  contested	  in	  some	  quarters.	  A	  former	  U.S.	  ambassador	  to	  the	  UN,	  Dore	  Gold	  (2004:2;	  10),	  condemns	  the	  UN’s	  failure	  to	  seize	  the	  opportunity	  for	  a	  stable	  world	  order	  once	  it	  was	  no	  longer	  ‘paralyzed	  by	  the	  Cold	  War’s	  superpower	  stalemate’,	  and	  could	  ‘at	  last	  perform	  as	  envisioned	  by	  its	  founders’.	  This	  was	  a	  moment,	  Gold	  claims,	  that	  saw	  a	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  the	  ‘utopian	  enthusiasm’	  that	  has	  been	  voiced	  when	  the	  UN	  was	  founded	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  That	  moment	  was	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  earlier	  post-­‐war	  initiatives	  to	  prevent	  future	  conflict	  throughout	  history	  —	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  after	  World	  War	  I	  and	  the	  Concert	  of	  Europe	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Napoleonic	  Wars	  in	  1815	  —	  and,	  like	  these	  efforts	  to	  promote	  peace,	  it	  had	  failed:	  	  	  The	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  order,	  with	  the	  US	  as	  its	  centerpiece,	  had	  quickly	  collapsed	  —	  more	   quickly	   than	   either	   the	   Concert	   of	   Europe,	  which	   lasted	   for	   ninety-­‐nine	  years,	  or	  the	  League	  of	  Nations,	  which	  was	  active	  for	  about	  twenty.	  	  	  	  By	  2002,	  Gold	  laments,	  all	  prospects	  for	  a	  stable,	  more	  secure,	  world	  had	  vanished	  and	  a	  	  ‘new	  crisis	  seemed	  to	  threaten	  world	  peace	  every	  few	  months’.	  The	  UN,	  he	  claims,	  is	  singularly	  unsuited	  to	  preserving	  global	  order,	  is	  congenitally	  flawed,	  and	  beyond	  redemption.	  Far	  from	  any	  impression	  that	  the	  UN	  may	  give	  of	  being	  a	  benign	  but	  ineffective	  world	  body,	  Gold	  examines	  the	  UN’s	  record	  and	  concludes	  that	  the	  organisation	  has	  actually	  ‘accelerated	  and	  spread	  global	  chaos’	  […]	  its	  involvement	  in	  conflict	  situations	  only	  making	  matters	  worse.	  	  Although	  the	  UN	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was	  born	  at	  a	  moment	  of	  extraordinary	  moral	  clarity,	  he	  ascribes	  many	  of	  the	  UN’s	  recent	  failures	  to	  a	  pervasive	  culture	  in	  the	  institution	  of	  	  ‘moral	  equivalence’	  and	  an	  inability	  to	  make	  moral	  choices.	  	  	  
4.3.6	  Globalisation	  	  If	  the	  sociopolitical	  and	  socio-­‐historical	  factors	  described	  so	  far	  have	  had	  deep	  and	  enduring	  impacts	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  UN’s	  relationships	  with	  NGOs,	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  technological	  effects	  of	  ‘globalisation’	  have	  been	  comparatively	  convulsive.	  The	  ending	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  the	  ensuing	  acceleration	  of	  globalisation,	  is	  widely	  credited	  with	  having	  pivotal	  significance	  in	  the	  emergence	  and	  rapid	  rise	  of	  a	  ‘global	  civil	  society’182	  (UN	  Report	  2004;	  Hill,	  2007;	  Van	  Rooy,	  2004:30),	  large	  segments	  of	  which	  were,	  and	  still	  are,	  greatly	  opposed	  to	  the	  forces	  driving	  globalisation	  and	  its	  extremely	  uneven	  effects	  throughout	  the	  world	  (see	  Chapter	  6).	  According	  to	  Kaldor,	  understanding	  the	  forces	  and	  effects	  of	  globalisation	  is	  central	  to	  understanding	  what	  is	  new	  about	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  since	  1989	  (2003a:1)183.	  	  	  This	  thesis	  argues,	  therefore,	  that	  it	  is	  useful	  in	  explaining	  the	  interface	  between	  NGOs/TANs	  and	  the	  international	  system,	  to	  focus	  research	  on	  accounts	  of	  globalisation’s	  effects	  on	  NGO	  activity	  at	  the	  UN.	  A	  UN	  Secretariat	  briefing	  paper	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  2003c)184	  states	  that	  during	  the	  90s	  there	  was	  ‘an	  explosion	  of	  NGO	  involvement	  in	  all	  activities	  of	  the	  UN’,	  especially	  to	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  UN	  world	  conferences.	  Moreover,	  the	  paper	  noted,	  this	  ‘melee	  of	  activities’	  by	  NGOs	  was	  regarded	  by	  some	  observers	  as:	  	  […]	  a	  truly	  21st	  Century	  phenomenon	  —	  a	  compelling	  product	  of	  the	  Network	  Age	   and	   a	   corrective	   to	   the	   failings	   of	   traditional	   democratic	   institutions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182	  Although	  this	  thesis	  is	  sceptical	  of	  claims	  asserting	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  analytically	  useful	  category	  of	  
ordinary	  citizens	  that	  is	  qualitatively	  different	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  humanity,	  apart	  from	  their	  having	  jobs	  in	  
social	  administration,	  religious	  orders	  or	  the	  military,	  references	  to	  ‘global	  civil	  society’	  abound	  in	  the	  
world	  politics	  literature	  and	  must	  be	  respectfully	  acknowledged.	  Nevertheless,	  I	  would	  venture	  that	  the	  
vast	  majority	  of	  civil	  servants	  consider	  their	  lives	  to	  be	  categorically	  ‘ordinary’.	  
183	  Opinion	  differs	  widely	  regarding	  the	  definition,	  meaning	  and	  effects	  of	  ‘globalisation’	  and	  also	  of	  ‘civil	  
society’.	  For	  a	  range	  of	  these	  opinions	  see	  Scholte,	  2005:1;	  Held	  and	  McGrew,	  2002:1-­‐2;	  Buzan,	  2004:	  
77-­‐89;	  Kaldor,	  2003b:	  559;	  Clark	  et	  al,	  2005:293;	  Keane,	  2003:	  xi-­‐xiii;	  Donnelly,	  2011;	  and	  Stiglitz,	  2002.	  
184	  This	  Report	  (UN	  System	  and	  Civil	  Society	  —	  An	  Inventory	  and	  Analysis	  of	  Practices)	  provides	  an	  
overview	  of	  the	  UN	  management’s	  (i.e.	  secretariat/insider)	  thinking	  on	  participation	  by	  civil	  society	  
groups	  in	  the	  deliberative	  processes	  of	  the	  UN	  at	  that	  point	  in	  time	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  2003c).	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(which	   focus	   on	   the	   parochial	   and	   short-­‐term	   in	   an	   age	   when	   people	   are	  increasingly	  worried	  about	  the	  global	  and	  the	  long-­‐term).	  	  	  	  Given	  an	  end-­‐20th	  Century	  conceptualisation	  of	  civil	  society	  as	  a	  constellation	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  who	  occupy	  a	  space	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  market	  (Van	  Rooy,	  
ibid	  6-­‐7),	  NGOs	  are	  widely	  understood	  in	  the	  literature	  and	  media	  as	  actors	  who	  take	  up	  causes	  and	  act	  as	  interceding	  agents	  with	  both	  states	  and	  markets.	  Moreover,	  within	  the	  globalisation	  concern	  movements,	  the	  main	  reference	  point	  for	  ideological	  debate	  is	  an	  agreement	  that	  there	  is	  something	  dangerous	  called	  ‘globalisation’,	  and	  there	  is	  something	  to	  be	  done	  about	  it	  (Van	  Rooy,	  ibid:	  26).	  Intensifying	  these	  concerns	  is	  the	  view	  that	  globalisation	  has	  put	  democracy	  in	  peril,	  arising	  from	  the	  ‘free	  trade’	  policies	  of	  the	  international	  institutions,	  such	  as	  the	  WTO,	  IMF	  and	  World	  Bank	  (ibid:	  27-­‐28).	  As	  might	  be	  expected,	  globalisation	  has	  had	  a	  major	  impact	  on	  the	  UN	  and	  the	  other	  major	  international	  institutions,	  especially	  the	  IMF,	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  WTO,	  which	  govern	  globalisation	  (Stiglitz,	  2002:10;	  Weiss	  and	  Thakur,	  2010:34-­‐35;	  Norris,	  2003:287-­‐297).	  In	  describing	  the	  widespread	  effects	  of	  globalisation	  in	  its	  2004	  Report,	  the	  World	  Commission	  on	  the	  Social	  Dimension	  of	  Globalization	  (UN-­‐ILO,	  2004)	  stated	  in	  dire	  language	  that	  the	  world	  had	  reached	  a	  governance	  ‘impasse’	  in	  its	  response	  to	  globalisation	  and	  global	  imbalances	  were	  ‘morally	  unacceptable	  and	  politically	  unsustainable’.	  	  	  According	  to	  the	  UN’s	  Panel	  of	  Experts	  on	  UN-­‐Civil	  Society	  Relations185	  	  (ibid:	  8)	  a	  clear	  paradox	  is	  thus	  seen	  to	  be	  emerging:	  while	  the	  substance	  of	  politics	  is	  fast	  globalising,	  (in	  the	  areas	  of	  trade,	  economics,	  environment,	  pandemics,	  terrorism,	  etc.),	  the	  process	  of	  politics	  is	  not;	  its	  principal	  institutions	  (elections,	  political	  parties	  and	  parliaments)	  remaining	  firmly	  rooted	  at	  the	  national	  or	  local	  level186.	  The	  Report	  claimed	  that	  in	  response	  to	  	  ‘the	  weak	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185	  This	  Report	  is	  examined	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  
186	  I	  should	  add	  here	  that	  a	  dispassionate	  complexity	  reading	  of	  these	  social	  inequalities	  would	  not	  
condemn	  the	  irrepressible	  drivers	  and	  conditions	  that	  enable	  societies,	  disproportionately,	  to	  explore	  
new	  opportunities	  beyond	  their	  known	  worlds,	  but	  would	  instead	  seek	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  deep	  
structural	  properties	  that	  generate	  the	  disparate	  fitness	  of	  people	  everywhere	  to	  survive	  and	  thrive	  in	  
their	  different	  environments.	  Thus	  armed	  with	  sound	  data,	  the	  machinery	  of	  governance	  is	  more	  likely	  
to	  eschew	  assumptions	  about	  causes	  and	  effects	  and	  easy	  targets,	  and	  take	  action	  against	  real	  causes,	  
using	  appropriate	  levers,	  to	  produce	  desired	  effects.	  See	  Giddens	  (1984:xxiv-­‐xxvi;	  34-­‐37,	  83-­‐92)	  for	  a	  
discussion	  of	  time-­‐geography	  distanciation	  theory,	  which	  inter	  alia	  gives	  particular	  attention	  to	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influence	  of	  traditional	  democracy	  in	  matters	  of	  global	  governance’,	  citizens	  of	  diverse	  countries	  increasingly	  act	  politically	  ‘by	  participating	  directly,	  through	  civil	  society	  mechanisms,	  in	  policy	  debates	  that	  particularly	  interest	  them’.	  It	  continues:	  	   This	   constitutes	   a	   broadening	   from	   representative	   to	   participatory	  democracy.	   Traditional	   democracy	   aggregates	   citizens	   by	   communities	   of	  neighbourhood	   (their	   electoral	   districts),	   but	   in	   participatory	   democracy	  citizens	   aggregate	   in	   communities	   of	   interest.	   And,	   thanks	   to	   modern	  information	   and	   communication	   technologies,	   these	   communities	   of	   interest	  can	  be	  global	  as	  readily	  as	  local.	  	  	  However,	  Thucyididean	  realism187,	  which	  guides	  the	  realist	  perspectives	  of	  this	  thesis	  (and	  is	  reflected	  in	  my	  H3),	  provides	  a	  starkly	  contrasting	  interpretation	  of	  the	  international	  response	  to	  these	  developments.	  Most	  importantly,	  it	  provides	  a	  compelling	  explanation	  of	  why	  situated	  political	  processes	  throughout	  the	  world	  are	  so	  resistant	  to	  ‘fast	  globalising’	  (even	  assuming	  a	  desire	  of	  governments	  adapt	  their	  political	  arrangements	  and	  the	  intricacies	  of	  the	  sui	  generis	  social	  contracts	  they	  have	  with	  their	  peoples).	  Classical	  realism	  also	  offers	  a	  coherent	  account	  of	  why	  individual	  nation	  states	  prize	  their	  sovereignty	  and	  raise	  barriers	  to	  protect	  their	  perceived	  national	  interests	  from	  remote	  control	  by	  exogenous	  others.	  I	  suggest	  this	  is	  especially	  so	  (and	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  following	  chapter),	  if	  this	  pressure	  comes	  from	  civil	  society	  organisations	  with	  the	  technological	  tools	  they	  believe	  have	  the	  capability	  to	  by-­‐pass	  the	  international	  deliberative	  processes,	  in	  order	  to	  exert	  pressure	  ‘from-­‐below’-­‐from-­‐above188	  on	  topics	  ‘that	  particularly	  interest	  them’.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  view	  of	  globalisation	  as	  a	  portmanteau	  for	  relatively	  unwanted	  aspects	  of	  modern	  life	  is	  not	  universally	  shared.	  In	  many	  instances,	  globalisation	  has	  been	  a	  force	  for	  good	  	  (Stiglitz,	  2002:4)	  —	  the	  removal	  of	  barriers	  to	  free	  trade	  and	  the	  closer	  integration	  of	  national	  economies	  having	  the	  potential	  to	  enrich	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
constraints	  over	  activity	  deriving	  from	  physical	  properties	  of	  the	  body	  and	  different	  environments	  in	  
which	  agents	  move.	  	  
187	  See	  Gilpin	  (2001:15-­‐19)	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  classical	  Thucydidean,	  realism,	  as	  adopted	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
Although	  Gilpin	  draws	  a	  distinction	  between	  state-­‐centred	  realism	  and	  systemic	  realism,	  I	  argue	  that	  in	  
light	  of	  complexity	  insights	  there	  is	  no	  analytical	  value	  to	  be	  had	  in	  separating	  these	  theories,	  which	  
simply	  reflect	  just	  two	  different,	  partial,	  interpretations	  of	  the	  ontological	  reality	  of	  the	  complex	  
international	  system.	  
188	  See	  Chandler	  (2004),	  for	  insights	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  political	  power	  ‘from	  below’.	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everyone	  in	  the	  world,	  particularly	  the	  poor.	  However,	  Stiglitz189	  (2002:3,7)	  and	  others	  (especially	  the	  Report	  by	  the	  World	  Commission	  on	  the	  Social	  Dimension	  of	  Globalization,	  UN-­‐ILO,	  2004),	  have	  had	  scathing	  criticism	  for	  the	  way	  globalisation	  has	  been	  managed	  by	  the	  international	  economic	  and	  financial	  institutions,	  producing	  devastating	  consequences	  for	  people	  in	  developing	  countries,	  especially	  the	  poor.	  Further	  destructive	  spin-­‐offs	  of	  this	  increased	  interdependence	  and	  interconnectivity	  include	  underworld	  trafficking	  in	  drugs,	  arms	  and	  humans	  (Weiss	  and	  Thakur,	  ibid).	  While	  the	  process	  of	  globalisation	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  irreversible	  (UN	  Global	  Compact,	  1999;	  Sec-­‐Gen,	  2001),	  the	  international	  institutions,	  including	  the	  UN,	  are	  increasingly	  coming	  under	  intense	  pressure	  from	  concern	  groups	  to	  radically	  rethink	  the	  policies	  that	  enable	  globalisation’s	  most	  extreme	  consequences,	  repair	  damaged	  communities	  and	  promote	  principles	  of	  social	  justice.	  	  	  	  A	  major	  initiative	  to	  involve	  civil	  society	  in	  finding	  solutions	  to	  the	  harmful	  effects	  of	  globalisation	  was	  announced	  in	  January	  1999,	  when	  the	  then	  Secretary-­‐General	  of	  the	  UN,	  Kofi	  Annan,	  asked	  the	  world’s	  business	  leaders	  attending	  the	  World	  Economic	  Forum	  in	  Davos,	  to	  support	  a	  ‘global	  compact	  of	  shared	  values	  and	  principles,	  which	  will	  give	  a	  human	  face	  to	  the	  global	  market’	  (UN-­‐Global	  Compact,	  1999).	  	  At	  the	  same	  venue,	  Annan	  said	  in	  2001,	  ‘if	  we	  cannot	  make	  globalization	  work	  for	  all,	  in	  the	  end	  it	  will	  work	  for	  none’	  (UN	  Sec-­‐Gen,	  2001).	  This	  initiative	  also	  brought	  the	  voices	  of	  corporations	  and	  big	  business	  into	  the	  UN’s	  dialogues	  with	  civil	  society.	  	  	  	  But	  the	  collective	  raised	  voices	  of	  transnational	  civil	  society	  groups	  appear	  destined	  to	  continue	  their	  tense	  relationships	  and	  to	  target	  the	  international	  fora,	  whether	  they	  are	  working	  in	  partnerships,	  or	  against	  the	  international	  order.	  This	  is	  because,	  as	  Clark	  et	  al	  announced	  after	  a	  major	  study	  of	  NGO	  activity	  in	  and	  around	  UN	  world	  conferences:	  ‘State	  sovereignty	  sets	  the	  limits	  of	  global	  civil	  society’	  (2005:314).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189	  It	  is	  a	  point	  of	  interest	  that	  Joseph	  Stiglitz,	  author	  of	  the	  seminal	  globalisation	  text	  ‘Globalization	  and	  
its	  Discontents’	  (2002),	  was	  also	  a	  member	  of	  the	  ILO’s	  World	  Commission	  on	  the	  Social	  Dimension	  of	  
Globalization,	  that	  compiled	  the	  UN	  report	  ‘A	  Fair	  Globalization:	  Creating	  Opportunities	  for	  All’	  (UN-­‐ILO,	  
2004).	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4.4	  Outcomes-­‐in-­‐process	  and	  indicative	  macroscopic	  patterns	  
4.4.1	  The	  UN	  today	  	  	  Today,	  as	  the	  General	  Assembly	  passes	  the	  milestone	  of	  its	  69th	  Session190,	  the	  UN	  is	  nevertheless	  keenly	  aware	  of	  its	  many	  critics	  and	  manifold	  shortcomings,	  its	  cumbersome	  institutional	  arrangements,	  inability	  to	  react	  to	  global	  challenges	  and	  notorious	  resistance	  to	  reform	  (see	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  opening	  speech,	  UN-­‐GA	  Opening,	  2011;	  and	  UN-­‐NGLS,	  2011).	  At	  a	  conference191	  held	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly	  in	  June,	  2011,	  the	  Assembly’s	  then	  President,	  Joseph	  Deiss	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  2011),	  expressed	  the	  urgent	  need	  to	  develop	  an	  efficient	  system	  of	  global	  governance	  to	  address	  increasingly	  global	  problems.	  He	  observed	  the	  progressive	  fragmentation	  of	  global	  governance	  and	  warned	  Member	  States	  that	  the	  UN	  must	  reform	  in	  order	  to	  remain	  relevant.	  To	  make	  his	  point,	  one	  speaker	  quoted	  the	  words	  of	  the	  veteran	  UN	  insider	  Sir	  Brian	  Urquhart192:	  	  	  The	  UN	   lives	   to	   a	   considerable	   extent	   in	   a	   political	   past	  where	   independent	  sovereignty	   was	   the	   gold	   standard	   of	   international	   affairs.	   What	   is	   needed	  now	  is	  to	  reconcile	  national	  sovereignty	  with	  the	  demands	  of	  human	  survival	  and	  decency	  in	  the	  astonishingly	  dangerous	  world	  which	  absent	  mindedly	  we	  have	  created.	  	  Echoing	  these	  concerns	  in	  a	  speech	  at	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  66th	  General	  Assembly,	  in	  September	  2011,	  the	  incoming	  UN	  President,	  Nassir	  Abdulaziz	  al-­‐Nasser	  (UN-­‐GA	  Opening,	  2011)	  said	  the	  world	  was	  now	  at	  a	  critical	  juncture	  and	  the	  UN	  would	  have	  to	  rethink	  the	  way	  it	  operates	  ‘in	  the	  wake	  of	  ongoing	  global	  economic	  turmoil,	  popular	  protests	  that	  were	  upending	  once-­‐stable	  Governments	  and	  the	  seemingly	  unending	  raft	  of	  natural	  hazards	  and	  man-­‐made	  disasters’.	  But	  in	  view	  of	  widespread	  misgivings,	  such	  as	  those	  cited	  above,	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  this	  urgent	  and	  impassioned	  call	  to	  action	  will,	  or	  can,	  elicit	  any	  significant	  collective	  response	  from	  the	  UN,	  given	  the	  plurality	  of	  sovereign	  national	  interest	  that	  has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190	  The	  General	  Debate	  of	  the	  69th	  Session	  of	  the	  General	  Assembly	  was	  held	  in	  New	  York	  in	  September	  
2014.	  
191	  The	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  held	  an	  ‘Informal	  Thematic	  Debate	  on	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  Global	  
Governance’	  in	  New	  York	  on	  28	  June	  2011.	  Its	  purpose	  was	  to	  provide	  input	  to	  a	  report	  on	  global	  
governance	  being	  prepared	  by	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  in	  the	  lead	  up	  to	  the	  66th	  Session	  of	  the	  General	  
Assembly	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  2011).	  
192	  A	  veteran	  British	  diplomat	  involved	  in	  establishing	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  1945	  and	  later	  serving	  for	  
many	  years	  as	  Undersecretary	  General	  for	  Political	  Affairs.	  He	  retired	  from	  the	  UN	  in	  1986	  (UN	  Urquhart	  
Bio,	  2011).	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long	  characterised	  —	  some	  might	  say	  ‘hobbled’	  —	  the	  UN’s	  normative	  capacities	  and	  any	  illusions	  about	  its	  ability	  to	  act	  as	  a	  de	  facto	  form	  of	  global	  governance.	  However,	  the	  UN’s	  constitutional	  fundamentals	  only	  partially	  explain	  its	  dysfunctionality	  and	  threats	  to	  its	  relevance	  in	  the	  contemporary	  world,	  since	  much	  of	  the	  disagreement	  between	  Member	  countries	  is	  related	  to	  the	  values	  embodied	  in	  their	  particular,	  different,	  economic,	  social	  and	  historical	  situations	  (Jolly	  et	  al,	  2004:4).	  	  	  Up	  until	  the	  recent	  transformations	  in	  the	  physical	  technologies	  of	  transportation	  and	  communication	  that	  power	  globalisation	  (Buzan	  and	  Little,	  2000:288),	  there	  was	  little	  prospect	  of	  significantly	  reducing	  the	  incompatibilities	  between	  the	  views	  and	  concerns	  of	  UN	  Member	  States.	  But	  transnational	  ‘norm	  entrepreneurs’	  	  —	  such	  as	  TANs	  —	  are	  now	  often	  credited	  with	  helping	  to	  close	  those	  gaps.	  By	  having	  the	  ability	  to	  inject	  unexpected	  voices	  into	  international	  discourse	  regarding	  problems	  of	  global	  scope,	  new	  ideas,	  norms	  and	  identities,	  TANs	  act	  as	  agents	  of	  change.	  Indeed,	  when	  advocacy	  networks	  are	  able	  to	  convert	  ‘voice’	  into	  ‘power’,	  by	  influencing	  policy-­‐making,	  they	  are	  in	  effect	  exercising	  power	  over	  governments	  (Nye,	  2011:8-­‐10;	  Willetts,	  2011:131-­‐2).	  Moreover,	  because	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  past	  NGO	  advocacy	  has	  been	  directed	  against	  governments	  and	  UN	  policy,	  these	  non-­‐state	  actors	  have	  become	  ‘a	  salient	  phenomenon	  in	  international	  policy	  making	  and	  execution’	  (Weiss	  and	  Gordenker,	  1996:24).	  Unsurprisingly,	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  NGOs	  are	  now	  eager	  to	  institutionalise	  a	  full-­‐fledged	  partnership	  with	  the	  United	  Nations	  (ibid:	  39;	  Zettler,	  2009;	  UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2012).	  	  However,	  these	  demands	  frequently	  encounter	  strong	  resistances	  and	  barriers	  to	  participation.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  countless	  UN	  projects,	  programmes	  and	  even	  agencies	  are	  dedicated	  to	  facilitating	  and	  enhancing	  the	  status,	  roles	  and	  capacities	  of	  NGOs	  in	  the	  work	  of	  the	  UN.	  This	  is	  obviously	  a	  fitness	  landscape	  in	  which	  all	  parties	  are	  challenged	  to	  find	  common	  ground,	  not	  least	  because	  of	  the	  increasing	  commitment	  of	  the	  UN	  and	  the	  international	  community	  to	  scientific,	  evidence-­‐based,	  policy	  making	  (UNICEF,	  2008)193.	  According	  to	  Segone	  and	  Pron	  (2008),	  international	  evidence-­‐based	  policymaking	  is	  ‘a	  policy	  process	  that	  helps	  planners	  make	  better-­‐informed	  decisions	  by	  putting	  the	  best	  available	  evidence	  at	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193	  UNICEF	  brochure	  Bridging	  the	  Gap	  (2008).	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centre	  of	  the	  policy	  process’.	  This	  approach	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  ‘opinion-­‐based’	  policy,	  which	  ‘relies	  heavily	  on	  either	  the	  selective	  use	  of	  evidence	  (e.g.	  on	  a	  single	  survey	  irrespective	  of	  quality)	  or	  on	  the	  untested	  views	  of	  individuals	  or	  groups,	  often	  inspired	  by	  ideological	  standpoints,	  prejudices,	  or	  speculative	  conjecture’.	  Thus,	  argumentation	  is	  central	  in	  all	  stages	  of	  the	  policy	  process	  and	  ‘evidence	  is	  an	  important	  toll	  for	  those	  engaged	  in	  the	  discourse’.	  In	  this	  environment,	  it	  goes	  without	  saying	  that	  answering	  complex	  global	  challenges	  with	  thin	  argumentation	  and	  incoherent	  ideologies	  is	  not	  considered	  a	  suitable	  response.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
4.5	  Summary	  	  To	  many	  observers,	  the	  UN	  and	  its	  system	  of	  related	  organisations	  is	  seen	  as	  deeply	  flawed	  and	  mired	  in	  perpetual	  crisis	  (Kennedy,	  2006:245;	  Weiss,	  2008:1;	  Weiss	  and	  Thakur,	  2010:	  xix;	  Gold,	  2004:3),	  still	  served	  by	  yesteryear’s	  institutional	  arrangements	  and	  urgently	  in	  need	  of	  reform	  (UN	  Sec-­‐Gen,	  2003;	  UN	  Report,	  2004a;	  UN-­‐NGLS,	  2003,	  2003b,	  2003c;	  UN-­‐GA	  Opening,	  2011;	  UN-­‐NGLS,	  2011),	  yet	  notoriously	  resistant	  to	  instituting	  the	  scale	  of	  adaptation	  needed	  to	  tackle	  the	  present	  generation	  of	  ‘global	  problems’.	  This	  opinion	  testified	  to	  Durkheim’s	  conviction	  that	  institutions	  are	  intrinsically	  limited	  and	  necessarily	  slow	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  undertake	  major	  transformations	  (as	  opposed	  to	  evolutionary	  ones),	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  political	  agitation	  for	  change	  (Giddens,	  1977:263;	  1984:229).	  	  Thus,	  despite	  the	  many	  criticisms	  of	  the	  UN’s	  performance	  record,	  there	  seems	  little	  likelihood	  that,	  without	  the	  United	  Nations,	  the	  world	  would	  have	  seen	  a	  more	  stable	  world	  order	  during	  the	  past	  six	  decades.	  Notwithstanding	  the	  deterritorialising	  effects	  of	  globalisation	  and	  increasingly	  complex	  interdependencies	  between	  nations,	  grounds	  were	  seen	  for	  the	  Westphalian	  order	  of	  states,	  underpinned	  by	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter,	  remaining	  the	  most	  intellectually	  coherent	  basis	  for	  conducting	  international	  affairs	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future.	  	  That	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  the	  dynamic	  and	  emergent	  properties	  of	  the	  UN	  system,	  nor	  the	  imperative	  for	  new	  knowledge,	  fresh	  ideas	  and	  outspoken	  voices	  in	  the	  system	  that	  are	  non-­‐aligned	  with	  domestic	  governments,	  not	  obligated	  to	  protect	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national	  sovereignty	  at	  any	  cost,	  and	  willing	  to	  propose	  solutions	  that	  transcend	  ideologies.	  	  	  A	  useful	  succinct	  reminder	  of	  the	  UN’s	  lack	  of	  coercive	  power,	  and	  what	  it	  can	  and	  cannot	  do,	  is	  provided	  by	  Jolly	  et	  al	  (2004:257):	  	  The	   UN	   writes	   and	   records,	   it	   sets	   goals	   and	   objectives.	   But	   ultimately	  governments	   and	   countries,	   leaders	   and	   ordinary	   people,	   farmers	   and	  craftsmen,	   companies	   and	   entrepreneurs	   take	   action.	   The	   UN	   can	   do	   little	  more	   than	   promote	   priorities	   for	   action,	   help	  monitor,	   and	   provide	  modest	  levels	  of	  technical	  and	  financial	  support.	  	  	  I	  turn	  now	  to	  examining	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  throughout	  the	  world,	  including	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks,	  whose	  interests	  and	  operations,	  by	  definition,	  transcend	  the	  borders	  of	  nation	  states.	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Chapter	  5	  




The	  clear	  strains	  in	  relations	  between	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  civil	  society	  	  
may	  originate	  partly	  in	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  clearly	  articulated	  case	  	  
for	  enhancing	  such	  engagement	  today.	  
	  
	   Extract	  from	  the	  Report	  by	  the	  Panel	  of	  Eminent	  Persons	  on	  	  United	  Nations-­‐Civil	  Society	  Relations	  	  (The	  Cardoso	  Report)194	  
	  
	  
5.1.	  	  	  Introduction	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  examine	  the	  development	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  NGOs	  (including	  TANs),	  in	  order	  that	  the	  place	  and	  function	  of	  TANs,	  as	  a	  typology	  of	  NGO	  operating	  in	  the	  international	  system,	  may	  be	  better	  understood.	  However,	  I	  should	  emphasise	  that	  this	  chapter	  component	  does	  not	  cover	  all	  NGOs,	  or	  TANs,	  operating	  planet-­‐wide.	  It	  is	  not	  epistemologically	  feasible,	  in	  a	  study	  of	  actors	  interacting	  in	  the	  UN	  system,	  to	  survey	  NGOs/TANs	  who	  are	  outside	  the	  system,	  although	  tendencies	  in	  the	  international	  system’s	  relationships	  with	  NGOs	  are	  quite	  clear.	  They	  are	  congenitally	  strained	  (UN	  Report,	  2004a;	  Joachim	  and	  Locher,	  2009:28)	  and	  likely	  to	  remain	  so	  as	  long	  as	  tensions	  persist	  between	  those	  who	  view	  the	  UN	  as	  mainly	  an	  intergovernmental	  body	  representing	  the	  states	  of	  the	  world	  and	  those	  who	  want	  to	  see	  the	  UN	  as	  a	  more	  democratic	  body	  representing	  the	  people	  of	  the	  world	  (Joachim	  and	  Locher,	  ibid).	  	  This	  thesis	  takes	  neither	  side	  in	  this	  dualistic	  debate,	  instead	  sharing	  Tarrow’s	  argument	  (2005:60)	  that	  ‘while	  globalization	  provides	  incentives	  and	  themes	  for	  transnational	  activism,	  it	  is	  internationalism	  that	  offers	  a	  framework,	  a	  set	  of	  focal	  points,	  and	  a	  structure	  of	  opportunities	  for	  transnational	  activists’.	  Acknowledging	  the	  ineluctable	  fact	  and	  function	  of	  the	  UN	  today,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  my	  argument	  turns	  now	  to	  exploring	  the	  relational	  interface	  between	  the	  leading	  institution	  of	  the	  international	  system	  and	  NGOs/TANs.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  report	  A/58/817,	  dated	  11	  June	  2004	  (UN	  Report,	  2004a).	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Typological	  challenges	  in	  the	  UN	  system	  Taxonomy	  and	  ambiguous	  terminology	  are	  major	  challenges	  in	  differentiating	  between	  civil	  society	  (i.e.	  non-­‐state)	  actors	  operating	  in	  the	  UN	  system,	  with	  imprecision	  in	  defining	  these	  blurred	  areas	  leaving	  much	  to	  interpretation	  and	  assumption195.	  Clarification	  is	  therefore	  provided	  on	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  the	  term	  ‘NGO’	  in	  the	  context	  of	  international	  politics.	  From	  this	  basis,	  I	  am	  then	  able	  to	  make	  a	  further	  distinction,	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  between	  NGOs	  in	  general,	  and	  those	  NGOs	  that	  demonstrate	  the	  emergent	  characteristics	  associated	  with	  TANs,	  which	  this	  thesis	  argues	  can,	  and	  should,	  be	  distinguished	  from	  other	  forms	  of	  NGO	  by	  the	  distinctiveness	  of	  their	  relatively	  recent	  utilisation	  of	  the	  fruits	  of	  the	  Information	  Age:	  the	  technology;	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  Internet	  and	  media	  relations	  in	  their	  communications	  strategies;	  their	  information	  management;	  interconnectivity;	  and	  network	  structures.	  While	  this	  is	  not,	  yet,	  a	  widely	  recognised	  insight,	  it	  is	  shared	  by	  Costoya	  (2007)196,	  who	  describes	  civil	  society	  networks	  as	  ‘information-­‐age	  extensions	  of	  NGOs’	  and	  posits,	  as	  does	  this	  thesis,	  that	  the	  Information	  Age	  is	  transforming	  the	  very	  composition	  of	  the	  social	  sector	  widely	  understood	  as	  ‘civil	  society’.	  	  	  The	  UN	  system	  formally	  makes	  no	  distinction	  between	  NGOs	  functionally,	  or	  philosophically	  —	  whether	  service-­‐providing	  or	  lobbyist,	  radical	  or	  reformist197	  —	  as	  long	  as	  they	  meet	  the	  UN’s	  accreditation	  criteria	  (see	  Section	  5.3.3),	  although	  there	  has	  been	  an	  evident	  tendency	  for	  decades	  towards	  encouraging	  greater	  participation	  in	  the	  work	  of	  the	  UN	  by	  NGOs	  from	  the	  global	  South	  to	  redress	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195	  In	  September	  2013,	  the	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme	  (UNDP)	  published	  a	  clarifying	  note	  
concerning	  the	  ‘confusing	  terminology’,	  as	  an	  annex	  to	  its	  eBook	  Working	  with	  Civil	  Society	  in	  Foreign	  
Aid:	  Possibilities	  for	  South-­‐South	  Cooperation?	  (UNDP,	  2013:123-­‐125).	  The	  UNDP’s	  clarification	  states	  
that	  while	  many	  aid	  actors,	  particularly	  governments	  in	  developing	  countries,	  refer	  to	  ‘NGOs’	  and	  their	  
role	  in	  international	  aid	  and	  development	  cooperation,	  the	  phrase	  ‘non-­‐governmental	  organisation’	  is	  
contested	  terminology.	  The	  clarification	  points	  out	  that,	  for	  many	  people,	  NGOs	  are	  understood	  to	  be	  
organisations	  that	  are	  subsumed	  within	  the	  broader	  category	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  (CSOs),	  and	  
this	  is	  the	  UNDP’s	  preferred	  term.	  Where	  a	  distinction	  is	  made	  for	  International	  NGOs	  (INGOs),	  they	  are	  
seen	  as	  a	  sub-­‐category	  of	  NGOs.	  Following	  this	  genealogical	  tree,	  this	  thesis	  posits	  that	  transnational	  
advocacy	  networks	  (TANs)	  are	  a	  subset	  of	  INGO.	  
	  196	  Costoya’s	  views	  on	  developing	  a	  typology	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  are	  expressed	  in	  a	  paper	  prepared	  
while	  a	  Research	  Fellow	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Research	  Institute	  for	  Social	  Development	  programme	  on	  
Civil	  Society	  and	  Social	  Movements,	  Geneva.	  	  	  
197	  A	  concise	  encapsulation	  of	  NGO	  diversity	  on	  similar	  lines	  is	  provided	  by	  Edwards	  (2000:36).	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imbalances	  in	  relation	  to	  NGOs	  from	  the	  North198.	  ECOSOC	  Resolution	  1297	  (XLIV)	  of	  29	  May,	  1968	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  1968b)	  urged	  the	  UN’s	  Office	  of	  Public	  Information	  (OPI)	  to	  increase	  its	  association	  with	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  NGOs	  in	  general,	  particularly	  according	  ‘immediate	  and	  sympathetic	  consideration’	  to	  ‘inadequately	  represented	  regions	  of	  the	  world,	  particularly	  in	  Africa’,	  and	  to	  also	  favour	  NGOs	  representing	  racial	  groups,	  especially	  to	  people	  ‘of	  African	  descent’.	  	  The	  only	  groups	  the	  OPI	  was	  directed	  to	  exclude	  from	  its	  relationships	  were	  ‘organizations	  whose	  aims	  or	  practices	  tend	  or	  contribute	  to	  the	  propagation	  of	  Nazi	  ideology	  and	  racial	  and/or	  religious	  discrimination’	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  1968b).	  In	  1996	  (ECOSOC	  Resolution	  1996/31)	  expressed	  a	  general	  hope	  that	  NGOs	  from	  developing	  countries	  would	  be	  encouraged	  to	  have	  greater	  participation	  in	  the	  UN’s	  international	  conferences;	  greater	  involvement	  should	  also	  be	  encouraged	  among	  ‘countries	  with	  economies	  in	  transition’	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  1996).	  However,	  such	  references	  to	  specific	  groups	  are	  indicative	  of	  thinking	  within	  ECOSOC	  only	  and	  have	  not	  been	  enshrined	  in	  UN	  policy.	  	  	  Therefore,	  in	  the	  UN’s	  un-­‐nuanced	  taxonomy	  the	  Zoroastrian	  Women’s	  Organization	  is	  functionally	  the	  same	  as	  Greenpeace	  and	  Amnesty	  International.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  UN	  system	  does	  not	  have	  a	  coherent	  response	  strategy	  to	  accommodate	  the	  diverse	  voices	  of	  today’s	  TANs	  that	  do	  not	  fit	  the	  UN	  criteria	  last	  reformed	  over	  18	  years	  ago	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  1996)	  to	  take	  into	  account	  NGOs	  operating	  at	  that	  time.	  	  In	  fact,	  in	  comparing	  UN	  amendments	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  the	  basic	  criteria	  for	  consulting	  NGOs	  is	  little	  changed	  from	  1946,	  when	  41	  NGOs	  were	  accredited	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2011c).	  	  	  This	  thesis	  argues,	  however,	  that	  in	  established	  practice	  within	  the	  UN	  system,	  differentiation	  between	  NGOs	  exists	  	  —	  not	  least	  between	  different	  genera	  of	  NGOs	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198	  It	  is	  a	  commonplace	  to	  find	  documents	  on	  CSOs	  (including	  NGOs	  and	  INGOs)	  circulating	  in	  the	  
international	  system	  that	  make	  the	  distinction	  between	  organisations	  based	  in	  the	  global	  North	  (NCSOs)	  
and	  those	  based	  in	  the	  global	  South	  (SCSOs).	  A	  practical	  element	  in	  making	  this	  distinction	  is	  due	  to	  the	  
fact	  that	  in	  most	  North-­‐South	  CSO	  cooperative	  relationships,	  NCSOs	  or	  INGOs	  have	  traditionally	  taken	  
the	  dominant	  role	  of	  aid	  donors,	  managers	  and	  service	  providers,	  while	  SCSOs	  have	  been	  cast	  in	  the	  
comparatively	  weaker	  roles	  of	  recipients	  and	  local	  enablers	  (OECD-­‐DAC,	  2008:3-­‐4;	  CCIC,	  2006:14-­‐15).	  A	  
discussion	  paper	  on	  aid	  effectiveness	  by	  the	  Canadian	  Council	  for	  International	  Co-­‐operation	  echoes	  
concerns	  in	  the	  aid	  sector	  over	  the	  imbalances	  in	  these	  ‘partnerships’,	  that	  ‘it	  may	  be	  more	  effective	  to	  
retain	  a	  distinction	  between	  CSOs	  with	  a	  service	  delivery	  mandate	  and	  CSOs	  seeking	  societal	  reform	  and	  
changes	  in	  the	  structures	  of	  injustice’	  (CCIC,ibid).	  Such	  calls	  for	  differentiating	  typologies	  of	  civil	  society	  
organisations	  support	  the	  underlying	  premises	  of	  this	  thesis.	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themselves	  —	  and	  has	  a	  significant	  bearing	  on	  the	  place,	  function,	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  these	  individual	  civil	  society	  actors	  in	  global	  politics	  (Willetts,	  2011:61-­‐63).	  Because	  of	  the	  UN	  system’s	  usage	  of	  a	  broad,	  umbrella	  categorisation	  for	  all	  NGOs,	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  place,	  function	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs	  in	  the	  international	  system	  needs	  to	  first	  ask	  which	  organisations	  the	  UN	  accepts,	  or	  refuses	  to	  accept,	  as	  NGOs	  at	  the	  level	  of	  global	  politics;	  what	  criteria	  the	  UN	  adopts	  for	  recognising	  NGOs	  and	  what	  the	  state	  of	  the	  relationships	  can	  tell	  us.	  	  
5.2	  	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  UN	  and	  NGOs/TANs	  The	  interface	  between	  the	  UN	  and	  NGOs	  is	  a	  densely	  crowded	  landscape.	  Over	  13,000199	  civil	  society	  organisations	  have	  established	  a	  formal	  relationship	  with	  the	  United	  Nations,	  in	  diverse	  roles	  and	  on	  a	  range	  of	  levels.	  These	  roles	  include	  advising	  UN	  agencies	  and	  Member	  States,	  disseminating	  information,	  raising	  awareness,	  policy	  advocacy,	  joint	  operational	  projects	  and	  providing	  services	  and	  technical	  expertise.	  Although	  only	  governments	  of	  Member	  States	  make	  decisions	  in	  the	  UN,	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  has	  increasingly	  been	  opened	  to	  an	  array	  of	  non-­‐state	  players,	  including	  NGOs,	  the	  private	  sector,	  trade	  unions,	  foundations,	  think	  tanks,	  local	  authorities	  and	  academic	  researchers	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2011;	  UN-­‐NGLS,	  2007a;	  Zettler,	  2009).	  Almost	  1,000	  of	  these	  NGOs	  are	  indigenous	  people’s	  organisations,	  some	  of	  which	  represent	  the	  interests	  of	  diasporas	  that	  are	  larger	  than	  the	  populations	  of	  some	  sovereign	  states200	  —	  such	  as	  the	  Roma	  and	  the	  Inuit	  (Klímová-­‐Alexander,	  2005:14;	  ICC,	  2011;	  Shadian,	  2010)	  —	  but	  whose	  constituents	  live	  as	  marginalised	  minorities	  within	  contemporary	  bordered	  states.	  As	  such,	  these	  NGOs	  are	  of	  special	  interest	  in	  examining	  the	  trajectories	  of	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks	  in	  the	  UN	  system,	  since	  they	  fundamentally	  contest	  the	  state-­‐centric,	  Westphalian,	  basis	  for	  collective	  representation	  in	  world	  politics	  with	  political,	  legal	  and	  normative	  claims	  developed	  over	  many	  decades.	  But	  whose	  voices	  should,	  or	  can,	  be	  heard?	  Who	  speaks	  for	  whom	  on	  the	  world	  stage,	  and	  with	  what	  authority?201	  However	  compelling	  their	  case	  for	  recognition,	  attention,	  and	  support	  on	  the	  world	  stage	  —	  by	  the	  sans	  frontiéres	  Roma,	  Inuit,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199	  UN	  Department	  of	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Affairs	  data	  (UN-­‐DESA,	  2011b).	  
200	  Estimates	  differ	  as	  to	  the	  number	  and	  geographical	  distribution	  of	  the	  Roma,	  but	  accounts	  generally	  
put	  the	  population	  at	  10-­‐15	  million	  throughout	  the	  world	  (Klimova:	  2005:14).	  According	  to	  the	  Inuit	  
Circumpolar	  Conference,	  the	  Inuit	  population	  is	  approximately	  155,000,	  which	  is	  larger	  than	  some	  38	  
UN	  Member	  States	  (ICC,	  2011:	  UN-­‐DESA,	  2012).	  
201	  For	  background	  to	  this	  debate,	  see	  Spivak’s	  seminal	  thesis	  on	  this	  subject	  (1985).	  See	  also	  Cochran,	  
(1999)	  and	  Erskine	  (2010:36).	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world’s	  women,	  elderly,	  youth,	  consumers,	  gay	  liberationists,	  blind,	  Bahá’í,	  farmers,	  grannies,	  tunnellers,	  rainwater	  harvesters,	  or	  by	  the	  Association	  of	  Garbage	  Collectors	  for	  Community	  Development202	  —	  they	  are	  not	  alone.	  The	  following	  diagram	  speaks	  for	  itself:	  	  
The	  Growth	  of	  NGOs	  at	  the	  UN	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
Figure	  5.1	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Graphic	  reproduced	  from	  Willetts,	  2011b:335.	  	  According	  to	  the	  Union	  of	  International	  Associations	  the	  number	  of	  international	  NGOs	  has	  grown	  to	  almost	  65,000203,	  and	  countless	  thousands	  more	  work	  regionally,	  nationally	  and	  locally.	  Thousands	  of	  these	  bodies,	  and	  other	  civil	  society	  groups,	  have	  informal	  links	  with	  parts	  of	  the	  UN	  system	  throughout	  the	  world.	  The	  complexity	  of	  this	  interface	  is	  what	  the	  UN	  has	  called,	  in	  customary	  understatement,	  ‘the	  often	  complex	  interplay	  of	  differing	  political	  perspectives’	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  ibid).	  This	  torrent	  of	  competing	  voices	  at	  the	  international	  level	  was	  described	  somewhat	  more	  expressively	  as	  ‘white	  noise’	  (and	  its	  effect	  as	  ‘gridlock’),	  by	  Keohane	  and	  Nye,	  as	  long	  ago	  as	  1988	  (1988:89),	  in	  their	  ‘paradox	  of	  plenty’	  commentary204,	  which	  asserts:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202	  Extracted	  from	  the	  full	  list	  of	  NGOs	  in	  consultative	  status	  with	  the	  UN,	  as	  of	  September	  2010	  (UN-­‐
ECOSOC,	  2010).	  	  	  
203	  Union	  of	  International	  Associations	  Yearbook	  data	  (UIA,	  2011).	  
204	  Cited	  also	  by	  Stone	  (2004:13)	  in	  the	  context	  of	  think-­‐tank	  development	  and	  influence.	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  […]	   to	   understand	   the	   effect	   of	   free	   information	   on	   power,	   one	   must	   first	  understand	   the	   paradox	   of	   plenty.	   A	   plenitude	   of	   information	   leads	   to	   a	  poverty	  of	  attention.	  Attention	  becomes	  a	  scarce	  resource,	  and	  those	  who	  can	  distinguish	  valuable	  signals	  from	  white	  noise	  gain	  power.	  	  This	  thesis	  posits,	  therefore,	  that	  it	  is	  more	  fruitful	  to	  investigate	  not	  what	  this	  information	  is,	  individually,	  but	  what	  it	  does,205	  collectively,	  to	  generate	  desired	  outcomes	  for	  specific	  units	  (e.g.	  TANs),	  within	  the	  system.	  Given	  that	  the	  definitive	  goal	  of	  TANs	  is	  to	  influence	  political	  policy	  and	  change	  the	  behaviour	  of	  states	  and	  international	  organisations206,	  the	  principal	  foci	  of	  investigation	  called	  for	  in	  this	  study	  are	  the	  mechanisms	  and	  relationships	  through	  which	  TAN	  goals	  are	  pursued	  at	  the	  international	  policy-­‐making	  level.	  	  Once	  registered	  with	  the	  UN	  Department	  of	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Affairs	  (DESA),	  civil	  society	  groups	  can	  apply	  for	  consultative	  status	  with	  the	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Council	  (ECOSOC),	  and	  over	  4,000	  NGOs207	  are	  currently	  in	  consultancy	  relationships	  with	  the	  UN	  at	  various	  levels	  of	  participation	  and	  influence	  in	  international	  affairs	  and	  policy-­‐making.	  This	  status	  gives	  NGOs	  access	  to	  the	  particular	  audiences	  they	  need	  to	  influence	  in	  order	  to	  advance	  their	  agendas,	  win	  allies	  and	  effect	  political	  outcomes	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2011c;	  Zettler,	  2009).	  The	  UN-­‐DESA	  NGO	  Branch	  also	  services	  over	  31,000	  other	  NGOs	  working	  with	  the	  United	  Nations	  (UN-­‐DESA,	  2014;	  UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2012).	  Accredited	  NGOs	  are	  currently	  able	  to	  address	  plenary	  meetings	  of	  UN	  Member	  States,	  contribute	  alternative	  reports	  and	  strategic	  information	  to	  treaty	  bodies,	  occasionally	  and	  informally	  brief	  the	  Security	  Council	  by	  way	  of	  the	  imaginative	  but	  unorthodox	  ‘Arria	  Formula’208,	  and	  sometimes	  sit	  on	  government	  delegations	  at	  UN	  meetings	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  2007a;	  UN-­‐NGLS,	  2003c).	  If	  access	  to	  important	  influencers	  is	  limited	  the	  prospects	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205	  	  TAN	  effectiveness,	  goals	  and	  influence	  are	  examined	  further	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  The	  basic	  premise	  of	  
relational	  power	  in	  international	  relations	  follows	  Nye’s	  insight	  that	  it	  is	  the	  power	  to	  achieve	  one’s	  
preferred	  behavioural	  outcomes	  (2010:10)	  
206	  	  This	  understanding	  of	  TAN	  goals	  is	  advanced	  persuasively	  by	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  (1998:2),	  and	  is	  
adopted	  and	  developed	  in	  this	  thesis.	  
207	  These	  civil	  society	  organisations	  range	  from	  service-­‐providing	  and	  academic	  bodies,	  to	  religious,	  
business,	  consulting,	  and	  lobbying	  groups.	  
208	  This	  term	  refers	  to	  a	  meeting-­‐fringe	  practice	  initiated	  in	  1992	  by	  the	  then	  President	  of	  the	  Security	  
Council,	  Ambassador	  Diego	  Arria	  (Venezuela).	  Arria-­‐formula	  meetings	  are	  not	  meetings	  of	  the	  Security	  
Council.	  They	  are	  convened	  at	  the	  initiative	  of	  a	  member	  or	  members	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  in	  order	  to	  
hear	  the	  views	  of	  individuals,	  organisations	  or	  institutions	  on	  matters	  within	  the	  competence	  of	  the	  
Security	  Council	  (UN	  data,	  2011b).	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influencing	  policy	  may	  become	  more	  challenging	  (Zettler,	  ibid).	  Such	  accreditation	  also	  enables	  NGOs	  to	  participate	  in	  international	  conferences	  convened	  by	  the	  UN	  and	  in	  meetings	  of	  the	  preparatory	  bodies.	  Interaction	  between	  the	  UN	  and	  NGOs	  has	  been	  continuous	  and	  evolving	  throughout	  the	  UN’s	  history,	  with	  both	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  and	  their	  relationships,	  morphing	  into	  unpredicted	  new	  forms	  over	  time.	  The	  relationships	  have	  taken	  on	  unforeseen	  dimensions	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  new	  political	  controversies	  arising,	  inter	  alia,	  from	  the	  uneven	  effects	  of	  globalisation;	  an	  increase	  in	  global	  challenges;	  and	  the	  rapid	  escalation	  in	  the	  number	  of	  NGOs	  seeking	  political	  policy	  redress	  at	  the	  international	  level.	  All	  of	  which	  phenomena	  the	  UN	  system	  has	  struggled	  to	  accommodate	  —	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  unanimity	  and	  success.	  	  
Resolutions,	  blueprints	  and	  promises:	  an	  archetypal	  UN	  formula	  The	  UN	  system’s	  intention	  to	  strengthen	  UN-­‐NGO	  relations	  has	  been	  underpinned	  in	  recent	  years	  in	  a	  somewhat	  drawn-­‐out	  string	  of	  documents209	  	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  2011a:	  UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2011c),	  particularly	  in	  the	  UN	  Millennium	  Declaration	  of	  September	  2000.	  In	  this	  landmark	  document,	  the	  General	  Assembly	  resolved,	  inter	  
alia:	  ‘To	  give	  greater	  opportunities	  to	  the	  private	  sector,	  non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  and	  civil	  society,	  in	  general,	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  organization’s	  goals	  and	  programmes’	  (UN-­‐Millennium	  Declaration,	  2000,	  Section	  VIII/30).	  The	  commitment	  of	  Member	  States	  to	  provide	  greater	  opportunities	  for	  NGO	  engagement	  was	  also	  reaffirmed	  in	  the	  2005	  World	  Summit	  Outcome	  Document	  (UN	  GA	  Resolution,	  2005;	  UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2011c).	  Therefore,	  it	  was	  to	  be	  expected	  that	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  new	  millennium	  would	  see	  the	  UN,	  under	  the	  pro-­‐reformist	  helm	  of	  then	  Secretary-­‐General,	  Kofi	  Annan,	  take	  determined	  steps	  towards	  a	  more	  fruitful	  engagement	  with	  NGOs	  (UN-­‐Report,	  2004a),	  however	  vague	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  overarching	  policy	  directive.	  	  	  This	  fresh	  momentum	  in	  the	  relationship	  was	  especially	  evident	  in	  civil	  society	  involvement	  in	  the	  UN’s	  continuing	  programme	  of	  World	  Summits	  and	  major	  conferences,	  which	  had	  experienced	  a	  period	  of	  intense	  activity	  in	  the	  1990s.	  Convened	  around	  such	  topics	  as	  human	  rights,	  the	  environment,	  women,	  ageing,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209	  For	  example,	  see	  UN	  Resolution	  1996/31	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  1996);	  UN	  Global	  Compact,	  1999;	  UN	  
Millennium	  Declaration,	  2000;	  UN-­‐Sec-­‐Gen	  (2003);	  UN	  Report	  2004a;	  UN	  Report,	  2004b;	  UN	  Resolution,	  
2005.	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gender	  issues,	  sustainable	  development,	  the	  information	  society,	  population,	  food	  and	  many	  other	  crucial	  themes	  (UN-­‐DESA,	  2011a;	  Pianta,	  2005),	  this	  extra-­‐institutional	  outreach	  was	  part	  of	  a	  UN	  initiative	  to	  foster	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  governance	  as	  a	  means	  of	  democratising	  international	  institutions.	  To	  the	  participants,	  these	  events	  created	  an	  unparalleled	  opportunity	  for	  advocacy	  groups	  to	  engage	  with	  international	  organisations	  and	  governments	  and	  to	  play	  a	  greater	  role	  in	  redesigning	  the	  institutional	  tools	  for	  addressing	  global	  issues.	  The	  new	  impetus	  for	  more	  inclusive	  relationships	  engaged	  new,	  transnational	  voices,	  fresh	  perspectives	  and	  novel	  ideas.	  It	  greatly	  expanded	  the	  reach,	  activities	  and	  hopes	  of	  globally-­‐focused	  civil	  society	  groups,	  led	  to	  increased	  engagement	  with	  national	  governments	  and	  grassroots	  organisations,	  and	  opened	  up	  a	  complex	  and	  important	  relationship	  between	  the	  UN	  and	  civil	  society	  organisations.	  It	  also	  led	  to	  the	  tidal	  wave	  of	  applications	  for	  NGO	  consultation	  accreditation	  at	  the	  UN	  that	  has	  overwhelmed	  the	  ECOSOC	  accreditation	  process	  ever	  since	  (Martens,	  2004).	  But	  it	  was	  not	  an	  unqualified	  success	  in	  anyone’s	  terms,	  as	  evidenced	  in	  reports	  of	  these	  events	  (Pianta,	  ibid;	  Syracuse	  University,	  2005;	  Mueller,	  Kuerbis,	  et	  al,	  2007).	  	  	  
Plus	  ça	  change,	  plus	  c’est	  la	  même	  chose	  Mindful	  of	  the	  large,	  widely-­‐publicised	  protests	  against	  international	  organisations	  characteristic	  of	  the	  late	  1990s210,	  the	  UN’s	  global	  conferences	  and	  summits	  also	  saw	  international	  organisations	  on	  the	  defensive	  and	  raised	  concerns	  about	  their	  legitimacy.	  During	  the	  World	  Summit	  on	  the	  Information	  Society	  (2003	  to	  2005),	  one	  research	  team	  observed	  (Syracuse	  University,	  2005),	  that	  the	  opportunity	  extended	  to	  civil	  society	  crumbled	  amid	  ‘tumultuous	  battles’,	  demonstrations,	  and	  chaotic	  efforts	  to	  establish	  a	  satisfactory	  interface	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  within	  an	  institutional	  environment.	  Very	  often	  the	  negative	  experience	  of	  the	  UN	  conference	  process	  —	  restrictions	  on	  meaningful	  participation,	  slow	  follow-­‐up	  and	  negligible	  benefits	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  2003c)	  —	  had	  quite	  unintentionally	  spurred	  the	  emergence	  of	  global	  social	  movements	  challenging	  global	  powers	  on	  the	  same	  issues	  that	  were	  addressed	  —	  and	  left	  unsolved	  —	  by	  the	  UN	  summits	  (Pianta,	  ibid).	  Such	  reactions	  strengthen	  the	  theory	  that	  TANs	  seek	  to	  fill	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210	  For	  example,	  the	  WTO	  Ministerial	  Conference	  1999,	  dubbed	  the	  ‘Battle	  of	  Seattle’,	  during	  which	  
50,000	  anti-­‐globalisation	  demonstrators	  overwhelmed	  police	  in	  Seattle,	  Washington,	  and	  closed	  down	  
parts	  of	  the	  WTO	  meeting	  (WTO	  Release	  (1999);	  BBC	  News	  Archive	  (2007).	  See	  also	  UN-­‐NGLS,	  2003c,	  for	  
a	  UN	  perspective	  on	  the	  issues	  of	  ‘violence’	  and	  ‘disruption’	  by	  CSOs.	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perceived	  lacuna	  for	  their	  voice	  within	  international	  politics,	  outside	  of	  the	  ‘consultative’	  role	  and	  the	  affiliation	  route.	  	  	  In	  tracing	  the	  course	  of	  NGO	  participation	  in	  UN	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  —	  through	  analysing	  published	  statements	  for	  changes	  in	  UN	  institutional	  arrangements,	  terminology	  and	  linguistic	  tone	  (e.g.	  enthusiasm)	  —	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  detect	  the	  waxing	  and	  waning	  of	  dispositions	  to	  NGO	  inclusivity,	  within	  the	  UN.	  For	  example,	  following	  the	  UN	  Earth	  Summit211	  in	  1992,	  the	  United	  Nations	  Environment	  Programme	  adopted	  what	  was	  termed	  ‘a	  Major	  Groups	  approach’	  to	  embrace	  broader	  public	  participation	  in	  the	  environmental	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  of	  the	  UN	  (vide	  Article	  21;	  UNEP,	  2013.)	  In	  1999,	  the	  UNEP	  created	  a	  Major	  Group	  &	  NGOs	  Unit	  in	  its	  Policy	  Branch	  to	  further	  facilitate	  the	  involvement	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  However,	  when	  the	  Major	  Groups	  and	  Stakeholders	  Branch	  was	  created	  within	  the	  UNEP	  in	  2004	  ‘to	  enhance	  participation	  of	  Major	  Groups	  and	  other	  Stakeholders	  in	  its	  work’,	  NGO	  exceptionality	  was	  not	  recognised	  in	  the	  title	  of	  the	  new	  Branch.	  Instead,	  the	  agency	  affirmed	  its	  commitment	  to	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  governance	  by	  recognising	  that	  sustainable	  development	  ‘requires	  the	  meaningful	  involvement	  and	  active	  participation	  of	  all	  nine	  Major	  Groups	  in	  society’.	  These	  were	  named,	  in	  order,	  as:	  business	  and	  industry,	  children	  and	  youth,	  farmers,	  indigenous	  people	  and	  communities,	  local	  authorities,	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations,	  the	  scientific	  and	  technical	  community,	  women,	  workers	  and	  trade	  unions.	  NGOs	  were	  on	  the	  list,	  but	  they	  were	  not	  accorded	  a	  privileged	  status	  over	  any	  of	  the	  other	  social	  groups.	  Explaining	  the	  rationale	  for	  this	  mechanism,	  the	  UNEP	  stated	  (UNEP,	  2013):	  	  	   UNEP	   recognises	   the	   importance	   of	   engaging	   Majors	   Groups	   and	   other	  Stakeholders	   as	   partners	   and	   appreciates	   the	   perspectives	   they	   bring	   to	   the	  table,	  valuable	  research	  and	  advocacy	  functions	  they	  perform	  and	  their	  role	  in	  helping	   foster	   long-­‐term,	  broad-­‐based	   support	   for	  UNEP’s	  mission	   [...]	  Major	  Groups	   and	   other	   Stakeholders	   also	   play	   a	   direct	   role	   in	   the	   formation	   of	  policy	  as	  researchers,	  think-­‐tanks,	  and	  watchdogs,	  or	  through	  advocacy.	  	  By	  2005	  the	  commitment	  of	  Member	  States	  to	  give	  greater	  opportunities	  to	  NGOs	  was	  stated	  in	  the	  Outcome	  Document	  of	  the	  2005	  UN	  World	  Summit	  (UN	  GA	  Resolution,	  2005;	  UN-­‐NGLS,	  2011a),	  but	  mention	  of	  NGOs	  came	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211	  Formally	  entitled	  the	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  the	  Environment	  and	  Development	  (UNCED).	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the	  40-­‐page	  document	  (paras.	  172-­‐4)	  and	  the	  language	  was	  comparatively	  low	  key,	  stating:	  	  	   We	  welcome	  the	  positive	  contributions	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  civil	  society,	  including	   non-­‐governmental	   organizations,	   in	   the	   promotion	   and	  implementation	  of	  development	  and	  human	  rights	  programmes.	  	  	  No	  more,	  no	  less.	  NGOs,	  amongst	  others,	  were	  quite	  plainly	  welcome	  to	  make	  contributions	  to	  the	  UN’s	  work,	  conditional	  on	  their	  inputs	  being	  considered	  ‘positive’,	  and	  being	  restricted	  to	  specific	  activities	  and	  certain	  areas.	  Moreover,	  the	  reference	  to	  the	  non-­‐state	  sector	  was	  now	  more	  overtly	  inclusive	  of	  other	  non-­‐state	  entities	  than	  previously.	  Up	  until	  mid-­‐point	  of	  the	  millennium’s	  first	  decade,	  the	  UN	  had	  invariably	  referred	  to	  non-­‐state	  actors	  as	  ‘civil	  society’,	  or	  ‘NGOs’.	  Now,	  the	  language	  was	  featuring,	  in	  the	  same	  contexts,	  ‘the	  private	  sector’,	  ‘local	  authorities’,	  and	  ethical	  business	  proponents	  in	  the	  ‘Global	  Compact’.	  	  	  This	  study	  noted	  a	  further	  challenge	  for	  advocacy-­‐oriented	  NGOs	  who	  focus	  heavily	  on	  attracting	  media	  attention	  as	  a	  conduit	  for	  channeling	  their	  advocacy	  messages	  to	  decision-­‐makers	  and	  the	  wider	  world.	  A	  study	  on	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  media	  on	  UN	  officials212,	  found	  that	  the	  ‘credibility’	  of	  information	  sources	  was	  of	  paramount	  importance	  and	  that	  UN	  officials	  had	  very	  selective	  habits	  concerning	  the	  media	  sources	  they	  trusted	  and	  used	  (Columbia	  U,	  2009).	  Information	  delivered	  directly	  from	  NGOs	  had	  to	  compete	  with	  research	  from	  trusted	  think	  tanks	  and	  academic	  sources,	  with	  trustworthiness	  and	  ‘high	  quality	  research’	  deemed	  the	  most	  important	  qualities	  required	  for	  external	  communications	  to	  be	  influential213.	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  research	  findings	  support	  the	  earlier	  insights	  of	  Keohane	  and	  Nye	  (198:89)	  that	  information	  overload	  has	  led	  UN	  officials	  to	  put	  a	  premium	  on	  information	  sources	  who	  can	  supply	  them	  with	  only	  the	  most	  ‘valuable	  signals’	  required	  for	  their	  work.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212	  The	  research	  project	  involved	  international	  civil	  servants	  and	  officials	  of	  country	  missions	  attached	  to	  
the	  UN	  (Columbia	  U,	  2009).	  
213	  The	  International	  Crisis	  Group’s	  reporting	  was	  lauded	  as	  being	  of	  ‘high	  quality’	  and	  ‘very	  
trustworthy’.	  This	  independent	  NGO	  is	  co-­‐chaired	  by	  a	  former	  UN	  Deputy	  Secretary-­‐General	  and	  
Administrator	  of	  the	  UN	  Development	  Programme,	  Lord	  Malloch-­‐Brown.	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Reading	  between	  the	  lines	  of	  the	  diplomatic	  discourses	  It	  is	  impossible,	  however,	  to	  make	  an	  accurate	  external	  assessment	  of	  the	  UN’s	  interface	  with	  NGOs,	  based	  solely	  on	  the	  careful	  diplomatic	  language	  of	  the	  UN’s	  public	  communications,	  which	  are	  produced	  by	  the	  organisation’s	  international	  civil	  service	  staff;	  or	  from	  the	  wording	  of	  UN	  statutory	  provisions	  for	  engagement	  with	  NGOs.	  In	  reviewing	  a	  body	  of	  major	  reports	  and	  speeches	  published	  by	  the	  UN	  secretariats,	  including	  those	  by	  recent	  holders	  of	  the	  post	  of	  Secretary-­‐General,	  this	  study	  found	  it	  rare	  for	  the	  positive	  contributions	  of	  NGOs	  and/or	  ‘civil	  society’	  to	  the	  work	  of	  the	  UN	  not	  to	  be	  mentioned	  prominently	  and	  quite	  appreciatively.	  It	  was	  also	  noted	  that	  it	  was	  rare	  for	  the	  UN’s	  references	  to	  NGOs	  to	  be	  other	  than	  rosy-­‐hued.	  	  	  Nevertheless,	  allusions	  to	  serious	  divisions	  in	  the	  relationships	  are	  to	  be	  found	  in	  mining	  the	  discourses	  for	  telltale	  signs214.	  In	  setting	  up	  a	  panel	  of	  experts	  to	  investigate	  ways	  of	  improving	  the	  UN’s	  relations	  with	  civil	  society	  in	  2003,	  the	  then	  Secretary-­‐General,	  Kofi	  Annan,	  said	  (UN	  Sec-­‐Gen,	  2003):	  	   Improving	  the	   interaction	  between	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  the	  many	  diverse	  actors	   in	   civil	   society	   is	   an	   essential	   step	   towards	   reforming	   the	   United	  Nations.	  The	  goals	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  can	  only	  be	  achieved	  if	  civil	  society	  as	  well	  as	  Governments	  and	  international	  agencies	  are	  fully	  engaged.	  	  Reading	  between	  the	  lines	  there	  are	  implications	  that:	  1.	  UN	  reform	  is	  crucial	  	  (otherwise	  it	  cannot	  achieve	  its	  goals);	  2.	  Significant	  faults	  exist	  in	  the	  relationship	  with	  civil	  society	  (otherwise	  there	  would	  be	  no	  need	  to	  mention	  improvement);	  and,	  3.	  Improving	  and	  increasing	  (‘fuller’)	  engagement	  with	  civil	  society	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  UN	  reform	  process.	  Endorsing	  this	  sentiment,	  a	  Coordinator	  of	  the	  UN	  Non-­‐Government	  Liaison	  Service	  (NGLS)	  stated	  that	  the	  world’s	  global	  governance	  architecture	  is	  ‘in	  crisis’	  but	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  developing	  rapidly	  —	  a	  process	  in	  which	  civil	  society	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  ‘vital	  driver	  of	  change	  and	  the	  democratisation	  of	  global	  decision-­‐making’	  (Hill,	  2007).	  	  	  Unsurprisingly,	  in	  reviewing	  UN/NGO	  relationship	  discourses	  (from	  non-­‐official	  UN	  observers)	  it	  is	  commonplace	  to	  find	  references	  to	  ‘obstacles’,	  ‘barriers’,	  ‘ups-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214	  See	  Section	  5.3.1	  for	  an	  unusually	  candid	  example	  of	  disagreements.	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and-­‐downs’,	  ‘opposition’,	  ‘tensions’,	  even	  ‘hostility’215.	  Overall,	  I	  consider	  the	  current	  relationship	  between	  international	  state	  and	  civil	  society	  actors	  might	  best	  be	  described	  as	  ideologically	  messy,	  unequal	  in	  powers	  and	  resources,	  spasmodic	  in	  development	  and	  inherently	  difficult	  —	  most	  notably,	  fraught	  with	  mutual	  suspicion,	  defensiveness	  and	  reluctance	  to	  compromise.	  Despite	  more	  frequent	  official	  usage	  of	  inclusive	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘partnerships’	  and	  ‘multi-­‐stakeholder	  governance’	  to	  refer	  to	  relatively	  recent	  cooperative	  projects	  with	  NGOs	  in	  the	  UN	  system,	  relationships	  with	  non-­‐state	  actors	  might	  be	  more	  accurately	  depicted	  as	  a	  sphere	  of	  non-­‐state	  entities	  operating	  on	  the	  fringes	  of	  policy-­‐making	  and	  debate,	  as	  supportive	  adjuncts	  to	  states.	  Although	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  historical	  tensions	  between	  states	  and	  NGOs	  have	  been	  slowly	  dissipating	  and	  that	  the	  UN’s	  world	  conference	  processes	  have	  ameliorated	  many	  states’	  fears,	  Member	  States	  generally	  remain	  defensive	  regarding	  challenges	  to	  their	  sovereignty,	  especially	  to	  any	  intimation	  that	  they	  should	  be	  accountable	  to	  international	  civil	  society	  (Otto,	  1999).	  	  	  	  
The	  ‘Third	  UN’	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215	  See	  Adams	  (1996);	  Zettler	  (2009);	  and	  Otto	  (1999),	  for	  additional	  testimony	  to	  this	  trend.	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  among	  the	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  United	  Nations	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
Figure	  5.2	  
Graphic	  reproduced	  from	  Weiss,	  Carayannis	  and	  Jolly	  (2009)	  
	  
5.2.1	  Taxonomical	  Challenges:	  What	  is	  an	  NGO	  in	  UN	  terms?	  	  Before	  looking	  at	  the	  interactivity	  of	  the	  three	  notional	  UNs	  and	  the	  mechanics	  of	  how	  the	  UN	  ‘makes	  suitable	  arrangements	  for	  consultation’	  with	  NGOs	  (Article	  71	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter),	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  determine	  which	  organisations	  the	  UN	  regards	  as	  NGOs.	  The	  definitions	  of	  ‘Member	  States’	  and	  ‘UN	  secretariats’	  are	  relatively	  straightforward.	  Apart	  from	  the	  general	  agreement	  that	  NGOs	  are,	  by	  definition,	  independent	  of	  governments	  and	  are	  not	  profit-­‐making	  or	  engaged	  in	  commercial	  activities,	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  specification	  of	  what	  constitutes	  a	  NGO	  in	  the	  UN	  context	  (this	  claim	  is	  supported,	  inter	  alia,	  by	  Otto,	  1999;	  Willetts,	  2003;	  2011:9-­‐10;	  and	  Costoya,	  2007).	  While	  the	  term	  ‘non-­‐governmental	  organisation’	  and	  the	  initials	  NGO	  first	  appeared	  in	  the	  UN	  Charter,	  they	  were	  left	  undefined.	  Even	  today,	  the	  general	  practice	  within	  the	  United	  Nations	  is	  to	  refer	  to	  civil	  society	  organisations	  using	  broad	  umbrella	  terminology	  —	  such	  as	  ‘civil	  society	  organization	  (CSO)’,	  ‘NGO’	  and	  ‘INGO’	  —	  which	  encompass,	  but	  inadequately	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differentiate,	  the	  specific	  agency	  of	  the	  various	  forms	  of	  NGO.	  Indeed,	  of	  NGOs	  overall,	  a	  former	  UN	  Secretary-­‐General,	  Boutros	  Boutros-­‐Ghali	  said:216	  
	  We	   are	   aware	   of	   what	   some	   nongovernmental	   organizations	   do	   in	   social,	  cultural	  and	  humanitarian	  fields,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  work	  to	  protect	  human	  rights	  and	   to	   promote	   development.	   But	   we	   do	   not	   often	   have	   occasion	   to	   think	  about	  what	   these	   organizations	   can	   do	   for	   international	   peace	   and	   security.	  And	   we	   too	   rarely	   think	   about	   the	   taxonomy	   of	   linkages	   —	   formal	   and	  informal,	  in	  education,	  advocacy	  and	  operations	  —	  between	  NGOs	  and	  the	  UN	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Where	  a	  distinction	  is	  made	  for	  International	  NGOs	  (INGOs),	  they	  are	  seen	  as	  a	  sub-­‐category	  of	  NGO.	  Following	  this	  genealogical	  tree,	  this	  thesis	  posits	  that	  TANs	  are	  a	  subset	  of	  INGO.	  It	  is	  one	  of	  the	  central	  arguments	  of	  this	  thesis	  that	  such	  taxonomical	  differentiation	  is	  crucial	  to	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  the	  UN	  system.	  This	  thesis	  suggests	  that	  the	  UN	  regards	  TANS	  as	  NGOs,	  or	  part	  of	  ‘civil	  society’217,	  but	  that	  these	  assertive	  contemporary	  networks	  are	  co-­‐evolving	  in	  response	  to	  constantly	  changing	  conditions	  in	  their	  environments	  and	  do	  not	  fit	  the	  ideal	  model	  of	  the	  traditional	  NGO	  depicted	  in	  UN	  official	  communications218.	  	  	  Up	  until	  the	  1990s,	  this	  traditional	  model	  was	  presumed	  to	  be	  an	  operational,	  or	  service-­‐providing,	  organisation	  running	  its	  own	  projects	  or	  interacting	  with	  UN	  operational	  bodies	  in	  the	  ‘field’,	  and	  concerned	  with	  development,	  humanitarian	  work,	  human	  rights	  or	  the	  environment219.	  The	  provision	  in	  the	  UN	  Chapter	  for	  consulting	  with	  NGOs	  (Article	  71),	  dating	  from	  1945	  and	  unchanged	  since	  then,	  strongly	  implies	  that	  NGOs	  may	  be	  singled	  out	  for	  formal	  discussion	  if	  they	  can	  be	  helpful	  in	  matters	  with	  which	  the	  UN	  is	  concerned.	  The	  reference220	  that	  the	  ECOSOC	  	  ‘may	  make’	  such	  suitable	  arrangements	  with	  NGOs	  as	  it	  deems	  fitting,	  unequivocally	  makes	  the	  point	  that	  judgments	  on	  the	  suitability	  of	  the	  NGOs,	  the	  form	  and	  extent	  of	  any	  consultation,	  and	  ‘the	  matters’	  themselves,	  rest	  entirely	  at	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  UN.	  It	  also	  accords	  with	  Donnelly’s	  opinion	  that	  states	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216	  Cited	  in	  Weiss	  and	  Gordenker,	  1996:8.	  
217	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  (1998:33),	  specifically	  contend	  that	  the	  advocacy	  network	  concept	  is	  a	  variant	  and	  
cannot	  be	  subsumed	  under	  notions	  of	  ‘transnational	  social	  movements’	  or	  ‘global	  civil	  society’.	  
218	  See	  Fisher	  (1997)	  for	  additional	  insights	  on	  the	  dynamic	  conditions	  shaping	  emerging	  forms	  of	  NGO.	  
219	  This	  view	  is	  shared	  by	  Martens	  (2006)	  and	  Fisher	  (1997)	  et	  al.	  	  
220	  Article	  71:	  ‘The	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Council	  may	  make	  suitable	  arrangements	  for	  consultation	  with	  
non-­‐governmental	  organizations	  which	  are	  concerned	  with	  matters	  within	  its	  competence’.	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‘superordinate’	  and	  NGOs	  are	  ‘subordinate’	  in	  these	  relationships	  (Donnelly,	  2006).	  From	  this,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  envisage	  a	  cooperative	  consultancy	  role	  for	  transnational	  ‘advocacy’	  NGOs	  that	  exist	  solely	  to	  lobby	  for	  international	  policy	  change	  —	  more	  in	  the	  style	  of	  global	  political	  parties.	  	  
	  In	  these	  changed	  circumstances,	  the	  UN’s	  official	  lumping	  together	  of	  non-­‐government	  actors	  under	  broad	  banners	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  assist	  clarification	  for	  observers	  both	  outside	  and	  inside	  the	  UN	  system,	  since	  it	  is	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  following	  chapters	  that	  such	  distinctions	  are	  made	  in	  practice.	  For	  many	  people,	  to	  define	  a	  NGO	  is	  equivalent	  to	  stating	  a	  political	  position,	  which	  may	  involve	  pejorative	  inferences.	  Consequently,	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  hypothesise	  that	  reluctance	  to	  more	  accurately	  sub-­‐categorise	  NGOs	  may	  be	  due	  as	  much	  to	  difficulty,	  as	  to	  deliberate	  diplomatic	  practice.	  Because	  the	  UN	  does	  not	  make	  this	  distinction,	  references	  to	  NGOs	  and	  INGOs,	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  UN	  (which	  are	  explored	  in	  the	  following	  sub-­‐sections),	  should	  be	  taken	  as	  applying	  also	  to	  TANs,	  unless	  otherwise	  noted.	  In	  other	  words,	  all	  TANs	  are	  phyla	  of	  NGOs,	  so	  UN	  references	  to	  NGOs	  include	  them	  by	  implication.	  
5.3	  Milestones	  in	  the	  UN/NGO	  relationship	  	  By	  establishing	  a	  system	  of	  consultative	  status,	  under	  its	  Charter,	  the	  UN	  provided	  a	  permanent	  opportunity	  for	  NGOs	  to	  promote	  their	  values	  at	  the	  global	  level.	  However,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  opportunity	  has	  been	  consistently	  enabled	  in	  the	  UN	  system,	  or	  availed	  of	  by	  NGOs,	  has	  varied	  throughout	  the	  years.	  
5.3.1	  Three	  Generations	  of	  outreach	  to	  civil	  society	  	  In	  the	  official	  Guide221	  for	  NGO	  representatives	  participating	  in	  the	  UN	  system,	  the	  Coordinator	  of	  the	  UN’s	  Non-­‐Governmental	  Liaison	  Service,	  Tony	  Hill,	  chronicles	  ‘three	  generations’	  of	  UN-­‐civil	  society	  relations	  since	  1945	  (Hill,	  2007222).	  The	  first	  generation,	  extending	  up	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  the	  late	  1980s,	  involved	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221	  UN-­‐NGLS	  (2007).	  
222	  Hill	  is	  cited	  in	  his	  personal	  capacity	  although	  his	  remarks	  are	  published	  in	  an	  official	  UN	  publication.	  It	  
is	  a	  widespread	  practice	  for	  the	  UN	  to	  add	  a	  disclaimer	  that	  the	  views	  expressed	  in	  its	  publications	  and	  
Websites	  do	  not	  necessarily	  represent	  those	  of	  a	  particular	  service,	  agency,	  or	  any	  other	  part	  of	  the	  UN	  
system.	  However,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  envisage	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  UN	  Members	  of	  secretariats	  would	  
permit	  the	  publication	  of	  material	  that	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  contentious,	  or	  with	  which	  officials	  
disagreed.	  Materials	  cited	  in	  this	  study	  that	  fit	  into	  this	  category	  (from	  UN	  official	  sources),	  include	  
those	  by	  Bendell,	  Boström,	  Costoya,	  Hill,	  Pianta,	  Sidhu,	  and	  Zettler.	  	  
	   145	  
mostly	  international	  NGOs,	  including	  professional	  and	  business	  associations,	  which	  were	  granted	  formal	  consultative	  relations	  with	  the	  UN	  in	  recognition	  of	  their	  international	  standing.	  It	  is	  for	  this	  first	  generation	  model	  of	  non-­‐government	  organisation	  that	  the	  UN	  Charter	  provision	  was	  designed,	  since	  the	  evolution	  of	  today’s	  multi-­‐faceted,	  international	  civil	  society	  was	  far	  beyond	  imagination	  at	  that	  time.	  It	  will	  be	  demonstrated	  later	  on	  that	  both	  this	  original	  presumption	  of	  a	  simplistic,	  supportive,	  NGO-­‐as-­‐a-­‐resource	  model,	  and	  the	  UN’s	  constitutional	  provision	  for	  engagement	  with	  its	  manifestations,	  have	  proven	  steadfastly	  resistant	  to	  change	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  statute	  modification	  and	  Member	  perceptions.	  	  The	  second	  generation	  of	  UN-­‐NGO	  relations	  began	  where	  the	  Cold	  War	  ended	  and	  covered	  the	  period	  up	  to	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  new	  millennium.	  This	  era	  saw	  an	  explosive	  growth	  in	  NGO	  presence	  across	  the	  entire	  UN	  system	  and	  relationships	  changed	  both	  quantitatively	  and	  qualitatively.	  Above	  all,	  the	  second	  generation	  of	  UN-­‐NGO	  relations	  were	  essentially	  political	  and	  reflected	  the	  motivation	  of	  NGOs	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  UN	  as	  part	  of	  the	  institutional	  architecture	  of	  global	  governance	  (Hill,	  ibid).	  	  In	  the	  first	  few	  years	  of	  the	  new	  millennium,	  a	  ‘third	  generation’	  began	  to	  take	  shape.	  Its	  distinctive	  features	  involved	  ‘like-­‐minded’	  coalitions	  of	  governments	  and	  civil	  society,	  and	  various	  forms	  of	  multi-­‐stakeholder,	  public-­‐private,	  public	  policy	  networks	  and	  partnerships,	  such	  as	  the	  Global	  Compact.223	  Hill	  asserts:	  	  These	  new	   forms	  of	  partnership	  relations	  currently	  co-­‐exist	  with	   the	  second	  generation	  political	  and	  advocacy	  role	  of	  civil	  society	  and	  raise	  many	  critical	  questions	  concerning	  the	  role	  of	  the	  UN	  as	  a	  broker	  of	  partnerships,	  the	  future	  of	  multilateralism	  as	  a	   form	  of	   global	   governance	  and	   the	   future	  of	   the	  UN’s	  relations	  with	  the	  second	  generation	  of	  largely	  advocacy	  NGOs,	  many	  of	  whom	  view	  these	  latest	  developments	  with	  scepticism,	  to	  say	  the	  least.	  	  	  The	  United	  Nations	  Global	  Compact	  project	  is	  certainly	  representative	  of	  this	  trend.	  Launched	  by	  the	  then	  UN	  Secretary-­‐General,	  Kofi	  Annan,	  at	  the	  World	  Economic	  Forum	  in	  Davos	  in	  1999,	  and	  promoted	  enthusiastically	  by	  the	  present	  Secretary-­‐General,	  Ban	  Ki-­‐moon,	  the	  Global	  Compact	  is	  a	  UN	  strategic	  policy	  initiative	  for	  bringing	  private	  sector	  business	  voices	  into	  the	  international	  policy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223	  A	  UN	  initiative,	  launched	  in	  1999,	  to	  bring	  business	  voices	  into	  its	  conversations	  (UN-­‐Global	  Compact,	  
2011).	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arena,	  promoting	  shared	  values	  and	  principles,	  and	  giving	  a	  human	  face	  to	  the	  global	  market	  (UN-­‐Global	  Compact,	  1999;	  2007).	  Now	  comprising	  over	  8,700224	  private	  sector	  companies	  in	  130	  countries,	  it	  represents	  a	  radical	  departure	  from	  UN	  orthodoxy:	  prompting	  criticisms	  from	  many	  countries	  in	  the	  South,	  and	  from	  some	  NGOs,	  that	  the	  UN	  has	  lost	  its	  soul	  and	  gone	  pro-­‐capitalist	  (UN-­‐Global	  Compact,	  2011;	  Weiss,	  2009:170).	  The	  question	  of	  which	  collectivities	  qualify	  as	  non-­‐governmental	  actors	  is,	  therefore,	  highly	  pertinent	  not	  only	  for	  this	  thesis,	  but	  for	  non-­‐state	  non-­‐commercial	  actors,	  since	  the	  UN	  recognises	  transnational	  corporations	  as	  NGO	  actors	  and	  the	  NGO	  lobby	  generally	  does	  not.	  	  The	  recent	  General	  Assembly	  conference	  on	  global	  governance	  reflected	  urgent	  concerns	  for	  reform	  in	  order	  to	  remain	  ‘relevant’	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  2011)	  —	  a	  sober	  reference	  to	  anxieties	  that	  globalisation	  is	  fuelling	  a	  debate	  about	  democratic	  remits	  and	  alternative	  models	  of	  governance	  at	  the	  global	  level	  to	  that	  of	  international	  institutions225.	  	  
5.3.2	  Making	  ‘suitable	  arrangements’:	  Key	  statutes	  	  The	  most	  visible	  building	  blocks	  of	  the	  ‘suitable	  arrangements’	  providing	  for	  the	  UN-­‐NGO	  relationship	  are	  the	  UN’s	  chartered	  mechanisms	  and	  key	  statutes	  for	  consulting	  NGOs,	  supported	  by	  a	  number	  of	  notable	  outreach	  initiatives	  by	  the	  UN	  to	  engage	  non-­‐state	  actors	  over	  the	  years.	  These	  documented	  procedures,	  outlined	  below,	  therefore	  provide	  acknowledged	  reference	  points	  and	  an	  historical	  framework	  for	  analysing	  UN/NGO	  relationships.	  Theoretical	  lenses	  can	  then	  be	  applied	  to	  open	  up	  a	  discussion	  on	  how	  well,	  or	  badly,	  these	  UN	  mechanisms	  operate,	  identifying	  points	  of	  compatibility	  and	  discord	  that	  have	  shaped	  the	  UN/NGO	  relationships	  as	  they	  stand	  today.	  For	  example,	  it	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  warning	  indicator	  of	  relationship	  quality	  that	  despite	  the	  thousands	  of	  NGOs	  now	  in	  accredited	  consultancy	  relationships	  with	  the	  United	  Nations,	  the	  UN	  last	  updated	  its	  rules	  for	  engagement	  with	  NGOs	  in	  1996226	  (and	  prior	  to	  that,	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224	  Statistics	  provided	  by	  the	  UN	  Global	  Compact	  official	  Website	  at	  
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html	  
225	  For	  example,	  the	  UN	  recognises	  the	  rejectionist	  tendencies	  of	  the	  global	  social	  justice	  movement,	  
which	  expresses	  itself	  through	  the	  World	  and	  Regional	  Social	  Forums,	  that	  have	  been	  held	  since	  the	  
historic	  Porto	  Allegre	  World	  Social	  Forum	  in	  2001	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  2007:141).	  
226	  Per	  UN-­‐ECOSOC	  Resolution,	  1996/31(1996).	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1968227).	  This	  does	  not	  readily	  indicate	  a	  healthy,	  adaptable,	  relationship	  that	  is	  highly	  tuned	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  the	  escalation	  of	  global	  challenges,	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  Internet,	  and	  new	  forms	  of	  interdependence	  and	  cooperation	  in	  the	  contemporary	  world.	  	  
	  
Opening	  the	  door	  —	  Article	  71	  As	  specified	  earlier,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  UN	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  is	  enabled	  under	  Article	  71	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Charter	  (UN	  Charter,	  1945a).	  While	  this	  mechanism	  may	  have	  seemed	  mutually	  advantageous,	  even	  progressive228,	  in	  its	  provisions	  for	  formalising	  consultation	  with	  non-­‐state	  groups	  on	  international	  matters	  in	  1945,	  it	  hardly	  seems	  so	  today.	  Yet,	  its	  tenets	  still	  drive	  the	  UN	  relationships	  with	  NGOs	  and	  policy	  in	  this	  field.	  The	  UN	  guidelines	  for	  NGOs	  working	  with	  ECOSOC	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2011c),	  reminds	  NGOs	  in	  its	  opening	  lines	  that	  Article	  71,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  enabling	  resolution	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  1996/31),	  form	  the	  bedrock	  of	  today’s	  NGO	  consultancy	  arrangements.	  	  	  Although	  Article	  71	  opened	  the	  door	  for	  NGOs,	  the	  scope	  for	  variable	  interpretation	  of	  the	  ambiguous	  terminology	  is	  obvious.	  One	  could	  question,	  for	  example,	  what	  constitutes	  ‘suitable	  arrangements’	  then,	  or	  now?	  What	  might	  be	  the	  form,	  scope,	  content	  and	  purpose	  of	  	  ‘consultation’?	  What	  should	  delimit	  ‘matters	  within	  its	  competence’?	  Should	  consultations	  with	  NGOs	  be	  confined	  only	  to	  matters	  covered	  by	  the	  ECOSOC?	  How	  should	  consultable	  organisations	  be	  defined	  if	  the	  only	  criterion	  is	  what	  they	  are	  not	  (i.e.	  not	  governmental)?	  How	  should	  any	  contributions	  by	  them	  be	  assessed?	  Must	  their	  contributions	  be	  limited	  only	  to	  ‘consultation’?	  Since	  ‘consultation’,	  in	  contemporary	  communications	  practice	  implies	  two-­‐way	  symmetrical	  dialogue	  and	  mutual	  responsibilities	  —	  such	  as	  listening	  and	  some	  degree	  of	  mutual	  benefit	  	  —	  is	  the	  ECOSOC	  process	  fit	  to	  operate	  in	  this	  way?	  (Grunig	  et	  al,	  2002:27;	  Nagy,	  2004:870;	  Doorley	  and	  Garcia,	  2009:	  14-­‐15;	  Miller,	  2005:12;	  Spicer,	  2006:27;	  Cutlip	  et	  al:2006).	  Furthermore,	  under	  what	  conditions,	  or	  circumstances,	  is	  it	  appropriate	  to	  resort	  to	  consultation	  with	  national	  NGOs,	  and	  what	  should	  be	  the	  repercussions	  if	  the	  relevant	  national	  government	  disapproves?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227	  Per	  UN-­‐ECOSOC	  Resolution,	  1968/1296	  (XLIV).	  
228	  Otto	  (1996),	  contends	  that	  Article	  71,	  in	  effect,	  eroded	  earlier	  practices	  in	  that	  it	  confined	  mandated	  
consultations	  to	  areas	  covered	  by	  the	  ECOSOC	  and	  by	  limiting	  NGO	  involvement	  to	  ‘consultation’.	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  Notwithstanding	  the	  UN’s	  principle	  of	  sovereign	  equality,	  this	  thesis	  concurs	  with	  opinion	  that	  the	  international	  society	  system	  is	  both	  stratified	  and	  functionally	  differentiated	  (Hobson	  and	  Sharman,	  2005;	  Donnelly,	  2006:204).	  Therefore,	  the	  perturbations	  inherent	  in	  the	  structural	  differences,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  suggest	  that	  both	  states	  and	  NGOs	  demonstrably	  cannot	  (under	  these	  arrangements)	  have	  equal	  possibility	  to	  participate	  in,	  or	  benefit	  from,	  the	  consultation	  process229;	  that	  attitudes	  and	  decision-­‐making	  will	  be	  relativist	  and,	  therefore,	  tension-­‐generating	  and/or	  controversial;	  and	  regional/national,	  geopolitical,	  cultural,	  ideological,	  technological,	  resource	  and	  capability	  differences	  will	  invariably	  trump	  efforts	  to	  advance	  planet-­‐wide	  projects.	  As	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  studies,	  the	  ideological	  framing	  of	  issues	  by	  civil	  society	  groups	  operating	  at	  the	  transnational	  level,	  often	  infers	  universal,	  rather	  than	  relative,	  values	  and	  norms	  and	  clear-­‐cut,	  single-­‐thesis,	  solutions.	  By	  contrast	  the	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  UN	  are	  exercised	  primarily	  by	  their	  individual	  sovereign	  concerns	  (or	  sometimes,	  regional	  concerns),	  and	  dialectic	  that	  optimises	  the	  possibility	  of	  achieving	  their	  preferred	  outcomes.	  Therefore,	  this	  thesis	  regards	  it	  as	  axiomatic	  that	  because	  issue	  areas	  in	  world	  politics	  are	  context-­‐dependent,	  one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all	  prescriptions	  tend	  to	  ensure	  they	  become	  intractable230.	  	  The	  imprecision	  and	  implications	  of	  Article	  71	  are,	  therefore,	  highly	  pertinent	  to	  a	  modern	  world	  in	  which,	  inter	  alia,	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  political	  concern	  groups	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229	  In	  their	  seminal	  study	  of	  human	  communication,	  including	  processes	  of	  consultation	  by	  an	  
organisation	  with	  its	  activist	  pressure	  group	  stakeholders,	  Grunig,	  Grunig	  and	  Dozier	  questioned	  the	  
likelihood	  that	  a	  large	  organisation	  with	  more	  power	  than	  its	  publics	  would	  ever	  deliberately	  choose	  to	  
practice	  symmetrical	  public	  relations.	  Nonetheless,	  there	  is	  strong	  evidence	  that	  continuous	  
symmetrical	  dialogue	  is	  instrumental	  in	  the	  success	  of	  activists	  and	  organisations	  in	  dealing	  with	  each	  
other	  (Grunig	  et	  al,	  2002:462).	  
230	  Two	  recent	  examples	  of	  intractability	  in	  addressing	  global	  challenges	  and	  international	  responses	  can	  
be	  seen	  in	  (a)	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  2011	  UN	  Climate	  Change	  Conference	  in	  Durban;	  and	  (b)	  the	  2013	  UN	  
Arms	  Trade	  Treaty.	  The	  outcome	  document	  from	  the	  climate	  summit,	  the	  Durban	  Platform,	  has	  been	  
hailed	  as	  a	  breakthrough	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Special	  Envoy	  for	  Climate	  Change,	  Todd	  Stern,	  because	  for	  the	  first	  
time	  the	  new	  international	  climate	  agreement	  has	  been	  designed	  to	  be	  broadly	  inclusive	  of	  all	  nations	  
and	  sensitive	  to	  relativist	  national	  concerns	  and	  realistic	  capabilities.	  Expressing	  optimism,	  Stern	  said	  the	  
blueprint	  proposes,	  inter	  alia,	  individuated	  responses	  that	  are	  customised	  to	  national	  circumstances	  and	  
capabilities	  (Stern,	  2013).	  In	  contrast,	  and	  following	  a	  decade	  of	  talks,	  the	  UN	  introduced	  an	  Arms	  Trade	  
Treaty,	  in	  April	  2013,	  which	  requires	  parties	  to	  adhere	  to	  a	  universal	  code.	  The	  Treaty,	  which	  remains	  to	  
be	  signed	  and	  ratified,	  is	  widely	  regarded	  as	  toothless	  and	  ’littered	  with	  loopholes’,	  because	  in	  order	  to	  
finally	  pass	  through	  the	  General	  Assembly	  the	  draft	  text	  was	  significantly	  weakened	  by	  numerous	  
concessions	  and	  a	  substantial	  group	  of	  major	  countries	  do	  not	  support	  it	  (see	  OI	  news,	  2013b).	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now	  organise	  themselves	  transnationally,	  without	  allegiance	  to	  any	  state,	  to	  lobby	  the	  international	  fora	  on	  global	  issues	  of	  their	  choosing.	  	  	  
Matters	  within	  ECOSOC	  competence	  	  In	  May	  1968,	  the	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Council	  passed	  a	  resolution	  (ECOSOC	  Resolution	  1296	  (XLIV)231	  clarifying,	  inter	  alia,	  the	  arrangements	  for	  consultations	  with	  NGOs,	  the	  basics	  of	  which	  are	  unchanged	  today	  (albeit	  updated	  in	  1996)	  and	  are	  outlined	  in	  the	  following	  sub-­‐section.	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  the	  1968	  statute	  elaborated	  on	  the	  organisational	  characteristics	  required	  by	  the	  UN	  for	  NGOs	  who	  wished	  to	  be	  accredited	  under	  the	  consultation	  terms	  of	  Article	  71,	  and	  listed	  the	  matters	  within	  the	  competence	  of	  ECOSOC,	  namely,	  ‘international	  economic,	  social,	  cultural,	  educational,	  health,	  scientific,	  technological	  and	  related	  matters	  and	  to	  questions	  of	  human	  rights’.	  
	  
Opening	  the	  NGO	  consultation	  door	  a	  little	  wider	  The	  provisions	  of	  the	  1968	  Resolution	  1296	  (XLIV)	  remained	  in	  force	  and	  were	  apparently	  considered	  to	  be	  adequate232	  for	  some	  25	  years,	  until	  pressures	  to	  update	  them	  led	  to	  the	  commencement	  of	  a	  review	  in	  1993	  and	  an	  updated	  resolution	  in	  1996	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  1996/31).	  The	  1996	  update	  was	  considered	  necessary,	  inter	  alia,	  to:	  take	  into	  account	  the	  full	  diversity	  of	  NGOs	  at	  the	  national,	  regional	  and	  international	  levels;	  acknowledge	  the	  breadth	  of	  NGO	  expertise	  and	  capacity	  to	  support	  the	  work	  of	  the	  UN;	  and	  to	  take	  account	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  NGO	  sector,	  ‘including	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  national	  and	  regional	  organizations’	  (ibid).	  A	  major	  reform	  initiative	  —	  known	  colloquially	  as	  the	  ‘Cardoso	  Report’	  (UN	  Report,	  2004a)	  —	  launched	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  the	  then	  Secretary-­‐General,	  Kofi	  Annan,	  in	  2003,	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  any	  substantive	  changes	  in	  the	  UN’s	  arrangements	  for	  NGO	  consultation.	  This	  intensive	  effort	  to	  overhaul	  the	  consultative	  arrangements	  for	  NGOs	  is	  examined	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  Section	  5.3.5.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231	  See	  UN-­‐ECOSOC	  (1968a).	  
232	  This	  impression	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  pressure	  to	  update	  them	  for	  some	  25	  
years,	  when	  the	  review	  for	  update	  commenced	  (ECOSOC	  Resolution	  1993/80	  of	  30	  July	  1993),	  
culminating	  with	  ECOSOC	  Resolution	  1996/31.	  The	  records	  of	  one	  NGO	  active	  at	  that	  time	  also	  reveal	  
that	  they	  were	  considered	  by	  NGOs	  to	  have	  been	  adequate	  to	  regulate	  the	  arrangements	  but	  needed	  
updating	  to	  reflect	  present	  realities	  (BIC,	  1994).	  	  
	   150	  
On	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  the	  procedure	  for	  achieving	  consultation	  status	  is	  straightforward:	  its	  requirements	  are	  readily	  stipulated	  on	  the	  UN	  Economic	  and	  Security	  Council	  Website	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2011A),	  which	  links	  to	  the	  full	  provisions	  of	  the	  prevailing	  statute	  (ECOSOC	  Resolution	  1996/31).	  This	  data	  explains	  that	  consultative	  status	  for	  NGOs	  is	  granted	  by	  the	  ECOSOC	  upon	  recommendation	  by	  the	  ECOSOC	  Committee	  on	  NGOs,	  comprising	  19	  Member	  States.	  There	  are	  three	  categories	  of	  NGO	  accreditation	  status:	  General,	  Special,	  and	  Roster	  status.	  Currently,233	  there	  are	  147	  organisations	  accredited	  with	  General	  status,	  2,774	  with	  Special	  Status,	  979	  with	  Roster	  status,	  and	  157	  with	  their	  accreditation	  suspended.	  The	  official	  line	  is	  that	  practical	  differences	  between	  the	  three	  categories	  are	  small	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2011a).	  	  General	  consultative	  status	  is	  reserved	  for	  large	  international	  NGOs	  whose	  area	  of	  work	  covers	  most	  of	  the	  issues	  on	  the	  agenda	  of	  ECOSOC	  and	  its	  subsidiary	  bodies.	  These	  tend	  to	  be	  fairly	  large,	  established	  international	  NGOs	  with	  ‘considerable’	  membership	  and	  a	  broad	  geographical	  reach.	  Special	  consultative	  status	  is	  granted	  to	  NGOs	  that	  have	  a	  special	  competence	  in,	  and	  are	  concerned	  specifically	  with,	  only	  a	  few	  of	  the	  fields	  of	  activity	  covered	  by	  the	  ECOSOC.	  These	  tend	  to	  be	  the	  smaller	  and	  more	  recently	  established	  NGOs	  that	  ECOSOC,	  or	  the	  UN	  Secretary-­‐General,	  considers	  can	  make	  ‘occasional	  and	  useful	  contributions	  to	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Council	  or	  its	  subsidiary	  bodies’.	  Organisations	  that	  do	  not	  fit	  into	  either	  of	  the	  other	  categories	  are	  usually	  included	  in	  the	  Roster.	  These	  tend	  to	  have	  a	  rather	  narrow	  and/or	  technical	  focus.	  NGOs	  that	  have	  formal	  status	  with	  other	  UN	  bodies,	  or	  specialised	  agencies	  (FAO,	  ILO,	  UNCTAD,	  UNESCO,	  UNIDO,	  WHO,	  and	  others),	  can	  also	  be	  included	  on	  the	  ECOSOC	  Roster.	  	  	  While	  the	  official	  publicity	  for	  accreditation	  is	  welcoming	  and	  friendly	  (vide	  UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2011a),	  the	  need	  for	  greater	  clarity	  begs	  for	  investigation	  and	  overhaul,	  according	  to	  the	  Cardoso	  Panel	  of	  Experts	  (UN	  Report,	  2004a),	  which	  investigated	  the	  UN-­‐NGO	  relationship,	  between	  2003	  and	  2004.	  Some	  10	  years	  later	  this	  is	  unchanged.	  Zettler	  (2009),	  who	  observed	  the	  NGO	  accreditation	  scheme	  as	  an	  academic	  intern	  at	  the	  UN,	  endorses	  the	  Panel’s	  claims	  that	  consultancy	  status	  involves	  a	  complicated	  accreditation	  process.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  ‘extensive	  process’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233	  Last	  published	  data	  as	  of	  September	  2013	  	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2013).	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can	  take	  years	  to	  complete,	  due	  to	  the	  limited	  resources	  of	  the	  ECOSOC	  NGO	  Branch	  and	  the	  politics	  that	  inevitably	  arise	  among	  Member	  States,	  when	  discussing	  which	  NGOs	  should	  be	  accepted,	  or	  rejected	  (ibid).	  	  Each	  of	  the	  above	  factors	  was	  highlighted	  in	  the	  Cardoso	  Panel’s	  call	  for	  reform	  (UN	  Report,	  ibid)	  and	  also	  by	  Martens	  (2004)	  and	  Boström	  (2011),	  who	  claim	  the	  NGO	  Committee,	  while	  formally	  a	  technical	  committee,	  can	  be	  a	  stumbling	  block	  for	  NGOs	  and	  is	  noted	  for	  frequently	  becoming	  the	  stage	  for	  debate	  on	  political	  issues	  and	  being	  used	  as	  an	  instrument	  for	  delay.	  	  	  	  In	  a	  sub-­‐section	  of	  the	  Cardoso	  Report	  (UN	  Report:	  ibid	  :20)	  specifically	  entitled	  ‘Streamlining	  and	  depoliticizing	  accreditation	  and	  access’,	  the	  review	  panel	  called	  on	  the	  UN	  to	  ‘realign	  accreditation	  with	  its	  original	  purpose,	  namely,	  it	  should	  be	  an	  agreement	  between	  civil	  society	  actors	  and	  Member	  States	  based	  on	  the	  applicants’	  expertise,	  competence	  and	  skills’.	  Because	  its	  membership	  reflects	  the	  UN’s	  membership	  as	  a	  whole,	  the	  UN	  ECOSOC	  NGO	  Committee	  will	  always	  have	  a	  majority	  from	  developing	  countries,	  which	  raises	  the	  possibility	  of	  bias	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  developing	  countries’	  issues	  and	  concerns.	  China	  and	  Chile,	  for	  example,	  have	  held	  on	  to	  their	  places	  on	  the	  Committee	  for	  decades	  and	  have	  successfully	  blocked	  the	  applications	  of	  anti-­‐Chinese	  and	  anti-­‐Cuban	  NGOs	  (Boström,	  ibid).	  Financially	  too,	  it	  is	  expensive,	  costing	  an	  estimated	  US$26,000	  per	  accredited	  applicant,	  notwithstanding	  that	  the	  NGO	  could	  still	  be	  denied	  accreditation	  based	  on	  political,	  rather	  than	  technical,	  reasons	  (UN	  Report,	  ibid;	  Zettler234,	  ibid).	  If	  a	  case	  fails	  to	  make	  it	  through	  the	  mechanism	  smoothly	  the	  cost	  can	  be	  a	  significant	  barrier	  for	  an	  NGO.	  Although	  some	  20	  applications	  a	  year	  are	  deferred	  (some	  by	  as	  much	  as	  two	  or	  three	  years),	  on	  average	  only	  four	  applications	  per	  year	  are	  declined	  (UN	  Report,	  ibid).	  The	  Cardoso	  Report	  asserted	  that:	  ‘Given	  that	  the	  main	  purpose	  of	  the	  process,	  in	  practice,	  is	  to	  determine	  which	  applicants	  are	  unsuitable,	  the	  true	  cost	  of	  the	  current	  mechanism	  amounts	  to	  nearly	  $1	  million	  per	  rejection’.	  	  The	  question	  of	  which	  NGOs	  might	  successfully	  negotiate	  this	  obstacle	  course	  is	  clearly	  open	  to	  dispute.	  The	  ECOSOC	  Website	  claims	  that,	  in	  most	  cases,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234	  Zettler	  estimates	  the	  cost	  is	  slightly	  lower	  at	  US$24,000	  (Zettler,	  2009).	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Council	  decides	  to	  approve	  the	  recommendations	  and	  in	  only	  very	  rare	  cases,	  it	  does	  not.	  It	  does	  seem,	  however,	  that	  there	  is	  some	  room	  for	  interpretation	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  success	  rate:	  annually	  some	  400	  organisations	  apply	  for	  consultative	  status.	  On	  average,	  between	  100	  and	  150	  applications	  are	  recommended	  by	  the	  Committee	  in	  each	  of	  its	  two	  sessions	  per	  year	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2011a).	  This	  does	  not,	  I	  submit,	  indicate	  a	  high	  success	  rate.	  According	  to	  Willetts	  (2011:19)	  the	  current	  state-­‐of-­‐play	  is	  that	  the	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Council	  will	  give	  access	  to	  the	  consultative	  arrangements	  to	  ‘almost	  all	  organizations	  that	  are	  non-­‐violent,	  non-­‐criminal	  and	  non-­‐commercial’.	  Kennedy	  (2006:218),	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  disagrees,	  saying	  many	  applications	  for	  accreditation	  are	  turned	  down.	  From	  this,	  I	  argue	  that	  such	  discrepancies	  in	  texts	  by	  these	  UN	  scholars	  indicate	  that	  what	  we	  are	  looking	  at	  is	  a	  complex,	  dynamic,	  system	  in	  which	  conditions	  are	  unstable	  and	  constantly	  in	  flux.	  
5.3.3	  Who	  is	  eligible?	  	  	  To	  become	  accredited	  for	  consultancy	  status	  with	  ECOSOC,	  NGOs	  must	  meet	  the	  following	  conditions	  set	  out	  in	  the	  ECOSOC	  resolutions	  —	  1296	  (XLIV)235	  of	  1968	  and	  1996/31	  of	  1996236	  —	  and	  in	  the	  Guide	  to	  consultative	  status	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2011c).	  An	  NGO	  must:	  	  
• Work	  in	  a	  field	  that	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  work	  of	  the	  ECOSOC;	  
• Have	  aims	  and	  purposes	  that	  conform	  to	  the	  spirit,	  purposes	  and	  principles	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter.	  Furthermore,	  it	  should	  undertake	  to	  support	  the	  work	  of	  the	  UN	  and	  promote	  knowledge	  of	  its	  principles	  and	  activities;	  
• Not	  engage	  in	  a	  politically	  motivated	  act	  against	  a	  Member	  State,	  or	  promote	  activities	  that	  are	  against	  the	  UN	  Charter;	  
• Should	  be	  a	  representative	  body,	  with	  identifiable	  headquarters	  and	  an	  executive	  officer.	  It	  should	  have	  a	  transparent	  and	  democratic	  decision-­‐making	  mechanism	  and	  a	  democratically	  adopted	  constitution;	  
• Have	  authority	  to	  speak	  for	  its	  members;	  
• Have	  appropriate	  mechanisms	  for	  accountability;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235	  UN-­‐ECOSOC	  (1968a).	  
236	  UN-­‐ECOSOC	  (1996).	  These	  are	  the	  principal	  statutes	  regulating	  the	  contemporary	  relationship	  with	  
NGOs.	  Earlier	  resolutions	  were	  consolidated	  in	  a	  statute	  (ECOSOC	  Resolution	  288	  B	  (X)	  of	  27	  February,	  
1950,	  and	  these	  were	  superceded	  by	  the	  1968	  ECOSOC	  Resolution	  1296	  (XLIV)	  of	  23	  May,	  1968	  (UN-­‐
ECOSOC,	  1968a).	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• Be	  funded	  mainly	  by	  its	  members	  and	  provide	  the	  Committee	  with	  its	  financial	  documentation	  and	  reports;	  
• Cannot	  be	  a	  profit-­‐making	  body.	  Individual	  companies	  cannot	  gain	  consultative	  status,	  but	  trade	  federations	  and	  commercial	  interests	  are	  recognised	  as	  NGOs;	  
• Cannot	  use	  or	  advocate	  violence;	  
• Respect	  the	  norm	  of	  ‘non-­‐interference	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  states’.	  This	  means	  an	  NGO	  cannot	  be	  a	  political	  party,	  but	  parties	  can,	  like	  companies,	  form	  international	  federations.	  NGOs	  concerned	  with	  human	  rights	  should	  not	  restrict	  their	  activities	  to	  a	  particular	  group,	  nationality	  or	  country;	  
• Cannot	  be	  an	  intergovernmental	  organization;	  
• Have	  been	  in	  existence	  for	  at	  least	  two	  years	  before	  applying;	  	  Because	  many	  of	  these	  terms,	  such	  as	  	  ‘politically	  motivated	  act’,	  ‘violence’237,	  ‘non-­‐interference’,	  and	  ‘commercial’	  activity	  are	  contested	  concepts,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  ECOSOC	  accreditation	  arrangements	  have	  a	  certain	  arbitrariness	  about	  them.	  For	  example,	  there	  is	  no	  formal	  barrier	  to	  gay,	  lesbian	  bisexual	  or	  transgender	  organisations,	  although	  none	  has	  achieved	  consultation	  status	  throughout	  the	  organisation’s	  history	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2011d).	  	  	  It	  is	  certainly	  open	  to	  question	  whether	  the	  NGO	  statute	  does,	  or	  does	  not,	  provide	  the	  main	  framework	  for	  deciding	  which	  NGOs	  should,	  or	  should	  not,	  be	  granted	  consultative	  status	  (Willetts,	  2011a:61).	  In	  a	  recent	  study	  of	  controversial	  issues	  and	  conflict	  patterns	  in	  the	  ECOSOC	  Committee	  on	  NGOS	  (Boström,	  2011),	  the	  following	  were	  listed	  as	  recurrent	  controversial	  topics	  in	  the	  Committee’s	  formal	  sessions	  between	  2008	  and	  2010:	  separatism;	  terrorism;	  lesbian,	  gay,	  bisexual	  and	  transgender	  (LGBT)	  rights;	  freedom	  of	  expression;	  and	  human	  rights.	  Of	  course,	  many	  of	  these	  issues	  overlap:	  LGBT	  rights	  are	  also	  human	  rights,	  and	  one	  country’s	  terrorist	  may	  also	  be	  another	  country’s	  separatist.	  The	  principle	  that	  existing	  borders	  are	  not	  to	  be	  moved	  is	  very	  strong	  in	  the	  UN,	  which	  means	  that	  accusing	  an	  NGO	  of	  separatism	  is	  a	  quite	  powerful	  argument	  against	  it	  gaining	  consultative	  status,	  or	  for	  suspending	  or	  withdrawing	  its	  status	  if	  it	  has	  already	  obtained	  it	  (ibid).	  Statutory	  backing	  for	  opposing	  NGO	  eligibility	  on	  these	  grounds	  comes	  from	  
Article	  2	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter	  (UN	  Charter,	  1945b),	  which	  emphasises	  sovereign	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237	  	  See	  Galtung	  (1969)	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  difficulties	  faced	  in	  defining	  ‘violence’.	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equality	  of	  Member	  states	  and	  territorial	  integrity,	  combined	  with	  ECOSOC	  Resolution	  1996/31	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  1996	  and	  bullet	  point	  two,	  above),	  which	  specifies	  that	  the	  aims	  and	  purposes	  of	  an	  organisation	  in	  consultative	  status	  must	  be	  ‘in	  conformity	  with	  the	  spirit,	  purposes	  and	  principles	  of	  the	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations’.	  Furthermore,	  it	  has	  been	  noted	  (Boström,	  2011)	  that	  independent	  human	  rights	  organisations	  that	  criticise	  Member	  States	  have	  difficulties	  in	  gaining	  consultative	  status	  and	  holding	  on	  to	  it.	  	  	  From	  these	  contradictions	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  some	  NGOs,	  particularly	  those	  that	  have	  the	  characteristics	  of	  TANs,	  are	  distinctly	  disadvantaged	  under	  the	  present	  accreditation	  rules,	  even	  before	  questions	  of	  subjectivity	  are	  raised.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  records	  of	  the	  NGO	  Committee	  decision-­‐making	  and	  reports	  by	  others	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2011d;	  Boström,	  2011)	  there	  is	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  attitudes	  of	  the	  Committee	  members	  are	  based	  more	  on	  principles	  and	  political	  positions	  than	  on	  judgments	  of	  individual	  NGOs.	  Due	  to	  brevity	  constraints	  for	  this	  dissertation	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  discuss	  all	  of	  these	  implications	  for	  TANs,	  however	  after	  applying	  the	  UN	  accreditation	  criteria	  to	  the	  data	  set,	  I	  prepared	  an	  indicative	  list	  of	  challenges	  likely	  to	  be	  faced	  by	  TANs.	  This	  is	  attached	  at	  Annex	  4.	  	  According	  to	  Willetts	  (ibid:	  62),	  the	  most	  important	  variables	  in	  determining	  the	  rights	  of	  NGOs	  within	  the	  UN	  system	  are	  not	  the	  formal	  rules	  at	  all,	  but	  the	  status,	  expertise,	  communications	  skills	  and	  trust	  established	  between	  NGO	  representatives	  and	  government	  delegates.	  It	  is	  for	  such	  reasons	  that	  this	  thesis	  considers	  it	  is	  vital	  that	  typology	  and	  multi-­‐dimensional	  structural	  aspects	  of	  NGOs	  (including	  TANs),	  be	  explored,	  since	  transphenomenal238	  subjectivity	  is	  strongly	  indicated	  as	  the	  primary	  determinant	  of	  NGO	  outcomes	  in	  the	  UN/NGO	  relationship,	  whatever	  the	  formal	  arrangements	  might	  be.	  	  
5.3.4	  	  	  Influence:	  Inside	  and	  Outside	  the	  UN	  	  How	  do	  NGOs	  exert	  their	  influence	  in	  the	  UN	  system?	  The	  UN’s	  Non-­‐Governmental	  Liaison	  Service	  states	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  2007a),	  that	  formal	  ongoing	  relationships	  of	  NGOs	  with	  the	  UN	  are	  based	  on	  two	  main	  activities:	  consultative	  status	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238	  Collier	  (1994:6)	  discusses	  the	  rationale	  for	  transphenomenal	  theorising	  (beyond	  appearances)	  to	  
explain	  underlying	  structures	  that	  may	  endure	  longer	  than	  the	  appearances,	  and	  generate	  them	  or	  
make	  them	  possible.	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information	  outreach.	  The	  former	  includes	  interacting	  with	  Member	  States	  and	  the	  institutional	  arms	  of	  the	  UN;	  monitoring	  agreements;	  briefing	  governments	  on	  issues;	  circulating	  information	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  UN;	  advocating	  positions	  at	  the	  national	  level;	  underscoring	  links	  between	  national	  actions	  and	  international	  commitments:	  organising	  caucuses	  to	  strengthen	  advocacy	  work;	  forging	  connections	  between	  the	  UN	  and	  NGOs	  around	  the	  world;	  and	  drawing	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  media	  to	  issues.	  Most	  forms	  of	  NGO	  participation	  in	  UN	  decision-­‐making	  start	  with	  applying	  for	  accreditation239.	  The	  NGLS	  (ibid)	  notes:	  	  	   With	  NGO	  activity	  now	  at	  an	  unprecedented	  level,	  NGOs	  can	  be	  found	  across	  the	  UN	  system,	  speaking	  to	  governments,	  serving	  on	  panels,	  holding	  briefings,	  forming	   issue	   caucuses,	   offering	   technical	   expertise,	   advocating	   on	   the	  national	  level,	  and	  implementing	  UN-­‐related	  projects.	  	  Conditioning	  this	  statement,	  the	  NGLS	  also	  notes	  that	  NGO	  involvement	  varies	  across	  different	  subjects,	  bodies	  and	  processes,	  ‘depending	  to	  some	  degree	  on	  the	  momentum	  of	  civil	  society	  activism	  outside	  the	  United	  Nations’.	  According	  to	  Willetts	  (ibid,	  135),	  NGO	  strategies	  directed	  at	  agenda	  setting	  have	  their	  greatest	  influence	  on	  policy	  formulation.	  After	  the	  opening	  stages	  of	  attention-­‐seeking	  on	  an	  issue,	  however,	  Willets	  considers	  NGOs	  have	  much	  less	  influence	  on	  the	  broad	  goals	  being	  set	  by	  governments.	  Nevertheless,	  they	  can	  influence	  the	  detailed	  text	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  negotiation	  process	  for	  a	  treaty	  or	  resolution,	  and	  they	  can	  affect	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  policy	  by	  monitoring	  its	  effectiveness	  and	  influencing	  governments	  to	  commit	  the	  necessary	  resources	  (ibid).	  Yet,	  for	  all	  the	  work	  done	  by	  NGOs	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  UN,	  some	  observers	  have	  said	  that	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  their	  greatest	  impact	  is	  elsewhere	  —	  on	  public	  opinion	  and	  the	  media	  —	  and	  not	  on	  the	  representatives	  of	  states,	  who	  can	  be	  ‘aloof	  to	  outside	  voices’	  (Kennedy,	  2006,	  218;	  see	  also	  Columbia	  U,	  2009).	  	  	  A	  popular	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  ‘pressure’	  NGOs	  ostensibly	  exert	  on	  states	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  linear	  graphic	  labeled	  the	  ‘Boomerang	  Pattern’	  (Figure	  5.3	  over	  page).	  Presented	  by	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  in	  1998	  (ibid:13),	  its	  authority	  is	  frequently	  cited	  in	  commentaries	  on	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  transnational	  advocacy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239	  This	  refers	  to	  the	  formal	  process	  that	  allows	  organisations,	  or	  groups,	  to	  attend	  UN	  meetings.	  
Accreditation	  for	  specific	  UN	  conferences	  is	  via	  separate	  ad	  hoc	  processes	  for	  each	  conference	  (UN-­‐
NGLS,	  2007a).	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networks	  gain	  influence.	  Undoubtedly,	  this	  diagram	  has	  become	  ‘famous’	  in	  debates	  on	  this	  subject	  matter	  (Willetts,	  2011:	  133).	  	  
Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  ‘Boomerang	  Pattern’	  of	  NGO	  pressure	  	  
	   	   	  
Figure	  5.3	  
In	  the	  Boomerang	  Pattern,	  State	  A	  blocks	  redress	  to	  organisations.	  They,	  in	  turn,	  activate	  a	  
network,	  whose	  members	  pressure	  their	  own	  state	  or	  states	   (B)	  and	  (if	   relevant)	  a	   third-­‐
party	  organization,	   such	  as	   the	  UN,	  which	   in	   turn	  pressures	  State	  A.	  Graphic	   reproduced	  
from	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:13).	  	  	  Having	  reviewed	  the	  ‘Boomerang	  Pattern’	  in	  the	  light	  of	  complexity	  conceptualisations	  of	  social	  phenomena	  as	  being	  non-­‐linear240,	  and	  my	  own	  observations,	  this	  thesis	  holds	  that	  this	  linear	  depiction	  does	  not	  come	  close	  to	  reflecting	  international	  relational	  reality.	  Furthermore,	  the	  depiction	  of	  inter-­‐state	  power	  relationships	  by	  way	  of	  simple	  linear	  diagrams	  is	  almost	  meaningless	  in	  the	  real	  world.	  In	  particular,	  the	  ubiquitous	  presence	  of	  degrees	  of	  collusion,	  corruption	  and	  nepotism	  are	  ignored.	  Religious,	  geo-­‐political,	  cultural	  and	  linguistic	  affinities	  are	  relegated	  and	  historical	  enmity	  hatchets	  are	  buried.	  Therefore,	  I	  submit,	  that	  however	  attractive	  it	  might	  seem,	  it	  is	  over-­‐simplistic	  to	  imagine	  that	  states	  and	  NGOs	  respond	  to	  ethnocentrically-­‐determined	  ‘naming	  and	  shaming’	  tactics	  and	  bring	  ‘pressure	  to	  bear’	  on	  each	  other	  in	  this	  direct,	  linear,	  way.	  As	  Geyer	  and	  Pickering	  point	  out	  (2011),	  such	  visualisations	  have	  a	  tendency	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240	  See	  Geyer	  and	  Rihani	  (2010:6)	  for	  a	  complexity	  overview	  of	  the	  non-­‐linear	  conceptualisation	  of	  social	  
phenomena.	  
	   157	  
to	  simplify	  and	  polarise	  discussions	  and	  debates	  about	  complex	  international	  situations.	  While	  this	  may	  be	  politically	  expedient	  for	  some	  actors,	  it	  ‘has	  the	  potential	  of	  leading	  international	  policy	  leaders	  into	  extremely	  problematic	  contexts	  and	  situations’.	  Crucially,	  Geyer	  and	  Pickering	  assert	  (2011:23):	  	  From	   a	   complexity	   perspective,	   it	   is	   both	   misguided	   and	   dangerous	   to	   use	  linear	  tools	  to	  analyse	  evolving	  and	  emergent	  complex	  systems	  and	  situations.	  	  Meanwhile,	  the	  extent	  of	  NGO	  influence	  at	  the	  intergovernmental	  level	  is	  debatable	  (Bendell,	  2006:32;	  Joachim	  and	  Locher,	  2009:	  177-­‐8).	  Some	  analysts	  point	  to	  the	  development	  of	  conventions	  to	  ban	  landmines,	  to	  reduce	  carbon	  emissions	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court,	  as	  examples	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  NGOs.	  Others	  suggest	  that	  NGO	  influence	  is	  exaggerated	  and	  these	  civil	  society	  organisations	  have	  little	  effective	  power	  in	  influencing	  decisions,	  especially	  on	  issues	  of	  peace	  and	  war.	  An	  assessment	  that	  is	  more	  in	  line	  with	  the	  analysis	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  the	  finding	  by	  Joachim	  and	  Locher,	  in	  their	  comparative	  study	  of	  NGO	  influence	  in	  the	  UN	  and	  EU	  (2009:177-­‐8),	  that	  assumptions	  about	  the	  instrumental	  agency	  of	  NGOs	  at	  the	  international	  level	  should	  be	  tempered.	  Rather	  than	  being	  ‘the	  supposed	  shapers	  of	  international	  norms	  and	  principles’	  a	  less	  positive,	  alternative	  view,	  was	  that	  NGOs	  were	  the	  ‘takers’	  in	  the	  relationship	  with	  IGOs,	  their	  abilities,	  choices	  and	  actions	  being	  ‘far	  more	  structurally	  conditioned	  than	  previous	  research	  has	  suggested’.	  Through	  a	  process	  of	  ‘finely-­‐tuned	  gate-­‐keeping	  mechanisms,	  incentives,	  and	  sanctions’,	  international	  organisations	  shape	  the	  behaviour	  of	  NGOs	  	  —	  rewarding	  actions	  that	  are	  in	  line	  with	  the	  institutional	  rules	  and	  penalising	  those	  that	  challenge	  or	  contradict	  them.	  Ultimately,	  NGO	  access	  to	  international	  organisations	  ‘is	  granted	  rather	  than	  achieved’	  (ibid).	  According	  to	  a	  high-­‐level	  UN	  executive241	  the	  consultative	  role	  of	  NGOs	  in	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Council	  is	  ‘a	  privilege,	  and	  not	  a	  right’.	  Moreover,	  NGOs	  taking	  up	  the	  consultative	  role	  were	  advised	  that	  ‘[H]igh	  standards	  of	  behaviour,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Council’s	  own	  demanding	  set	  of	  ethics,	  were	  universally	  required’	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2012).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241	  The	  Acting	  Director,	  Office	  for	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Council	  Support	  and	  Coordination,	  Department	  of	  
Economic	  and	  Social	  Affairs,	  David	  Hanif	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2012).	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As	  Tarrow	  has	  observed	  in	  his	  study	  of	  ‘The	  New	  Transnational	  Activism’,	  which	  examines	  the	  relatively	  recent	  arrival	  of	  legions	  of	  new	  non-­‐state	  organisations	  on	  to	  the	  international	  political	  scene	  (2005:28):	  	   International	   institutions,	   regimes	   and	   processes	   are	   not	   the	   expression	   of	  democracy,	  a	  global	  civil	  society	  or	  a	  world	  polity:	  they	  are	  arenas	  in	  which	  	  Conservative	   and	   progressive,	   global	   and	   antiglobal,	   religious	   and	   secular	  nonstate	  actors	  intersect.	  	  
5.3.5	  ‘Common	  concerns	  and	  apparent	  misunderstandings’	  	  	  
	  The	  Cardoso	  Report	  and	  fallout	  Strong	  indications	  regarding	  the	  status	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  UN	  and	  NGOs	  and	  other	  civil	  society	  actors	  can	  be	  found	  in	  a	  number	  of	  UN	  reports	  published	  in	  recent	  years,	  particularly	  those	  connected	  with	  the	  Cardoso	  Report242.	  In	  2003,	  the	  UN	  Secretary-­‐General,	  Kofi	  Annan,	  set	  up	  a	  ‘Panel	  of	  Eminent	  Persons	  on	  United	  Nations-­‐Civil	  Society	  Relations’,	  chaired	  by	  Fernando	  Henrique	  Cardoso,	  a	  former	  President	  of	  Brazil,	  to	  look	  into	  ways	  of	  improving	  the	  system	  for	  facilitating	  the	  UN’s	  interaction	  with	  civil	  society	  (UN	  Sec-­‐Gen	  (2003;	  UN	  Report,	  2004a).	  Annan,	  who	  took	  up	  his	  post	  in	  1997,	  was	  an	  ambitious	  reformer	  and	  a	  strong	  supporter	  of	  civil	  society	  participation	  in	  the	  UN	  (UN	  Report,	  2004a).	  Just	  as	  the	  provisions	  for	  formalising	  the	  UN’s	  relationship	  with	  NGOs	  had	  been	  reviewed	  and	  enhanced	  in	  1968,	  then	  reviewed	  and	  updated	  in	  1996,	  Annan	  tried	  to	  reform	  the	  arrangements	  once	  again	  in	  2003	  by	  launching	  the	  major	  review	  initiative	  of	  the	  Cardoso	  Panel	  (UN	  Sec-­‐Gen,	  2003).	  The	  Panel	  worked	  on	  the	  reforms	  for	  one	  year	  and	  submitted	  its	  controversial	  report,	  We	  the	  peoples:	  civil	  society,	  the	  United	  
Nations	  and	  Global	  Governance,	  in	  2004	  (UN	  Report,	  2004b;	  UN	  Report	  2004c).	  Since	  then,	  none	  of	  the	  significant	  recommendations	  have	  been	  adopted.	  However,	  the	  Panel’s	  investigation	  process	  did	  extract	  some	  revealing	  insights	  on	  the	  state	  of	  the	  UN-­‐NGO	  relationship.	  	  The	  covering	  letter	  to	  the	  Report	  (UN	  Report,	  2004a)	  commenced	  by	  asserting	  the	  Panel’s	  view	  that	  ‘the	  rise	  of	  civil	  society	  is	  indeed	  one	  of	  the	  landmark	  events	  of	  our	  times’,	  with	  global	  governance	  no	  longer	  the	  sole	  domain	  of	  governments.	  Three	  aspects	  of	  global	  trends	  were	  identified	  in	  the	  Report	  as	  being	  particularly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242	  Referred	  to	  throughout	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  as	  the	  ‘Report’	  (UN	  Report,	  2004a).	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relevant	  to	  the	  Panel’s	  purpose,	  influencing	  how	  it	  had	  approached	  its	  task.	  These	  were:	  (i)	  deficits	  of	  democracy	  in	  global	  governance;	  (ii)	  the	  growing	  capacity	  and	  influence	  of	  non-­‐State	  actors;	  and	  	  (iii)	  ‘the	  rising	  power	  of	  global	  public	  opinion’.	  	  	  The	  Report	  described	  a	  world	  that	  had	  changed	  radically	  from	  the	  time	  of	  the	  UN’s	  origins,	  a	  world	  ‘no	  longer	  as	  unified	  by	  the	  imperatives	  of	  preventing	  future	  world	  wars,	  rebuilding	  devastated	  States	  and	  making	  colonies	  independent’243.	  Present	  challenges	  were	  seen	  as	  ‘ranging	  from	  terrorism	  to	  unilateralism	  and	  war,	  from	  pandemics	  and	  climate	  change	  to	  economic	  crisis	  and	  debt,	  from	  ethnic	  or	  sectarian	  tensions	  to	  international	  crime,	  and	  from	  the	  universality	  of	  rights	  to	  respect	  for	  diverse	  cultures’.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Panel	  noted,	  the	  intergovernmental	  world	  had	  become	  more	  complex	  and	  diverse,	  with	  ‘four	  times	  as	  many	  Governments	  defining	  global	  priorities	  through	  their	  membership	  in	  the	  United	  Nations’	  than	  at	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  world	  body.	  	  	  	  The	  rising	  power	  of	  public	  opinion	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  major	  concern,	  which	  the	  Panel,	  addressed	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  	  Globalization,	   new	   information	   technologies	   and	   the	   low	   cost	   of	   all	   forms	  of	  communication	   also	  mean	   that	   the	  world	   order	   has	   become	  more	   open	   and	  interconnected	  than	  ever	  before.	  That	  brings	  new	  opportunities	  but	  also	  new	  threats,	   as	   problems	   spill	   swiftly	   over	   national	   frontiers	   […]	   Governments	  alone	   cannot	   resolve	   today’s	   global	   problems.	   A	   wide	   array	   of	   actors	   now	  jostle	   alongside	   Governments	  —	   civil	   society,	   corporations,	   local	   authorities	  and	  parliamentarians	  —	  seeking	  a	  role	  in	  defining	  priorities	  and	  contributing	  to	  the	  solutions.	  	  Highlighting	  the	  role	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  shaping	  ‘global	  public	  opinion’244	  the	  Report	  pointed	  out	  that	  civil	  society	  organisations,	  through	  their	  Websites	  and	  other	  channels,	  are	  informing	  citizens	  about	  policy	  choices.	  Global	  networks	  of	  activists,	  parliamentarians,	  journalists,	  social	  movement	  leaders	  and	  others	  are	  also	  influencing	  policy	  debates,	  especially	  on	  international	  issues.	  Moreover	  (ibid):	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243	  See	  Chapter	  4	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  these	  eras	  in	  the	  UN’s	  development	  and	  their	  
relevance	  to	  contemporary	  issues	  championed	  by	  NGOs/TANs,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  UN’s	  relationships	  with	  
non-­‐state	  actors	  representing	  these	  interests	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  
244	  See	  also	  Chapter	  6.	  While	  the	  Cardoso	  Report	  uses	  the	  term	  ‘global	  public	  opinion’,	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  
collective	  ‘public	  opinion’	  —	  let	  alone	  a	  global	  one	  	  —	  is	  controversial	  (Chandler,	  2007;	  van	  der	  Eijk	  and	  
Franklin,	  2009,148-­‐9).	  Clark	  et	  al	  (2005:313),	  noted	  the	  disunity	  in	  political	  opinion	  between	  NGOs,	  as	  
well	  as	  states	  (in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  UN	  world	  conferences),	  where	  political	  differences	  were	  markedly	  
polarised	  along	  North-­‐South,	  rich-­‐poor,	  and	  developed-­‐less	  developed	  lines.	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   All	  this	  is	  reinforced	  by	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  mass	  media	  on	  current	  affairs	  —	  and	  by	   the	  diverse	   sources	   that	  most	  people	   can	   turn	   to	   for	   information.	  And	  all	  this	  is	  creating	  a	  new	  phenomenon	  —	  global	  public	  opinion	  —	  that	  is	  shaping	  the	  political	   agenda	   and	   generating	   a	   cosmopolitan	   set	   of	   norms	   and	   citizen	  demands	  that	  transcend	  national	  boundaries.	  	  	  It	  seems	  incongruous	  that	  UN	  official	  communications	  so	  frequently	  refer	  to	  ‘global	  civil	  society’,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  engage	  with	  it,	  when	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  cohesive	  society	  at	  the	  global	  level	  is	  so	  contested	  among	  scholars	  (Chandler,	  2009;	  Keane,	  2003:94-­‐5;	  Risse,	  2000;	  Bartelson,	  2006,	  2009).	  Similarly,	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  ‘global	  public	  opinion’,	  as	  recognised	  in	  the	  Cardoso	  Report	  (UN	  Report,	  2004b)	  is	  equally	  debatable	  (Chandler,	  2007;	  van	  der	  Eijk	  and	  Franklin,	  2009,148-­‐9;	  Clark	  et	  al,	  2005:313).	  A	  contradiction	  seems	  to	  be	  evident	  in	  that	  global	  politics	  is	  essentially	  concerned	  with	  a	  deterritorialised,	  abstract,	  idealised	  and	  less	  socially-­‐grounded	  politics	  than	  that	  of	  the	  UN’s	  Member	  States,	  whose	  political	  concerns	  are	  quite	  the	  opposite.	  As	  Chandler	  (ibid)	  points	  out:	  	  It	   is	   the	   abstract,	   disconnected	   nature	   of	   global	   politics	   that	   enables	   the	  rhetoric	  to	  far	  exceed	  the	  reality.	  While	  the	  assertions	  of	  global	  threats,	  global	  values	   and	   global	   wars	   imply	   that	   the	   stakes	   are	   higher	   than	   ever	   —	   that	  politics	   is	  more	   focused	   and	  more	   urgent	  —	   the	   reality	   is	   that	   the	   growing	  level	  of	  abstraction	  reflects	  a	  lack	  of	  engagement	  with	  these	  concerns.	  	  
	  One	  of	  the	  main	  reasons	  for	  interrogating	  this	  discourse	  is	  because,	  in	  agreement	  with	  Chandler	  (2007),	  this	  thesis	  is	  critical	  of	  the	  more	  sweeping	  claims	  about	  the	  role	  of	  communicative	  interaction	  between	  ‘global	  civil	  society’	  actors	  that	  has	  been	  central	  to	  the	  argument	  that	  an	  alternative	  approach	  to	  politics	  is	  being	  constituted	  in	  the	  global	  sphere.	  This	  latter	  line	  of	  political	  argument	  has	  been	  expounded	  in	  a	  landmark	  trilogy	  by	  Castells	  (UN	  Report,	  2004a:	  75;	  Castells,	  2000,	  2007,	  2009).	  However,	  this	  thesis	  notes	  that	  the	  Cardoso	  Report’s	  distinctive	  emphasis	  on	  the	  power	  of	  global	  public	  opinion	  and	  global	  civil	  society	  is	  unsurprising	  in	  light	  of	  Castell’s	  membership	  of	  the	  12-­‐strong	  Panel	  of	  Experts	  (UN	  Report,	  2004a:	  75).	  	  A	  further	  document	  of	  interest	  is	  the	  Panel’s,	  more	  detailed,	  pre-­‐Report	  survey	  on	  the	  experiences	  of	  NGOs	  with	  consultative	  status	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  2003b),	  which	  revealed	  some	  common	  themes	  of	  dissatisfaction	  with	  NGO	  relationships	  within	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the	  UN	  system,	  and	  with	  each	  other245.	  Some	  notable	  comments	  seen	  among	  the	  questionnaires	  completed	  by	  NGO	  representatives	  were:	  “Civil	  society	  is	  given	  a	  grudging,	  and	  mostly	  ceremonial,	  access	  to	  the	  deliberative	  process”;	  “Treating	  NGOs	  like	  naïve	  children	  who	  can	  easily	  be	  given	  the	  runaround	  invites	  cynicism	  and	  anger	  —	  which	  often	  then	  turns	  from	  informed	  policy	  recommendations	  to	  frustrated	  protest.”	  Moreover,	  the	  UN	  provided	  poor	  access	  to	  decision-­‐makers,	  and	  for	  Southern-­‐based	  civil	  society	  inexperience	  in	  lobbying	  skills	  this	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  serious	  handicap.	  Many	  expressed	  a	  need	  for	  more	  UN-­‐support	  for	  institutional	  capacity	  building	  skills	  for	  NGOs	  (particularly	  non-­‐accredited	  NGOs,	  who	  were	  often	  detrimentally	  ‘confrontational’);	  logistical	  support	  for	  Southern	  NGOs;	  and	  for	  facilitating	  co-­‐ordination,	  networking,	  and	  communications	  between	  NGOs246.	  	  	  Other	  recommendations	  (in	  the	  pre-­‐Report	  survey)	  for	  improving	  UN-­‐Civil	  Society	  relationships	  at	  the	  international	  level,	  included	  amending	  the	  ‘unfair	  criteria	  in	  the	  UN	  ECOSOC	  accreditation	  process’	  which	  made	  it	  difficult	  for	  small	  African	  NGOs	  to	  become	  accredited,	  since	  they	  are	  ‘required	  to	  fulfill	  the	  same	  criteria	  and	  operate	  under	  the	  same	  rules	  as	  their	  Northern	  counterparts	  who	  have	  been	  operating	  in	  a	  democratic	  climate	  for	  the	  last	  50	  years	  or	  more’	  and	  who	  operate	  with	  budgets	  exceeding	  those	  of	  many	  African	  states.	  In	  particular,	  the	  requirement	  for	  NGOs	  to	  disclose	  information	  about	  their	  governing	  body	  and	  sources	  of	  income	  ‘might	  result	  in	  undemocratic	  governments	  classifying	  certain	  NGOs	  as	  subversive,	  and	  even	  banning	  their	  activities’,	  especially	  if	  the	  activities	  include	  advocacy	  and	  lobbying	  campaigns	  for	  democratic	  reform	  of	  governance	  and	  freedom	  of	  speech.	  Furthermore,	  there	  were	  calls	  for	  the	  accreditation	  review	  to	  be	  made	  by	  a	  technical	  committee	  rather	  than	  a	  political	  process247.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245	  Joachim	  and	  Locher	  (2009:27-­‐28)	  found	  that	  while	  the	  ‘partnerships’	  and	  ‘global	  compact’	  rhetoric	  
permeates	  the	  UN	  system’s	  interactions	  with	  NGOs	  and	  multinational	  corporations,	  there	  is	  resistance.	  
Some	  of	  the	  larger,	  more	  established	  NGOs	  are	  worried	  about	  their	  influence	  being	  diluted	  by	  an	  influx	  
of	  thousands	  of	  new	  NGOs,	  and	  some	  States	  (notably	  the	  Non-­‐Aligned	  Movement)	  opposing	  expanded	  
NGO	  access.	  	  	  
246	  It	  appears,	  from	  the	  UN-­‐NGLS	  Website	  (http://	  www.un-­‐ngls.org)	  and	  the	  UN	  Department	  of	  Public	  
1Information	  NGO	  Branch	  Website	  (http://www.undpi.org)	  that	  considerable	  efforts	  have	  been	  made	  in	  
recent	  years	  to	  address	  these	  latter	  grievances	  and	  improve	  support	  and	  communications	  services	  for	  
NGOs.	  	  
247	  This	  line	  of	  argument	  is	  supported	  by	  Zettler	  (2009)	  and	  Martens	  (2004).	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The	  Panel’s	  survey	  report	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  ibid)	  concluded	  by	  quoting	  some	  statements	  by	  NGO	  representatives	  that	  ‘exemplify	  the	  diversity’	  of	  the	  civil	  society	  responses:	  	  What	  gives	  you	   the	   right	   to	  govern	   the	  whole	  earth?	  We	  all	   ready	   [sic]	  have	  politicians	  that	  are	  corrupt	  why	  would	  we	  want	  to	  complicate	  matters	  further	  with	   a	   government	   that	   can	  not	  be	   reached	  on	  a	   local	   or	  national	   level.	   It	   is	  simply	  a	  communist	  action	  on	  your	  part	  to	  control	  the	  lives	  of	  people	  around	  the	  globe.	  I	  would	  not	  want	  to	  be	  part	  of	  a	  group	  that	  thought	  they	  knew	  what	  was	  best	   for	  me.	   I	   can	   think	   for	  myself!	   Control	   is	   your	   goal	  not	   freedom	  or	  individual	  rights.	  	  Another	  activity	  in	  support	  of	  the	  Cardoso	  Panel’s	  review	  was	  the	  UN	  Non-­‐Governmental	  Liaison	  Service’s	  two-­‐day	  consultation248	  event	  with	  civil	  society	  representatives,	  on	  the	  theme:	  ‘The	  Crisis	  in	  Global	  Governance:	  Challenges	  for	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  Global	  Civil	  Society’.	  Nearly	  60	  NGO/CSO	  representatives	  from	  more	  than	  20	  countries	  attended	  the	  meeting	  in	  Geneva,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  number	  of	  representatives	  from	  the	  UN	  system.	  The	  meeting	  report	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  2003a)	  noted	  that	  one	  of	  the	  most	  striking	  developments	  in	  global	  governance	  in	  the	  previous	  10-­‐15	  years	  had	  been	  the	  emergence	  of	  global	  civil	  society	  as	  ‘a	  new	  factor	  in	  power	  relationships	  at	  the	  global	  level’.	  The	  comments	  in	  the	  conference	  report	  (ibid)	  were	  unusually	  candid:	  In	  referring	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  crisis	  in	  global	  governance,	  one	  participant	  pointed	  out	  by	  that	  there	  had	  never	  been	  an	  effective	  system	  of	  global	  governance,	  and	  even	  that	  had	  ‘somehow	  broken	  down	  in	  recent	  years’.	  Another	  reportedly	  stated:	  ‘The	  United	  Nations	  was	  created	  by	  the	  victors	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  for	  the	  victors	  of	  World	  War	  II’.	  Moreover,	  there	  was	  further	  criticism	  that	  the	  history	  of	  the	  UN	  had	  been	  marked	  by	  a	  range	  of	  dualities,	  which	  had	  tended	  to	  reflect	  a	  contrast	  between	  the	  UN’s	  normative	  goals	  and	  the	  realities	  of	  power	  in	  the	  world.	  Several	  participants	  urged	  the	  Panel	  to	  reject	  current	  opinions	  that	  downplayed	  the	  value	  of	  the	  work	  of	  advocacy	  NGOs	  in	  favour	  of	  operational	  NGOs	  in	  the	  integrated	  follow-­‐up	  to	  UN	  conferences.	  The	  emergence	  and	  influence	  of	  neo-­‐conservative	  think-­‐tanks	  and	  policy	  institutes	  was	  also	  troubling	  to	  the	  NGO/CSO	  participants,	  who	  viewed	  increased	  questioning	  of	  their	  legitimacy,	  accountability	  and	  representativeness,	  from	  that	  quarter,	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  pressures	  they	  were	  beginning	  to	  exert	  on	  centres	  of	  power.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248	  The	  NGLS	  convened	  the	  consultation	  from	  2-­‐4	  June,	  2003	  in	  Geneva	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  2003a).	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When	  the	  Cardoso	  Report	  (A/58/817)	  was	  tabled	  in	  June	  2004	  (UN	  Report,	  2004a),	  it	  contained	  30	  recommendations	  for	  reform,	  among	  them	  calls	  for	  the	  UN	  to	  become	  more	  ‘outward-­‐looking’,	  more	  democratic	  in	  its	  processes,	  embrace	  a	  plurality	  of	  constituencies	  and	  ‘connect	  the	  global	  to	  the	  local’.	  However,	  there	  were	  many	  criticisms	  of	  the	  Report.	  One	  UN	  analyst249,	  claimed	  the	  content	  was	  ‘extreme	  naïve	  idealism,	  which	  is	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  reality’.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  immediate	  concerns	  by	  Member	  States	  about	  these	  recommendations,	  the	  Secretary-­‐General	  was	  moved	  to	  issue	  a	  follow-­‐up	  report,	  entitled	  ‘Clarification	  of	  some	  common	  concerns	  and	  apparent	  misunderstandings’	  (UN	  Report,	  2004c).	  Its	  content,	  summarised	  below,	  provides	  a	  very	  clear	  picture	  of	  the	  mistrust	  and	  reservations	  some	  Member	  States	  and	  NGOs	  have	  for	  changes	  in	  the	  UN’s	  relations	  with	  civil	  society,	  particularly	  NGOs,	  and	  why	  they	  are	  so	  resistant	  to	  reform.	  	  Among	  the	  concerns	  of	  governments	  documented	  (ibid)	  were:	  	  
• Opening	  up	  the	  UN	  to	  greater	  participation	  by	  NGOs	  could	  impact	  on	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  within	  the	  UN,	  raising	  fears	  of	  the	  erosion	  of	  state	  sovereignty	  and	  prerogatives;	  
• Strengthening	  the	  role	  of	  NGOs	  in	  global	  politics	  could	  further	  limit	  their	  authority	  over	  domestic	  policies	  and	  make	  them	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  outside	  influence;	  
• Some	  governments	  were	  wary	  of	  the	  role	  of	  NGOs	  in	  their	  own	  countries	  and	  reluctant	  to	  see	  the	  UN	  engage	  more	  closely	  with	  them;	  
• Governments	  questioned	  the	  assumption	  that	  it	  is	  the	  NGOs,	  not	  the	  government,	  that	  really	  ‘represent	  the	  grass-­‐roots	  people’	  of	  their	  countries;	  
• Some	  governments	  were	  concerned	  that	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  NGOs	  would	  further	  unbalance	  North-­‐South	  relations	  within	  the	  UN:	  
• Some	  governments	  were	  worried	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  NGOs	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  UN,	  overburdening	  an	  already	  complex	  governmental	  deliberative	  process;	  
• Similarly,	  some	  were	  concerned	  that	  the	  accreditation	  process	  would	  continue	  to	  expand	  and	  become	  more	  cumbersome;	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  Willetts	  (2011:11).	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• Some	  said	  that	  preserving	  the	  confidentiality	  of	  deliberations	  between	  Member	  States	  was	  important	  and	  ‘may	  be	  undermined	  if	  NGOs	  are	  always	  around’;	  and	  
• Regarding	  recommendations	  for	  increasing	  the	  NGO	  outreach	  by	  UN	  offices	  at	  the	  country-­‐level,	  governments	  responded	  unfavourably,	  expressing	  concerns	  that	  UN	  offices	  are	  basically	  focused	  on	  governments	  and	  should	  not	  be	  diverted	  from	  their	  work	  by	  local	  NGOs.	  	  Among	  the	  concerns	  of	  NGOs	  were:	  	  
• The	  proposed	  new	  accreditation	  mechanism	  could	  erode	  their	  existing	  rights;	  
• The	  criteria	  for	  accreditation	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  General	  Assembly	  would	  be	  stringent	  and	  actually	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  reducing	  the	  number	  of	  NGOs	  eligible	  for	  consultative	  status	  to	  the	  UN;	  
• Disquiet	  was	  expressed	  over	  which	  accredited	  NGOs	  would	  be	  selected	  to	  participate	  in	  UN	  events,	  such	  as	  the	  proposed	  public	  hearings,	  and	  how	  such	  selections	  would	  be	  made.	  	  
• There	  were	  concerns	  about	  the	  elevation	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  over	  and	  above	  NGOs,	  adding	  fears	  that	  ‘the	  UN	  may	  get	  hijacked	  by	  for-­‐profit	  organizations’;	  
• Concerns	  were	  expressed	  about	  any	  changes	  that	  could	  further	  increase	  the	  weight	  of	  Northern	  NGOs	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  NGOs	  from	  the	  South;	  and	  
• NGOs	  were	  sceptical	  about	  the	  likely	  level	  of	  support	  for	  the	  proposed	  Trust	  Funds:	  how	  funds	  would	  be	  allocated	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  recipient	  NGOs	  would	  be	  constrained	  as	  a	  result	  of	  receiving	  funding	  support.	  	  On	  reviewing	  these	  reservations	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  representatives	  of	  NGOs	  are	  as	  protective	  about	  their	  statutory	  status	  in	  the	  UN	  system	  as	  States	  are	  regarding	  theirs.	  Therefore,	  calls	  for	  reform	  of	  the	  provisions	  for	  NGO	  participation	  in	  the	  policy-­‐making	  mechanisms	  have	  met	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  support	  and	  opposition	  on	  all	  sides,	  not	  least	  from	  NGOs	  currently	  working	  in	  the	  system,	  who	  are	  suspicious	  that	  any	  changes	  may	  erode	  the	  entitlements	  they	  have	  already	  secured	  and	  admit	  other	  voices,	  of	  which	  they	  disapprove,	  to	  the	  system.	  In	  light	  of	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the	  surrounding	  controversy,	  the	  Cardoso	  Report	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  shelved250	  since	  2004	  and	  this	  opportunity	  for	  modernisation	  and	  reform	  has	  foundered.	  	  
Relationship	  trends:	  setting	  the	  rules	  and	  controlling	  the	  action	  Despite	  its	  greater	  openness,	  the	  UN	  remains	  an	  institution	  governed	  by	  its	  Member	  States	  and	  structured	  primarily	  to	  support	  opportunities	  for	  governments	  to	  debate	  and	  make	  decisions.	  By	  virtue	  of	  their	  sovereign	  statehood,	  states	  set	  the	  international	  scene	  and	  make	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  international	  order	  by	  which	  all	  other	  actors	  operate	  (UN	  Report,	  2004a;	  Waltz,	  1979:94).	  States	  are,	  therefore,	  differentiated	  from,	  and	  superordinate	  to,	  non-­‐state	  actors	  (Donnelly,	  2011:	  6).	  On	  this	  subject	  the	  Cardoso	  Report	  (ibid)	  commented	  that	  ‘while	  civil	  society	  can	  help	  to	  put	  issues	  on	  the	  global	  agenda,	  only	  Governments	  have	  the	  power	  to	  decide	  on	  them’.	  Given	  this	  long-­‐established	  and	  fixed	  state	  of	  affairs,	  this	  thesis	  study	  found	  that	  the	  relatively	  recent	  and	  rapid	  emergence	  of	  TANs	  in	  international	  relations	  and	  policy-­‐making	  is	  a	  cause	  of	  uncertainty	  within	  international	  policy-­‐making	  institutions,	  leading	  to	  perceptions	  that	  the	  policy-­‐making	  paradigm	  is	  in	  transition.251	  	  	  Evidence	  that	  the	  UN	  struggles	  to	  accommodate	  some	  elements	  of	  civil	  society	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  Background	  Paper	  prepared	  by	  the	  UN	  Secretariat	  in	  2003	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  2003c):	  	   UN-­‐civil	   society	   relationship	   in	   essence	   concerns	   participation.252	  Handled	  well,	   it	   enhances	   the	   quality	   of	   decision-­‐making,	   increases	   ownership	   of	   the	  decisions,	   improves	   accountability	   and	   transparency	   of	   the	   process	   and	  enriches	  outcomes	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  views	  and	  experiences.	  But	  —	  handled	  badly	   —	   it	   can	   confuse	   choices,	   hamper	   the	   inter-­‐governmental	   search	   for	  common	   ground,	   erode	   the	   privacy	   needed	   for	   sensitive	   discussions,	   over-­‐crowd	  agendas	  and	  present	  distractions	  at	  important	  meetings.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250	  On	  its	  Website,	  the	  NGLS	  claims	  that	  since	  the	  tabling	  of	  the	  report	  “some	  concrete	  developments”	  
have	  taken	  place,	  such	  as	  the	  General	  Assembly	  beginning	  to	  hold	  informal	  meetings	  with	  civil	  society	  
and	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  Trust	  Fund	  to	  support	  the	  efforts	  of	  UN	  in-­‐country	  teams	  in	  their	  work	  with	  
civil	  society.	  These	  are	  relatively	  inconsequential	  concessions	  in	  light	  of	  the	  calls	  for	  reform	  contained	  in	  
the	  Cardoso	  Report,	  A/59/354	  	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  2011a;	  UN-­‐Report,	  2004a).	  
251	  Kuhn	  (1996:151-­‐152)	  provides	  an	  authoritative	  account	  of	  the	  defensive	  behaviours	  of	  those	  who	  
perceive	  themselves	  to	  be	  keepers-­‐of-­‐the-­‐paradigm	  in	  the	  face	  of	  revolutionary	  change.	  
252	  Emphasis	  as	  in	  original.	  This	  Background	  Paper	  was	  prepared	  as	  an	  official	  brief	  for	  the	  Secretary-­‐
General’s	  Panel	  of	  Experts	  on	  the	  Relationship	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  with	  Civil	  Society.	  The	  Panel	  
conducted	  its	  enquiry	  between	  2003	  and	  2004	  and	  presented	  its	  Report	  (‘The	  Cardoso	  Report’)	  in	  June	  
2004	  (UN	  Report,	  2004a).	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Notwithstanding	  the	  diplomatic	  framing	  of	  these	  relationships	  as	  engagements	  that	  are	  ‘handled	  well’,	  or	  ‘handled	  badly’	  by	  unidentified	  parties,	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  statement	  clearly	  shows	  that	  key	  qualities	  of	  good	  relationships253	  —	  notably	  trust,	  tact,	  mutual	  understanding	  and	  mutual	  respect	  —	  are	  prone	  to	  serious	  lapses.	  It	  may	  be	  deduced	  also	  from	  this	  statement	  that	  the	  typologies	  of	  NGO	  that	  the	  UN	  might	  struggle	  to	  ‘handle	  well’,	  are	  those	  that	  deploy	  the	  forceful	  public	  communications	  strategies	  I	  describe	  later	  on	  as	  typical	  of	  contemporary	  TANs.	  	  These	  fears,	  particularly	  regarding	  unwanted	  disclosures	  during	  ‘sensitive	  discussions’,	  will	  be	  shown	  to	  have	  particular	  relevance	  for	  NGOs	  who	  adopt	  the	  publicity-­‐seeking	  communication	  style	  definitive	  of	  TANs.	  The	  statement	  also	  intimates	  the	  possibility	  that	  counterparts	  in	  international	  policy-­‐making	  situations	  are	  motivated	  to	  adopt	  Thucydidean	  defensive	  postures	  in	  their	  engagements	  with	  TANs	  and	  other	  types	  of	  NGO254.	  	  	  Thus,	  the	  UN’s	  Non-­‐Governmental	  Liaison	  Service	  acknowledges	  that	  in	  international	  matters,	  ‘not	  all	  governments	  have	  readily,	  or	  in	  some	  cases	  consistently,	  embraced	  a	  wider	  role	  for	  civil	  society’	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  2007b).	  The	  Introduction	  to	  the	  UN	  guidebook	  for	  NGO	  participation	  in	  negotiations	  and	  decision-­‐making	  at	  the	  UN	  points	  out,	  somewhat	  enigmatically	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  ibid):	  	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  non-­‐State	  actors	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  is	  an	  ever-­‐evolving	  one;	  and,	  what	  the	  future	  holds	  for	  access	  and	  input	  by	  civil	  society	  remains	   unclear.	   However,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   no	   matter	   the	   modalities,	   civil	  society	  will	  be	  involved.	  Ban	  Ki-­‐moon,	  the	  eighth	  Secretary-­‐General	  of	  the	  UN,	  noted	  in	  his	  first	  address	  to	  ECOSOC	  that	  ‘Today,	  no	  UN	  development	  effort	  —	  whether	  advocacy	  for	  a	  broad	  cause	  or	  support	  for	  specific	  goals	  —	  can	  make	  real	  headway	  without	  support	  from	  civil	  society.	  	  	  To	  a	  prospective,	  or	  newly	  accredited	  NGO	  actor,	  the	  message	  to	  NGOs	  here	  is	  stark:	  the	  supporting	  role	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  UN’s	  work	  is	  valued,	  but	  prospects	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253	  Substantive	  communications	  theory	  on	  the	  key	  qualities	  of	  good	  relationships	  is	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  
6.	  
254	  This	  refers	  to	  Thucydidean	  theory	  regarding	  security	  and	  suspicion	  of	  the	  motives	  of	  mistrusted	  
others,	  who	  are	  perceived	  as	  ‘not	  us’.	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  the	  tenets	  of	  Thucydidean	  theory	  are	  thus	  
evident	  in	  the	  behaviours	  of	  all	  parties	  to	  relationships	  within	  the	  international	  system,	  and	  never	  more	  
so	  than	  in	  the	  conspicuous	  stalemate	  between	  UN	  Member	  States	  and	  NGOs	  that	  is	  now	  enshrined	  in	  
the	  Cardoso	  Report.	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for	  a	  more	  instrumental	  role	  for	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  indeed	  any	  change	  of	  role,	  are	  unpromising.	  
5.4	  Summary	  The	  UN’s	  contemporary	  relationship	  with	  NGOs	  is	  greatly	  encumbered	  by	  historical	  baggage,	  which	  can	  be	  usefully	  understood	  as	  resulting	  from	  the	  complex	  system	  effects	  of	  sensitivity	  to	  initial	  conditions,	  path	  dependency	  and	  lock-­‐in.	  The	  United	  Nations	  Charter,	  so	  visionary	  in	  its	  conceptualisations	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1940s,	  did	  not	  envisage	  a	  world	  facing	  today’s	  global	  challenges,	  developmental	  disparities	  and	  shifting	  power	  relationships;	  nor	  one	  endowed	  with	  such	  a	  wealth	  of	  scientific	  and	  technological	  advances.	  It	  certainly	  did	  not	  foresee	  the	  evolution	  of	  powerful,	  supranational	  actors	  on	  the	  world	  stage	  that	  were	  not	  states	  or	  inter-­‐governmental	  organisations255.	  And	  yet,	  the	  UN	  provides	  the	  institutional	  structures	  for	  civil	  society	  actors	  to	  achieve	  their	  aims,	  allowing	  them,	  as	  necessary,	  to	  by-­‐pass	  domestic	  structures.	  	  	  However,	  there	  are	  significant	  downsides	  for	  NGOs	  in	  seeking	  relationships	  with	  international	  institutions:	  many	  fear	  that,	  inter	  alia,	  they	  could	  lose	  their	  independence,	  funding	  or	  ability	  to	  react	  quickly	  to	  situations	  if	  they	  were	  encumbered	  by	  international	  institutional	  bureaucracy	  and	  processes	  (Martens,	  2006).	  Recent	  UN	  outreach	  initiatives	  to	  include	  a	  greater	  business	  and	  commercial	  interests	  component	  in	  the	  consultation	  framework	  with	  civil	  society	  	  (reflected	  in	  the	  new	  ‘coalitions	  and	  partnerships’	  terminology	  in	  UN	  publications)	  may	  signal	  a	  turning	  point	  in	  relations	  with	  NGOs.	  Certainly,	  some	  NGOs	  represented	  at	  the	  UN	  have	  expressed	  their	  dismay	  at	  the	  perceived	  ‘elevation	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  over	  and	  above	  NGOs’.	  To	  what	  extent	  this	  apparent	  change	  of	  policy	  reflects	  the	  differences	  in	  leadership	  culture	  between	  Kofi	  Annan	  and	  Ban	  Ki-­‐moon,	  is	  not	  yet	  reflected	  in	  current	  commentaries	  but	  may	  become	  more	  apparent	  over	  time.	  The	  capacity	  to	  include	  civil	  society	  voices	  in	  decision-­‐making	  exists,	  although	  the	  ECOSOC	  mechanism	  appears	  to	  operate	  in	  an	  inconsistent	  manner	  —	  in	  theory	  open	  to	  all	  issues	  and	  all	  applicants,	  apart	  from	  paedophile	  groups,	  Nazis,	  and	  organisations	  that	  propagate	  racial	  and/or	  religious	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255	  These	  properties	  of	  complex	  systems	  can	  be	  readily	  seen	  in	  the	  locked-­‐in	  constitutional	  
arrangements	  of	  long-­‐established	  policy-­‐making	  unions.	  For	  example,	  they	  are	  evident	  in	  the	  enduring	  
difficulties	  faced	  within	  the	  European	  Union,	  when	  Member	  States	  try	  to	  institute	  constitutional	  reforms	  
by	  way	  of	  the	  Treaty	  mechanism.	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discrimination	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2011d;	  UN	  Report,	  2004a;	  UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  1968b);	  Boström,	  2011;	  Willetts,	  2011a:	  19)	  —	  in	  practice,	  the	  accreditation	  criteria	  appears	  to	  be	  applied	  flexibly.	  	  	  Conversely,	  significant	  sectors	  among	  NGOs/TANs	  find	  the	  statutory	  obligations	  required	  for	  UN	  consultant	  accreditation	  —	  such	  as	  supporting	  the	  Charter	  and	  work	  of	  the	  UN	  and	  not	  engaging	  in	  ‘politically	  motivated’	  acts	  against	  Member	  States	  —	  incompatible	  with	  their	  ideological	  principles	  and	  posing	  insurmountable	  barriers	  to	  their	  participation	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system	  via	  the	  UN	  (See	  Annex	  4	  for	  further	  examples).	  	  	  Overall,	  NGOs,	  including	  TANs,	  appear	  to	  function	  in	  the	  United	  Nations	  system	  in	  an	  irregular,	  unpredictable,	  manner	  that	  is	  not	  easily	  comprehensible	  without	  taking	  into	  account	  my	  following	  examination	  of	  the	  distinctive	  nature	  of	  TANs	  (Chapter	  6)	  and	  the	  empirical	  case	  studies	  presented	  in	  Chapters	  7	  to	  9.	  The	  place	  and	  function	  of	  NGOs	  is	  formally	  established	  by	  the	  UN	  Charter,	  but	  in	  practice,	  NGOs	  appear	  to	  contribute	  to	  policy-­‐making	  at	  arm’s	  length,	  if	  at	  all	  —	  and	  Member	  States,	  on	  the	  whole,	  prefer	  to	  keep	  things	  that	  way.	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Chapter	  6	  
	  
6.	  Transnational	  Advocacy	  Networks	  	  	  
	  
Hope	  is	  like	  a	  path	  in	  the	  countryside:	  
originally	  there	  was	  no	  path	  —	  	  
yet	  as	  people	  are	  walking	  all	  the	  time	  in	  the	  same	  spot,	  
a	  way	  appears.	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6.1	  Introduction	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  examined	  the	  institutional	  mechanism	  for	  engagement	  and	  state	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  international	  system,	  as	  exemplified	  by	  the	  UN,	  and	  the	  world’s	  NGOs	  en	  bloc.	  I	  emphasised	  that	  the	  UN	  system	  does	  not	  formally	  differentiate	  between	  typologies	  of	  NGO	  and	  that	  this	  is	  a	  longstanding	  institutional	  norm.	  However,	  this	  thesis	  argues	  that	  this	  is	  anachronistic:	  an	  instance	  of	  path-­‐dependency	  in	  a	  complex	  system	  that	  was	  shown	  to	  be	  now	  struggling	  to	  accommodate	  an	  increasingly	  numerous	  and	  vociferous	  variant	  of	  the	  traditional	  NGO	  consultancy	  model.	  Mindful	  of	  the	  comments	  of	  leading	  political	  scholars257	  that	  TANs	  are	  an	  ‘elusive’	  social	  phenomenon	  to	  capture	  conceptually	  for	  analysis,	  this	  chapter	  explores	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  TAN	  variant,	  the	  context	  in	  which	  they	  developed,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  differ	  from	  traditional	  NGOs	  and	  establishes	  an	  eight-­‐point	  referent	  model	  by	  which	  they	  can	  be	  defined.	  The	  chapter	  then	  shows	  how	  political	  activism,	  no	  longer	  hostage	  to	  the	  gatekeeping	  predisposition	  of	  the	  traditional	  media,	  has	  been	  radically	  transformed	  in	  recent	  years.	  	  	  I	  aim	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  not	  only	  are	  TANs	  distinctly	  different	  from	  other	  NGOs	  and	  that	  they	  are	  politically	  important,	  but	  in	  what	  ways	  they	  are	  important,	  which	  among	  them	  appear	  to	  be	  important	  and	  whether	  they	  do,	  in	  fact	  possess	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256	  Chinese	  writer	  and	  dissident.	  	  
257	  For	  example	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  (1998:5),	  Risse,	  2002:255;	  Diani	  and	  McAdam,	  2003:1.	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powers	  widely	  attributed	  to	  them	  to	  significantly	  ‘change	  the	  behavior	  of	  states	  and	  of	  international	  organizations’	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:2).	  This	  thesis	  is	  premised	  on	  the	  assertion	  that	  contemporary	  TANs	  have	  emerged	  as	  a	  variant,	  or	  sub-­‐genus,	  of	  the	  traditional	  NGO	  operational	  model	  long	  associated	  with	  notions	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  service-­‐providing,	  crisis	  fieldwork,	  grassroots	  welfare	  and	  issue-­‐promotion;	  and	  ‘doing	  good’	  (Fisher,	  1997;	  Risse,	  2012:432;	  OECD-­‐DAC,	  2008).	  	  
6.2	  Overview	  of	  TAN-­‐specific	  arguments	  and	  assumptions	  Therefore,	  this	  chapter	  points	  out	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  aggressive	  brand	  differentiation	  and	  attention-­‐seeking	  activities	  adopted	  by	  many	  TANs	  have	  aroused	  concerns	  about	  whether	  they	  are	  prioritising	  the	  helping	  of	  others,	  versus	  primarily	  helping	  themselves	  (Weiss,	  2013:7;	  Cooley	  and	  Ron,	  2010;	  Polman,	  2010;	  Lecy,	  Mitchell	  and	  Schmitz,	  2010,	  229-­‐251;	  Polis	  Report,	  2012:2).	  Even	  within	  the	  sector,	  concerns	  have	  been	  raised	  that	  because	  of	  the	  exponential	  growth	  in	  access	  to	  mobile	  and	  social	  media	  technology	  and	  platforms	  NGOs	  are	  no	  longer	  considered	  the	  ‘de	  facto	  guardians’	  they	  once	  were	  (Polis	  Report,	  ibid).	  	  In	  advancing	  this	  premise,	  I	  intend	  no	  suggestion	  that	  present-­‐day	  variants	  to	  the	  earlier	  NGO	  model	  are	  therefore,	  necessarily,	  not	  constituted	  for	  ‘doing	  good’.	  My	  argument	  holds	  value	  judgments	  regarding	  the	  political	  causes	  taken	  up	  by	  TANs	  to	  be	  matters	  of	  subjective	  ideological	  opinion	  and,	  therefore,	  in	  most	  cases,	  unsuited	  to	  objective	  macroscopic	  perspectives	  of	  international	  relational	  phenomena.	  Moreover,	  it	  was	  shown	  in	  Chapter	  5	  that	  the	  UN	  has	  a	  statutory	  obligation	  to	  take	  an	  extremely	  broad	  view	  of	  NGOs	  and	  their	  concern	  issues	  and,	  apart	  from	  a	  few	  controversial	  exceptions258,	  does	  not	  discriminate	  on	  ideological	  grounds	  against	  the	  majority	  of	  NGOs	  that	  apply	  to	  have	  their	  voices	  heard	  in	  a	  consultancy	  role	  with	  the	  UN.	  Therefore,	  this	  thesis	  does	  not	  give	  undue	  weight	  to	  political	  theories	  that	  presuppose	  civil	  society	  groups	  fail	  to	  achieve	  their	  preferred	  outcomes	  in	  the	  international	  arena	  principally	  because	  they	  have	  ideological	  differences	  with	  other	  participants.	  Although,	  it	  is	  shown	  in	  the	  following	  case	  studies	  that	  some	  TANs	  do	  claim	  they	  are	  discriminated	  against	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258	  Organisations	  associated	  with	  paedophilia,	  or	  extreme	  violence,	  appear	  to	  encounter	  the	  strongest	  
opposition	  from	  Member	  States.	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because	  their	  arguments	  are	  unpalatable	  to	  state	  interests259,	  this	  premise	  obliged	  the	  study	  to	  investigate	  multi-­‐causality	  by	  encompassing	  a	  much	  wider	  range	  of	  possible	  constraints	  and	  barriers	  than	  ideological	  conflict.	  In	  taking	  this	  approach,	  the	  study	  was	  guided,	  inter	  alia,	  by	  the	  record	  of	  achievements	  of	  the	  international	  deliberative	  culture	  and	  the	  famous	  1984	  (‘We	  can	  do	  business	  together’)	  quote	  by	  the	  then	  British	  state	  leader,	  Margaret	  Thatcher,	  about	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  Mikhail	  Gorbachev,	  with	  whom	  she	  had	  massive	  ideological	  differences	  (Thatcher,	  1984)260.	  	  Firstly,	  I	  argue	  that	  TANs	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  new	  and	  distinctive	  genus	  of	  social	  collectivity:	  constituted	  by	  civil	  society	  organisations	  that	  have	  adapted	  to	  the	  conditions	  in	  their	  environments	  by	  adopting	  advocacy	  communications	  strategising	  as	  their	  principal	  tactic.	  This	  thesis	  suggests	  that	  when	  organisations	  engaging	  in	  micro-­‐	  and	  meso-­‐levels	  of	  systemic	  complexity	  aspire	  to	  communicate	  their	  external	  messages	  to	  audiences	  transnationally,	  or	  globally,	  they	  encounter	  complex,	  macro-­‐level,	  fitness	  landscapes	  and	  barriers	  that	  are	  uniquely	  challenging.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  the	  crux	  of	  this	  thesis	  that	  the	  essential	  characteristics	  of	  transnational	  'advocacy'	  NGOs	  	  (post-­‐NIEO261,	  media	  savvy,	  predominantly	  or	  exclusively	  'advocacy'-­‐oriented,	  Internet-­‐enabled,	  burgeoning	  rapidly	  since	  the	  1990s/millennium)	  differentiate	  them	  from	  other	  typologies	  of	  NGO	  operating	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  	  	  Although	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  TANs	  come	  in	  many	  sizes	  and	  political	  hues,	  I	  construct	  here	  the	  outlines	  of	  a	  TAN	  referent	  object	  that	  in	  its	  more	  complete	  formulations	  tends	  to	  exhibit	  the	  following	  advocacy-­‐oriented,	  non-­‐traditional	  international	  NGO	  characteristics:	  (a)	  prioritising	  of	  strategic	  corporate	  image	  marketing	  and	  public	  donor-­‐market	  outreach;	  (b)	  prioritising	  of	  self-­‐promotion	  and	  social	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259	  A	  recent	  example	  was	  the	  strategic	  NGO	  walkout	  at	  the	  COP19	  international	  summit	  by	  a	  number	  of	  
environmental	  and	  climate	  change	  groups	  (BBC	  Archive,	  2013d;	  GI	  news,	  2013e,	  GI	  news,	  2013f).	  
260	  Full	  quote:	  ‘[…]	  We	  can	  do	  business	  together.	  We	  both	  believe	  in	  our	  own	  political	  systems.	  He	  firmly	  
believes	  in	  his;	  I	  firmly	  believe	  in	  mine.	  We	  are	  never	  going	  to	  change	  one	  another.	  So	  that	  is	  not	  in	  
doubt,	  but	  we	  have	  two	  great	  interests	  in	  common:	  that	  we	  should	  both	  do	  everything	  we	  can	  to	  see	  
that	  war	  never	  starts	  again,	  and	  therefore	  we	  go	  into	  the	  disarmament	  talks	  determined	  to	  make	  them	  
succeed.	  And	  secondly,	  I	  think	  we	  both	  believe	  that	  they	  are	  the	  more	  likely	  to	  succeed	  if	  we	  can	  build	  up	  
confidence	  in	  one	  another	  and	  trust	  in	  one	  another	  about	  each	  other's	  approach,	  and	  therefore,	  we	  
believe	  in	  cooperating	  […]’	  (Thatcher,	  1984).	  
261The	  relevance	  of	  this	  distinction	  was	  explained	  in	  Section	  4.3.4.	  See	  also	  Woods	  (2008:247)	  and	  Van	  
Rooy	  (2004:	  47-­‐50).	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boundary	  construction262;	  and	  (c)	  adoption	  of	  advanced	  ‘new	  media’	  tools	  and	  sophisticated	  communications	  techniques	  to	  ‘transnationalise’	  the	  advocacy	  ‘voice.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  recognisable	  characteristics,	  which	  I	  argue	  are	  increasingly	  commonplace	  properties	  of	  TANs,	  the	  chapter	  prepares	  the	  ground	  for	  examining	  three	  specific	  cases	  of	  TAN	  relationships	  with	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system	  to	  find	  whether	  they	  ‘can	  do	  business	  together’.	  	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  scholars	  have	  approached	  TANs	  from	  a	  very	  wide	  range	  of	  sociological	  vantage	  points	  in	  a	  comparatively	  short	  timeframe.	  For	  example,	  some	  political	  scholars	  have	  foregrounded	  the	  ‘transnational’	  aspects	  of	  new	  forms	  of	  activism	  (e.g.	  Tarrow,	  2005),	  while	  others	  deem	  the	  ‘network’	  analogy	  to	  have	  special	  salience	  (e.g.	  Castells,	  2004b,	  2007,	  2012;	  Marsh,	  1998).	  Many	  scholars	  focus	  on	  the	  specific	  political	  advocacy	  campaigns	  waged	  by	  TANs	  (e.g.	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998),	  emphasising	  the	  moral	  aspects	  of	  the	  causes	  they	  champion	  and	  asserting	  the	  existence	  of	  universal	  norms.	  The	  complex	  realism	  approach	  adopted	  in	  this	  thesis	  accepts	  such	  theoretical	  plurality	  and	  relativity	  and	  the	  partial	  explanations	  that	  these	  diverse	  analytical	  frameworks	  can	  provide.	  However,	  I	  posit	  that	  understanding	  the	  advocacy	  function	  of	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks,	  rather	  than	  focusing	  solely	  on	  the	  contentious	  political	  issues	  on	  which	  they	  campaign,	  is	  the	  primary	  key	  to	  understanding	  their	  international	  relevance	  and	  fortunes.	  Moreover,	  advocacy	  is	  integral	  to	  politics	  and	  is	  not	  restricted	  to	  any	  particular	  policy	  domain	  (Prakash	  and	  Gugerty	  2010:1).	  	  	  Where	  Tarrow	  sees	  dissimilarities	  in	  national	  political	  cultures	  as	  constituting	  the	  main	  barrier	  to	  effective	  transnational	  advocacy	  —	  essentially	  bridging	  the	  political	  divides	  between	  the	  local	  and	  the	  global	  (2005:75)	  —	  I	  consider	  that	  the	  adversarial	  advocacy	  communications	  strategies	  typically	  employed	  by	  TANs	  may	  constitute	  a	  more	  significant	  barrier	  to	  them	  achieving	  their	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  My	  argument	  here	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  understanding,	  touched	  on	  earlier,	  that	  dissimilarities	  in	  national	  political	  cultures	  are	  a	  fact	  of	  everyday	  life	  in	  the	  dynamic	  relationships	  among	  the	  ideologically	  disparate	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system263.	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  since	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II264	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262	  See	  Section	  2.2.1	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  Tilly’s	  insights	  (2004)	  into	  the	  significance	  of	  ‘social	  boundary	  
mechanisms’	  in	  providing	  the	  socio-­‐cultural	  ‘glue’	  for	  collectivities.	  
263This	  includes	  all	  elements	  involved	  in	  the	  international	  system,	  not	  only	  nation	  states.	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the	  establishment	  of	  the	  UN	  and	  Bretton	  Woods	  institutions,	  the	  international	  system	  elements	  have	  striven,	  relatively	  successfully,	  to	  overcome	  their	  political	  dissimilarities	  —	  and,	  importantly,	  have	  managed	  to	  keep	  the	  international	  system	  largely	  functional	  and	  peaceful.	  	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  adversarial	  strategies	  typically	  associated	  with	  much	  TAN	  activism,	  transnational	  interactions	  in	  most	  spheres	  of	  globalising	  human	  activity,	  whether	  political,	  commercial	  or	  social,	  emphasise	  relationship-­‐building	  (especially	  the	  fostering	  of	  mutual	  trust,	  respect	  and	  understanding265)	  and	  conflict	  calming.	  Added	  to	  this,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  peremptory,	  results-­‐oriented	  and	  urgency	  imperatives	  of	  contemporary	  TAN	  advocacy	  —	  while	  essential	  to	  their	  public	  credibility,	  media	  interest,	  supporter	  attraction	  and	  retention	  and	  competitive	  fund-­‐raising	  —	  constitute	  additional	  resistances	  and	  barriers	  to	  their	  achievement	  of	  viable	  collaborative	  relationships	  in	  the	  international	  policy-­‐making	  arena.	  It	  hardly	  needs	  stating,	  but	  to	  the	  officials	  who	  are	  their	  counterparts	  in	  the	  international	  system	  these	  typical	  TAN	  imperatives	  are	  not	  concerns	  they	  share.	  	  	  Various	  scholars	  point	  out	  that	  TANs	  operating	  in	  global	  civil	  society	  are,	  in	  fact,	  distinctive	  in	  their	  rejection	  of	  formal	  engagement	  in	  existing	  political	  institutions	  and	  practices	  —	  what	  Chandler	  describes	  as	  ‘the	  anti-­‐politics	  of	  rejectionism’.	  (Chandler	  2004,	  2005;	  Castells,	  2012:	  234-­‐237),	  Indeed,	  Chandler	  opines	  that	  global	  civil	  society	  activism	  is	  distinctive	  not	  only	  in	  its	  rejection	  of	  state-­‐based	  processes	  ‘which	  force	  the	  individual	  to	  engage	  with	  and	  account	  for	  the	  views	  of	  other	  members	  of	  society’,	  but	  exhibits	  a	  broader	  problem:	  an	  ‘unwillingness	  to	  engage	  in	  political	  contestation’	  at	  all	  (2004).	  Thus,	  Chandler	  concludes:	  	   Advocates	   of	   global	   civil	   society	   ‘from	   below’	  would	   rather	   hide	   behind	   the	  views	   of	   someone	   else,	   legitimising	   their	   views	   as	   the	   prior	  moral	   claims	   of	  others—the	   courtly	   advocates—or	   putting	   themselves	   in	   harm’s	   way	   and	  leading	  by	  inarticulate	  example,	  rather	  than	  engaging	  in	  a	  public	  debate.	  The	  unwillingness	  of	  radical	  activists	  to	  engage	  with	  their	  own	  society	  reflects	  the	  attenuation	  of	  political	  community	  rather	  than	  its	  expansion.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264	  The	  dangerous	  years	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  are	  not	  overlooked,	  however,	  they	  were	  years	  of	  serious	  
tensions	  and	  comparatively	  contained	  proxy	  wars.	  World	  war	  involving	  the	  major	  nations	  was	  averted	  
and	  continues	  to	  be	  forestalled.	  
265An	  overview	  of	  relationship	  qualities,	  as	  acknowledged	  in	  substantive	  communications	  theory,	  is	  
presented	  in	  Chapter	  3.	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  While	  this	  might	  be	  a	  harsh	  perspective,	  it	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  studies	  that	  it	  is	  a	  commonly	  encountered	  alternative	  argument	  in	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  contributions	  of	  new	  voices	  in	  world	  politics.	  If	  this	  can	  be	  proven,	  it	  is	  a	  world	  away	  from	  the	  traditional	  notions	  of	  NGO	  humanitarian	  service-­‐providing,	  collaborative	  projects	  with	  states,	  and	  ‘doing	  good’.	  	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266	  Apart	  from	  the	  data	  on	  the	  failure	  aspect	  that	  appears	  in	  the	  literature	  and	  discourses	  	  (e.g.	  Keck	  and	  
Sikkink,	  1998:x;	  Secrett,	  2011a,	  2011b;	  Howell,	  2014),	  the	  high	  levels	  of	  frustration	  expressed	  by	  TANs	  
themselves	  are	  highlighted	  in	  the	  case	  studies.	  	  
	   175	  
Number	  of	  Organisations	  in	  the	  Yearbook	  of	  International	  Organizations	  
(by	  year,	  1909	  –	  2013)	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Figure	  6.1	  
Fig.	   6.1.	   This	   infograph	   indicates:	   (i)	   the	   enormous	   scale	   of	   INGO	   growth;	   (ii)	   that	   this	  
growth	  has	  occurred	   in	  a	  relatively	  short	  space	  of	  time;	  (iii)	   that	   is	  has	  proliferated	  from	  
the	  1980s	  onwards;	  and	  (iv)	  it	  supports	  Buzan’s	  observation	  that	  whatever	  else	  was	  going	  
on	   in	   the	   world	   of	   non-­‐government	   organisations	   during	   this	   time,	   ‘the	   transnational	  
domain	  was	  uncommonly	  lively’	  (UIA	  data,	  2013a;	  Buzan,	  2004:81).	  	  Some	  of	  the	  organisations	  in	  this	  field	  of	  transnational	  advocacy	  have	  become	  familiar,	  well-­‐established,	  advocacy	  brands:	  Greenpeace,	  Oxfam,	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  Amnesty,	  Médecins	  Sans	  Frontières,	  Transparency	  International,	  Make	  Poverty	  History,	  the	  International	  Red	  Cross.	  But	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  INGOs	  have	  not	  established	  a	  prominent	  advocacy	  voice.	  [To	  test	  this,	  one	  could	  ask:	  How	  many	  of	  the	  INGOs	  on	  the	  UN	  consultancy	  lists,	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  have	  a	  familiar	  ring?]	  And	  there	  are	  no	  records	  to	  show	  the	  numbers	  that	  have	  tried	  to	  form	  but	  failed,	  merged,	  morphed	  into	  something	  else,	  or	  disbanded.	  In	  fact,	  this	  thesis	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  case	  to	  be	  made	  that	  the	  globally-­‐recognised	  NGO	  brands	  mentioned	  above	  are	  renowned	  because	  they	  alone	  have	  the	  resources	  to	  sustain	  their	  desired	  corporate	  identity	  and	  communicate	  using	  the	  sophisticated	  tools	  and	  techniques	  that	  are	  not	  only	  characteristic	  of	  contemporary	  TANs	  but	  are	  absolutely	  necessary	  to	  their	  survival	  and	  efficacy.	  Whether	  they	  are	  termed	  CSOs,	  INGOs,	  NGOs,	  TANs,	  or	  something	  else,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  there	  is	  no	  global	  requirement	  for	  civil	  society	  organisations	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to	  be	  formally	  registered,	  and	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  these	  enterprises	  are	  not	  captured	  by	  the	  UIA’s	  statistics.	  	  	  It	  would	  be	  questionable	  to	  presume	  that	  the	  explosion	  in	  the	  numbers	  of	  TANs	  since	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  the	  global	  dissemination	  of	  vast	  amounts	  of	  information	  on	  protest	  issues,	  is	  due	  chiefly	  to	  there	  being	  greater	  numbers	  of	  issues	  to	  protest	  about	  and	  unprecedented	  numbers	  of	  people	  with	  concerns	  in	  their	  lives267.	  Critical	  and	  complex	  realism	  insists	  we	  look	  beyond	  agents,	  events	  and	  discourses	  and	  probe	  deeply	  into	  the	  underlying	  structural	  and	  systemic	  multi-­‐causality	  of	  events	  by	  asking:	  what	  else	  is	  going	  on	  in	  this	  socio-­‐political	  environment	  and	  why	  have	  these	  patterns	  emerged?268	  Having	  chosen	  the	  advanced	  tools	  of	  contemporary	  advocacy	  communications,	  many	  TANs	  have	  embarked	  on	  a	  course	  that,	  fuelled	  by	  both	  hopefulness	  and	  competitive	  pressures269,	  is	  shaping	  their	  place	  and	  function	  in	  the	  international	  system	  and	  their	  effectiveness	  in	  achieving	  their	  aims.	  Moreover,	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  selection	  of	  communications	  tools	  is	  shaping	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  organisations	  themselves	  —	  both	  positively	  and	  negatively	  —	  and,	  thus,	  influencing	  their	  future	  hopes,	  trajectories	  and	  achievements.	  	  
6.4	  Socio-­‐political	  context	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  what	  is	  new	  about	  the	  new	  transnational	  activism	  is	  its	  connection	  to	  both	  the	  current	  wave	  of	  globalisation	  and	  the	  changing	  structure	  of	  international	  politics	  (Tarrow,	  2005:4).	  While	  for	  many,	  globalisation	  provides	  the	  incentives	  and	  causes	  of	  resistance,	  Tarrow	  observed	  that	  it	  is	  the	  latter	  that	  offers	  activists	  focal	  points	  for	  collective	  action,	  provides	  them	  with	  expanded	  resources	  and	  opportunities,	  and	  brings	  them	  together	  in	  transnational	  coalitions	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267	  This	  issue	  is	  addressed	  separately	  in	  Section	  6.5,	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  ‘risk’	  portrayal	  and	  
dissemination.	  
268	  See	  Bhaskar	  (2011:	  2-­‐3)	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  critical	  realist	  perspective	  on	  investigating	  structural	  
causality.	  In	  similar	  vein,	  Aristotle	  wrote	  that	  he	  was	  fairly	  certain	  that	  ‘everything	  has	  been	  discovered’,	  
and	  that	  many	  times	  over,	  in	  the	  long	  course	  of	  history.	  Therefore,	  one	  ought	  to	  make	  full	  use	  of	  what	  
has	  been	  discovered,	  but	  also	  endeavour	  to	  investigate	  whatever	  has	  been	  overlooked	  (Aristotle,	  
1992:419).	  
269	  My	  argument	  here	  relates	  to	  the	  forces	  and	  emotions	  driving	  the	  tool	  selection,	  which	  I	  consider	  
have	  determinative,	  path-­‐dependent,	  effects.	  It	  does	  not	  contradict	  the	  observations	  by	  Castells	  
(2012:13-­‐14)	  and	  Brader	  and	  Valentino	  (2007:180-­‐181),	  that	  the	  emotions	  that	  are	  most	  relevant	  to	  
social	  mobilisation	  and	  political	  behaviour	  are	  varying	  degrees	  of	  fear	  and	  enthusiasm.	  According	  to	  
Castells	  (ibid),	  fear	  is	  directly	  related	  to	  other	  negative/avoiding	  emotions	  such	  as	  
anxiety/anger/outrage,	  while	  enthusiasm	  is	  a	  positive/approach-­‐stimulating	  emotion	  that	  is	  linked	  to	  
hope.	  Hope	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  project	  behaviour	  into	  the	  future	  and	  is	  fundamental	  to	  goal-­‐seeking	  
behaviour.	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campaigns.	  I	  consider	  the	  following	  background	  contextual	  issues	  are	  relevant	  to	  this	  argument:	  
 ‘Cycles	  of	  contention’	  phenomenon:	  Some	  contemporary	  TANs	  (notably	  Greenpeace)	  had	  their	  roots	  in	  the	  ‘cycle	  of	  contention’270	  that	  emerged	  in	  North	  America	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  early	  70s.	  This	  was	  a	  period	  of	  heightened	  collective	  activism	  that	  witnessed	  social	  movements	  moving	  from	  the	  fringes	  of	  society	  to	  the	  mainstream	  (Tarrow,	  1998;	  Klandermans	  and	  Staggenborg,	  2002:x).	  However,	  guided	  by	  Castells’s	  assertion	  that	  ‘the	  networked	  social	  movements	  of	  the	  digital	  age	  represent	  an	  entirely	  new	  species	  of	  social	  movement’	  (2013:15),	  this	  thesis	  focuses	  on	  the	  period	  that	  saw	  NGOs	  adopting	  new	  tools	  of	  advocacy	  communications	  —	  and	  suggests,	  consequent	  TAN	  emergence	  —	  from	  the	  1990s	  up	  to	  the	  present	  time.	  	  	  
 The	  rise	  of	  a	  ‘global	  conscience’	  and	  the	  ‘normative	  turn’	  in	  IR:	  With	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  contradictory	  trends	  in	  the	  emerging	  international	  system,	  namely	  globalisation	  and	  fragmentation,	  served	  to	  renew	  and	  reshape	  the	  debate	  concerning	  a	  universal	  human	  rights	  order	  (Patman,	  2000:7).	  Furthermore,	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  globalisation,	  particularly	  on	  developing	  countries	  and	  the	  world’s	  poor,	  were	  causing	  alarm	  (Stiglitz,	  2002:214;	  Scholte,	  2005:9).	  Hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  with	  globalisation	  trends	  and	  consequent	  increases	  in	  knowledge	  about	  the	  plight	  of	  vulnerable	  people	  throughout	  the	  world,	  academic	  research	  into	  social	  phenomena	  began	  to	  favour	  constructivist	  approaches271	  involving	  investigations	  made	  at	  the	  micro-­‐level	  of	  individual	  opinion	  and	  experience,	  albeit	  sometimes	  aggregated,	  rather	  than	  at	  the	  macroscopic	  level	  of	  observed	  systemic	  patterns,	  behaviours	  and	  large-­‐scale	  social	  structural	  consequences	  over	  time.	  Considering	  the	  greatly	  increased	  attention	  being	  given	  to	  humanitarian	  concern	  issues	  and	  the	  accompanying	  need	  to	  find	  the	  causes	  of	  social	  problems	  negatively	  affecting	  people	  in	  their	  immediate	  environments,	  it	  is	  understandable	  that	  post-­‐structural	  epistemologies	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270	  Tarrow	  is	  accredited	  with	  coining	  the	  term	  ‘cycle	  of	  contention’	  or	  ‘protest	  cycle’	  (1998).	  Foremost	  of	  
these	  collective	  actions	  were	  the	  West-­‐centric	  peace/anti-­‐nuclear,	  civil	  rights	  and	  women’s	  movements.	  
271	  Some	  scholars	  have	  observed	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  transnational	  social	  agency	  is	  fraught	  with	  
contradiction	  due	  chiefly	  to	  the	  advent	  and	  influence	  of	  constructivist	  ideas	  in	  international	  relations,	  
since	  the	  1980s	  (Adler,	  2002:95-­‐118;	  Buzan,	  2004:1;	  Brown	  and	  Ainley,	  2005:48).	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would	  be	  indispensable	  as	  a	  research	  tool	  when	  applied	  to	  relevant	  subjects.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  can	  learn	  much	  about	  how	  individuals	  understand	  their	  social	  world	  by	  asking	  them.	  However,	  we	  can	  learn	  only	  partially	  from	  the	  subjective	  understandings	  of	  individuals	  about	  other	  social	  worlds272,	  beyond	  their	  certain	  knowledge,	  in	  order	  to	  ascertain	  the	  ontological	  ‘big	  picture’.	  	  	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  prevailing	  social	  concerns	  of	  recent	  decades	  and	  consequent	  ‘normative	  turn’	  in	  IR	  theorising	  required	  that	  hitherto	  excluded	  voices	  be	  brought	  into	  political	  debates.	  In	  particular,	  there	  was	  unprecedented	  impetus,	  now	  on	  a	  transnational	  scale,	  to	  address	  the	  question:	  Who	  speaks	  for	  the	  voiceless?	  —	  as	  exemplified	  in	  Spivak’s	  seminal	  thesis	  ‘Who	  speaks	  for	  the	  subaltern?	  (1985).	  Indeed,	  ‘who	  should	  speak	  for	  the	  voiceless’	  also	  became	  more	  of	  an	  issue.	  Inevitably,	  the	  question	  of	  TANs	  as	  agents,	  or	  representatives,	  of	  principled	  issues	  and	  causes	  became	  a	  spirited	  debate.	  Who	  has	  the	  right	  to	  represent	  whom,	  was	  raised	  as	  a	  key	  concern,	  especially	  when	  it	  involved	  those	  who	  cannot	  speak	  for	  themselves	  	  —	  such	  as	  the	  poor,	  the	  marginalised	  and	  the	  oppressed;	  whales	  and	  sharks,	  Asiatic	  moon	  bears,	  coral	  reefs,	  rainforests,	  Mother	  Earth,	  the	  unborn,	  future	  generations,	  etcetera.	  This	  thesis	  suggests	  there	  are	  also	  fairness	  concerns	  to	  be	  considered	  about	  political	  policy	  processes	  that	  hear	  only	  those	  TANs	  that	  are	  endowed	  with	  the	  most	  competitive	  resources	  and,	  consequently,	  are	  able	  to	  generate	  the	  loudest	  voices.	  	  
 Emergence	  of	  multi-­stakeholder	  governance	  pressures:	  The	  international	  system,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  UN,	  attempted	  to	  establish	  greater	  engagement	  with	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  early	  21st	  century,	  particularly	  by	  embarking	  on	  policies	  of	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  governance,	  involving	  a	  greater	  role	  for	  civil	  society	  organisations	  to	  contribute	  fresh	  perspectives	  and	  voices.	  However,	  there	  remained	  incompatibilities	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  entities	  in	  attempting	  to	  engage	  with	  each	  other	  within	  the	  international	  institutional	  framework273.	  Individual	  Member	  States	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272	  The	  relative	  merits	  of	  ‘insider-­‐outsider’	  constructivist	  approaches	  and	  perspectives,	  discussed	  by	  Blee	  
and	  Taylor	  (2002:97-­‐98),	  are	  relevant	  to	  this	  methodological	  debate.	  
273	  For	  examples,	  see	  Pianta,	  2005;	  Syracuse	  University,	  2005;	  Mueller,	  Kuerbis,	  et	  al,	  2007.	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evidently	  struggled	  at	  times	  to	  accommodate	  civil	  society	  presence	  and	  acknowledge	  its	  legitimacy.	  Along	  with	  Waltz	  (2002:350)	  and	  Burchill	  (2013:80-­‐81),	  I	  argue	  that	  nation	  states	  have	  not	  been	  supplanted	  in	  this	  contest	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors	  and	  remain	  the	  basic	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system;	  they	  have	  not	  ‘withered	  away	  because	  of	  globalization’,	  according	  to	  Patten	  (2008:4;	  see	  also	  Risse,	  2002:255;	  Tarrow,	  2005:3,	  8;	  and	  Castells,	  2012:234);	  and	  nation	  states	  ‘continue	  to	  be	  the	  crucial	  links	  in	  any	  chain	  of	  global	  action	  against	  problems	  that	  cannot	  be	  dealt	  with	  by	  a	  single	  government’.	  Tarrow	  clearly	  shares	  this	  view	  (ibid)	  when	  he	  argues:	  	  […]	   while	   globalization	   provides	   incentives	   and	   themes	   for	   transnational	  activism,	   it	   is	   internationalism	  that	  offers	  a	   framework	   ,	  a	  set	  of	   focal	  points,	  and	  a	  structure	  of	  opportunities	  for	  transnational	  activists.	  	  Similarly,	  Castells	  concludes	  after	  studying	  social	  movements	  around	  the	  world	  (ibid):	  	  […]	   the	   critical	   passage	   from	  hope	   to	   implementation	   of	   change	  depends	   on	  the	  permeability	  of	  political	  institutions	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  movement,	  and	  on	  the	  willingness	  of	  the	  movement	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  process	  of	  negotiation.	  	  	  From	  these	  perspectives,	  it	  is	  only	  when	  social	  movements	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  pre-­‐set	  policy	  agendas	  of	  the	  political	  actors	  that	  political	  reform	  becomes	  possible	  (Tarrow,	  2005:3.8;	  Castells,	  2012:234).	  Thus,	  the	  possibility	  of	  obtaining	  ‘rewards’	  is	  a	  vital	  condition	  for	  successful	  relationships	  (Giddens,	  2002:61),	  while	  in	  regard	  to	  social	  capital	  in	  the	  interaction	  ritual	  market	  ‘persons	  with	  more	  resources	  can	  demand	  more	  from	  those	  they	  interact	  with’	  (Collins,	  2004:151).	  	  However,	  despite	  the	  relatively	  sudden	  arrival	  of	  the	  multifarious	  ‘global	  conscience’	  phenomenon	  in	  the	  international	  arena	  and	  the	  multi-­‐stakeholder	  governance	  initiatives,	  Castells	  reminds	  us	  (ibid:	  235)	  that	  the	  ‘fundamental	  challenge’	  from	  social	  movements	  concerns	  (a)	  their	  denial	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  ‘the	  political	  class’	  (over	  such	  matters	  as	  ‘lack	  of	  representativeness’,	  due	  to	  perceived	  inequalities	  of	  money	  and	  power	  that	  they	  consider	  lead	  to	  distorted	  electoral	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processes	  and	  biased	  electoral	  laws);	  and	  (b)	  the	  ‘denunciation	  of	  their	  subservience	  to	  the	  financial	  elites’.	  Moreover,	  in	  most	  cases:	  	   […]	   the	  movements	   do	   not	   trust	   existing	   political	   institutions	   and	   refuse	   to	  believe	   in	  the	  feasibility	  of	   their	  participation	   in	  the	  predetermined	  channels	  of	  political	  representation.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  Castells,	  admits,	  there	  is	  little	  room	  for	  a	  ‘true	  acceptance’	  of	  NGO	  involvement	  in	  social	  change	  policymaking	  processes	  by	  most	  governments,	  either.	  	  Support	  for	  these	  arguments	  can	  also	  be	  found	  in	  Tarrow’s	  work	  with	  contentious	  political	  advocacy	  groups	  who	  ‘shift	  the	  scale	  of	  contention’	  in	  waging	  their	  protests	  (Tarrow,	  2005:121).	  In	  fact,	  Tarrow	  claims:	  ‘[S]cale	  shift	  is	  an	  essential	  element	  of	  all	  contentious	  politics,	  without	  which	  all	  of	  contention	  that	  arises	  locally	  would	  remain	  at	  that	  level’.	  I	  argue	  that	  Tarrow’s	  conceptualisation	  is	  theoretically	  arid,	  in	  that	  it	  ignores	  the	  properties	  and	  powers	  of	  the	  relational	  fitness	  landscapes	  that	  condition	  these	  shifts,	  enabling	  and	  constraining	  all	  interactions.	  Instead	  of	  acceptance	  that	  these	  activities	  happen	  mechanically	  in	  a	  relational	  vacuum,	  I	  argue	  that	  complexity	  theorisation	  would	  see	  them	  more	  convincingly	  as	  encountering	  differing	  levels,	  or	  planes274,	  of	  complexity	  and	  resistance,	  and	  co-­‐evolving.	  All	  of	  which,	  I	  submit,	  tends	  to	  further	  substantiate	  my	  argument	  that	  Thucydidean	  insights	  regarding	  trust,	  wariness,	  uncertainty	  and	  debilitating	  suspicion	  in	  relationships	  apply	  as	  much	  to	  the	  burgeoning	  relationships	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  elements	  in	  the	  international	  system,	  as	  they	  do	  between	  states.	  	  Consequently,	  the	  lines	  of	  international	  argument	  are	  being	  continually	  redrawn	  and	  the	  multitude	  of	  new	  civil	  society	  actors	  coming	  into	  the	  international	  arena	  have	  meant	  that	  ideological	  differences	  between	  the	  more	  traditional	  realist,	  state-­‐centric,	  IR	  viewpoints275	  and	  those	  holding	  alternative	  political	  perspectives	  —	  such	  as	  international	  liberalist,	  neo-­‐liberalist,	  Marxist,	  and	  universal	  cosmopolitanist276	  —	  must	  now	  be	  considered	  in	  any	  analysis	  of	  engagement	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274	  This	  follows	  Wight’s	  theorisation	  of	  ‘structural	  relational	  logics’	  associated	  with	  planes	  of	  social	  
reality	  (2006:175,	  298-­‐299).	  However,	  the	  application	  of	  complexity	  insights	  that	  recognise	  planes	  of	  
differing	  complexity	  is	  mine.	  
275	  Dominant	  in	  IR	  thinking	  in	  the	  1980s,	  ‘90’s	  and	  still	  influential	  (Brown	  and	  Ainley,	  2005:40).	  	  
276	  See	  Beitz	  (1998)	  and	  Held	  (2010:ix-­‐xii)	  for	  definitions	  of	  cosmopolitanism.	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between	  states	  and	  these	  non-­‐state	  actors	  (Buzan,	  2004:	  1;	  6-­‐10;	  Brown	  and	  Ainley,	  2005:40-­‐59;	  Norris,	  2003:287-­‐297,	  and	  Cochran,	  1999:21-­‐22).	  For	  these	  reasons,	  this	  thesis	  holds	  that	  using	  only	  political	  lenses	  to	  analyse	  the	  TAN	  phenomenon	  as	  a	  large	  and	  growing	  cluster	  of	  collectivities	  serves	  to	  make	  them	  seem	  more	  confusing	  and	  elusive.	  	  	  In	  assessing	  the	  international-­‐level	  interface	  and	  degrees	  of	  responsiveness	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  it	  is	  also	  relevant	  to	  consider	  worldwide	  differences	  in	  (a)	  interpretations	  of	  democracy	  and	  democratic	  governance	  models	  and	  the	  degrees	  to	  which	  the	  nearly	  200	  governments	  worldwide	  are	  amenable	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  foreign,	  often	  Eurocentric,	  non-­‐state	  pressure	  groups;	  and	  (b)	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  greater	  numbers	  of	  politically	  disinterested	  individuals	  are	  actually	  being	  empowered	  and	  motivated	  by	  TANs	  	  to	  participate	  in	  national	  and	  international	  politics277.	  In	  fact,	  Prior	  (2007:111-­‐115)	  found	  that	  although	  Internet	  use	  increased	  political	  knowledge	  among	  citizens	  already	  interested	  in	  politics,	  it	  had	  the	  opposite	  effect	  among	  the	  previously	  apathetic278.	  As	  Hindman	  concluded	  (2009:	  8-­‐10,	  142):	  ‘It	  may	  be	  easy	  to	  speak	  in	  cyberspace,	  but	  it	  remains	  difficult	  to	  be	  heard’.	  
	  
Uncertainty	  and	  Risk	  In	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  many	  influential	  scholars	  have	  expressed	  concerns	  about	  the	  levels	  of	  perceived	  risk,	  danger	  and	  anxiety	  in	  the	  modern	  world	  and,	  importantly,	  the	  	  ‘manufactured’	  nature	  of	  that	  risk	  (e.g.	  Beck,	  1992,	  1994:2007:115,	  2009;	  Adams	  and	  van	  Loon,	  2000:2-­‐3;	  Giddens,	  1991a,	  1991b,	  1999,	  2002;	  Beck,	  Giddens	  and	  Lash,	  1994;	  Lash,	  1994:Ch.1;	  2000:47-­‐61).	  Archer	  considers	  ‘we	  still	  live	  in	  the	  crisis	  of	  late	  modernity’,	  in	  which	  the	  world	  has	  witnessed	  the	  growing	  rapidity	  and	  intensification	  of	  social	  change	  over	  the	  past	  quarter	  of	  a	  century	  (2013:2).	  In	  these	  circumstances,	  Giddens	  asserts	  (2002:28-­‐29),	  there	  is	  a	  new	  moral	  climate	  of	  politics,	  marked	  by	  polarised	  groups	  trading	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277	  Analysis	  of	  which,	  I	  suggest,	  cannot	  be	  done	  adequately	  through	  the	  literature,	  but	  only	  through	  
website	  analysis.	  To	  illustrate,	  the	  world’s	  largest	  online	  TAN,	  Avaaz,	  which	  claimed	  to	  have	  almost	  6.5	  
million	  ‘members’	  in	  November	  2010,	  was	  claiming	  over	  37	  million	  members	  in	  June	  2014	  (Avaaz,	  2010;	  
Avaaz,	  2014).	  This	  TAN	  describes	  itself	  thus:	  ‘Avaaz	  is	  the	  global	  online	  advocacy	  network	  that	  brings	  
people-­‐powered	  politics	  to	  global	  decision-­‐making’.	  
278	  Prior’s	  research	  defined	  apathy	  regarding	  political	  knowledge	  (among	  those	  with	  Internet	  access)	  as	  
having	  a	  low,	  or	  no,	  interest	  in	  news	  consumption	  but	  a	  high,	  or	  exclusive,	  interest	  in	  entertainment	  
programmes.	  This	  work	  is	  also	  cited	  by	  Hindman	  (2009:10).	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accusations	  of	  ‘scaremongering’	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  ‘cover-­‐ups’	  on	  the	  other,	  as	  people	  try	  to	  gather	  information	  that	  might	  enable	  them	  to	  calculate	  the	  severity	  of	  the	  risks	  they	  face	  in	  their	  lives.	  Similarly,	  Adam	  and	  van	  Loon	  argue	  (ibid)	  that	  perceptions	  of	  risk	  are	  manufactured	  not	  only	  by	  the	  application	  of	  technologies,	  but	  also	  by	  the	  work	  of	  ‘making	  of	  sense’	  of	  perceived	  technological	  outcomes279.	  	  To	  deal	  with	  this	  complexity,	  some	  are	  comforted	  by	  simplistic	  solutions.	  Evans	  (2012)	  suggests	  that	  in	  the	  face	  of	  risk	  and	  uncertainty	  we	  feel	  less	  powerless	  and	  impotent	  if	  we	  perform	  an	  action,	  something	  visible,	  or	  a	  ritual,	  	  (‘theatre’),	  to	  provide	  an	  illusion	  of	  control.	  It	  feels	  better	  than	  doing	  nothing.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  many	  are	  overwhelmed	  by	  their	  understandings	  of	  contemporary	  global	  challenges.	  In	  this	  context,	  popular	  forms	  of	  social	  protest	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  attempts	  to	  ‘colonise	  the	  future’	  and	  try	  to	  make	  it	  more	  certain	  and	  secure	  (Latour,	  2013:	  486;	  Giddens,	  1991b:114).	  Indeed,	  Giddens,	  asserts	  (1991b:125):	  ‘Individuals	  seek	  to	  colonise	  the	  future	  for	  themselves	  as	  and	  intrinsic	  part	  of	  their	  life-­‐planning’.	  	  But	  whilst	  knowledge	  of	  risk	  and	  fear	  impels	  some	  people	  to	  take	  direct	  action	  themselves,	  for	  others	  the	  opposite	  is	  true.	  It	  is	  a	  known	  paradox	  that	  heightening	  the	  urgency	  and	  magnitude	  of	  social	  challenges	  may	  actually	  postpone,	  or	  suppress,	  concerted	  actions	  to	  resolve	  them.	  Gould	  opines	  that	  the	  linguistic	  framing	  of	  issues	  in	  terms	  of	  disasters,	  daunting	  prospects,	  uncertainty	  and	  risk,	  often	  done	  for	  rhetorical	  effect,	  may	  lead	  to	  attitudes	  of	  defeatism	  and	  despair	  (2012:95-­‐96).	  According	  to	  Broom	  and	  Sha	  (2012:315)	  research	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  messages	  shows	  low-­‐fear	  messages	  achieve	  greater	  compliance	  than	  high-­‐fear	  messages	  —	  the	  latter	  producing	  defensive	  reactions	  that	  lead	  to	  distortion,	  denial	  or	  rejection	  of	  the	  message.	  Castells	  opines	  that,	  when	  faced	  with	  an	  external	  threat	  over	  which	  they	  have	  no	  control	  people,	  generally,	  are	  inclined	  to	  do	  nothing:	  ‘Thus,	  anxiety	  leads	  to	  fear,	  and	  has	  a	  paralyzing	  effect	  on	  action’.	  Beck	  asserts	  (1992:183;	  1994:9)	  that,	  paradoxically,	  people’s	  horizons	  dim	  as	  their	  perception	  of	  risks	  grow:	  	   For	  risks	  tell	  us	  what	  should	  not	  be	  done	  but	  not	  what	  should	  be	  done.	  With	  risks,	   avoidance	   imperatives	   dominate.	   Someone	   who	   depicts	   the	   world	   as	  risk	  will	  ultimately	  become	  incapable	  of	  action.	  The	  salient	  point	  here	  is	  that	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  See	  also	  Lyotard	  (1984).	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the	  expansion	  and	  the	  heightening	  of	  the	  intention	  of	  control	  ultimately	  ends	  up	  producing	  the	  opposite.	  	  One	  effect	  of	  TAN	  political	  interventions	  that,	  I	  suggest,	  has	  clear	  implications	  for	  the	  future	  of	  democratic	  systems	  of	  governance	  is	  the	  tendency	  to	  disparage	  elected	  authorities	  and	  politicians	  in	  demanding	  that	  they	  reset	  their	  priorities.	  However,	  elections	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  disillusioned	  voters	  tend	  not	  to	  switch	  their	  ideological	  dispositions:	  they	  respond	  by	  not	  voting	  at	  all	  (van	  der	  Eijk	  and	  Franklin,	  2009:91).	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  mass	  media	  highlighting	  of	  anti-­‐politician	  valence280	  claims	  could	  also	  have	  profound	  implications	  for	  heightening	  anxieties	  and	  skewing	  public	  opinion	  towards	  ill-­‐considered	  political	  priorities	  by	  activating	  ‘availability	  heuristics’	  and	  ‘availability	  cascades’,	  as	  identified	  by	  Kahneman	  (2011:8-­‐8;	  142),	  Kuran	  and	  Sunstein	  (1999).	  	  	  
‘Precautionary	  principle’	  	  One	  response	  to	  the	  globalised,	  creeping	  sense	  of	  anxiety,	  has	  been	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  co-­‐evolving	  coping	  mechanism:	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  ‘precautionary	  principle’	  (Giddens,	  2002:32;	  Beck,	  2009:11-­‐13).	  While	  Giddens	  recalls	  that	  this	  idea	  first	  emerged	  in	  Germany	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ecological	  debates	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  this	  thesis	  suggests	  that	  the	  influences	  were	  probably	  more	  widespread,	  since	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  was	  already	  enshrined	  in	  the	  UN’s	  World	  Charter	  for	  
Nature,	  adopted	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly	  in	  1982	  (UN	  GA	  Resolution,	  1982:11).	  	  	  	  The	  precautionary	  principle	  makes	  the	  proposition	  that	  in	  situations	  where	  planned	  human	  activities	  are	  likely	  to	  pose	  a	  significant	  risk	  to	  nature,	  and	  where	  any	  potential	  adverse	  effects	  are	  not	  yet	  fully	  understood,	  the	  activities	  should	  not	  proceed	  (ibid).	  In	  these	  circumstances,	  Giddens	  observes	  (2002:28-­‐29),	  there	  is	  a	  whole	  new	  dimension	  to	  risk:	  uncalculated	  and	  uncalculatable	  risk,	  and	  a	  new	  moral	  climate	  of	  politics.	  Nevertheless,	  Giddens	  points	  out	  (ibid:	  34):	  	  ‘Our	  age	  is	  not	  more	  dangerous	  —	  not	  more	  risky	  —	  than	  those	  of	  earlier	  generations,	  but	  the	  balance	  of	  risks	  and	  dangers	  has	  shifted’.	  There	  is,	  furthermore,	  confusion	  regarding	  what	  constitutes	  sufficient	  scientific	  evidence	  and	  persistent	  doubts	  about	  the	  competence	  being	  applied	  to	  complex	  political	  decision-­‐making,	  and	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  See	  van	  der	  Eijk	  and	  Franklin	  (2009:166),	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  use	  of	  valence	  issues	  to	  question	  the	  
competence	  of	  political	  rivals.	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disquiet	  about	  whose	  voices	  are	  being	  heard,	  or	  should	  be	  heard,	  and	  whom	  to	  trust	  (Beck,	  1992:57-­‐59;	  Giddens,	  2002:29-­‐35).	  	  	  
6.5	  Identification	  of	  contemporary	  TANs	  	  The	  challenges	  of	  defining	  TANs	  are	  not	  only	  faced	  by	  elements	  within	  the	  international	  system	  but	  by	  observers	  everywhere,	  who	  use	  the	  term	  as	  a	  form	  of	  convenient	  shorthand281.	  In	  fact,	  according	  to	  Willetts	  (2011:31),	  there	  is	  ‘no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  typical	  NGO’:	  	  	   NGOs	   are	   any	   organized	   groups	   of	   people	   that	   are	   not	   direct	   agents	   of	  individual	   governments,	   not	   pursuing	   criminal	   activities,	   not	   engaged	   in	  violent	  activities,	  and	  not	  primarily	  established	  for	  profit-­‐making	  purposes.	  	  At	  first	  sight,	  there	  is	  nothing	  especially	  complicated	  in	  understanding	  the	  individual	  words,	  or	  the	  label	  ‘Transnational	  —	  Advocacy	  —	  Network’.	  In	  fact,	  in	  a	  descriptive	  sense	  it	  aptly	  depicts	  groups	  of	  civil	  society	  activists	  engaged	  in	  advocating	  their	  principled	  issues,	  organised	  into	  networks,	  and	  operating	  across	  more	  than	  one	  state	  border	  (Brown	  and	  Ainley,	  2005:35).	  According	  to	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  (1998:2),	  a	  TAN	  is	  an	  organisation	  composed	  of	  social	  change	  activists	  ‘[…]	  working	  internationally	  on	  an	  issue,	  who	  are	  bound	  together	  by	  shared	  values,	  a	  common	  discourse,	  and	  dense	  exchanges	  of	  information	  and	  services’.	  	  	  	  Linguistically	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  definitions	  and	  interpretations	  of	  terms	  vary	  widely,	  considering	  the	  literature	  emanates	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  transnational	  sources,	  each	  with	  a	  distinct	  school	  of	  thought	  (Buzan,	  2004;	  Brown	  and	  Ainley,	  2005:	  11-­‐12).	  Even	  in	  English,	  the	  words	  ‘transnationality’,	  ‘advocacy’	  and	  ‘networks’	  each	  have	  their	  own	  theoretical	  paradigms	  to	  be	  considered	  (Marsh,	  1998),	  besides	  any	  further	  interpretations	  as	  to	  what	  these	  ideas	  might	  mean	  collectively.	  According	  to	  Risse,	  (2002:255)	  ‘transnational	  relations	  ’	  is	  a	  	  ‘rather	  elusive	  concept’	  and	  he	  considers	  it	  is	  actually	  ‘impossible	  to	  theorize	  about	  them	  in	  any	  systematic	  sense’.	  Others	  define	  transnational	  relations	  as	  ‘relationships	  that	  involve	  transactions	  across	  state	  boundaries	  in	  which	  at	  least	  one	  party	  is	  not	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281	  See	  Watts	  (2011:26-­‐27)	  for	  insight	  into	  the	  common	  device	  of	  imagining	  a	  ‘representative	  agent’	  with	  
the	  characteristics	  of	  an	  individual	  to	  represent	  the	  character	  of	  a	  group.	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state’	  (Brown	  and	  Ainley,	  2005:35),	  and	  this	  is	  a	  reasonable	  definition	  that	  I	  also	  adopt.	  	  	  In	  examining	  the	  literature	  for	  signs	  of	  TAN	  formation	  and	  activity	  (and	  applying	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  definition),	  I	  have	  found	  writers	  in	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  —	  and	  approaching	  from	  different	  perspectives	  —	  frequently	  ascribe	  transnational,	  advocacy	  and/or	  social	  network	  characteristics	  to	  all	  of	  the	  following	  typologies,	  and	  more:	  global	  social	  movements	  (GSMs),	  social	  movement	  organisations	  (SMOs),	  international	  social	  movements,	  global	  civil	  society,	  civil	  society	  organisations	  (CSOs),	  transnational	  collective	  actions,	  transnational	  campaigning,	  issue	  networks,	  international	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  (INGOs),	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  (NGOs)	  and,	  of	  course,	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks	  (TANs).	  Role	  delineation	  becomes	  confusing,	  for	  example,	  when	  NGOs	  form	  nodes	  in	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks	  and	  it	  becomes	  more	  difficult	  for	  observers	  to	  establish	  whether	  the	  TAN,	  or	  NGO,	  is	  the	  dominant	  voice	  in	  the	  advocacy.	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  claim	  international	  and	  domestic	  NGOs	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  all	  282	  advocacy	  networks	  (1998:9).	  	  	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  (ibid:	  30)	  identified	  three	  different	  types	  of	  transnational	  network,	  based	  on	  their	  motivations	  and	  each	  corresponding	  to	  different	  endowments	  of	  political	  resources	  and	  patterns	  of	  influence:	  	  	  
• Those	  with	  essentially	  instrumental	  goals,	  especially	  transnational	  corporations	  and	  banks;	  
• Those	  motivated	  primarily	  by	  shared	  causal	  ideas,	  such	  as	  scientific	  groups	  or	  epistemic	  communities;	  and	  	  
• Those	  motivated	  primarily	  by	  shared	  principled	  ideas	  or	  values	  (transnational	  advocacy	  networks).	  	  	  It	  is	  this	  third	  category	  that	  provides	  the	  focus	  for	  this	  thesis,	  being	  distinctive	  in	  the	  centrality	  of	  ‘principled	  ideas’;	  employing	  strategies	  that	  aim	  to	  use	  information	  and	  beliefs	  as	  tools	  to	  motivate	  political	  action	  and	  using	  this	  leverage	  to	  gain	  the	  support	  of	  more	  powerful	  institutions	  (ibid).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282	  Emphasis	  is	  my	  own,	  not	  in	  original.	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The	  ‘new	  media	  turn’	  in	  NGOs	  In	  response	  to	  what	  I	  saw	  as	  useful	  but	  outdated	  definitions	  of	  TANs,	  as	  identified	  above	  by	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  (1998:2)	  and	  to	  substantiate	  my	  premise	  that	  contemporary	  TANs	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  distinct	  from	  other	  typologies	  of	  NGOs	  and	  INGOs283,	  I	  developed	  the	  following	  eight-­‐point	  analytical	  framework	  for	  the	  study.	  While	  accepting	  the	  general	  validity	  of	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  referent	  criteria	  for	  TANs	  at	  a	  particular	  pre-­‐millennium	  point	  in	  time,	  this	  thesis	  posits	  that	  it	  does	  not	  go	  far	  enough	  to	  help	  us	  understand	  the	  contemporary	  TAN	  protest	  model.	  These	  scholars	  observed,	  almost	  two	  decades	  ago	  (ibid):	  	   Despite	   their	   differences,	   these	   networks	   are	   similar	   in	   several	   important	  respects:	  the	  centrality	  of	  values	  or	  principled	  ideas,	  the	  belief	  that	  individuals	  can	  make	  a	  difference,	  the	  creative	  use	  of	  information,	  and	  the	  employment	  by	  nongovernmental	  actors	  of	  sophisticated	  political	  strategies	  in	  targeting	  their	  campaigns.	  	  In	  particular,	  this	  thesis	  argues	  that	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  present-­‐day	  TANs	  express	  themselves	  in	  the	  world	  deserves	  a	  more	  analytically	  useful	  basis	  than	  to	  say	  they	  make	  ‘creative	  use	  of	  information’.	  Moreover,	  this	  thesis	  considers	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  conclusion	  that	  TANs	  share	  a	  capacity	  for	  adopting	  ‘sophisticated	  political	  strategies	  in	  targeting	  their	  campaigns’	  is	  largely	  mistaken.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  I	  suggest	  that	  in	  general	  TANs	  increasingly	  employ	  sophisticated	  communications	  strategies	  in	  their	  campaigns	  but	  that	  sophisticated	  political	  strategies	  are	  not	  an	  essential	  characteristic	  of	  contemporary	  TANs.	  In	  fact,	  when	  viewed	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  complex	  realism,	  the	  structural	  multi-­‐dimensionality,	  diversity	  of	  national	  interests	  and	  disparate	  complexity	  levels	  of	  the	  international	  landscape	  make	  the	  possibility	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  deploying	  ‘sophisticated’	  political	  strategies	  likely	  to	  be	  rare.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  sophisticated	  communications	  strategies	  are	  well	  in	  evidence	  in	  international	  politics	  and	  are	  becoming	  increasingly	  easy	  to	  deploy.	  	  	  Just	  as	  the	  field	  of	  IR	  witnessed	  a	  ‘normative	  turn’	  in	  the	  1980s284	  and	  a	  corresponding	  burgeoning	  in	  NGO	  activity,	  the	  contemporary	  form	  of	  globalised	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283	  This	  thesis	  is	  also	  guided	  by	  Castells’s	  specific	  insights	  into	  the	  communications	  practices	  of	  
contemporary	  activist	  networks	  (2007;	  2012).	  
284	  See	  Erskine	  (2010:36-­‐42)	  and	  Kurki	  and	  Wight	  (2010:28),	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  ’normative	  turn’	  in	  IR.	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NGO	  activism,	  or	  TAN	  model,	  might	  be	  usefully	  regarded	  as	  the	  ‘new	  media	  turn’	  in	  NGOs.	  The	  thinking	  behind	  this	  approach	  was	  three-­‐pronged:	  (a)	  Since	  TANs	  employ	  communications	  strategies	  and	  tools	  that,	  I	  suggest,	  are	  distinctively	  different	  (and	  determinative)	  from	  the	  attributes	  associated	  with	  traditional	  service-­‐providing	  NGO	  models,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  better	  understand	  what	  these	  are;	  (b)	  when	  we	  can	  better	  understand	  the	  characteristics	  that	  TANs	  possess,	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  assess	  also	  the	  intended,	  and	  unintended,	  effects	  these	  properties	  might	  have	  on	  the	  audiences	  and	  environments	  they	  aim	  to	  influence.	  In	  this	  way	  we	  can	  better	  evaluate	  also	  their	  fitness	  to	  pursue	  their	  diverse	  political	  advocacy	  agendas	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  landscape;	  and	  (c)	  I	  sought	  to	  develop	  a	  prototype	  for	  a	  more	  relevant	  referent	  for	  contemporary	  TANs:	  one	  that	  might	  be	  of	  practical	  value	  in	  empirical	  research.	  	  	  Moreover,	  I	  sought	  a	  referent	  model	  that	  could	  help	  to	  distance	  the	  contentious	  aspects	  of	  TAN	  activism	  in	  order	  to	  concentrate	  the	  research	  focus	  on	  the	  patterns	  of	  TAN	  behaviours	  and	  relational	  interactions	  with	  others.	  This	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  more	  compassionate	  means	  of	  analysing	  the	  international	  environment	  for	  TAN	  interactions,	  instead	  of	  alternatives	  that	  typically	  focus	  on	  the	  moral	  relativity	  of	  TAN	  issues,	  since	  difference	  of	  opinion	  is	  an	  unstable	  basis	  for	  theorising	  causality	  and	  outcomes	  in	  the	  international	  institutional	  arena.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapters	  4	  and	  5,	  the	  institutional	  arrangements	  of	  the	  international	  fora	  have	  been	  established,	  over	  many	  generations	  of	  deliberation,	  for	  the	  specific	  purpose	  of	  airing	  disagreements,	  hearing	  arguments	  and	  broadening	  participation	  in	  the	  interactions	  and	  discourses	  that	  lead	  to	  persuasion,	  compromise	  and	  change.	  The	  eight	  characteristics	  that	  I	  identify	  as	  commonly	  exhibited	  by	  TANs	  and	  having	  determinative	  effects	  on	  their	  international	  relationships	  were	  developed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  broad	  content	  analysis	  of	  the	  literature	  and	  discourses,	  an	  iterative	  process	  involving	  interrogation	  of	  the	  three	  case	  studies	  and	  personal	  experience	  of	  media	  and	  public	  communications	  practice.	  The	  properties	  that	  this	  thesis	  regards	  as	  the	  essential	  characteristics	  of	  a	  contemporary	  TAN	  model	  are:	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Transnational	  Advocacy	  Network	  Identification	  Matrix	  
Iconic	  attributes	  of	  case	  study	  TANs	   Present/Not	  
present	  
1.	  Distinctive,	  highly-­‐visual,	  transnational,	  
corporate	  identity	  
	  
2.	  Demonstrable	  prioritising	  of	  self-­‐
promotion	  
	  
3.	  Demonstrable	  prioritising	  of	  voice-­‐
amplification	  strategies	  in	  advocacy	  
	  
4.	  Highly	  media-­‐savvy*	  with	  unremitting	  
media	  relations**	  activity	  	  
	  
5.	  Demonstrable	  high	  degree	  of	  adoption	  
of	  sophisticated	  public/political	  
communications	  style	  and	  strategies# 	  
	  
6.	  Demonstrable	  high-­‐degree	  of	  adoption	  
of	  advanced	  information	  and	  
communications	  technologies	  
	  
7.	  Demonstrable	  high	  degree	  of	  strategic	  
social	  boundary	  mechanism	  construction	  §	  
	  
8.	  Demonstrable	  differentiation	  strategies	  
within	  the	  NGO	  sector	  and	  within	  the	  




*‘Media-­‐savvy’	   is	   interpreted	   as	   demonstrating	   a	   high	   level	   of	   awareness	   of	  
contemporary	  media	  and	  news	  generation.	  	  
**‘Media	  relations	  activity’	  is	  interpreted	  to	  mean	  strategic	  engagement	  with	  the	  
news	  media,	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   eliciting	   positive	   news	   coverage	   and	   ameliorating	  
unfavourable	  coverage.	  	  	  
#Sophisticated	   public	   communication	   strategies	   assessed	   are:	   brand	  
development,	  creative	  framing,	  ideological	  cue	  delivery	  and	  priming.	  	  
§’Social	  boundary	  mechanism’	  indicators	  assessed	  are:	  prominence	  and	  repetition	  
of	  symbols,	  heroes,	  myths,	  mysticism	  and	  empty	  signifiers,	  and	  representations	  of	  
otherness	  and	  ‘the	  other’	  in	  the	  organisation’s	  grand	  narrative.	  
	  This	  referent	  model	  is	  designed	  for	  the	  identification	  of	  contemporary	  TANs285.	  Although	  it	  is	  a	  truism	  that	  epochs	  cannot	  be	  identified	  until	  they	  have	  ended,	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  current	  phase	  of	  TAN	  development	  might	  in	  future	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  second-­‐generation	  model	  —	  a	  type	  of	  TAN	  2.0	  —	  that	  is	  an	  NGO	  offspring	  of	  the	  second	  generation	  of	  World	  Wide	  Web	  technology,	  Web	  2.0,	  which	  emerged	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.	  This	  phase	  of	  technological	  development	  saw	  the	  information-­‐sharing	  capabilities	  of	  static	  Websites	  further	  revolutionised	  to	  allow	  unprecedented	  levels	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285	  That	  is,	  TANs	  emerging	  during	  a	  period	  roughly	  conterminous	  with	  the	  popularisation	  and	  
affordability	  of	  globe-­‐spanning	  communications	  tools	  and	  best-­‐practice	  techniques	  (i.e.	  the	  1990s	  to	  the	  
present).	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of	  globe-­‐spanning	  interaction	  between	  information	  providers	  and	  information	  consumers	  and	  the	  advent	  of	  new	  social	  media	  —	  what	  Castells	  calls	  ‘mass	  self-­‐communication’	  (2007:239).	  In	  my	  proposition,	  we	  should	  expect	  to	  see	  a	  further	  generation	  of	  TANs	  emerging	  in	  a	  co-­‐evolutionary	  dynamic	  with	  the	  technological	  tools	  that	  will	  be	  contingent	  on	  the	  advent	  of	  Web	  3.0.	  
6.6	  Outspoken	  champions	  of	  causes	  	  There	  appears	  to	  be	  little	  argument	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  advocacy	  networks	  can	  generate	  attention	  to	  new	  issues	  and	  help	  to	  set	  international	  agendas	  when	  they	  mobilise	  their	  networks	  and	  provoke	  media	  attention,	  debates,	  hearings	  and	  meetings	  on	  issues	  that	  previously	  had	  not	  been	  a	  matter	  of	  public	  debate	  (Biersteker,	  2002:170;	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:25).	  However,	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  concede	  (ibid:x).:	  	  	  The	   ideas	  and	  principles	   that	  participants	  of	   these	  networks	  espouse	  do	  not,	  all	  by	  themselves,	  produce	  these	  changes.	  Networks	  frequently	  fail	  to	  achieve	  their	   goals;	   in	   many	   instances,	   serious	   transnational	   problems	   exist	   but	   no	  network	  is	  formed.	  	  	  Leaving	  aside	  for	  the	  moment	  speculation	  on	  why	  they	  might	  fail	  to	  meet	  their	  own	  aspirations,	  or	  champion	  some	  causes	  and	  not	  others286,	  it	  is	  apposite	  to	  ask:	  Who	  then	  are	  these	  ‘others’	  on	  whose	  behalf	  advocacy	  networks	  act	  as	  non-­‐elected	  agents,	  or	  representatives?	  The	  literature	  reveals	  that	  the	  three	  central	  issue	  areas	  of	  contemporary	  advocacy	  are	  human	  rights;	  the	  environment	  or	  ‘nature’;	  and	  women’s	  rights	  and	  other	  broad	  humanitarian	  interests	  (Brown	  and	  Ainley,	  2005:208-­‐210;	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:	  ix).	  People	  suffering	  physical	  harm,	  especially	  the	  vulnerable	  or	  innocent,	  are	  particularly	  compelling	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  ibid:	  27).	  Castells	  suggests	  that	  movements	  based	  on	  such	  issues	  arise	  to	  challenge	  what	  activists	  often	  define	  as	  ‘global	  capitalism’;	  patriarchalism	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  women,	  children	  and	  sexual	  minorities;	  and	  productivism,	  in	  defense	  of	  a	  holistic	  vision	  of	  the	  natural	  environment	  and	  an	  alternative	  way	  of	  life.	  This,	  I	  would	  point	  out,	  clearly	  reflects	  the	  socio-­‐historical	  ‘global	  conscience’	  landscape	  discussed	  earlier.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286	  It	  is	  pointed	  out	  in	  Chapter	  8	  that	  NGOs	  themselves	  have	  voiced	  concerns	  over	  what	  they	  view	  as	  
imbalances	  and	  inconsistencies	  resulting	  from	  ‘media-­‐driven	  attention’	  that	  popularises	  some	  
humanitarian	  crises	  but	  leads	  to	  the	  neglect	  of	  others	  that	  ‘fail	  to	  grip	  the	  media’s	  attention’	  (Collinson	  
et	  al,	  2010;	  OI	  Report,	  2012;	  U.S.	  NSS,	  2002	  and	  2010).	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6.6.1	  Advocacy	  communications	  as	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  	  In	  demonstrating	  the	  importance	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  advocacy-­‐oriented	  analytical	  framework	  adopted	  for	  this	  thesis,	  I	  would	  first	  pose	  a	  question:	  	  If	  present-­‐day	  TANs	  are	  constituted	  by	  the	  communications	  technologies	  and	  techniques	  they	  adopt,	  what	  would	  happen	  if	  these	  tools	  were	  removed?	  I	  suggest	  the	  answer	  would	  be:	  no	  tools,	  no	  TANs.	  Indeed,	  Castells	  asserts	  that	  the	  networked	  social	  movements	  of	  today	  ‘could	  not	  exist	  without	  the	  Internet’	  (2012:234).	  It	  is	  further	  argued	  that	  a	  communications	  lens	  is,	  therefore,	  indispensable	  to	  examining	  the	  tools	  TANs	  select,	  the	  strategies	  they	  devise	  to	  express	  their	  purposes,	  and	  the	  resulting	  disparate	  fortunes	  of	  TANs.	  This	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  to	  indicate	  that	  this	  thesis	  is	  in	  the	  thrall	  of	  ‘cyber-­‐utopianism’,	  Internet-­‐centrism	  (Morazov	  (2011:	  xiii-­‐xvii),	  or	  technology	  fetishism	  (Dean,	  2009:	  31-­‐33).	  	  	  Instead,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  new,	  affordable,	  tools	  by	  themselves	  are	  of	  little	  use	  in	  political	  activism:	  it	  is	  the	  levels	  of	  skill	  and	  sophistication	  in	  their	  selection	  and	  use	  that	  have	  important	  implications	  for	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs	  in	  the	  international	  system,	  the	  quality	  of	  their	  relationships	  with	  other	  international	  actors	  with	  whom	  they	  engage,	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  all	  of	  these	  relationships	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  each	  TAN	  in	  achieving	  its	  preferred	  outcomes.	  Castells	  (2007)	  asserts	  that	  ‘politics	  is	  based	  on	  socialised	  communication’	  —	  on	  the	  capacity	  to	  influence	  people’s	  minds:	  	   […]	  power	  relations,	   that	   is	   the	  relations	  that	  constitute	  the	  foundation	  of	  all	  societies,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   processes	   challenging	   institutionalized	   power	  relations	  are	  increasingly	  shaped	  and	  decided	  in	  the	  communications	  field.	  
	  Moreover,	  Calabrese	  (2004)	  maintains	  that	  communication	  issues	  will	  be	  ‘vital’	  for	  the	  future	  of	  a	  democratic	  and	  egalitarian	  global	  civil	  society.	  Accordingly,	  I	  suggest,	  these	  observations	  raise	  a	  number	  of	  obvious	  questions:	  (1)	  Why	  do	  TANs	  routinely	  employ	  simplistic,	  micro-­‐sociological	  understandings	  in	  their	  communications	  practices	  that	  are	  ostensibly	  focused	  on	  positively	  influencing	  complex	  international,	  evidence-­‐based,	  policy-­‐making?	  And	  (2):	  Have	  important	  communications	  principles	  been	  blind	  spots	  for	  some	  TANs	  in	  their	  quest	  to	  install	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popular,	  mainstream,	  understandings	  of	  complex	  issues	  on	  the	  international	  policy-­‐making	  agenda	  and,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  sowing	  the	  seeds	  of	  self-­‐defeat?	  
	  Since	  around	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  millennium,	  the	  majority	  of	  public	  relations	  and	  communication	  professionals	  worldwide	  have	  embraced	  the	  term	  and	  connotations	  of	  ‘advocacy’	  as	  a	  primary	  function	  of	  public	  relations287	  (Fitzpatrick	  and	  Bronstein,	  2006:ix,	  24;	  PRSA,	  2013).	  Thus,	  ‘advocacy’	  is	  now	  widely	  understood	  within	  the	  international	  communications	  paradigm	  to	  be	  a	  salient	  form	  of	  communications	  practice.	  In	  their	  study	  of	  advocacy	  NGOs	  and	  collective	  action,	  Prakash	  and	  Gugerty	  claim	  the	  term	  ‘advocacy’	  ‘suggests	  systematic	  efforts	  (as	  opposed	  to	  sporadic	  outbursts)	  by	  actors	  that	  seek	  to	  further	  specific	  policy	  goals’288.	  Moreover,	  they	  opine	  ‘[A]dvocacy	  is	  integral	  to	  politics	  and	  not	  restricted	  to	  any	  particular	  policy	  domain’	  (2010:1).	  	  	  Nevertheless,	  I	  argue	  that	  despite	  all	  of	  the	  recent	  advances	  in	  communications	  technologies	  and	  skills,	  the	  basic	  understandings	  of	  acceptable	  human	  communications	  qualities	  have	  not	  changed	  significantly.	  This	  is	  expressed	  in	  Florini’s	  belief	  that	  (2000:234):	  	   All	   civil	   society	   advocacy	   stands	   or	   falls	   on	   the	   persuasiveness	   of	   the	  information	   it	  provides.	  Over	   time,	  groups	  whose	   facts	  and	  arguments	  prove	  unfounded	  discredit	  themselves.	  	  
	  
6.6.2	  Communication	  strategies	  adopted	  by	  TANs	  	  
In	  this	  section	  I	  discuss	  just	  some	  of	  the	  sophisticated	  communications	  strategies	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287	  In	  2000,	  the	  Public	  Relations	  Society	  of	  America	  acknowledged	  ‘advocacy’	  for	  the	  first	  time	  as	  one	  of	  
the	  core	  values	  of	  public	  relations.	  While	  agreeing	  that	  the	  paradigm	  shift	  that	  sees	  public	  relations	  in	  
terms	  of	  an	  advocacy	  function	  is	  now	  most	  cited	  by	  contemporary	  practitioners,	  Fawkes	  (2011:17)	  notes	  
that	  advocacy-­‐model	  thinking	  is	  strongly	  U.S.-­‐	  based	  and	  that	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  other	  substantive	  
theoretical	  approaches	  to	  public	  relations	  that	  also	  have	  their	  supporters.	  The	  observation	  that	  this	  new	  
wave	  of	  advocacy	  thinking	  emerged	  in	  the	  U.S.	  does	  nothing	  to	  undermine	  my	  premise	  that	  there	  exists	  
a	  now	  dominant	  PR	  concept	  of	  ‘advocacy’	  and	  that	  it	  applies	  perfectly	  to	  modern	  TANs.	  In	  fact,	  Fawkes’s	  
observations	  strongly	  support	  my	  argument	  that	  the	  most	  highly	  visible	  TANs,	  particularly	  those	  
attracting	  attention	  from	  the	  mainstream	  mass	  media,	  have	  evidently	  adopted	  international	  brand	  
marketing	  and	  communications	  practices	  that	  were	  developed	  primarily	  for	  multinational	  enterprises	  
headquartered	  in	  the	  U.S.	  The	  cross-­‐pollination	  of	  ideas	  and	  the	  migration	  of	  communications	  personnel	  
across	  all	  sectors	  of	  society,	  and	  transnationally,	  are	  also	  highly	  relevant	  to	  this	  thesis.	  As	  will	  be	  shown	  
in	  Chapters	  7	  to	  9,	  these	  tendencies	  are	  pronounced	  in	  each	  of	  the	  three	  case	  studies	  examined.	  	  	  
288	  See	  also	  Kahneman,	  particularly	  in	  regard	  to	  ‘availability	  entrepreneurs’	  and	  ‘availability	  cascades’	  
(2011:142);	  Kuran	  and	  Sunstein	  (1999);	  and	  Rogers	  and	  Frey	  (2014).	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and	  tactics	  that	  can	  be	  observed	  by	  way	  of	  an	  external	  communications	  audit	  of	  TAN	  practices.	  This	  empirical	  process	  included	  data	  collection	  and	  analysis	  of	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  communications	  outputs	  by	  TANs,	  particularly	  the	  case	  study	  models.	  It	  also	  included	  my	  analysis	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  data	  set	  of	  news	  media	  discourses,	  as	  reflected	  in	  the	  Bibliography.	  Based	  on	  this,	  I	  argue	  that	  organisations	  that	  most	  closely	  resemble	  the	  TAN	  referent	  for	  this	  thesis	  also	  display	  signs	  of	  commoditisation	  of	  contemporary	  communications	  ‘global	  best	  practice’	  technologies	  and	  practices289.	  These	  public	  communications	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  are	  the	  product	  of	  strategic	  corporate	  decisions	  and	  are	  designed	  to	  elicit	  predetermined	  responses	  from	  targeted	  audiences	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  organisation’s	  preferred	  outcomes	  and	  goals.	  Those	  commonly	  observed290	  as	  being	  used	  by	  TANs	  include:	  	  
 Framing:	  Of	  all	  the	  rhetorical	  techniques	  typically	  practiced	  by	  TANs,	  strategic	  framing	  and	  reframing	  of	  issues	  is	  arguably	  the	  most	  well	  known,	  even	  by	  lay	  audiences291.	  For	  example,	  packaging	  information	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘the	  crisis’	  or	  ‘the	  catastrophe’	  is	  commonly	  seen	  in	  TAN	  advocacy	  framing292.	  	  	  
 Priming	  and	  cognitive	  cues:	  It	  is	  to	  be	  expected	  that	  the	  primary	  tactic	  of	  TANs	  is	  to	  strategically	  communicate	  information	  to	  the	  actors	  within	  their	  networks	  and	  to	  their	  target	  audiences	  (Brader	  and	  Valentino,	  2007:184,	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:2,	  8).	  Among	  the	  cognitive	  cues	  this	  study	  found	  to	  be	  most	  in	  evidence	  in	  TAN	  communications	  were	  (i)	  stereotypes,	  which	  can	  lead	  people	  to	  habitually	  look	  for	  a	  particular	  undesirable,	  or	  desirable,	  trait	  or	  inconsistency	  in	  another;	  (ii)	  associative	  biases	  with	  things	  that	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289	  This	  argument	  that	  many	  TANS	  are	  all	  beginning	  to	  look	  the	  same,	  act	  the	  same,	  use	  identical	  
commoditised	  activist	  strategies	  and	  promote	  similar	  populist	  political	  messages,	  is	  evidenced,	  inter	  
alia,	  by	  the	  Websites	  of	  the	  following	  prominent	  advocacy	  organisations:	  Avaaz	  
(http://www.avaaz.org/en/);	  CAFOD	  (http://www.cafod.org.uk/	  );	  Caritas:	  (http://www.caritas.org/);	  
Christian	  Aid	  (https://www.christianaid.org.uk/	  );	  Tearfund	  (http://www.tearfund.org/);	  Friends	  of	  the	  
Earth	  (http://www.foei.org/);	  Greenpeace	  International	  (http://www.greenpeace.org/international/);	  
Oxfam	  International	  (http://www.oxfam.org/);	  and	  Save	  the	  Children	  International	  
(http://www.savethechildren.net/).	  
290	  For	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  discussion	  of	  these	  terms,	  see	  Annex	  5.	  
291	  See	  Goffman	  (1986)	  for	  his	  seminal	  work	  on	  perspective	  framing.	  
292	  Kahneman	  argues	  (2011:	  301,	  367)	  that	  human	  brains	  have	  a	  mechanism	  that	  gives	  priority	  to	  bad	  
news,	  so	  we	  pay	  far	  more	  attention	  to	  alerts	  about	  threats	  and	  warnings	  that	  we	  do	  to	  information	  
about	  opportunities,	  or	  good	  news.	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liked	  or,	  especially,	  disliked;	  and	  (iii)	  priming	  for	  receptiveness	  to	  ideas	  and	  suggestions	  (see	  Kahneman,	  2011:	  50-­‐58).	  	  	  
 ‘Fuzzy’	  brand	  promises:	  TANs	  often	  employ	  the	  communications	  technique	  of	  designing	  ‘fuzzy	  brand	  promises’	  that	  trigger	  emotional	  responses	  with	  widely	  diversified	  audiences.	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  the	  setting	  of	  ‘fuzzy’,	  idealised	  but	  humanly	  unactualisable	  goals,	  is	  a	  critical	  performance	  indicator	  in	  evaluating	  the	  disparate	  fortunes	  of	  TANs,	  while	  the	  setting	  and	  advocacy	  of	  clearly-­‐defined	  goals	  that	  are	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  possibility	  and	  are	  aligned	  with	  prudent	  strategies,	  is	  intrinsic	  to	  understanding	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  handful	  of	  most	  often	  cited	  TAN	  success	  stories:	  the	  campaigns	  to	  ban	  land	  mines	  and	  cluster	  bombs,	  end	  slavery	  in	  the	  USA,	  extend	  suffrage	  to	  women,	  establish	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court,	  regulate	  conflict	  diamonds,	  and	  end	  foot	  binding	  in	  China	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:	  Ch.2;	  Lecy	  et	  al,	  2010:236).	  	  
	  
 ‘Validity	  of	  voice’	  authentication:	  Deployment	  of	  this	  tactic	  is	  clearly	  evident	  in	  the	  strategic	  presentation	  of	  advocacy	  material	  by	  TANs.	  Examples	  include	  the	  relating	  of	  personal	  experiences	  of	  advocates	  and	  their	  expertise,	  novelty	  such	  as	  the	  deployment	  of	  celebrity	  influencers,	  newsworthiness	  of	  the	  information	  conveyed,	  and	  personal	  accounts	  by	  victims	  of	  the	  relief	  brought	  by	  TAN	  interventions.	  	  
 Perlocution:	  Perlocutionary	  communications	  tactics	  are	  often	  evident	  in	  TAN	  communications	  —	  that	  is,	  linguistic	  forms	  that	  have	  action	  as	  their	  aim	  and	  imply	  action	  but	  do	  not	  embody	  an	  explicit	  call	  for	  the	  receiver	  to	  take	  an	  action	  (Habermas293,	  1989:133;	  Miller,	  2005:147).	  Oblique	  forms	  of	  persuading,	  or	  convincing,	  may	  fall	  into	  this	  category294.	  Another	  form	  is	  the	  use	  of	  language	  to	  confuse	  the	  boundaries	  between	  ‘seriousness’	  and	  ‘play’	  (Habermas,	  ibid).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293	  This	  communications	  theory	  is	  presented	  in	  Volume	  1	  of	  Habermas’s	  magnum	  opus,	  The	  Theory	  of	  
Communicative	  Action	  (1989:331).	  
294	  I	  posit	  that	  an	  accessible	  example	  of	  this	  linguistic	  device	  is	  Mark	  Antony’s	  funeral	  oration	  in	  
Shakespeare’s	  Julius	  Caesar,	  during	  which	  the	  prevailing	  sentiment	  of	  a	  crowd	  is	  manipulated	  from	  one	  
extreme	  to	  another.	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  Figure	  6.4	  An	  example	  of	  an	  intentionally	  confusing	  strategic	  communication.	  	   Significant	  evidence	  of	  these	  techniques	  was	  particularly	  found	  in	  the	  case	  study	  on	  Greenpeace	  International	  	  (GI	  news,	  2009a;	  GP	  UK	  news,	  2013;	  Weyler,	  2012).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  modern	  communications	  understanding	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  singular	  ‘general	  public’	  but	  many	  ‘publics’	  to	  be	  strategically	  approached	  at	  multiple	  levels	  of	  analysis,	  each	  with	  its	  own	  scale	  of	  complexity,	  structural	  influences,	  properties,	  resistances	  and	  limitations295.	  (Broom	  and	  Sha,	  2013:	  291;	  Rawlins	  and	  Bowen,	  2004:718;).	  ‘Public	  opinion’	  is	  a	  collective	  phenomenon	  not	  an	  individual	  phenomenon,	  van	  der	  Eijk	  and	  Franklin	  claim296.	  (2009:155).	  And	  because	  individuals	  differ	  from	  one	  another,	  what	  works	  to	  influence	  one	  individual	  may	  not	  work	  with	  another.	  Guided	  by	  Granovetter’s	  study	  of	  ‘threshold’	  models	  of	  collective	  behaviour	  (1978),	  this	  thesis	  argues	  that	  untargeted,	  inexpert,	  advocacy	  that	  is	  framed	  to	  heighten	  the	  emotional	  responses	  of	  communities-­‐at-­‐large,	  risk	  creating	  unpredictable	  consequences.	  	  	  Thus,	  I	  suggest	  that,	  when	  a	  communications	  lens	  is	  applied,	  the	  concept	  of	  	  ‘people	  power’	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  theoretically	  unstable	  and	  politically	  naïve.	  This	  is	  because	  there	  is	  no	  one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all	  in	  a	  world	  where	  each	  individual	  is	  unique.	  However,	  collectivities	  can	  be	  formed	  between	  approximately	  like-­‐minded	  individuals	  on	  certain	  levels	  of	  their	  interests.	  Bonds	  of	  unity	  are	  thus	  formed	  when	  our	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295	  See	  Kahneman	  (2011:142)	  for	  insights	  into	  ‘availability	  cascades’	  and	  ‘availability	  entrepreneurs’.	  
296	  See	  van	  der	  Eijk	  and	  Franklin,	  2009:154-­‐155	  for	  more	  on	  ‘the	  magic	  of	  aggregation’,	  by	  which	  
individual	  opinions	  cannot	  be	  aggregated	  to	  constitute	  ‘public	  opinion’,	  since	  different	  aspects	  of	  it	  
come	  from	  different	  individuals,	  but	  ‘the	  public’	  as	  a	  collective	  entity	  can	  be	  very	  knowledgeable	  on	  
topics	  of	  salience	  to	  the	  component	  members	  and	  can	  very	  quickly	  acquire	  knowledge	  on	  new	  areas	  of	  
interest.	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metaphors	  for	  understanding	  the	  world	  are	  shared,	  or	  are	  believed	  to	  be	  shared,	  by	  others.	  In	  particular,	  the	  human	  tendency	  to	  generalise	  from	  negative	  specifics	  —	  such	  as	  in	  communicating	  fears	  of	  risks	  and	  seeking	  to	  maximise	  support	  from	  others	  in	  overcoming	  them297	  —	  can	  be	  activated	  now	  by	  emotional	  triggers	  that	  are	  often	  communicated	  electronically	  across	  formerly	  impenetrable	  barriers	  of	  state	  boundaries,	  ethnicity,	  language,	  parochial	  knowledge,	  social	  status,	  gender	  and	  age.	  Complexity	  theories	  also	  cast	  doubt	  on	  the	  possibility	  that	  assumptions	  about	  individuals	  can	  be	  extrapolated	  to	  provide	  us	  with	  knowledge	  about	  the	  unknowable	  preferences	  and	  properties	  of	  collectives,	  such	  as	  crowds	  (Watts,	  ibid;	  Geyer	  and	  Rihani,	  2010:29).	  However,	  this	  study	  found	  that	  some	  TANs	  frequently	  make	  exaggerated	  claims	  for	  the	  political	  instrumentality	  of	  ‘people	  power’,	  increasingly	  so	  since	  the	  arrival	  of	  interactive	  new	  media	  tools.	  The	  notion	  that	  political	  mass	  mobilisation	  follows	  information	  delivery	  and	  consequent	  awareness	  is	  a	  popular	  meme	  in	  online	  activism,	  which	  has	  reified	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘people	  power’.	  For	  example,	  the	  advocacy	  network	  ’38	  Degrees’	  (Slogan:	  ‘38	  
degrees	  is	  the	  angle	  at	  which	  an	  avalanche	  happens’),	  claims	  one	  million	  online	  members	  and	  is	  a	  typical	  example	  of	  this	  mechanical,	  quantitative,	  thinking	  about	  social	  causality	  (38	  Degrees,	  2014)298.	  
6.6.3	  How	  instrumental	  are	  TANs	  in	  effecting	  international	  policy	  change?	  	  Before	  examining	  the	  question	  of	  TAN	  instrumentality	  in	  effecting	  international	  policy	  change,	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  first	  consider	  (a)	  whether	  changing	  international	  policy	  is	  a	  typical	  aim	  of	  TANs;	  (b)	  what	  are	  typical	  aims	  of	  TANs;	  (c)	  whether,	  and	  in	  what	  ways,	  TAN	  effectiveness	  can	  be	  assessed;	  and	  (d),	  whether	  TANs	  are	  effective	  in	  achieving	  their	  aims.	  
	  According	  to	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  (1998:	  2),	  TAN	  aims,	  taken	  overall,	  are	  ‘to	  change	  the	  behaviour	  of	  states	  and	  of	  international	  organizations’.	  These	  writers	  claim	  that,	  more	  distinctively	  than	  other	  kinds	  of	  transnational	  actors,	  (ibid):	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297	  See	  Kahneman,	  2011:300-­‐303;	  Collins,	  2004:24;	  Goffman,	  1959:	  91-­‐94).	  
298	  Other	  examples	  include	  Greenpeace	  International,	  which	  now	  claims	  to	  have	  24	  million	  supporters	  
(GI	  Annual	  Report	  2012:4,	  52),	  up	  from	  ‘2.9	  million	  in	  donor-­‐supporters’	  in	  just	  a	  few	  years,	  while	  Avaaz	  
claimed	  to	  have	  almost	  6.5	  million	  ‘members’	  in	  November	  2010,	  and	  over	  34	  million	  members	  in	  April	  
2014	  (Avaaz,	  2010;	  2014).	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[…]	   advocacy	   networks	   often	   reach	   beyond	   policy	   change	   to	   advocate	   and	  instigate	   changes	   in	   the	   institutional	   and	   principled	   basis	   of	   international	  interactions.	  	  	  Without	  probing	  too	  deeply	  into	  what	  reaching	  ‘beyond	  policy	  change’	  might	  mean	  and	  whether	  influence	  and	  attitudinal	  change	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  come	  before	  rather	  than	  after	  policy	  change,	  this	  assertion	  would	  appear	  to	  indicate	  that	  instrumentality	  in	  international	  policy	  change	  is	  not	  a	  typical	  aim	  of	  TANs.	  Yet,	  I	  argue	  (supported	  by	  the	  case	  studies)	  that	  TANs	  typically	  claim	  significant,	  or	  sole,	  instrumentality	  in	  effecting	  conclusive	  victories	  in	  the	  contested	  areas	  of	  international	  policy	  change	  and	  treaties.	  	  What	  we	  know	  about	  individual	  TANs	  and	  their	  aims	  is	  almost	  exclusively	  what	  they	  tell	  us	  about	  themselves299.	  Castells	  says	  ‘social	  movements	  are	  what	  they	  say	  they	  are’	  (2004a:	  73),	  which	  in	  light	  of	  the	  numbers	  and	  mass	  communication	  capabilities	  of	  contemporary	  TANs,	  I	  suggest,	  puts	  the	  onus	  on	  sceptical	  and	  attentive	  publics	  to	  examine	  their	  self-­‐advocacy.	  But	  although	  the	  publicly-­‐expressed	  aims	  of	  TANs	  tend	  to	  be	  generally	  targeted	  and	  unidirectional,	  their	  campaigns	  show	  a	  wide	  divergence	  between	  conformist,	  reformist	  and	  transformist	  strategies	  (Scholte,	  2005:324).	  Their	  issues	  might	  include,	  inter	  alia,	  human	  and	  non-­‐human	  rights,	  social	  justice,	  the	  environment	  and	  climate	  change,	  immigration,	  aid,	  trade	  and	  labour	  activism,	  and	  TANs	  who	  link	  domestic	  activists	  to	  international	  institutions.	  But	  transnational	  civil	  society	  relations	  also	  has	  a	  ‘dark	  side’,	  producing	  clandestine	  cells	  of	  terrorists	  and	  militants,	  international	  drug	  rings	  and	  traders	  in	  human	  beings	  (Tarrow,	  2005:43),	  that	  is	  not	  always	  acknowledged.	  Nevertheless,	  these	  covert	  activities	  of	  certain	  types	  of	  transnational	  activism	  and	  social	  networking	  tend	  to	  be	  bypassed	  by	  the	  mainstream	  political	  science	  literature	  on	  social	  networks.	  The	  saying	  that	  ‘one	  man’s	  terrorist	  is	  another	  man’s	  freedom-­‐fighter’	  comes	  readily	  to	  mind	  in	  this	  discussion300.	  This	  factor	  served	  to	  reinforce	  the	  research	  decision	  to	  put	  aside	  questions	  about	  the	  ideological	  and	  moral	  relativity	  of	  the	  issues	  TANs	  adopt	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299	  Apart	  from	  the	  occasional	  public	  comments	  by	  whistleblowers	  and	  disgruntled/disillusioned	  former	  
insiders.	  See	  for	  example,	  Polman	  (2010);	  Brand	  (2006,	  2009);	  The	  New	  Statesman	  (2010);	  Moore	  (2005,	  
2007,	  2008,	  2013);	  Bernstein	  (2009);	  and	  Bloomberg	  (2010).	  
300	  The	  origin	  of	  this	  well-­‐known	  quote	  is	  obscure.	  This	  exact	  quote	  and	  versions	  of	  it	  have	  been	  
attributed	  to	  several	  sources.	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order	  to	  focus	  closely	  on	  the	  communicative	  approach	  to	  the	  primary	  research	  question	  and	  hypotheses.	  	  	  Therefore,	  I	  consider	  the	  way	  to	  better	  understanding	  TANs	  is	  not	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  confusing	  range	  of	  disparities	  in	  their	  aims,	  issues,	  ideologies	  and	  strategies.	  Instead,	  I	  argue	  that	  we	  can	  learn	  much	  about	  TANs	  by	  better	  understanding	  the	  advocacy	  characteristics	  they	  have	  in	  common.	  The	  referent	  criteria	  presented	  in	  Section	  6.5	  is	  intended	  to	  assist	  this	  endeavour.	  
	  Contra	  the	  often	  emphatic	  claims	  of	  political	  success,	  or	  conclusive	  victories,	  by	  TANs	  themselves	  and	  relayed	  by	  the	  mainstream	  media301,	  the	  correlation	  between	  non-­‐state	  actors’	  international	  engagement	  with	  states	  and	  international	  institutions	  and	  specific	  policy	  changes	  is	  hard	  to	  quantify	  (Chandler	  2005:162;	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:	  x,	  202;	  Forsythe,	  2012:	  248-­‐249).	  Indeed,	  complexity	  science	  considers	  the	  ‘credit	  assignment’	  problematique	  to	  be	  an	  inherent	  feature	  of	  complex,	  evolving	  and	  adaptive	  systems	  (Holland,	  2006:2;	  Watts,	  2011:27).	  The	  credit	  assignment	  problem	  arises	  because	  information	  about	  performance	  of	  agents	  is	  often	  irregular	  and	  partial:	  the	  result	  of	  an	  intricate	  skein	  of	  interactions	  extending	  over	  space	  and	  time.	  Holland	  notes	  that	  it	  is	  rare	  to	  have	  information	  available	  that	  overtly	  identifies	  the	  ‘stage	  setting’	  options	  that	  influenced	  events	  and	  apparent	  outcomes	  (ibid).	  	  	  Questions	  then	  arise	  as	  to	  whether	  advocacy	  networks	  are	  due	  credit,	  or	  merely	  claiming	  credit,	  for	  principled	  causes	  that	  are	  being	  championed	  more	  discretely	  and	  effectively	  through	  the	  agency	  of	  other	  civil	  society	  agents,	  such	  as	  the	  proliferating	  global	  ‘think	  tanks’,	  and	  by	  conventional	  diplomacy.	  It	  was	  noted	  in	  the	  data	  set	  that	  post	  hoc	  assumptions	  are	  a	  prominent	  characteristic	  of	  the	  discourse	  on	  TANs.	  Watts	  opines	  (ibid)	  that	  because	  we	  seek	  to	  explain	  happenings	  after	  the	  fact,	  concentrating	  on	  what	  strikes	  us	  as	  sufficiently	  interesting,	  ‘our	  explanations	  place	  far	  too	  much	  emphasis	  on	  what	  actually	  happened	  relative	  to	  what	  might	  have	  happened	  but	  didn’t’	  (ibid).	  The	  result	  is	  that:	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  Many	  examples	  are	  provided	  in	  the	  three	  case	  study	  chapters.	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[…]	  what	   appears	   to	   us	   to	   be	   causal	   explanations	   are	   in	   fact	   just	   stories	  —	  descriptions	   of	   what	   happened	   that	   tell	   us	   very	   little,	   if	   anything	   about	   the	  mechanisms	  at	  work.	  	  In	  view	  of	  the	  impossibility	  of	  knowing	  and	  evaluating	  all	  of	  the	  contingent	  factors	  in	  play	  that	  impact	  on	  the	  contentious	  political	  issues	  championed	  by	  TANs,	  this	  thesis	  has	  taken	  the	  ‘effectiveness’	  of	  TANs	  to	  be	  assessed	  based	  on	  evidence	  of	  whether	  they	  have	  been	  successful	  in	  achieving	  their	  preferred	  outcomes	  in	  quest	  of	  their	  stated	  goals.	  	  	  International	  policy-­‐making	  is	  a	  different	  matter.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  states	  of	  the	  international	  system	  that	  are	  called	  upon	  to	  formulate	  global	  policy,	  the	  policy	  options	  available	  to	  them	  are	  complex	  and	  far	  from	  the	  clear-­‐cut	  demands	  of	  TANs,	  which	  Forsythe	  found	  are	  often	  considered	  by	  many	  foreign	  policy	  professionals	  to	  be	  moralistic,	  rigid,	  utopian	  or	  naïve	  (2012:	  248-­‐249).	  Regarding	  foreign	  policy-­‐making	  as	  ‘the	  management	  of	  inherent	  contradictions’,	  Hoffmann	  (1977)	  declared	  that	  foreign	  policy	  officials	  were	  challenged	  to	  manage	  the	  contradictions	  inherent	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  blend	  security,	  economic,	  ecological	  and	  human	  rights	  concerns	  into	  one	  overall	  policy.	  The	  problem	  was	  not	  to	  eliminate	  these	  contradictions,	  Hoffmann	  opined,	  but	  to	  ‘think	  them	  through’,	  as	  every	  foreign	  policy	  was	  confronted	  with	  a	  ‘formidable	  variety	  of	  issues’.	  Moreover,	  ‘no	  government	  is	  in	  full	  control	  of	  its	  own	  agenda.	  Other	  nations	  intervene,	  and	  accidents	  or	  crises	  occur’.	  	  One	  useful	  device	  in	  examining	  TANs	  has	  been	  to	  compare	  and	  contrast	  them	  to	  their	  civil	  society	  rivals	  in	  terms	  of	  policy-­‐influencing	  success:	  i.e.	  the	  increasing	  and	  ever	  more	  prominent	  global	  think	  tanks.	  Commenting	  on	  transnational	  think	  tanks,	  Stone	  (2004:13)	  observes	  that	  institutional	  procedures	  entail	  that	  the	  international	  system	  responds	  better	  to	  the	  well-­‐organised	  and	  knowledgeable	  rather	  than	  to	  ‘disorganized,	  poorly-­‐financed,	  unskilled	  pressure	  groups’.	  Willetts	  also	  endorses	  this	  point	  	  (2011:62),	  stating	  that,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  UN:	  	   The	   most	   important	   variables	   determining	   the	   rights	   of	   NGOs	   are	   not	   the	  formal	  rules,	  but	  the	  status,	  the	  expertise,	  the	  communications	  skills,	  and	  the	  trust	  established	  in	  personal	  relationships	  between	  NGO	  representatives	  and	  government	  delegates.	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Indeed,	  Stone	  claims,	  the	  1999	  UN	  meeting	  on	  think	  tanks	  identified	  a	  role	  for	  think	  tanks	  to	  act	  as	  a	  ‘quality	  check	  system’,	  vetting	  NGOs	  and	  their	  worthiness	  for	  interaction	  with	  the	  UN	  —	  a	  decision	  that,	  I	  suggest,	  gives	  some	  indication	  of	  attitudes	  within	  the	  UN	  regarding	  the	  relative	  merits	  of	  think	  tanks	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  TANs.	  	  The	  difficulties	  of	  engaging	  TANs	  in	  collaborative	  relationships	  with	  international	  organisations	  and	  states	  was	  also	  observed	  by	  McGann	  and	  Sabatini	  in	  their	  research	  into	  global	  think	  tanks,	  policy	  networks	  and	  governance	  (2011:69-­‐70).	  Noting	  that	  ‘[A]bove	  all,	  the	  primary	  objective	  of	  a	  transnational	  advocacy	  network	  is	  to	  raise	  global	  consciousness’	  they	  found:	  	   […]	   advocacy	   networks	   often	   phrase	   their	   mission	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   superior	  moral	   argument,	   thereby	   rendering	   most	   opposition	   ineffective.	   However	  transnational	   advocacy	   networks	   are	   generally	   not	   well	   integrated	   into	  policymaking	  and	  tend	  to	  operate	  more	  like	  “outsider	  groups.”	  	  	  These	  negative	  assessments	  are	  not	  intended	  to	  deny,	  or	  obscure,	  the	  achievements	  that	  have	  been	  credited	  to	  the	  efforts	  of	  TANs.	  But	  they	  are	  intended	  to	  highlight	  the	  need	  for	  more	  critical	  approaches	  to	  the	  typically	  exaggerated	  efficacy	  claims	  of	  many	  TANs.	  This	  need	  for	  greater	  balance	  is	  crucial	  given	  that	  claims	  for	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  TAN	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  predominantly	  come	  from	  TANs	  themselves	  and	  are	  sometimes	  relayed	  and	  disseminated	  widely	  by	  the	  mass	  media.	  	  	  Reflecting	  the	  perspective	  of	  UN	  counterparts	  inside	  the	  machinery	  of	  global	  policy	  making,	  the	  UN	  guide	  to	  consultative	  status	  for	  NGOs	  uses	  comparatively	  restrained	  terminology	  in	  covering	  the	  contribution	  of	  NGOs,	  at	  the	  international	  level,	  in	  a	  single	  sentence	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2011c),	  to	  wit:	  	   NGOs	   contribute	   to	   a	   number	   of	   activities	   including	   information	  dissemination,	   awareness	   raising,	   development	   education,	   policy	   advocacy,	  joint	  operational	  projects,	  participation	  in	  intergovernmental	  processes	  and	  in	  the	  contribution	  of	  services	  and	  technical	  expertise.	  	  	  Commenting	  on	  TAN	  agency	  and	  the	  bargaining	  process	  that	  takes	  place	  in	  policy	  negotiation,	  Risse	  (2000),	  points	  out	  that	  rhetorical	  action	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  reach	  one’s	  goals	  can	  only	  be	  effective	  if	  the	  other	  side	  ‘listens	  and	  remains	  open	  to	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persuasion’.	  This	  is	  a	  factor	  that,	  I	  consider,	  may	  well	  be	  ruled	  out	  in	  situations	  where	  the	  TAN	  tactics	  of	  confrontation	  and	  ‘shaming’	  have	  already	  been	  deployed.	  Thus,	  I	  found	  additional	  support	  for	  my	  Hypothesis	  #3302	  in	  the	  important	  insights	  expressed	  by	  Pasquino	  (2008:28-­‐29)	  and	  Albertazzi	  and	  McDonnell	  et	  al	  (2008)	  regarding	  populist	  political	  movements.	  There	  were	  clear	  indications	  of	  populist	  political	  messages	  in	  the	  strategic	  communications	  of	  some	  TANs	  (including	  two	  of	  the	  case	  study	  TANs).	  Analysing	  the	  negative	  impact	  that	  populism	  exerts	  on	  democratic	  frameworks,	  Pasquino	  asserts	  (ibid):	  	   Hostility	  prevents	  collaboration	  and	  accommodation	  and	  maintains	  a	  situation	  of	  conflict	  which	  is	  not	  conducive	  to	  an	  accepted	  democratic	  outcome.	  	  	  	  Florini	  and	  Simmons	  (2000:4)	  assert	  that	  while	  ‘the	  world	  badly	  needs	  someone	  to	  act	  as	  the	  ‘global	  conscience’	  they	  question	  whether	  transnational	  civil	  society	  can,	  and	  should,	  fill	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  supply	  of,	  and	  the	  need	  for,	  problem	  solving.	  An	  overriding	  problem,	  they	  claim,	  is	  the	  paucity	  of	  analysis	  of	  TANs	  linking	  civil	  society	  organisations	  across	  territorial	  boundaries,	  comparisons	  of	  their	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses,	  or	  studies	  examining	  more	  than	  one	  isolated	  country	  case	  at	  a	  time.	  They	  question:	  	   […]	  whether,	  and	  under	  what	  conditions,	  it	  is	  desirable	  for	  transnational	  civil	  society	  to	  play	  a	  significant	  part	  in	  making	  the	  decisions	  that	  shape	  the	  future	  for	  all	  of	  us.	  	  	  
Multitudes	  and	  ‘white	  noise’	  	  The	  multitude	  of	  ‘voices’	  competing	  to	  be	  heard	  troubles	  some	  observers	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  TANs	  —	  as	  exemplified	  by	  the	  	  ‘white	  noise’	  analogy	  used	  by	  Keohane	  and	  Nye	  to	  describe	  the	  cacophony	  of	  competing	  protest	  voices	  (1988:89).	  Lamenting	  the	  difficulties	  TANs	  now	  face	  in	  finding	  novel	  ways	  of	  capturing	  attention	  for	  their	  political	  causes,	  a	  former	  head	  of	  Friends	  of	  the	  Earth	  UK	  observed	  more	  recently	  that:	  ‘The	  media	  is	  saturated	  with	  protest’	  (Secrett,	  2011a).	  As	  a	  possible	  restorative,	  he	  urged	  fragmented	  groups	  to	  pool	  their	  resources	  and	  to	  ‘stop	  working	  in	  parallel,	  and	  join	  with	  other	  causes	  —	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302	  Hypothesis	  #3	  concerns	  the	  barriers	  that	  I	  consider	  some	  TANs	  encounter	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  their	  
adversarial	  strategies.	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development,	  human	  rights,	  poverty,	  public	  health,	  democracy,	  community	  well-­‐being	  —	  united	  under	  one	  banner:	  ‘For	  people,	  for	  the	  planet’	  (Secrett,	  2011b).	  	  	  	  However,	  this	  advice	  appears	  to	  miss	  the	  point	  that	  while	  a	  prima	  facie	  case	  can	  be	  made	  for	  the	  amalgamation	  of	  NGOs/TANs	  to	  achieve	  greater	  political	  power	  focused	  on	  their	  commonly	  desired	  aims,	  there	  are	  generally	  worlds	  of	  differences	  between	  all	  of	  the	  following:	  their	  ideological	  underpinnings303;	  supporter	  demographics	  and	  sensitivities;	  relative	  statures	  and	  reputations;	  strategic	  practices;	  organisational	  cultures,	  memories	  and	  key	  personalities;	  geographical	  reach	  and	  influence;	  complex	  micropolitics304	  and	  rivalries;	  track	  records	  of	  achievement;	  capabilities;	  resources	  provision	  and	  donor	  market	  attractors.	  Thus,	  this	  thesis	  argues	  that	  while	  in	  theory	  TANs,	  as	  clusters,	  ought	  to	  get	  along	  —	  such	  as	  all	  those	  concerned	  with	  human	  rights	  issues,	  or	  the	  environment,	  for	  example	  —	  it	  appears	  that,	  in	  practice,	  they	  rarely	  do:	  the	  similarities	  being	  sufficient	  to	  identify	  the	  political	  cause	  typology	  but	  insufficient	  to	  explain	  an	  organisation’s,	  or	  cluster’s,	  fitness	  and	  inter-­‐relationships	  within	  its	  environment.	  	  
6.6.4	  Impacts	  of	  funding	  on	  TAN	  goal	  achievement	  	  The	  argument	  turns	  now	  to	  the	  propositions	  made	  in	  my	  H5305,	  which	  posits	  that	  the	  funding	  models	  adopted	  by	  TANs	  may	  have	  a	  determinative	  effect	  on	  their	  advocacy	  strategies.	  I	  argue,	  using	  the	  case	  studies	  as	  evidence,	  that	  these	  choices,	  in	  turn,	  have	  a	  determinative	  effect	  on	  each	  TAN’s	  place	  and	  function	  in	  the	  international	  system	  and	  on	  its	  effectiveness	  in	  achieving	  its	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  Observations	  supporting	  this	  premise	  have	  also	  been	  made	  by	  many	  others	  (e.g.	  Howell,	  2013;	  Barakso,	  2010:157-­‐158;	  Cooley	  and	  Ron,	  2010:205;	  Young,	  2010:53;	  Bob,	  2010:134-­‐135;	  Lecy,	  Mitchell	  and	  Schmitz,	  2010:235;	  McGann	  and	  Sabatini,	  2011:69-­‐70).	  	  Without	  disputing	  the	  normative	  motivations	  of	  Greenpeace,	  Oxfam	  or	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  or	  other	  TANs,	  an	  uncritical	  focus	  on	  what	  advocacy	  organisations	  reveal	  about	  themselves	  publicly	  does	  not	  adequately	  reflect	  the	  organisational	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303	  See	  Buzan,	  2004:	  1;	  6-­‐10;	  Brown	  and	  Ainley,	  2005:40-­‐59.	  
304	  As	  identified	  by	  Fisher,	  1997:455.	  
305	  H5:	  The	  funding	  models	  TANs	  adopt	  have	  a	  determinative	  effect	  on	  their	  advocacy	  strategies.	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insecurity,	  competitive	  pressures,	  institutional	  rivalries,	  and	  fiscal	  uncertainty	  that	  characterise	  the	  transnational	  sector	  (Cooley	  and	  Ron,	  2002:5-­‐6;	  Weiss,	  2013:113).	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  a	  clearer	  picture	  of	  the	  financial	  reality	  of	  the	  environment	  in	  which	  TANs	  operate,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  de-­‐centre	  the	  ideological	  rhetoric	  and	  stated	  goals	  for	  a	  moment,	  as	  advised	  by	  Meadows	  (2009:13-­‐14)	  and	  ask:	  What	  is	  the	  primary	  purpose	  of	  TANs	  in	  their	  competitive	  market?	  Political	  theorists	  might	  conceivably	  respond	  that	  it	  is	  the	  quest	  for	  self-­‐determination	  and	  emancipation;	  political	  normative	  theorists	  might	  counter	  that	  it	  is	  the	  pursuit	  of	  social	  justice	  for	  self	  and	  the	  championing	  of	  social	  justice	  for	  others	  (vide	  Chapters	  1-­‐2).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  organisational,	  business,	  communications	  and	  marketing	  theorists	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  primary	  purpose	  of	  all	  ventures	  and	  all	  organisations,	  is	  the	  imperative	  to	  first	  ensure	  their	  own	  survival	  by	  persuading	  others	  to	  provide	  the	  resources	  needed	  to	  pursue	  the	  secondary,	  ideological,	  goals306.	  Indeed,	  Weiss	  observes	  in	  regard	  to	  humanitarian	  INGOs	  (ibid):	  ‘Survival	  is	  a	  minimum	  goal;	  prosperity	  is	  the	  real	  objective’.	  	  	  Whilst	  it	  would	  be	  charitable	  to	  assume	  that	  these	  imperatives	  are	  pursued	  concurrently	  and	  with	  equal	  vigour,	  recent	  studies	  indicate	  that	  many	  TANs	  are	  highly	  aware	  that	  their	  survival	  comes	  first:	  that	  they	  operate	  in	  a	  crowded	  and	  competitive	  environment	  where	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  are	  based	  on	  market	  rules	  and	  their	  relationships	  with	  their	  donor	  publics	  are	  complex	  and	  unstable,	  with	  target	  audiences	  largely	  too	  uninterested	  and	  ill-­‐informed	  for	  meaningful	  engagement	  beyond	  the	  making	  of	  (often	  impulsive)	  micro-­‐donations	  (Polis	  Report,	  2012:8-­‐9;	  Lecy	  et	  al,	  2010:229,	  Cooley	  and	  Ron,	  2002;	  2012:205-­‐7;	  Ron,	  Ramos	  and	  Rodgers,	  2005;	  Darnton	  and	  Kirk,	  2011:6;	  Weiss,	  2012:xii).	  	  	  Contra	  the	  majority	  of	  early	  studies307	  in	  the	  field	  of	  International	  Relations	  that	  viewed	  TANs	  as	  altruistic	  actors	  seeking	  to	  advance	  universally	  accepted	  principles,	  or	  norms308,	  some	  of	  the	  more	  recent	  scholarship	  argues	  that	  these	  transnational	  NGOs	  are	  better	  understood	  as	  interest-­‐driven	  actors	  motivated	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306	  This	  view	  is	  shared	  by	  Weiss,	  Slim,	  et	  al	  (Weiss,	  2013:xii).	  
307	  See,	  for	  example,	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:35.	  
308	  Some	  studies	  have	  advanced	  an	  argument	  that	  organised	  groups	  emerge	  in	  response	  to	  shared	  
grievances	  rather	  than	  shared	  norms	  (Prakash	  and	  Gugerty,	  2010:2).	  However,	  this	  debate	  does	  not	  
alter	  the	  argument	  being	  made	  here	  that	  survival	  of	  the	  collective	  entity	  in	  an	  increasingly	  challenging	  
environment	  is	  the	  paramount	  concern	  of	  those	  seeking	  to	  project	  and	  sustain	  an	  organised	  political	  
advocacy	  ‘voice’.	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primarily	  by	  the	  imperative	  of	  organisational	  survival	  in	  a	  competitive	  environment	  (Lecy	  et	  al,	  2010:229,	  234-­‐36;	  Ron,	  Ramos	  and	  Rodgers,	  2005;	  Cooley	  and	  Ron,	  2002;	  Weiss,	  2013).	  Putting	  this	  in	  blunt	  terms,	  Lecy	  et	  al	  (ibid:	  236),	  argue	  that	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  transnational	  NGO	  sector	  should	  be	  interpreted	  not	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  the	  growing	  strength	  of	  global	  norms	  —	  and	  proof	  of	  an	  emerging	  global	  civil	  society309	  —	  but	  as	  ‘a	  free-­‐market	  scramble	  of	  self-­‐interested	  TNGOs310	  vying	  for	  attention	  in	  an	  economic	  environment	  of	  limited	  donor	  funds’.	  	  	  Some	  observers	  of	  TANs	  argue	  that	  today	  ‘the	  corporatization	  of	  activism	  is	  deepening	  and	  accelerating	  across	  all	  causes	  and	  cultures’	  (Dauvergne	  and	  LeBaron,	  2014:1;	  Polman,	  2010;	  Weiss,	  ibid).	  Activist	  organisations,	  they	  claim,	  have	  ‘increasingly	  come	  to	  look,	  think	  and	  act	  like	  corporations’.	  Moreover,	  this	  trend	  is	  seen	  as	  speeding	  along	  a	  two-­‐way	  street,	  with	  businesses	  (a)	  seeking	  out	  advocacy	  organisations	  for	  legitimacy	  and	  marketing	  opportunities	  and	  (b)	  activists	  courting	  companies	  for	  funds	  and	  partnerships.	  Whilst	  conceding	  that	  travelling	  this	  route	  can	  ‘enhance	  the	  influence	  of	  advocacy	  groups	  within311	  ruling	  political	  and	  economic	  institutions’,	  providing	  them	  with	  access	  to	  the	  corridors	  of	  power	  and	  even	  gaining	  them	  seats	  on	  corporate	  boards	  and	  at	  international	  negotiating	  tables,	  Dauvergne	  and	  LeBaron	  (ibid)	  consider	  principled	  activists	  must	  pay	  a	  ‘big	  sacrifice’	  by	  leaving	  their	  radical	  credentials	  at	  the	  door	  and	  accepting	  that	  they	  must	  work	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  global	  capitalism	  and	  forsake	  any	  thoughts	  of	  transforming	  the	  world	  order.	  Because	  of	  these	  costly	  trade-­‐offs,	  which	  brought	  into	  question	  the	  independence	  of	  NGOs	  due	  to	  their	  reliance	  on	  their	  funding	  sources,	  Howell	  has	  queried312:	  ‘Are	  NGOs	  fit	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  advocacy	  and	  campaigning?’	  (2013).	  Similarly,	  Dauvergne	  and	  LeBaron	  observed	  that	  (ibid):	  	  	   One	  consequence	  for	  world	  politics	  is	  that	  activism	  is	  now	  less	  ‘radical’	  than	  it	  was	   forty	   or	   fifty	   years	   ago,	   at	   least	   in	   terms	   of	   systemic	   and	   far-­‐reaching	  change.	  	  Nevertheless,	  they	  admit	  (ibid):	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309	  This	  debate	  is	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  	  
310	  Lecy	  et	  al	  favour	  the	  term	  ‘Transnational	  Non-­‐Governmental	  Organization’	  (TNGO).	  
311	  Emphasis	  as	  in	  original.	  
312	  Professor	  Howell’s	  comments	  are	  published	  in	  an	  op-­‐ed	  he	  wrote	  for	  The	  Guardian	  (UK),	  to	  coincide	  
with	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  2013	  World	  Social	  Forum.	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[…]	  compared	  to	  those	  outside	  of	  the	  establishment,	  activists	  on	  the	  inside	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  able	  to	  shape	  corporate	  governance	  or	  prod	  a	  policy	  reform.	  	  	  Overall,	  this	  study	  noticed	  a	  pronounced	  trend	  for	  scholars	  and	  the	  media	  to	  take	  a	  more	  critical	  view	  of	  the	  operations	  of	  TANs	  than	  in	  the	  past,	  particularly	  highly	  visible,	  attention-­‐seeking	  organisations	  —	  such	  as	  Greenpeace	  and	  Oxfam	  —	  that	  source	  large	  amounts	  of	  their	  funding	  from	  members	  of	  the	  public.	  Although	  it	  is	  early	  days	  yet	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  worldwide	  adaptation	  of	  INGOs	  to	  new	  communications	  technologies,	  this	  increasing	  trend	  might	  suggest	  that	  the	  radical	  transparency	  of	  social	  media	  may	  not	  be	  advantageous	  to	  large	  numbers	  of	  TANs.	  Indeed,	  Polman	  says	  of	  humanitarian	  aid	  agencies	  in	  crisis	  situations	  (Polman,	  2010):	  ‘Aid	  organizations	  are	  businesses	  dressed	  up	  like	  Mother	  Teresa,	  but	  that’s	  not	  how	  reporters	  see	  them’.	  	  
6.7	  Summary	  This	  chapter	  pointed	  out	  that	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  political	  sociologists	  consider	  TANs	  to	  be	  politically	  important	  (thereby	  supporting	  my	  H1)313,	  increasing	  rapidly	  in	  number	  and	  distinctively	  different,	  characteristically	  rejecting	  of	  the	  international	  governance	  order	  (H2,	  H3)314.	  But,	  there	  remains	  much	  confusion	  and	  gaps	  in	  the	  literature	  regarding	  the	  essential	  nature	  of	  those	  differences	  and	  how	  to	  approach	  and	  analyse	  them.	  An	  advocacy-­‐oriented	  referent	  model	  was	  presented	  as	  a	  practical	  step	  towards	  addressing	  this	  lacuna	  (H1).	  Communications	  theoretical	  lenses	  were	  presented	  to	  assess	  some	  of	  the	  conventional	  wisdoms	  with	  a	  range	  of	  phronetic	  wisdoms315	  regarding	  TAN	  activity;	  and,	  thus,	  aid	  understanding	  of	  the	  advocacy	  strategies	  that	  contemporary,	  ICT-­‐enabled,	  TANs	  are	  increasingly	  employing	  in	  pursuit	  of	  their	  goals	  (H2,	  H3).	  A	  discussion	  was	  opened	  regarding	  the	  competencies	  and	  consequences	  of	  those	  strategic	  choices	  on	  both	  international	  stakeholders	  and	  heterogeneous	  worldwide	  audiences.	  The	  complex,	  multi-­‐dimensional	  and	  analytically	  multi-­‐level	  international	  landscape,	  in	  which	  UN-­‐consultant	  TANs	  operate,	  was	  described	  (H4).	  Support	  was	  presented	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313	  H1:	  Contemporary	  TANs	  are	  an	  important	  NGO	  variant	  in	  international	  politics	  that	  have	  
unprecedented	  properties	  and	  powers	  emerging	  from	  their	  advocacy	  communications,	  which	  are	  
typically	  neglected	  in	  politics	  theorising.	  	  
314	  H2:	  The	  international	  system	  is	  struggling	  to	  accommodate	  TANs	  and	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  
international	  institutions	  have	  a	  distinctively	  troubled	  interface	  with	  modern	  TAN-­‐type	  NGOs.	  	  
	  	  	  	  H3:	  The	  adversarial	  advocacy	  strategies	  typically	  adopted	  by	  TANs	  constitute	  a	  barrier	  to	  them	  
achieving	  their	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  policy-­‐making	  environment.	  	  
315	  Praxis-­‐based.	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H5316,	  which	  proposes	  that	  the	  funding	  models	  TANs	  adopt	  have	  a	  determinative	  effect	  on	  their	  advocacy	  strategies.	  	  	  Having	  differentiated	  the	  properties	  of	  the	  TAN	  variant	  and	  the	  international	  fitness	  landscape	  in	  which	  they	  operate,	  (Chapters	  4	  and	  5)	  I	  turn	  now	  to	  presenting	  three	  case	  studies	  involving	  activist	  organisations	  that	  exhibit	  these	  characteristics	  to	  varying	  degrees.	  This	  follows	  the	  analytical	  sequence	  set	  out	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  which	  explained	  my	  prioritisation	  of	  a	  macro-­‐sociological	  approach317	  to	  examining	  the	  already	  existing	  structural	  context	  of	  the	  international	  system	  
before	  drilling	  down	  to	  seek	  validation	  of	  my	  observations	  at	  the	  micro-­‐level	  of	  individual	  case	  studies.	  Thus,	  the	  investigation	  explores	  three	  on-­‐going	  international	  system	  relationships	  from	  a	  range	  of	  ‘bottom	  up’	  perspectives.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316	  H4:	  A	  complex	  realist	  approach	  has	  exemplary	  merit	  in	  approaching	  the	  subject	  area	  and	  primary	  
research	  question	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  
317	  This	  is	  also	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  morphogenetic	  approach	  expounded	  by	  Wight	  (2013:86,99),	  
Archer,	  Propora,	  et	  al	  (2003).	  
	   206	  
Chapter	  7	  
	  
7.	  Greenpeace	  International	  	  	  
Say	  not	  the	  struggle	  nought	  availeth,	  
The	  labours	  and	  the	  wounds	  are	  vain,	  	  
The	  enemy	  faints	  not,	  nor	  faileth,	  
And	  as	  things	  have	  been,	  things	  remain.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  Arthur	  Hugh	  Clough	  (1862)	  	  	  	  	  
7.1	  Introduction	  This	  chapter	  advances	  the	  thesis	  by	  examining	  the	  environmental	  advocacy	  organisation	  Greenpeace	  International	  (GI)	  as	  the	  first	  of	  the	  study’s	  three	  case	  studies	  of	  TANs	  that	  operate	  at	  unit-­‐level	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  In	  order	  to	  assess	  GI’s	  place	  and	  function	  in	  the	  international	  arena	  it	  uses	  a	  combination	  of	  diachronic	  process	  tracing	  and	  complex	  realism	  to	  explore	  the	  organisation’s	  development,	  the	  ever-­‐changing	  features	  of	  its	  fitness	  landscape318	  and	  the	  processes	  and	  interactions	  in	  which	  it	  engages	  with	  other	  international	  actors	  (H4).	  From	  this	  analysis,	  a	  number	  of	  propositions	  are	  made	  regarding	  GI’s	  influence	  and	  effectiveness	  in	  achieving	  its	  desired	  outcomes	  during	  certain	  episodes	  in	  its	  history,	  and	  overall.	  The	  chapter	  further	  identifies	  the	  salient	  structures,	  conditions	  of	  possibility,	  properties	  and	  powers	  of	  GI’s	  social	  ecosystem,	  which	  might	  have	  been	  causally	  implicated	  in	  events	  and	  their	  outcomes.	  Because	  of	  length	  constraints,	  this	  chapter	  represents	  a	  truncated	  version	  of	  the	  original	  research	  project.	  	  By	  applying	  the	  multi-­‐lensed	  methodology	  described	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  the	  chapter	  supports	  the	  dissertation	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  adversarial	  advocacy	  strategy	  adopted	  by	  some	  TANs	  is	  a	  barrier	  to	  them	  achieving	  their	  aims	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318	  ‘Fitness	  landscape’	  is	  a	  term	  and	  concept	  frequently	  used	  by	  scholars	  working	  in	  complexity	  studies	  
(vide	  Chapter	  3,	  also	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden,	  2011:	  68-­‐69;	  Geyer	  and	  Pickering,	  2011;	  Geyer	  and	  Rihani,	  
2012:143;	  Walby,	  2007;	  Mitleton-­‐Kelly,	  2003;	  Kauffman,	  2000:18-­‐20).	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international	  institutional	  system	  (H3).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  GI	  we	  see	  a	  TAN	  that	  has	  been	  constitutionally	  and	  actively	  committed	  to	  an	  adversarial	  advocacy	  strategy	  for	  over	  40	  years	  and	  follow	  its	  development	  and	  effectiveness	  over	  this	  time.	  	  
	  While	  focusing	  on	  documented	  accounts	  of	  GI’s	  advocacy	  activities,	  the	  research	  was	  predicated	  on	  an	  assumption	  that	  it	  was	  important	  to	  critique	  also	  the	  counterfactual	  aspects	  of	  GI’s	  operations	  —	  i.e.	  what	  GI’s	  advocacy	  function	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  do	  by	  comparison	  with	  other	  prominent	  TANs,	  such	  as	  Oxfam	  International	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  which	  are	  examined	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  This	  dissertation	  argues	  that	  the	  popular	  research	  approach	  of	  focusing	  on	  the	  campaigns	  waged	  by	  NGOs,	  including	  TANs,	  and	  the	  reasons	  they	  give	  for	  their	  effectiveness,	  is	  reductionist	  and	  inhibiting,	  offering	  only	  a	  very	  partial	  view	  of	  the	  contexts	  and	  differentiated	  power	  relationships	  underlying	  events	  in	  international	  politics	  (Kotkin,	  2009;	  Morazov,	  2013:41-­‐42)319.	  Many	  scholars	  caution	  against	  taking	  the	  ‘micro’	  choices	  of	  individuals	  at	  one	  level	  of	  analysis	  to	  fully	  explain	  the	  ‘macro’	  phenomena	  of	  the	  social	  world	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  analysis	  (Archer,	  1995:7;	  Wendt,	  1991:	  387;	  Wight,	  2006:103;	  and	  Watts,	  2011:61-­‐67)320.	  Consequently,	  I	  argue,	  that	  when	  analysing	  the	  records	  of	  protest	  events	  and	  evaluating	  effectiveness,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  ask:	  What	  else	  was	  going	  on	  in	  the	  fitness	  landscape	  for	  Greenpeace	  at	  given	  moments	  in	  the	  past	  that,	  apart	  from	  the	  historical	  accounts	  provided	  by	  Greenpeace	  and	  mass	  media	  reports	  often	  influenced	  by	  these	  accounts,	  may	  have	  impacted	  its	  fortunes?	  	  The	  chapter	  demonstrates	  also	  the	  explanatory	  advantages	  of	  using	  complex	  realist	  perspectives	  and	  communication	  theory,	  in	  addition	  to	  political	  science,	  to	  obtain	  a	  better	  intellectual	  grip	  on	  Greenpeace	  and	  its	  impacts	  (H4).	  Moreover,	  where	  regularities	  with	  other	  TANs	  can	  be	  observed321,	  the	  Greenpeace	  case	  helps	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  elusive	  phenomenon	  of	  TANs	  as	  a	  distinct	  typology	  and	  their	  relative	  place,	  function	  and	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system	  (H1,	  H2,	  H3).	  In	  particular,	  attention	  is	  drawn	  to	  those	  aspects	  of	  Greenpeace	  that	  show	  conformity	  with	  complex	  realist	  theorisation,	  which	  takes	  the	  ‘international	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319	  Contra	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  (1998:6-­‐8),	  Kotkin	  (2009)	  argues	  that	  in	  focusing	  on	  political	  opposition	  from	  
quarters	  that	  could	  be	  categorised	  as	  civil	  society,	  ‘analysts	  too	  often	  leave	  out	  the	  other	  side	  across	  the	  
table	  from	  the	  opposition	  (ibid:	  xiv)’.	  	  
320	  This	  refers	  to	  the	  micro-­‐macro	  problematique	  in	  sociology,	  or	  the	  problem	  of	  levels-­‐of-­‐analysis.	  
321	  This	  does	  not	  ignore	  the	  methodological	  principle	  that	  correlation	  does	  not	  imply	  causality	  but	  is	  
intended	  to	  assist	  potentially	  fruitful	  further	  investigation.	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system’	  to	  be	  a	  complex,	  open	  and	  adaptive	  system,	  made	  up	  of	  innumerable,	  intersecting,	  sub-­‐system	  elements	  that	  influence,	  shape,	  or	  constrain	  each	  other322.	  As	  a	  globe-­‐spanning	  network	  of	  people	  and	  resources,	  Greenpeace	  is	  itself	  shown	  to	  be	  a	  complex	  evolving	  system,	  similarly	  composed	  of	  innumerable,	  intersecting,	  sub-­‐system	  elements,	  co-­‐evolving	  in	  a	  social	  ‘ecosystem’323.	  	  	  Complexity	  lenses	  were	  used	  on	  the	  Greenpeace	  data	  set	  in	  order	  to	  recognise	  and	  explain,	  inter	  alia,	  instantiations	  of	  each	  of	  the	  following	  key	  features	  of	  complex	  systems	  —	  emergence,	  sensitivity	  to	  initial	  conditions,	  resilience,	  path	  dependency	  and	  lock-­‐in,	  co-­‐evolution,	  the	  effects	  of	  negative	  and	  positive	  feedback	  loops,	  exploration	  of	  	  ‘adjacent	  possible’,	  opportunities,	  instability,	  unpredictability	  and	  unintended	  consequences324.	  In	  my	  analysis,	  all	  of	  these	  features	  were	  observed	  and	  their	  relevance	  to	  the	  political	  fortunes	  of	  Greenpeace	  is	  pointed	  out.	  
	  
Chapter	  outline	   	  The	  chapter	  and	  the	  following	  two	  are	  organised	  on	  a	  four-­‐part	  structural	  framework.	  This	  is	  intended	  to	  aid	  comprehension	  and	  cross-­‐chapter	  comparison	  of	  the	  large	  volume	  of	  case-­‐based	  data	  that	  was	  collected	  by	  way	  of	  the	  process	  tracing	  methodology.	  This	  format	  provides	  the	  reader	  with	  information	  and	  evidence	  data	  on	  each	  organisation,	  divided	  under	  five	  rubrics:	  identity	  and	  aims;	  the	  socio-­‐historical	  context	  and	  reasons	  why	  the	  organisation	  emerged	  when	  it	  did;	  its	  salient	  strategies	  over	  time	  (i.e.	  what	  happened);	  data	  collection	  and	  methodology;	  and	  the	  debated	  outcomes325	  of	  its	  international	  impact.	  The	  ‘outcomes’	  are	  presented	  not	  as	  concluded	  episodes	  with	  unequivocal	  results	  but	  as	  ‘Outcomes-­‐in-­‐process	  and	  indicative	  macroscopic	  patterns’,	  in	  accordance	  with	  morphogenetic	  approaches	  advised	  by	  Archer	  (2013:3-­‐4)	  and	  Wight	  (2013:	  86-­‐93)	  
et	  al.	  In	  keeping	  with	  process	  tracing	  analytical	  methods,	  this	  section	  maps	  the	  main	  theories	  and	  arguments	  on	  to	  the	  data	  set	  and	  discusses	  my	  corroborating	  evidence	  and	  results.	  To	  assist	  this	  analysis,	  the	  section	  is	  further	  organised	  into	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322	  A	  persuasive	  case	  for	  this	  reasoning	  is	  presented	  by	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden	  (2011:72-­‐73).	  
323	  See	  Mitleton-­‐Kelly	  (2003),	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  richness	  that	  a	  complexity	  perspective	  lends	  to	  
thinking	  about	  organisations.	  
324	  See	  Chapter	  3	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  these	  features	  of	  complex	  systems,	  and	  also	  
Geyer	  and	  Pickering	  (2011),	  Mitleton-­‐Kelly	  (2003)	  and	  Walby	  (2007).	  
325	  The	  discussion	  of	  ‘outcomes’	  here	  is	  a	  presentation	  of	  competing	  ontological	  perspectives	  regarding	  
events	  and	  situations	  that	  are	  essentially	  open-­‐ended	  because	  of	  our	  complex	  systemic	  social	  world.	  It	  is	  
for	  the	  reader	  to	  weigh	  whether	  a	  TAN	  achieved	  its	  preferred	  outcomes	  in	  a	  specific	  instance.	  	  	  	  
	   209	  
the	  three	  theoretical	  themes,	  which	  this	  thesis	  posits	  have	  the	  greatest	  potential	  to	  explain	  the	  conundrums	  posed	  by	  a	  particular	  TAN	  in	  its	  international	  relationships:	  (a)	  its	  political	  philosophy;	  (b)	  its	  advocacy	  function;	  and	  (c)	  its	  relationships	  with	  elements	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  system.	  	  The	  chapter	  concludes	  with	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  proof	  points	  tending	  to	  support	  the	  theories	  and	  hypotheses.	  In	  this	  way,	  it	  contributes	  to	  the	  comparative	  case	  study	  analysis	  of	  Chapters	  7,	  8	  and	  9,	  which	  supports	  the	  overall	  conclusions	  of	  the	  dissertation.	  	  
7.2	  Identity	  and	  Aims	  This	  section	  provides	  a	  basic	  introduction	  to	  GI	  and	  describes	  the	  salient	  aspects	  of	  its	  activities	  and	  reputation	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  mainstream	  media	  and	  discourses.	  Through	  tracing	  the	  development	  of	  the	  organisation’s	  mission,	  vision,	  values,	  aims,	  imperatives	  and	  principal	  commitments,	  we	  can	  observe	  also	  the	  strategic	  corporate,	  or	  brand,	  image	  that	  Greenpeace	  projects	  to	  the	  world	  and,	  by	  extension,	  deduce	  how	  the	  organisation	  desires	  to	  position	  itself	  in	  its	  environment,	  which	  includes	  the	  international	  political	  arena.	  	  Arguably	  the	  world’s	  most	  recognised	  and	  iconic326	  TAN,	  GI	  has	  an	  establishment	  of	  2.9	  million	  audited	  donor-­‐supporters327,	  14,500	  volunteers,	  over	  2,500	  permanent	  staff,	  and	  over	  40	  years’	  experience	  in	  capturing	  news	  headlines	  for	  its	  diverse	  political	  protests.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326	  Urry	  (2003:58,	  citing	  also	  Szerszynski,	  1997:	  46)	  claims	  Greenpeace’s	  brand	  identity	  has	  ‘such	  an	  
iconic	  status	  that	  it	  is	  a	  world-­‐wide	  symbol	  of	  ecological	  virtue	  quite	  above	  and	  beyond	  the	  actual	  
practical	  successes	  of	  the	  organization.’	  Calling	  Greenpeace	  a	  GIN	  (Globally	  Integrated	  Network),	  rather	  
than	  a	  semantically	  similar	  TAN,	  Urry	  asserts	  that,	  like	  other	  global	  players,	  Greenpeace	  devotes	  much	  
attention	  to	  developing	  and	  sustaining	  its	  brand	  identity	  throughout	  the	  world.	  
327	  According	  to	  the	  latest	  information	  published	  in	  GI’s	  Annual	  report	  for	  2012	  and	  on	  its	  Website	  at	  
http//www.greenpeace.org.	  Empirical	  analysis	  of	  GI’s	  annual	  reports	  (2005-­‐12),	  revealed	  that	  this	  
supporter	  figure	  has	  remained	  flat	  in	  recent	  years,	  never	  rising	  above	  2.9	  million.	  However,	  in	  the	  2011	  
Annual	  Report,	  the	  Executive	  Director,	  Dr.	  Kumi	  Naidoo,	  commented	  that	  owing	  to	  GI’s	  positive	  
experiences	  with	  Web-­‐based	  advocacy	  campaigns	  ‘we	  have	  changed	  the	  way	  we	  count	  our	  supporters.	  
We	  no	  longer	  refer	  to	  having	  3	  million	  “financial	  supporters”,	  but	  instead	  talk	  of	  over	  17	  million	  people	  
who	  have	  given	  us	  approval	  and	  agency	  to	  contact	  them	  and	  work	  with	  them	  on	  future	  campaigns.	  They	  
are	  all	  to	  be	  considered	  Greenpeace	  supporters,	  partners	  and	  collaborators,	  and	  together	  we	  have	  
become	  more	  effective	  and	  powerful’	  (GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2011:3).	  In	  the	  annual	  report	  for	  the	  following	  
year	  (2012),	  this	  supporter	  figure	  was	  adjusted	  further	  upward	  to	  cover	  ‘a	  growing	  supporter	  base	  of	  
some	  24	  million:	  those	  who	  work	  for	  us,	  volunteer,	  donate,	  follow,	  like,	  and	  take	  online	  action’	  (GI	  
Annual	  Report,	  2012:	  4,	  52).	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From	  relatively	  under-­‐resourced	  beginnings	  as	  a	  small	  and	  largely	  disorganised	  protest	  group	  in	  Vancouver	  in	  the	  early	  1970s,	  Greenpeace	  is	  today	  headquartered	  in	  Amsterdam	  and	  has	  offices	  in	  40	  countries	  worldwide.	  Although	  Greenpeace	  emphasises	  its	  global	  reach	  and	  operations,	  it	  is	  predominantly	  a	  European	  organisation	  in	  its	  funding	  and	  supporter	  base.	  Germany,	  by	  far,	  provides	  both	  the	  largest	  number	  of	  donors	  and	  funding,	  followed	  at	  the	  top	  end	  of	  the	  scale	  by	  The	  Netherlands,	  the	  USA,	  Switzerland,	  the	  Nordic	  countries	  and	  the	  UK	  (ibid:	  39).	  Its	  global	  organisational	  structure	  resembles	  the	  hierarchical,	  multi-­‐national	  corporation	  model,	  with	  national	  and	  regional	  offices	  franchised	  to	  use	  the	  name	  ‘Greenpeace’.	  This	  hierarchical	  management	  structure	  appears	  to	  enable	  a	  high	  level	  of	  central	  management	  control	  over	  the	  network	  and	  compliance	  with	  centrally-­‐approved	  brand	  activities.	  It	  also	  is	  key	  to	  GI’s	  business	  transactional	  model	  in	  which,	  I	  suggest,	  Greenpeace	  management	  and	  staff	  take	  the	  roles	  of	  both	  principal	  and	  agent	  and	  the	  organisation’s	  endogenous	  supporter-­‐partner-­‐collaborator	  base	  is	  also,	  predominantly,	  its	  client.	  
7.2.1	  ‘Creative	  confrontation’	  at	  the	  core	  of	  advocacy	  strategy,	  identity	  and	  aims	  	  While	  in	  sectoral	  terms	  Greenpeace	  is	  an	  international	  NGO,	  GI	  strongly	  self-­‐identifies	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  purposive,	  advocacy	  role,	  describing	  itself	  as	  ‘an	  independent	  global	  campaigning	  organisation’	  that	  ‘uses	  non-­‐violent,	  creative	  confrontation	  to	  expose	  global	  environmental328	  problems’	  and	  ‘force	  the	  solutions	  which	  are	  essential	  to	  a	  green	  and	  peaceful	  future’	  (GI	  data,	  2012a;	  GI	  Annual	  Report	  2010).	  In	  GI’s	  use	  of	  descriptors	  such	  as	  campaigning,	  exposing,	  confronting	  and	  forcing329,	  this	  thesis	  suggests	  that	  Greenpeace	  not	  only	  differentiates	  itself	  from	  NGOs	  that	  are	  merely	  interested	  in	  advocating	  issues:	  it	  makes	  advocacy	  strategy	  its	  primary	  identifier	  and	  function	  and,	  thereby,	  explicitly	  commits	  itself	  to	  an	  adversarial	  stance	  in	  its	  communications	  and	  tactics.	  	  Adding	  something	  of	  an	  anomaly	  to	  this	  mission	  plan,	  Greenpeace’s	  objective	  is	  not,	  as	  might	  be	  expected,	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328	  According	  to	  Shaw-­‐Bond	  (2000),	  Greenpeace	  can	  no	  longer	  strictly	  call	  itself	  an	  environmental	  group	  
as	  it	  is	  fighting	  as	  much	  against	  global	  trade	  and	  the	  multinationals.	  He	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  the	  
destruction	  by	  Greenpeace	  activists	  of	  an	  experimental	  crop	  of	  GM	  maize	  near	  Norwich,	  UK,	  in	  the	  
summer	  of	  1999.	  In	  taking	  this	  action,	  Shaw-­‐Bond	  contends,	  the	  protesters	  were	  effectively	  saying	  that	  
they	  were	  rejecting	  GM	  crops	  irrespective	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  these	  had	  a	  detrimental	  effect	  on	  the	  
environment.	  Political	  comments	  by	  GI’s	  Executive	  Director,	  Dr.	  Kumi	  Naidoo,	  during	  the	  2012	  World	  
Economic	  Forum	  at	  Davos	  are	  also	  reminiscent	  more	  of	  the	  anti-­‐corporation/anti-­‐globalisation	  lobby	  
than	  of	  environmental	  protection	  campaigning	  (vide	  GI	  Naidoo,	  2012a)	  
329	  My	  emphasis.	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communication	  goal330.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  ‘to	  ensure	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  earth	  to	  nurture	  life	  in	  all	  its	  diversity’	  (ibid).	  Although	  there	  is	  no	  definitive	  algorithmic	  link331	  between	  this	  vague	  mission	  statement	  and	  the	  strategy	  and	  methods	  to	  achieve	  it,	  GI	  targets	  its	  campaign	  work	  at	  ‘the	  greatest	  threats	  to	  the	  global	  environment’.	  Accordingly,	  Greenpeace	  has	  identified	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  global	  threats332,	  over	  the	  past	  four	  decades	  and	  its	  campaigns	  have	  grown	  both	  in	  number	  and	  scope	  (see	  Section	  7.4).	  At	  the	  present	  time,	  Greenpeace	  has	  on-­‐going	  campaigns	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  climate	  change,	  forests,	  oceans,	  ecological	  farming	  and	  food,	  toxic	  pollution,	  nuclear	  issues,	  and	  peace	  and	  disarmament.	  In	  the	  past	  few	  years,	  Greenpeace	  has	  identified	  climate	  change	  as	  the	  greatest	  environmental	  challenge	  yet	  faced	  by	  Mankind	  and	  ‘the	  one	  that	  will	  define	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  our	  movement’	  (GI	  The	  Guardian,	  2011d;	  Annual	  Report	  2012:3).	  	  GI’s	  core	  values	  are	  accompanied	  by	  the	  direction	  that	  they	  be	  reflected	  in	  all	  Greenpeace	  campaigns	  and	  guide	  its	  work	  worldwide.	  These	  are:	  ‘bearing	  witness,	  non-­‐violence333,	  independence,	  having	  no	  permanent	  friends	  or	  foes,	  and	  promoting	  solutions’.	  This	  operating	  ethos	  was	  framed	  by	  Greenpeace’s	  co-­‐founders	  over	  40	  years	  ago,	  and	  the	  organisation	  reiterates	  prominently	  in	  its	  publicity	  materials	  that	  these	  tenets	  still	  drive	  its	  work	  today	  (GI	  data,	  2012a).	  From	  a	  complex	  realism	  perspective,	  the	  path	  dependency	  implications	  of	  these	  initial	  commandments	  will	  be	  shown	  throughout	  the	  chapter	  to	  have	  had	  a	  profound	  and	  ongoing	  influence	  on	  (a)	  the	  type	  of	  organisation	  that	  Greenpeace	  has	  become;	  (b)	  on	  its	  external	  relationships;	  and	  (c)	  its	  effectiveness	  in	  achieving	  its	  corporate	  aims334.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330	  Greenpeace	  strategies	  and	  prime	  goal	  run	  strangely	  counter	  to	  some	  of	  the	  basic	  tenets	  of	  modern	  
public	  communications	  theory,	  which	  holds	  that	  communications	  strategies	  require	  objectives	  of	  a	  
communications	  nature.	  If	  goals	  and	  strategies	  are	  not	  aligned,	  there	  is	  the	  likelihood	  that	  energies	  and	  
resources	  will	  be	  concentrated	  on	  honing	  strategies,	  instead	  of	  achieving	  goals.	  Furthermore,	  public	  
communications	  programme	  goals	  must	  not	  be	  unobtainable,	  otherwise	  an	  impression	  is	  created	  of	  
always	  failing,	  even	  if	  superb	  work	  has	  been	  done	  (Palin,	  1985:4).	  The	  role	  of	  metaphor	  and	  ‘fuzzy	  
promises’	  in	  global	  branding	  strategies	  is	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  	  	  
331	  Mass	  awareness	  does	  not	  ensure	  the	  Earth’s	  ability	  to	  nurture	  all	  life.	  
332	  As	  listed	  on	  GI’s	  Website	  at	  http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/	  
333	  Although	  Greenpeace	  robustly	  promotes	  the	  message	  that	  its	  tactics	  are	  non-­‐violent,	  I	  aver	  that	  
understandings	  and	  definitions	  of	  what	  constitutes	  ‘violence’	  are	  relativistic	  rather	  than	  universal	  and	  
absolute.	  
334	  See	  Arthur	  (1989)	  for	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  implications	  of	  locked-­‐in	  practices	  and	  processes	  than	  may	  
be	  difficult	  to	  change.	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7.2.2	  Identifying	  Greenpeace	  as	  a	  TAN	  Is	  Greenpeace	  a	  TAN?	  This	  section	  examines	  the	  rationale	  for	  describing	  GI	  as	  a	  TAN.	  This	  thesis	  is	  premised	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  TANs	  are	  conceptually	  different	  from	  other	  typologies	  of	  NGO	  in	  a	  number	  of	  distinctive	  ways	  (H1).	  The	  ways	  in	  which	  GI	  exactly	  fits	  all	  eight	  criteria	  of	  the	  reference	  model	  designed	  for	  this	  thesis	  (Figure	  6.2)	  are	  set	  out,	  as	  follows:	  	  	  
Criterion	  #1:	  	  
• Distinctive,	  highly-­visual,	  transnational	  corporate	  identity335	  
Indications:	  The	  distinctive	  Greenpeace	  corporate	  logo,	  shown	  below,	  is	  prominently	  displayed	  on	  all	  Greenpeace	  branded	  protest	  actions.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Figure	  7.1	  The	  distinctive	  Greenpeace	  logo	  (GI	  image,	  2007)	  
	  A	  selection	  of	  publicity	  photographs	  is	  reproduced	  here	  from	  the	  GI	  Website	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  way	  GI	  typically	  amplifies	  its	  voice	  in	  its	  political	  communications	  strategies.	  	  The	  distinctive	  logo	  is	  unmistakable,	  as	  well	  as	  unmissable	  due	  to	  the	  enormity	  of	  the	  signage	  generally	  used	  to	  display	  it.	  It	  is	  posited	  that	  in	  these	  few	  images	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  find	  evidence	  that	  GI	  satisfies	  at	  least	  seven	  of	  the	  eight	  criteria	  in	  the	  TAN	  referent	  model336.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335	  Although	  these	  criteria	  are	  not	  presented	  in	  any	  particular	  hierarchical	  order,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  conceive	  
of	  an	  advocacy	  NGO	  achieving	  significant	  prominence	  with	  transnational	  audiences	  without	  the	  
necessary	  condition	  of	  having	  a	  recognisable	  corporate	  identity.	  
336	  The	  only	  criterion	  not	  specifically	  shown	  in	  these	  images	  is	  a	  ‘demonstrable	  high	  degree	  of	  strategic	  
social	  boundary	  mechanism	  construction’,	  which	  would	  arguably	  necessitate	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  explicit	  
partisan	  message	  of	  ‘us-­‐versus-­‐them’,	  rather	  than	  an	  implied	  one	  (such	  as	  might	  be	  achieved	  via	  
audience	  cognitive	  association	  with	  a	  visual	  cue,	  sign,	  or	  symbol	  —	  e.g.	  potential	  alignment	  with	  those	  
who	  take	  action	  to	  ‘Save’	  aspects	  of	  the	  global	  commons,	  or	  protect	  polar	  bears,	  or	  prominently	  defy	  
perceived	  abuses	  of	  power.	  Evidence	  that	  satisfies	  this	  requirement	  of	  the	  referent	  model	  is	  presented	  
later.	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  Figure	  7.3	  Banner	  message:	  ‘Save	  the	  Arctic!	  Free	  our	  activists!’	  (GI	  image,	  2013a)	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  Figure	  7.4	  Greenpeace	  protest	  theatre	  has	  a	  distinctive	  brand	  identity.	  (GI	  image,	  2013b)	  	  
	  
Criterion	  #2:	  	  
• Demonstrable	  prioritising	  of	  self-­promotion	  
Indications:	  Greenpeace	  branding	  is	  foregrounded	  in	  all	  GI	  publicity	  outputs,	  as	  exemplified	  in	  the	  Arctic	  campaign	  publicity	  photograph	  (below),	  in	  which	  the	  Greenpeace	  name	  appears	  four	  times	  on	  a	  single	  publicity	  image.	  Another	  demonstration	  of	  this	  distinctive	  communications	  strategy	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  frequent,	  prominent,	  portrayal	  of	  GI’s	  Executive	  Director,	  Dr.	  Kumi	  Naidoo,	  as	  an	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  activist337.	  The	  publicity	  photo	  ‘GI	  photo,	  2013a’	  (see	  previous	  page),	  shows	  a	  Greenpeace	  protest	  banner	  that	  was	  unfurled	  across	  the	  venue	  for	  the	  UN	  climate	  conference	  COP19	  in	  Warsaw	  in	  November	  2013.	  The	  banner	  states	  ‘Save	  the	  Arctic!	  Free	  our	  activists!338’,	  arguably	  giving	  equal	  weight	  to	  both	  messages	  alongside	  the	  Greenpeace	  logo.	  A	  GI	  press	  release	  at	  the	  time	  prioritised	  the	  TAN’s	  message	  in	  its	  headline:	  ‘Warsaw	  iconic	  building	  is	  stage	  for	  call	  to	  free	  activists	  as	  COP19	  fails	  to	  respond	  to	  climate	  emergency’	  (see	  GI	  news,	  2013f).	  Three	  further	  publicity	  releases	  that	  typify	  the	  political	  issues	  GI	  chooses	  to	  pursue	  may	  be	  seen	  on	  the	  GI	  Website,	  headlined:	  Greenpeace	  International	  head	  boards	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337	  Evidence	  of	  these	  numerous	  references	  is	  readily	  available	  from	  the	  Greenpeace	  International	  official	  
Website.	  	  
338	  This	  is	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  Greenpeace	  activists	  the	  ‘Arctic	  30’,	  who	  were	  imprisoned	  in	  Russia	  at	  that	  
time.	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Gazprom	  Arctic	  oil	  platform;	  An	  open	  letter	  to	  the	  people	  of	  Russia;	  and	  A	  Letter	  to	  
President	  Putin’	  (GI	  Naidoo,	  2012a;	  2012b;	  2012c;	  2012d;	  2012e).	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Figure	  7.6	  CEO	  Kumi	  Naidoo	  (Centre)	  gives	  added	  news	  value	  to	  a	  ‘media	  mindbomb’	  
by	  scaling	  a	  Russian	  oilrig.	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Criterion	  #3:	  	  
• Demonstrable	  prioritising	  of	  voice-­amplification	  strategies	  in	  advocacy	  
Indications:	  GI’s	  commitment	  to	  campaign-­‐orientation,	  bearing	  witness	  and	  ‘media	  mindbombs’.	  The	  prioritisation	  of	  voice-­‐amplification	  advocacy	  strategies	  is	  amply	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  wide	  range	  and	  enormous	  scale	  of	  the	  publicity	  outputs	  emanating	  from	  Greenpeace,	  as	  may	  be	  seen	  on	  the	  organisation’s	  international	  HQ	  and	  national	  branch	  Websites.	  	  	  
Criterion	  #4:	  	  
• Highly	  media-­savvy,	  with	  unremitting	  media	  relations	  activity	  
Indications:	  Demonstrably	  large	  volume	  and	  professional	  quality	  of	  media	  releases	  posted	  on	  the	  GI	  and	  Greenpeace	  national	  Websites	  and	  on	  Greenpeace	  platforms	  on	  social	  media339.	  This	  includes	  up-­‐to-­‐the-­‐minute	  breaking	  news	  (often	  transmitted	  from	  remote	  locations340),	  press	  releases,	  photographic	  images,	  videos,	  Webcams	  and	  podcasts,	  feature	  articles,	  interviews	  with	  newsmakers	  and	  background	  reports.	  GI’s	  latest	  annual	  report	  declares	  a	  commitment	  to	  further	  exploring	  the	  frontiers	  of	  on-­‐line	  activism	  and	  encouraging	  ‘people	  power’	  via	  social	  media	  activity	  (GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2012:40-­‐41).	  Greenpeace	  also	  makes	  explicit	  statements	  concerning	  its	  media-­‐savvy	  traditions	  and	  continuing	  commitment	  to	  a	  high	  level	  of	  media	  relations	  activity	  (see	  Hunter	  and	  Naidoo,	  2011).	  The	  text	  credited	  to	  Hunter	  and	  Naidoo	  (2011),	  further	  demonstrates	  this	  point,	  being	  a	  revised	  edition	  of	  Robert	  Hunter’s	  1979	  eye-­‐witness	  account	  of	  the	  early	  days	  of	  Greenpeace	  (Hunter,	  1979).	  The	  modernised,	  2011	  version	  of	  Hunter’s	  book,	  re-­‐issued	  under	  his	  name,	  was	  provided	  with	  a	  foreword	  by	  the	  current	  CEO	  and	  published	  by	  GI	  to	  mark	  its	  40th	  Anniversary.	  This	  skilled	  communications	  tactic	  provides	  for	  Greenpeace	  to	  control	  the	  reiteration	  of	  a	  version	  of	  its	  narrative	  of	  which	  it	  approves,	  and	  the	  story	  arguably	  becomes	  re-­‐energised,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Robert	  Hunter	  died	  in	  2005341.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339	  Such	  as	  Greenpeace	  sites	  on	  YouTube,	  Facebook,	  Twitter,	  Pinterest,	  Tumblr	  and	  Feedburner.	  In	  
addition	  to	  Greenpeace’s	  own	  Websites,	  these	  social	  media	  sites	  are	  all	  kept	  supplied	  with	  fresh	  news	  
and	  publicity	  materials	  by	  Greenpeace	  communications	  staff.	  
340	  For	  example,	  the	  real-­‐time	  video	  transmission	  from	  the	  Arctic	  Sunrise	  during	  the	  September	  2013	  
protest	  action	  to	  board	  a	  Gazprom	  oilrig	  in	  the	  Pechora	  Sea	  in	  the	  Russian	  Arctic	  (GI	  Naidoo,	  2013b).	  
341	  According	  to	  the	  GI	  Website,	  Bob	  Hunter	  died	  of	  prostate	  cancer	  on	  2	  May	  2005,	  aged	  63.	  See	  
Section7.3.3.	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Criterion	  #5:	  	  
• Demonstrable	  high	  degree	  of	  adoption	  of	  sophisticated	  public/political	  
communications	  style	  and	  strategies	  
	  
Indications:	  The	  high	  quality	  of	  GI’s	  communications	  outputs,	  reflecting	  advanced	  international	  public	  communications	  standards,	  and	  explicit	  statements	  concerning	  the	  importance	  and	  resources	  in	  its	  communications	  function.	  These	  statements	  can	  be	  found	  on	  the	  GI	  Website.	  Greenpeace	  includes	  ‘embedded’	  freelance	  journalists	  on	  its	  missions	  and	  calls	  on	  a	  talent	  pool	  of	  20	  world-­‐class	  freelance	  photographers	  (GI	  data,	  2013;	  GI	  Quarterly,	  2011;	  GI	  news,	  2011c).	  	  	  
Criterion	  #6:	  	  
• Demonstrable	  high	  degree	  of	  adoption	  of	  advanced	  information	  and	  
communication	  technologies	  
	  
Indications:	  The	  high	  speed,	  quality	  and	  global	  reach	  of	  GI’s	  external	  communications	  outputs	  and	  explicit	  statements	  on	  GI	  official	  Website.	  The	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  communications	  equipment	  installed	  on	  the	  new	  oceangoing	  vessel	  
Rainbow	  Warrior	  III	  is	  apposite	  (GP	  USA,	  2012).	  From	  its	  inception,	  Greenpeace	  has	  adopted	  the	  cutting	  edge	  technology-­‐of-­‐the-­‐day	  in	  its	  campaigning.	  In	  1970,	  this	  included	  short	  wave	  radio,	  Zodiac	  speedboats,	  a	  radio	  direction	  finder	  and	  35	  mm	  film	  (Hunter	  and	  Naidoo,	  2011).	  Today,	  it	  includes	  installed	  satellite	  communications	  technology	  aboard	  a	  fleet	  of	  oceangoing	  vessels,	  helicopters,	  high-­‐performance	  speedboats,	  computers	  and	  advanced	  mobile	  communications	  equipment	  for	  recording	  and	  transmitting	  images,	  editorial	  content	  and	  audio-­‐visual	  outputs342.	  	  	  
Criterion	  #7:	  	  
• Demonstrable	  high	  degree	  of	  strategic	  social	  boundary	  mechanism	  
construction	  
	  
Indications:	  In	  brand	  positioning	  terms	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  GI’s	  construction	  and	  brand	  ‘ownership’	  of	  the	  evocative	  ‘Warriors	  of	  the	  Rainbow’	  imagery	  constitutes	  a	  powerful	  social	  boundary	  mechanism.	  In	  this	  reading	  of	  Greenpeace’s	  promotion	  of	  the	  legend	  as	  an	  advocacy	  tactic,	  audiences	  for	  Greenpeace	  messages	  are	  primed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342	  Demonstrated	  to	  me	  during	  a	  visit	  on	  board	  Arctic	  Sunrise	  in	  the	  UK,	  June	  2013.	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to	  identify	  with	  the	  virtuous	  deeds	  of	  a	  mystical	  tribe	  of	  proselytising	  eco-­‐warriors	  (see	  Section	  7.4.1),	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  mentally	  distancing	  themselves	  from	  the	  perversity	  and	  otherness	  of	  those	  who	  do	  not	  subscribe	  to	  its	  uncompromising	  ecological	  message.	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  also	  that	  when	  the	  Greenpeace	  CEO(Naidoo),	  calls	  on	  supporters	  to	  take	  urgent	  action	  against	  allegedly	  apathetic	  political	  leaders	  and	  those	  who	  do	  ecological	  harm,	  in	  order	  to	  save	  the	  planet	  ‘for	  our	  children	  and	  grandchildren’,	  he	  is	  conceptually	  ring-­‐fencing	  a	  socially-­‐responsible,	  pro-­‐Greenpeace,	  world	  from	  a	  socially-­‐irresponsible,	  sub-­‐class	  of	  humanity	  (see	  GI	  Naidoo,	  2012a;	  GI	  news,	  2012b	  and	  GI	  Annual	  Report	  2012,2012:8).	  	  	  	  
	  
Criterion	  #8:	  	  
• Demonstrable	  differentiation	  strategies	  within	  the	  NGO	  sector	  and	  within	  the	  
typology	  of	  TANs	  
	  
Indications:	  As	  evidenced	  in	  the	  following	  section,	  Greenpeace	  has	  constructed	  a	  distinctive,	  brand	  identity	  that	  is	  typically	  regarded	  as	  ‘iconic’	  in	  comparison	  to	  other	  NGOs,	  including	  other	  TANs.	  Although	  aspects	  of	  the	  Greenpeace	  protest	  model	  appear	  to	  have	  become	  commoditised	  over	  the	  years	  by	  other	  environmental	  and	  non-­‐environmental	  groups343,	  complexity	  theory	  offers	  the	  analytical	  tools	  to	  explain	  why	  Greenpeace	  has	  apparently	  retained	  certain	  cumulative	  advantages	  as	  the	  first-­‐adopter	  of	  an	  innovative	  model	  of	  political	  protest	  that	  was	  —	  as	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  following	  section	  —	  specifically	  designed	  by	  its	  founders	  in	  the	  early	  1970s,	  to	  capture	  public	  and	  mass	  media	  attention.	  Among	  the	  differentiators	  that	  are	  pointed	  out	  throughout	  this	  study,	  and	  that	  Greenpeace	  consistently	  highlights	  in	  its	  protest	  actions,	  are	  inter	  alia:	  its	  flagship	  
Rainbow	  Warrior	  III	  and	  incomparably	  large	  fleet	  of	  oceangoing	  vessels;	  its	  professed	  adherence	  to	  non-­‐violent	  tactics;	  its	  commitment	  to	  ‘speaking	  truth	  to	  power’344;	  its	  staging	  of	  audacious	  publicity	  stunts,	  and	  its	  particular	  transactional	  protest	  model	  in	  which	  multitudes	  of	  donor-­‐supporters	  act	  as	  ‘principals’	  in	  an	  exchange	  arrangement	  under	  which	  small	  bands	  of	  Greenpeace	  activists	  carry	  out	  acts	  of	  defiance	  and	  protest,	  as	  ‘agents’,	  acting	  with	  a	  mandate	  on	  their	  behalf345.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343	  For	  example,	  the	  Greenpeace	  breakaway	  group,	  Sea	  Shepherd	  Conservation	  Society,	  and	  Friends	  of	  
the	  Earth	  (Sea	  Shepherd,	  2012);	  The	  Times	  (2013);	  Secrett	  (2011a).	  	  
344	  GI	  annual	  Report,	  2012:37;	  GI	  Naidoo,	  2012d.	  
345	  A	  recent	  example	  was	  the	  Arctic	  protest	  action	  in	  attempting	  to	  board	  a	  Russian	  oil	  rig,	  resulting	  in	  
the	  arrest	  and	  detention	  of	  30	  Greenpeace	  activists	  (GI	  news,	  2013d,	  2013h;	  BBC	  Archive,	  2013b,	  
2013c).	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7.3	  Socio-­‐historical	  context	  The	  Greenpeace	  narrative	  is	  the	  stuff	  of	  legend	  —	  an	  impression	  that	  has	  been	  undoubtedly	  reinforced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  accounts	  of	  the	  organisation’s	  beginnings	  use	  the	  same	  leitmotifs	  and	  tend	  to	  rely	  on	  a	  finite	  stock	  of	  lore,	  recurring	  details	  and	  factoids346.	  The	  GI	  Website347	  is	  a	  rich	  source	  of	  background	  data	  and,	  given	  GI’s	  declared	  commitments	  to	  transparency	  and	  accountability348,	  this	  thesis	  takes	  it	  to	  be	  the	  authorised	  portrayal	  of	  Greenpeace’s	  collective	  view	  of	  itself,	  even	  if	  the	  content	  is	  expressed	  in	  a	  contemporary,	  Web-­‐friendly,	  narrative	  style	  that	  lends	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s	  an	  air	  of	  once-­‐upon-­‐a-­‐time	  antiquity349,350.	  
7.3.1	  Pacifists,	  environmentalists	  and	  newsmakers	  	  Four351	  Canadians	  are	  now	  recognised	  by	  GI	  to	  have	  been	  prominent	  in	  guiding	  its	  first	  defiant	  steps.	  The	  four,	  each	  of	  whom	  has	  been	  provided	  with	  a	  cameo	  on	  the	  GI	  ‘Founders’	  Webpage,	  were	  (according	  to	  their	  thumbnail	  bios):	  ‘a	  relentless	  visionary	  and	  mystic	  storyteller’	  Bob	  Hunter;	  ‘pragmatic,	  driven	  and	  famously	  ruthless’	  David	  McTaggart;	  and	  ‘committed	  pacifists	  and	  lifelong	  activists’	  Dorothy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346	  This	  point	  is	  noted	  not	  to	  disparage	  the	  historical	  accounts	  themselves,	  only	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  
information	  available	  and	  its	  frequent	  recasting	  in	  Greenpeace	  promotional	  materials,	  to	  the	  point	  
where,	  I	  suggest,	  it	  becomes	  difficult	  to	  separate	  historical	  fact	  from	  legend.	  All	  of	  the	  four	  core	  
founders	  of	  Greenpeace	  are	  now	  deceased	  (Hunter,	  McTaggart	  and	  the	  Stowes),	  and	  selected	  aspects	  of	  
their	  lives	  have	  become	  reified.	  Complexity	  theorising	  problematises	  the	  effects	  of	  repetition	  occurring	  
in	  complex	  open	  systems	  over	  time,	  highlighting	  the	  eventual	  corruption	  of	  intended	  pathways	  brought	  
about	  by	  small,	  incremental,	  alterations	  in	  the	  repeated	  pattern	  (see	  also	  Kahneman,	  2011:8).	  I	  suggest	  
this	  is	  happening	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Greenpeace	  legends	  and	  founding	  tenets	  and	  that	  this	  has	  implications	  
for	  the	  place,	  function	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  Greenpeace	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  	  
347	  At	  http://www.greenpeace.org/	  
348	  Apart	  from	  statements	  to	  this	  effect	  in	  its	  publicity	  materials,	  Greenpeace	  was	  one	  of	  the	  founder	  
members	  of	  the	  INGO	  Accountability	  Charter	  (INGO	  Charter,	  2012).	  
349	  GI’s	  Website	  showcases	  many	  pithy	  chunks	  of	  content	  that	  provide	  snapshots	  of	  the	  organisation’s	  
founding	  circumstances,	  founding	  fathers,	  and	  early	  victories.	  This	  content	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  
observations	  of	  social	  movement	  scholars	  concerning	  the	  role	  of	  heroes,	  myths	  and	  mysticism,	  
emblems,	  symbols	  and	  ‘empty	  signifiers’	  (Burgos,	  2000:8-­‐9)	  in	  constructing	  bonds	  with	  the	  past	  that	  
provide	  a	  rationale	  for	  what	  the	  organisation	  is	  now	  and	  is	  intent	  on	  becoming.	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  
important	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  problem	  with	  stereotypes	  and	  icons	  is	  that	  they	  are	  incomplete,	  
admitting	  factors	  that	  comply	  with	  a	  particular	  interpretation	  and	  omitting	  those	  that	  do	  not.	  
350	  Cross-­‐matching	  Greenpeace’s	  narrative	  with	  other	  socio-­‐historical	  accounts	  of	  the	  era,	  such	  as	  
Turner,	  2006	  and	  Moore,	  2013,	  provided	  additional	  individual	  perspectives	  as	  well	  as	  a	  necessary	  
measure	  of	  substantiation.	  Obviously	  there	  are	  strategic	  gaps	  in	  the	  Greenpeace	  narrative,	  particularly	  
in	  regard	  to	  political	  undercurrents,	  such	  as	  the	  combining	  of	  elements	  of	  the	  New	  Left	  and	  the	  New	  
Communitarianism	  in	  the	  emerging	  youth	  counterculture	  in	  the	  U.S.	  (Turner,	  2006:31-­‐33).	  However,	  it	  is	  
hardly	  fair	  to	  compare	  an	  individual	  organisation’s	  Website	  with	  the	  content	  of	  academic	  texts.	  	  	  
351	  Greenpeace	  does	  not	  recognise	  other	  founder	  members	  who	  left	  the	  organisation	  and	  with	  whom	  it	  
has	  issues,	  such	  as	  Dr.	  Patrick	  Moore	  (Moore,	  2008;	  Moore,	  2013)	  and	  Captain	  Paul	  Watson	  (Sea	  
Shepherd,	  2012,	  URL).	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and	  Irving	  Stowe352,	  who	  banded	  together	  in	  Vancouver,	  in	  1970,	  as	  the	  Don’t	  Make	  A	  Wave	  Committee	  (Hunter	  and	  Naidoo,	  2011;	  Weyler,	  2004	  and	  2012;	  Sea	  Shepherd,	  2012:URL).	  Its	  sole	  objective	  was	  to	  stop	  a	  second	  U.S.	  nuclear	  weapons	  test	  at	  Amchitka	  Island	  in	  the	  Aleutians.	  	  	  Described	  by	  GI	  as	  ‘Quakers,	  pacifists,	  ecologists	  journalists	  and	  hippies’	  the	  group	  was	  credited	  with	  ‘dreaming	  big,	  infectious	  dreams’.	  The	  links	  with	  newsmaking	  were	  particularly	  strong.	  Describing	  the	  group	  years	  later,	  one	  of	  the	  founders,	  Rex	  Wyler,	  is	  quoted	  as	  saying	  (Wyler,	  2012):	  	   In	   Greenpeace,	   we	   were	   all	   journalists.	   We	   understood	   how	   the	   media	  worked.	  We	  were	   all	   Marshall	   McLuhan	   devotees,	   and	  we	   had	   all	   these	   big	  ideas	  how	  we	  were	  going	  to	  use	  the	  media	  to	  change	  the	  way	  people	  thought	  about	  things,	  and	  we	  did.	  Part	  of	  the	  thing	  with	  using	  the	  media	  is	  that	  you've	  got	   to	   create	   stories.	   And	  we	   knew	   how	   stories	  worked.	   You've	   got	   to	   have	  characters	  and	  they've	  got	  to	  be	  doing	  stuff,	  it's	  got	  to	  be	  dramatic	  and	  visually	  interesting	  and	  all	  of	  that.	  	  	  
7.3.2	  Civil	  protest	  movement	  of	  the	  1960s	  	  In	  keeping	  with	  their	  pacifist	  ideals,	  the	  group	  took	  a	  boat	  into	  the	  nuclear	  test	  zone	  in	  an	  act	  of	  passive	  protest353.	  Non-­‐violent,	  citizen	  action	  strategies	  had	  been	  used	  during	  the	  1960s	  by	  the	  U.S.	  civil	  rights,	  women’s	  rights	  and	  peace	  movements	  and	  were	  being	  widely	  viewed	  in	  the	  North	  American	  context	  as	  effective,	  novel	  and	  headline-­‐grabbing354.	  	  The	  Don’t	  Make	  a	  Wave	  Committee	  members	  hoped	  they	  could	  similarly	  create	  an	  anti-­‐nuclear,	  environmental	  conservation	  movement	  and	  popularise	  it	  in	  mainstream	  public	  awareness,	  using	  the	  mass	  media	  as	  their	  strategic	  delivery	  instrument	  (GI	  news,	  2004c;	  Hunter,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352	  These	  four	  were	  part	  of	  a	  larger,	  loose-­‐knit,	  group	  of	  Canadian	  anti-­‐war	  and	  anti-­‐nuclear	  weapons	  
dissidents,	  and	  environmental	  conservationists	  belonging	  to	  the	  British	  Columbia	  branch	  of	  the	  Sierra	  
Club	  and	  members	  of	  the	  Society	  of	  Friends	  (Quakers).	  Established	  in	  1892,	  the	  Sierra	  Club	  claims	  to	  be	  
the	  largest	  and	  most	  influential	  grassroots,	  environmental	  organisation	  in	  the	  U.S.A.	  (Sierra	  Club,	  
2012:URL).	  	  
353	  The	  idea	  of	  sailing	  a	  boat	  into	  a	  nuclear	  weapons	  testing	  zone	  was	  not	  new,	  having	  been	  originally	  
tried	  in	  1958	  by	  an	  American	  ex-­‐Navy	  officer,	  Albert	  Bigelow,	  in	  a	  protest	  against	  U.S.	  nuclear	  testing	  in	  
the	  Pacific	  (Bigelow,	  2011/1959;	  Wittner,	  1997:55).	  According	  to	  Hunter	  and	  Weyler,	  Bigelow’s	  
campaign	  was	  the	  inspiration	  for	  the	  group’s	  decision	  to	  adopt	  the	  same	  tactic	  (Weyler,	  2004:65-­‐66;	  
Hunter,	  2005:18;Hunter	  and	  Naidoo,	  2011).	  
354	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  descriptive	  accounts	  on	  the	  Greenpeace	  International	  Website,	  see	  also	  Turner,	  
2006;	  Weyler,	  2004	  and	  2012;	  GI	  Naidoo,	  2011;	  and	  The	  Guardian	  2011b,	  for	  substantiation.	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1979;	  Hunter	  and	  Naidoo,	  2011;	  Wyler,	  ibid).	  They	  had	  no	  intention	  of	  starting	  an	  international	  organisation	  (GI	  Naidoo,	  2011).	  	  	  The	  provenance	  of	  the	  Committee’s	  name	  change	  to	  the	  distinctive	  ‘Greenpeace’	  is	  also	  linked	  to	  this	  formative	  period	  and	  to	  countercultural	  currents	  in	  the	  prevailing	  social	  and	  political	  moods355.	  To	  fund	  the	  voyage,	  a	  sell-­‐out	  rock	  concert	  in	  Vancouver	  had	  attracted	  some	  16,000	  supporters	  —	  and	  pro	  bono	  performances	  by	  singers	  Joni	  Mitchell	  and	  James	  Taylor,	  amongst	  others	  —	  raising	  Greenpeace’s	  public	  and	  media	  profile	  enormously,	  as	  well	  as	  some	  US$23,000	  in	  donations356.	  Although	  such	  fund-­‐raising	  and	  media-­‐attracting	  strategies	  are	  now	  standard	  tactics	  in	  the	  political	  advocacy	  toolbox,	  they	  were	  groundbreaking	  at	  the	  dawn	  of	  the	  70s	  (GI	  data,	  2007;	  Secrett,	  2011a	  and	  2011b).	  However,	  the	  original	  voyage	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  disaster	  by	  those	  involved357	  (GI	  data,	  2007).	  The	  boat	  was	  intercepted	  and	  turned	  away	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Navy	  well	  short	  of	  the	  target	  area;	  there	  was	  bitter	  in-­‐fighting	  from	  the	  outset	  among	  the	  heterogeneous	  activists	  on	  board;	  and	  the	  nuclear	  test	  went	  ahead	  as	  scheduled.	  However,	  a	  sea	  change	  in	  political	  advocacy	  had	  occurred	  that,	  according	  to	  GI,	  had	  changed	  the	  face	  of	  protest,	  and	  perceptions	  of	  protest,	  irrevocably358.	  Public	  and	  media	  interest	  had	  been	  ignited	  about	  the	  group	  of	  activists	  who,	  in	  a	  modern-­‐day	  David	  and	  Goliath	  scenario,	  had	  challenged	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  military	  forces	  on	  Earth.	  Greenpeace	  now	  counts	  the	  campaign	  amongst	  its	  victories,	  recalling	  how,	  after	  the	  voyage,	  the	  remaining	  nuclear	  tests	  were	  cancelled	  and	  five	  months	  later	  the	  entire	  Amchitka	  nuclear	  test	  programme	  was	  halted	  and	  the	  island	  subsequently	  turned	  into	  a	  bird	  sanctuary359.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355	  Greenpeace	  lore	  relates	  that,	  as	  the	  group	  members	  were	  leaving	  one	  of	  their	  preparatory	  meetings	  
for	  the	  voyage,	  one	  of	  their	  number	  (Irving	  Stowe),	  raised	  two	  fingers	  in	  a	  ‘peace’	  sign,	  to	  which	  another	  
(ecologist,	  Bill	  Darnell),	  commented,	  ‘make	  it	  a	  green	  peace’	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  group’s	  concern	  for	  the	  
planet	  and	  opposition	  to	  nuclear	  arms.	  Others	  overheard	  and	  were	  impressed	  by	  this	  exchange	  and,	  
shortly	  thereafter,	  the	  iconic	  Greenpeace	  name	  was	  born.	  	  
356	  This	  protest	  rock	  concert	  to	  raise	  funds	  for	  the	  Amchitka	  voyage	  has	  been	  described	  as	  ‘the	  biggest	  
counter-­‐culture	  event	  of	  the	  year’	  (GI	  data,	  2007;	  see	  also	  Turner,	  2006:	  3-­‐9;	  and	  The	  Guardian,	  2011b).	  
357	  This	  assessment	  of	  the	  initial	  outcome	  of	  the	  voyage	  is	  openly	  admitted	  on	  the	  Greenpeace	  
International	  Website	  at	  http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/history/amchitka-­‐
hunter/.	  
358	  See	  also	  Weyler	  2004	  and	  20012;	  also	  GI	  news,	  2004c	  for	  first-­‐person	  accounts	  by	  Rex	  Weyler,	  who	  
was	  intimately	  involved	  in	  designing	  and	  carrying	  out	  these	  strategies.	  
359	  This	  section	  recounts	  the	  historical	  context	  according	  to	  the	  Greenpeace	  narrative.	  It	  is	  not	  part	  of	  
this	  thesis	  to	  examine	  whether,	  or	  not,	  it	  represents	  either	  reality	  or	  a	  post	  hoc	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
causes	  of	  the	  cancellation	  of	  the	  Amchitka	  nuclear	  testing	  programme.	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7.3	  3	  ‘Media	  mindbombs’	  	  Although	  the	  enormous	  scale	  of	  the	  public	  and	  media	  response	  was	  unpredicted	  and	  apparently	  took	  both	  the	  activists	  and	  observers	  by	  surprise,	  the	  newsworthiness	  of	  the	  story	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  the	  cadre	  of	  journalists	  among	  them,	  particularly	  the	  late	  Bob	  Hunter,	  who	  shaped	  the	  protest	  model	  that	  has	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  a	  ‘Greenpeace	  action’	  using	  what	  he	  termed	  ‘media	  mindbombs’.	  GI	  describes	  this	  tactic	  as	  ‘consciousness-­‐changing	  sounds	  and	  images	  that	  would	  blast	  across	  the	  world	  in	  the	  guise	  of	  news’	  (GI	  data,	  2008).	  In	  a	  complexity	  theorisation	  of	  these	  events,	  I	  suggest	  that	  Hunter	  was	  able	  to	  recognise	  some	  of	  the	  pivotal	  properties	  and	  powers	  of	  the	  fitness	  landscape	  for	  the	  proposed	  anti-­‐nuclear	  enterprise.	  	  	  	  
7.3.4	  Taking	  a	  left	  turn	  after	  the	  Cold	  War	  	  A	  further	  significant	  development	  was,	  arguably,	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  ending	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  peace	  movement	  being	  largely	  disbanded	  and	  many	  of	  its	  members	  gravitating	  to	  the	  environmental	  movement	  (Moore,	  2013:	  Ch.1;	  
The	  Independent,	  2014).	  Describing	  his	  experiences	  at	  the	  core	  of	  Greenpeace	  at	  this	  time,	  one	  of	  the	  organisation’s	  co-­‐founders,	  the	  ecologist	  and	  author	  Patrick	  Moore,	  claims360	  he	  was	  compelled	  to	  leave	  after	  15	  years	  in	  the	  top	  committee	  when	  increasingly	  extremist	  ‘neo-­‐Marxist,	  far-­‐left	  agendas’	  began	  to	  emerge	  and	  the	  group	  adopted	  policies	  that	  he	  could	  not	  accept	  from	  a	  scientific	  perspective:	  	  	  To	   a	   considerable	   extent	   the	   environmental	   movement	   was	   hijacked	   by	  political	   and	   social	   activists	   who	   learned	   to	   use	   green	   language	   to	   cloak	  agendas	   that	   had	  more	   to	   do	  with	   anticapitalism	   and	   antiglobalization	   than	  with	  science	  or	  ecology	   […].	  There	  was	  a	   lot	  of	  power	   in	  our	  movement	  and	  they	   saw	   how	   it	   could	   be	   turned	   to	   serve	   their	   agendas	   of	   revolutionary	  change	  and	  class	  struggle.	  	  	  Today,	  the	  identification	  of	  ‘green’	  campaigning	  with	  left-­‐wing	  politics	  endures	  (Brand,	  2009:213-­‐214;	  Helm,	  2012:64).	  As	  Brand	  observes	  (ibid):	  	  	  Worldwide,	   the	   political	   stereotype	   these	   days	   is	   that	   Green	   equals	   left,	   left	  equals	  Green,	  and	  right	  equals	  anti-­‐Green361	  […]	  Becoming	  politically	  narrow	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360	  A	  candid	  account	  of	  this	  period	  is	  contained	  in	  Dr.	  Moore’s	  recent	  text,	  Confessions	  of	  a	  Greenpeace	  
Dropout:	  The	  Making	  of	  a	  Sensible	  Environmentalist	  (Moore,	  2013).	  	  
361	  Brand’s	  theorising	  is	  taken	  here	  to	  be	  the	  personal	  perspective	  of	  a	  veteran	  environmentalist	  and	  
activist	  and	  does	  not	  assume	  any	  deeper	  political	  inferences	  as	  to	  whether,	  or	  not,	  the	  territorialised	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limits	  Greens’	  thinking	  and	  marginalizes	  their	  effectiveness,	  because	  whatever	  they	  say	  is	  automatically	  dismissed	  by	  anyone	  who	  has	  doubts	  about	  liberals.	  	  	  Although	  this	  study	  focuses	  principally	  on	  Greenpeace’s	  relationships	  with	  international	  actors,	  we	  have	  seen	  here	  how	  changing	  conditions	  in	  political,	  economic	  and	  cultural	  structures,	  inter	  alia,	  led	  to	  the	  perturbations	  caused	  by	  autonomous	  new	  agents	  joining	  the	  Greenpeace	  system	  and	  Moore,	  for	  one,	  leaving	  it;	  and	  all	  parties	  availing	  of	  ‘adjacent	  possible’	  opportunities	  (Kauffman,	  2000:22	  and	  Mitleton-­‐Kelly,	  2003:15).	  	  	  	  
7.4	  Milestones	  and	  salient	  strategies	  	  The	  following	  salient	  milestones	  and	  strategies	  are	  considered	  to	  have	  shaped	  (a)	  not	  only	  the	  outcomes	  of	  its	  activism;	  but	  (b)	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  Greenpeace	  itself;	  (c)	  the	  mainstream	  media	  face	  of	  the	  environmental	  movement;	  and	  (d)	  the	  advocacy	  strategies	  of	  countless	  sociopolitical	  protest	  groups	  worldwide.	  	  
7.4.1	  Warriors	  of	  the	  Rainbow	  	  The	  Rainbow	  Warrior	  legacy	  has	  helped	  to	  prolong,	  promote	  and	  widely	  disseminate	  a	  cross-­‐cultural	  cognitive	  link	  between	  the	  Greenpeace	  corporate	  identity	  —	  the	  trademark	  ‘Greenpeace	  action’	  —	  and	  controversial,	  and	  therefore	  newsworthy,	  acts	  of	  protest.	  Greenpeace	  co-­‐founder,	  Rex	  Weyler	  claims	  they	  set	  out	  ‘to	  create	  an	  environmental	  movement’	  and	  had	  no	  plans	  to	  start	  an	  organisation	  to	  spearhead	  the	  project,	  let	  alone	  an	  international	  one.	  He	  emphasised	  also	  that:	  ‘We	  weren’t	  trying	  to	  make	  Greenpeace	  famous	  but	  to	  make	  the	  environment	  famous’	  (Weyler,	  2004	  and	  2012;	  GI	  Naidoo,	  2011).	  Nevertheless,	  Greenpeace	  has	  made	  itself	  famous	  and	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  assiduously	  cultivate	  a	  status	  as	  ‘the	  world’s	  most	  visible	  environmental	  organisation’	  (GI	  data,	  2007).	  The	  powerful	  imagery	  and	  feisty	  tactics	  the	  Greenpeace	  founders	  employed	  in	  their	  advocacy	  strategies	  evidently	  touched	  human	  emotions	  in	  the	  1970s,	  and	  in	  the	  decades	  since	  then,	  and	  have	  shaped	  the	  formation	  and	  development	  of	  a	  novel	  organisational	  model	  for	  political	  issue-­‐promotion	  and	  protest.	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  a	  key	  cross-­‐cultural,	  motivational,	  meme	  underlying	  the	  popularity	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Left-­‐Right	  axis	  of	  political	  orientation	  is	  actually	  transferable,	  or	  meaningful,	  as	  an	  analytical	  framework	  
for	  understanding	  global	  politics,	  as	  questioned	  by	  Chandler	  (2009:537).	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magnetism	  of	  the	  Greenpeace	  brand	  image	  is	  the	  constant	  reinforcement	  of	  an	  association	  with	  the	  empathetic,	  apocalyptic362	  legend	  of	  the	  Rainbow	  Warriors363.	  	  	  In	  1978,	  the	  organisation’s	  first	  dedicated	  vessel	  was	  purchased,	  secondhand,	  and	  renamed	  Rainbow	  Warrior	  (GI	  data,	  2012:	  FAQs):	  the	  first	  in	  GI’s	  distinctive,	  global-­‐roaming,	  ‘eco-­‐navy’,	  which	  remains	  deployed	  in	  the	  forefront	  of	  Greenpeace	  campaigning	  (Weyler,	  2004;	  GI	  news,	  2004c;	  GI	  news,	  2009d).	  Weyler,	  has	  been	  candid	  in	  pointing	  out	  the	  value	  of	  mythmaking	  in	  framing	  Greenpeace	  stories	  (GI	  News,	  2004c):	  	   By	  1972,	   I	  had	   read	  everything	  published	  by	  media	  guru	  Marshall	  McLuhan,	  and	   his	   idea	   that	   "we	   think	   and	   live	   mythically"	   influenced	   our	   tactics.	  Although	   we	   employed	   good	   science,	   we	   understood	   that	   the	   facts	   don't	  always	  win	  the	  public	  mind.	  	  	  […]	  The	   Internet	   is	   a	   tremendous	   tool,	   like	   the	  printing	  press	   and	   television	  before	   it,	   that	   democratizes	   knowledge	   and	   culture-­‐making.	   Some	   of	   the	  cyber-­‐activist	  messages	   I	  witness	  on	   the	   Internet	   today	  are	  brilliant,	   but	   the	  fundamentals	   of	   good	   storytelling	   haven't	   changed	   much	   in	   two	   thousand	  years.	   We	   still	   have	   to	   find	   those	   mythical	   images	   that	   touch	   the	   human	  emotions.	  	  
7.4.2	  Rainbow	  Warrior	  sinking	  and	  aftermath	  	  The	  single,	  albeit	  tragic,	  event	  that	  attracted	  the	  most	  media	  coverage	  and	  international	  attention	  in	  Greenpeace	  history,	  was	  the	  1985	  mining	  and	  sinking	  of	  the	  first	  Rainbow	  Warrior	  by	  French	  secret	  service	  agents,	  and	  the	  death	  of	  a	  Portuguese364	  freelance	  photographer	  crewmember(UN	  Sec-­‐Gen	  Report,	  1986;	  GI	  Archive,	  2012;	  GI	  data,	  2012b;	  GP	  USA	  data,	  2005a;	  BBC	  Archive,	  2005).	  The	  BBC	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
362	  Apocalypticism,	  pairing	  Mankind’s	  cataclysmic	  annihilation	  with	  promised	  salvation	  for	  the	  faithful	  
and	  retribution	  for	  one’s	  persecutors,	  is	  a	  recognisable	  theme	  in	  many	  of	  the	  world’s	  historical	  religions	  
and	  civilisations	  (Bennett,	  2001:10-­‐11).	  The	  projection	  of	  an	  imperative	  mission	  to	  regain	  an	  objective	  
common	  good	  that	  has	  been	  lost	  (a	  type	  of	  Holy	  Grail),	  exactly	  fits	  the	  description	  of	  ‘empty	  signifiers’	  
noted	  among	  social	  movements	  by	  Burgos	  (2000:	  8-­‐9).	  Lomberg	  (2001:12-­‐13)	  asserts	  that	  the	  
communication	  of	  environmental	  knowledge	  taps	  deeply	  into	  our	  doomsday	  beliefs.	  He	  cites	  
Greenpeace	  as	  one	  of	  the	  organisations	  he	  considers	  to	  have	  been	  involved	  in	  some	  ‘outstanding	  
examples	  of	  environmental	  mythmaking’	  (ibid:	  13).	  	  
363	  The	  origins	  and	  accounts	  of	  this	  legend	  are	  contested.	  This	  version,	  promoted	  by	  Greenpeace,	  is	  
attributed	  to	  Bob	  Hunter	  and	  purportedly	  underlies	  the	  decision	  to	  name	  a	  succession	  of	  Greenpeace	  
protest	  vessels	  Rainbow	  Warrior.	  In	  this	  typically	  apocalyptic	  story,	  an	  old	  Indian	  woman	  relates	  how	  
the	  Cree	  foresee	  a	  time	  when	  ‘the	  white	  man’s	  materialistic	  ways	  strip	  the	  earth	  of	  its	  resources.	  Just	  
before	  it	  is	  too	  late	  the	  Great	  Spirit	  of	  the	  Indians	  will	  return	  to	  resurrect	  the	  braves	  and	  teach	  the	  white	  
man	  reverence	  for	  the	  earth’.	  The	  legend	  states	  that	  these	  courageous	  people	  will	  become	  known	  as	  
The	  Warriors	  of	  the	  Rainbow	  (GI	  data,	  2012;	  GI	  news,	  2011a,	  2011b).	  	  
364	  Descriptions	  of	  the	  photographer,	  Fernando	  Pereira,	  vary	  because	  he	  was	  both	  a	  Portuguese	  national	  
and	  a	  citizen	  of	  The	  Netherlands	  (UN	  Sec-­‐Gen	  Report,	  1986;	  GP	  USA	  data,	  2005;	  GI	  data,	  2012).	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claims	  it	  was	  this	  single	  event	  that	  ‘hurtled	  Greenpeace	  into	  instant	  global	  celebrity	  and	  ensured	  that	  Rainbow	  Warrior	  Mark	  II	  became	  an	  enduring	  icon	  of	  the	  environmental	  movement’	  (BBC	  Archive,	  ibid).	  The	  mining	  of	  the	  ship,	  in	  Auckland	  Harbour,	  was	  a	  covert	  operation	  by	  French	  services	  agents	  acting	  under	  official	  orders365	  to	  sabotage	  the	  Greenpeace	  campaign	  to	  stop	  nuclear	  weapons	  testing	  on	  Pacific	  islands	  (UN	  Sec-­‐Gen	  Report,	  ibid;	  GI	  data,	  2012b;	  The	  Times,	  2005).	  The	  New	  Zealand	  Prime	  Minister,	  David	  Lange,	  was	  to	  later	  describe	  the	  attack	  as	  ‘a	  sordid	  act	  of	  international	  state-­‐backed	  terrorism’	  (GI	  Archive	  2012;	  King,	  1986:202).	  	  	  The	  ruling	  on	  the	  case	  by	  the	  UN	  (UN	  Sec-­‐Gen	  Report,	  1986)	  could	  arguably	  be	  interpreted	  as	  the	  product	  of	  an	  international	  institution	  that	  appears	  to	  be	  wholly	  focused	  on	  mediating	  the	  conflicting	  interests	  and	  sensibilities	  of	  two	  of	  its	  members	  and	  expresses	  a	  comparative	  lack	  of	  concern	  for	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  primary	  victims	  in	  the	  case:	  Greenpeace	  and	  its	  slain	  photographer.	  Indeed,	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  UN’s	  standpoint	  and	  relatively	  apathetic	  orientation	  towards	  Greenpeace	  could	  be	  interpreted	  in	  the	  UN’s	  naming	  of	  the	  ruling	  document	  —	  viz.	  ‘Case	  concerning	  the	  difficulties	  between	  New	  Zealand	  and	  France	  arising	  from	  the	  
Rainbow	  Warrior	  affair’	  (UN	  Sec-­‐Gen	  Report,	  ibid).	  Whether	  the	  UN	  could,	  or	  should,	  have	  discharged	  its	  role	  differently	  is	  not	  at	  issue	  here.	  As	  explained	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  the	  UN	  is	  a	  voluntary	  association	  of	  sovereign	  States	  and	  has	  no	  powers	  of	  coercion.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  ruling	  by	  the	  UN	  Secretary-­‐General	  as	  arbitrator	  —	  which	  Greenpeace	  labels	  ‘a	  political	  deal’	  (GI	  Archive,	  2012)	  —	  appears	  in	  a	  humanitarian	  reading	  to	  have	  been	  of	  no	  consolation	  to	  Greenpeace	  whatsoever	  (UN	  Sec-­‐Gen	  Report,	  1986,	  Ruling	  7:	  GP	  USA	  data,	  2005b).	  	  	  It	  can	  be	  deduced	  from	  Greenpeace	  Websites	  that	  institutional	  memories	  of	  the	  attack	  on	  the	  Rainbow	  Warrior	  and	  the	  unsatisfactory	  aftermath	  process	  evidently	  still	  rankle	  with	  Greenpeace	  (GI	  Archive,	  2012;	  GI	  data,	  2012a,	  2012b;	  GP	  USA	  data,	  2005,	  2005d).	  Throughout	  the	  years,	  the	  entire	  issue	  of	  apologies,	  appropriate	  compensation	  and	  punishments	  —	  and	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  UN	  in	  arbitrating	  the	  matter	  —	  has	  evidently	  been,	  from	  the	  Greenpeace	  perspective,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
365	  Twenty	  years	  after	  the	  sinking	  of	  the	  Rainbow	  Warrior,	  the	  former	  head	  of	  the	  French	  intelligence	  
service	  disclosed	  previously	  classified	  details	  of	  the	  mission	  and	  admitted	  that	  it	  had	  been	  personally	  
authorised	  by	  the	  then	  President	  of	  France,	  Françoise	  Mitterand	  (The	  Times,	  2005).	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unsatisfactory	  (GP	  USA	  data,	  2010;	  2005b).	  On	  the	  25th	  anniversary	  of	  the	  sinking,	  Greenpeace	  concluded	  (ibid,	  2005b):	  ‘The	  guilty	  have	  not	  been	  punished	  and	  justice	  has	  not	  been	  served’.	  	  Consequently,	  this	  section	  builds	  on	  my	  theorisation	  that,	  for	  an	  organisation	  that	  looks	  to	  its	  past	  for	  inspiration	  and	  has	  a	  core	  commitment	  to	  ensuring	  its	  backstory	  is	  not	  forgotten	  (GI	  data,	  2012a),	  the	  effect	  of	  Internet-­‐enabled	  institutional	  memory	  reinforcement,	  such	  as	  this,	  should	  not	  be	  discounted	  in	  assessing	  the	  roots	  and	  depth	  of	  contemporary,	  distrusting,	  attitudes	  within	  Greenpeace	  towards	  the	  UN.	  Thus,	  GI’s	  editorial	  framing	  of	  accounts	  of	  the	  
Rainbow	  Warrior	  attack	  live	  on,	  on	  its	  Website,	  as	  a	  reminder	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  international	  action	  —	  and	  of	  the	  UN,	  specifically	  —	  in	  responding	  to	  Greenpeace’s	  loudly-­‐voiced	  interests	  and	  concerns.	  As	  time	  passed,	  Greenpeace	  reframed	  the	  
Rainbow	  Warrior	  disaster	  as	  being	  one	  of	  its	  triumphs	  (GP	  USA,	  2005c).	  	  
7.4.3	  Working	  with	  the	  anti-­‐nuclear	  international	  lobby	  	  The	  anti-­‐nuclear	  confrontations	  between	  Greenpeace	  and	  France	  did	  not	  end	  with	  the	  dramatic	  events	  of	  the	  mid-­‐’80s.	  The	  French	  government	  was	  to	  maintain	  an	  unyielding	  stance	  to	  all	  opposition	  to	  its	  nuclear	  testing	  programme	  in	  the	  next	  decade,	  up	  to	  January	  1996,	  when	  the	  tests	  were	  finally	  halted	  amid	  an	  increasing	  international	  outcry	  (GI	  Archive,	  1996;	  CNN,	  1995a,	  1995b).	  Many	  world	  leaders	  expressed	  their	  condemnation	  of	  France’s	  resistance	  to	  the	  prevailing	  international	  nuclear-­‐test-­‐ban	  mood,	  which	  in	  November	  1995	  had	  seen	  95	  countries	  at	  a	  UN	  disarmament	  committee	  meeting	  voting	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  resolution	  to	  ban	  nuclear	  testing	  immediately	  (CNN,	  1995b)366.	  Giving	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  extent	  and	  fervour	  of	  international	  indignation	  just	  one	  month	  before	  the	  French	  cessation	  of	  testing,	  the	  South	  Pacific’s	  strongest	  critic	  of	  the	  tests,	  the	  then	  New	  Zealand	  Prime	  Minister	  (Bolger),	  said	  (CNN,	  1995a):	  	  It's	   really	   quite	   incredible	   that	   France	   didn't	   listen	   to	   not	   only	   the	   South	  Pacific,	  listen	  to	  the	  Commonwealth	  leaders,	  listen	  to	  the	  United	  Nations.	  The	  voice	  of	  the	  world	  says	  no	  to	  nuclear	  testing,	  and	  you	  are	  left	  wondering	  what	  part	  of	  'no'	  the	  French	  government	  doesn't	  understand.	  	  These	  were	  comparatively	  heady	  days	  for	  Greenpeace,	  with	  headline-­‐grabbing	  confrontations	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  South	  Pacific	  between	  Greenpeace	  vessels	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366	  France	  halted	  the	  tests	  on	  29	  January	  1986,	  some	  two	  months	  after	  this	  meeting.	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the	  French	  navy,	  and	  GI’s	  anti-­‐nuclear	  activists,	  world	  leaders,	  international	  institutions	  and	  widespread	  public	  opinion	  all	  seemingly	  fighting	  on	  the	  same	  side.	  This	  thesis	  argues,	  however,	  that	  given	  the	  increase	  in	  scientific	  knowledge	  regarding	  the	  dangers	  of	  nuclear	  war	  and	  radioactive	  fallout	  from	  nuclear	  weapons	  testing,	  and	  the	  intensity	  of	  international	  sentiment367,	  the	  possibility	  that	  conventional	  power	  relations	  and	  diplomacy	  had	  prime	  instrumentality	  in	  resolving	  the	  standoff	  should	  not	  be	  discounted,	  or	  subordinated	  to	  assertions	  by	  Greenpeace	  that	  France’s	  cessation	  of	  testing	  was	  due	  to	  the	  more	  visible	  accounts	  of	  battles	  with	  Greenpeace	  anti-­‐nuclear	  activists	  being	  played	  out	  in	  the	  international	  mass	  media	  (GI	  news,	  2009c).	  	  	  
7.4.4	  Brent	  Spar	  campaign	  	  On	  a	  different	  battlefront	  in	  1995,	  Greenpeace	  was	  in	  international	  headlines	  for	  its	  controversial	  conduct	  to	  prevent	  Shell	  UK	  from	  dumping	  its	  unwanted	  Brent	  Spar	  oil	  platform	  into	  the	  North	  Sea	  (GI	  data,	  2011;	  Bennie,	  1998).	  Following	  the	  British	  Government’s	  approval	  of	  plans	  for	  a	  deep-­‐sea	  disposal	  of	  the	  huge	  oil	  facility,	  Greenpeace	  began	  a	  media-­‐intensive	  advocacy	  campaign,	  raising	  the	  issue	  from	  the	  domestic	  to	  the	  international	  political	  arena.	  This	  campaign	  included	  media-­‐attracting,	  protest	  spectacles,	  such	  as	  sending	  teams	  of	  activists	  to	  seize	  and	  occupy	  the	  condemned	  oil	  installation.	  After	  pressure	  from	  its	  sister	  companies	  in	  Europe	  (where	  public	  green-­‐consumer	  sentiment	  was	  more	  overt	  than	  in	  the	  UK),	  Shell	  UK	  was	  forced	  to	  capitulate	  (Bennie,	  ibid).	  Throughout	  the	  affair,	  the	  Greenpeace	  key	  message	  was	  that	  if	  the	  disposal	  went	  ahead	  it	  would	  both	  damage	  the	  environment	  and	  send	  the	  wrong	  signal	  to	  industry	  that	  this	  was	  an	  acceptable	  form	  of	  waste	  disposal	  (ibid).	  	  	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Greenpeace	  quickly	  seized	  the	  moral	  high	  ground	  and	  landscaped	  it	  with	  the	  type	  of	  symbolic,	  moral	  messages	  that	  have	  been	  a	  common	  theme	  throughout	  its	  campaigning	  history	  (ibid),	  this	  study	  noted	  that	  from	  all	  accounts,	  none	  of	  the	  warring	  parties	  finally	  emerged	  as	  an	  unequivocal	  winner	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367	  Nuclear	  scientists	  are	  credited	  with	  mounting	  the	  first	  substantial	  challenge	  to	  the	  nuclear	  threats	  
emanating	  from	  East-­‐West	  tensions	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  (Willetts,	  2011:160-­‐61).	  In	  particular,	  the	  
conclusions	  of	  some	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  eminent	  scientists,	  brought	  together	  annually	  under	  the	  
auspices	  of	  the	  Pugwash	  Conference	  on	  Science	  and	  World	  Affairs	  (founded	  in	  1957),	  were	  discreetly	  
passed	  on	  to	  decision-­‐makers	  in	  both	  East	  and	  West,	  to	  promote	  peace.	  The	  Pugwash	  conference	  was	  
subsequently	  awarded	  the	  Nobel	  Peace	  Prize	  in	  1995	  (ibid).	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from	  this	  famous	  clash	  of	  worldviews	  concerning	  the	  environmental	  commons.	  According	  to	  Bennie,	  the	  notable	  features	  of	  the	  episode	  include:	  (i)	  The	  campaign	  involved	  a	  moral	  stand	  ‘against	  the	  double-­‐headed	  monster’	  of	  business	  and	  government	  and	  it	  appealed	  to	  the	  emotions	  of	  the	  general	  public;	  (ii)	  Greenpeace	  took	  the	  issue	  to	  an	  international	  audience,	  via	  the	  international	  mass	  media	  appetite	  for	  its	  bold	  confrontation	  of	  powerful	  institutions	  and	  actors368;	  (iii)	  It	  had	  a	  dramatic	  and	  enduring	  effect	  in	  reversing	  business	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  environment369;	  and	  (iv)	  Greenpeace	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  volatility	  of	  reputational	  capital	  applies	  equally	  to	  NGOs,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  big	  business	  and	  politicians.	  	  	  Widely	  perceived	  as	  more	  trustworthy370	  than	  its	  powerful	  rivals,	  Greenpeace	  began	  its	  campaign	  with	  a	  distinct	  reputational	  advantage.	  It	  had	  established	  a	  positive	  image	  in	  the	  media	  and,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  uncritical	  media	  coverage	  early	  on,	  was	  the	  most	  important	  informational	  source	  during	  the	  ‘definitional	  period’	  of	  media	  interest.	  However,	  after	  widely-­‐acknowledged	  serious	  errors	  and	  evidence	  of	  deceit	  in	  its	  timing	  and	  use	  of	  ‘scientific’	  data	  to	  support	  its	  claims,	  there	  was	  a	  marked	  decline	  in	  respect	  for	  the	  ‘Greenpeace	  expert’	  and	  the	  organisation	  suffered	  enormous	  reputational	  loss	  (Risse,	  2012:291;	  Van	  Rooy	  2004:84;	  Forini,	  2000:231).	  After	  the	  campaign,	  the	  media	  reassessed	  their	  willingness	  to	  be	  ‘led	  by	  the	  nose’	  and	  as	  a	  result	  they	  are	  now	  held	  to	  be	  more	  cautious	  about	  supporting	  Greenpeace	  claims	  (Risse,	  ibid).	  Van	  Rooy	  (ibid)	  posits	  that	  ‘probably	  the	  most	  serious	  accusations	  of	  misreported	  evidence,	  in	  recent	  years,	  have	  been	  directed	  at	  environmentalists’371,	  and	  of	  these	  ‘the	  most	  infamous	  case	  is	  widely	  regarded	  to	  have	  been	  that	  of	  the	  Greenpeace	  1995	  campaign’.	  Greenpeace	  eventually	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368	  Although	  Greenpeace	  had	  been	  successful	  in	  appealing	  to	  public	  sympathy	  in	  Britain,	  it	  had	  not	  
resulted	  in	  dramatically	  high	  levels	  of	  public	  protest	  at	  the	  domestic	  level	  (Bennie,	  1998).	  
369	  Bennie	  (1998)	  considers	  the	  reversal	  in	  attitudes	  largely	  involved	  the	  business	  world	  acknowledging	  
the	  unpredictability	  of	  public	  opinion	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  reputational	  damage	  and	  ‘green	  consumer’	  
retaliation.	  	  
370	  	  See	  Risse,	  2010:290-­‐291	  and	  also	  Rom,	  Ramos	  and	  Rodgers,	  2005.	  
371	  In	  discussing	  his	  statistically-­‐supported	  scientific	  findings	  that	  challenge	  the	  widespread	  conception	  
that	  the	  Earth’s	  ecosystem	  is	  collapsing	  and	  catastrophic	  consequences	  are	  imminent,	  Lomborg	  
(2001:4,12),	  states	  that	  ‘	  the	  public	  environmental	  debate	  has	  unfortunately	  been	  characterized	  by	  an	  
unpleasant	  tendency	  towards	  rather	  rash	  treatment	  of	  the	  truth.’	  The	  constant	  repetition	  and	  often	  
heard	  environmental	  exaggerations	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘The	  Litany’	  (the	  self-­‐destructive,	  trashed	  planet	  
scenario)	  has	  pervaded	  the	  debate	  ‘so	  deeply	  and	  for	  so	  long	  that	  blatantly	  false	  claims	  can	  be	  made	  
again	  and	  again,	  without	  any	  references,	  and	  yet	  still	  be	  believed’	  (ibid:12).	  See	  Kahneman’s	  research	  in	  
relation	  to	  ‘availability	  bias’	  in	  which	  the	  frequency	  with	  which	  see	  instances	  of	  a	  risk,	  whether	  it	  is	  real	  
or	  not,	  increases	  our	  assumptions	  of	  its	  dangers	  and	  importance	  (2011:138-­‐140)	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apologised	  publicly	  for,	  inter	  alia,	  exaggerating	  the	  potential	  pollution	  from	  any	  associated	  petroleum	  leak	  by	  a	  factor	  of	  37,	  but	  the	  memory	  of	  this	  highly	  charged	  campaign	  endures	  (ibid).	  	  	  Today,	  Greenpeace	  chronicles	  the	  Brent	  Spar	  campaign	  on	  the	  Victories	  Timeline	  on	  its	  Website372,	  describing	  it	  as	  a	  ‘dramatic	  win’	  for	  Greenpeace’s	  confrontational	  tactics	  and	  ‘consumer	  power’,	  with	  mention	  of	  wrong-­‐headed	  opposition	  but	  not	  of	  GI’s	  ignominy	  or	  the	  highly	  controversial	  political,	  industrial	  and	  scientific	  nature	  of	  the	  issue	  (GI	  data,	  2012;	  GI	  Archive,	  1995;	  Bennie,	  ibid)	  —	  exemplifying	  quite	  openly,	  Shaw-­‐Bond	  observes,	  ‘how	  scientific	  facts	  frequently	  play	  second	  fiddle	  to	  politics’	  (Shaw-­‐Bond,	  2000).	  	  
7.4.5	  Widening	  the	  range	  of	  campaign	  issues	  	  Greenpeace	  also	  chronicles	  (GI	  data,	  2012)	  among	  its	  victorious	  moments	  the	  campaigns	  against	  nuclear	  energy	  production,	  seal	  culling,	  whaling,	  over-­‐fishing,	  deforestation,	  discharge	  and	  disposal	  of	  toxic	  substances,	  genetically	  modified	  crops	  and	  palm	  oil	  production.	  The	  list	  of	  campaigns	  in	  which	  Greenpeace	  claims	  sole	  instrumentality	  for	  achieving	  a	  conclusive	  victory	  shows	  an	  increasing	  diversity	  of	  issues	  and	  number	  of	  claimed	  successes,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  very	  noticeable	  shift	  from	  mainly	  targeting	  governments	  towards	  predominantly	  targeting	  major	  corporations,	  or	  global	  brands	  (Shaw-­‐Bond,	  2000),	  using	  a	  combination	  of	  social	  media	  networking,	  online	  petition	  generation,	  ‘faux	  tweets’,	  ‘faux	  press	  releases’	  and	  protest	  street	  theatre	  aimed	  at	  mocking	  the	  brand	  image	  (GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2012:40-­‐41).	  Among	  the	  world’s	  biggest	  brands	  to	  have	  been	  the	  focus	  of	  its	  adverse	  publicity	  are:	  Unilever,	  Coca-­‐Cola,	  McDonalds,	  Ford,	  Volkswagen,	  Nestlé,	  Duracell,	  Shell,	  Esso,	  Nike,	  Puma,	  Adidas,	  H&M,	  Zara,	  Levi’s,	  Sony	  Ericcson,	  Apple,	  Dell,	  Hewlett-­‐Packard,	  Monsanto,	  Mattel,	  Xerox	  (GI	  data,	  2012c;	  BBC	  Archive,	  2012a;	  L.A.	  Times,	  2011;	  GI	  Guide	  to	  Greener	  Electronics,	  2011).	  	  	  In	  the	  past	  decade,	  Greenpeace	  has	  responded	  to	  changing	  circumstances	  on	  a	  number	  of	  fronts,	  mainly	  by	  honing	  its	  strategies,	  doing	  more	  of	  the	  same	  with	  more	  and	  better	  resources	  and	  selecting	  new	  high-­‐profile	  targets	  that	  guarantee	  headlines.	  The	  policies	  to	  prioritise	  climate	  change	  and	  scale	  up	  activities	  in	  the	  global	  South,	  discussed	  later,	  while	  signalling	  a	  marked	  refocusing	  of	  GI’s	  strategic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372	  Available	  at	  http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/history/Victories-­‐timeline/.	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direction	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  yet	  made	  any	  directly	  attributable	  impacts	  on	  the	  achievement	  of	  environmental	  goals373.	  Meanwhile,	  GI’s	  tactical	  actions	  continue	  to	  follow	  its	  trademark	  repertoire	  involving	  small	  teams	  of	  risk-­‐taking	  activists,	  giant-­‐sized	  banners,	  mountaineering	  equipment	  and	  hardhats,	  humorous	  costumes,	  a	  fleet	  of	  ships,	  speedboats	  and	  aircraft,	  and	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  information	  communications	  technologies	  and	  media	  relations	  techniques.	  The	  latest	  Rainbow	  
Warrior,	  launched	  in	  October	  2011,	  is	  described	  as	  ‘[A]	  floating	  communications	  hub’	  (GP	  USA,	  2012).	  	  
Maintaining	  a	  presence	  on	  social	  media	  networks,	  such	  as	  Facebook,	  Twitter,	  YouTube,	  Pinterest,	  Tumblr	  and	  Feedburner	  is	  further	  enabling	  Greenpeace	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  mass	  audiences	  through	  new	  channels374	  (GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2012:41;	  GI	  Quarterly,	  2011;	  GI	  news,	  2011c).	  	  	  Both	  the	  Greenpeace	  co-­‐founder	  Rex	  Weyler	  and	  the	  current	  Executive	  Director,	  Kumi	  Naidoo,	  have	  also	  emphasised	  the	  corporate	  strategic	  belief	  that	  self-­‐mockery	  and	  ‘humor	  goes	  a	  long	  way	  toward	  easing	  the	  public's	  mind	  and	  disarming	  the	  media's	  natural	  skepticism’	  (GI	  Naidoo,	  2011;	  GI	  news,	  2004c)375.	  Therefore,	  they	  both	  admit	  that	  GI	  uses	  a	  ‘reverse	  psychology’	  advocacy	  strategy	  that	  holds	  that	  if	  organisations	  laugh	  at	  themselves	  the	  public	  tends	  to	  take	  them	  seriously,	  and	  vice	  versa	  (GI	  Naidoo,	  ibid).	  There	  is	  arguably	  an	  inverse	  relationship	  evolving	  between	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  increasingly	  complex	  campaign	  issues	  now	  being	  championed	  by	  Greenpeace	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  popularisable	  humour	  invested	  in	  its	  campaign	  strategies376.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
373	  Some	  critics,	  such	  as	  Stewart	  Brand	  claim	  GI’s	  ‘anti-­‐science’	  agenda	  is,	  in	  reality,	  obstructing	  progress	  
in	  developing	  countries.	  Brand	  is	  an	  influential	  American	  writer,	  environmentalist	  and	  noted	  critic	  of	  
environmental	  groups	  such	  as	  Friends	  of	  the	  Earth	  and	  now	  Greenpeace,	  who,	  he	  claims,	  allow	  ideology	  
to	  cloud	  their	  acceptance	  of	  scientific	  advances	  (Brand,	  2009;	  New	  Statesman,	  2010).	  
374	  Greenpeace	  currently	  claims	  to	  have	  24	  million	  email	  or	  mobile	  subscribers,	  Facebook	  fans	  or	  Twitter	  
followers.	  
375	  This,	  I	  submit,	  shows	  a	  parallel	  with	  Habermas’s	  recommendations	  for	  activists	  to	  use	  rhetorical	  
techniques	  and	  perlocution	  (Habermas,	  1989:133	  and	  Section	  6.5.2).	  
376	  Two	  recent	  examples,	  in	  connection	  the	  with	  GI’s	  Save	  the	  Arctic	  campaign	  and,	  by	  extension,	  the	  
challenge	  of	  global	  warming,	  were	  publicity	  stunts	  involving	  what	  GI	  termed	  ‘our	  rather	  hilarious	  hijack’	  
of	  the	  Formula	  1,	  German	  Grand	  Prix,	  awards	  ceremony	  (GI	  news,	  2013c),	  and	  the	  Greenpeace	  UK	  
construction	  of	  	  ‘a	  giant	  people-­‐powered	  polar	  bear’,	  a	  ‘super-­‐puppet	  —	  the	  size	  of	  a	  double	  decker	  bus’	  
that	  was	  built	  to	  be	  hauled	  through	  the	  streets	  of	  London	  in	  an	  advocacy	  tactical	  action	  described	  as	  
‘part	  protest,	  part	  performance’.	  According	  to	  the	  Greenpeace	  UK	  publicity	  release,	  the	  artificial	  fur	  
fabric	  of	  the	  enormous	  marionette	  ‘carries	  the	  names	  of	  each	  and	  every	  member	  of	  the	  movement	  to	  
save	  the	  Arctic’	  (GP	  UK	  news,	  2013).	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7.4.6	  Re-­‐orienting	  Greenpeace’s	  geopolitical	  polarity	  	  A	  recent	  policy	  shift	  is	  currently	  taking	  place	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  GI’s	  South	  Africa-­‐born	  Executive	  Director,	  Kumi	  Naidoo377.	  This	  involves	  Greenpeace	  acknowledging	  ‘the	  growing	  importance	  of	  the	  Global	  South’	  by	  focusing	  resources	  on	  countries	  such	  as	  the	  so-­‐called	  BRICS	  (GI	  Naidoo,	  2012b;	  The	  Guardian	  (2011d).	  It	  is	  too	  early	  to	  say	  what	  impact	  this	  stratagem	  will	  have	  on	  GI’s	  place,	  function	  and	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  However,	  projections	  of	  such	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  world’s	  economic	  polarity	  have	  not	  eventuated	  and	  have	  been	  significantly	  eroded	  by	  recent	  data378	  (IMF,	  2013:41;	  Davos	  Global	  Economic	  Outlook	  2014;	  Magnus,	  2014).	  	  	  	  	  
7.5	  Outcomes-­‐in-­‐process	  and	  indicative	  macroscopic	  patterns	  
	  7.5.1	  Assessment	  of	  Greenpeace	  applying	  a	  Complex	  Realism	  analytical	  framework	  	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  argue	  that	  when	  Greenpeace	  is	  viewed	  ‘as	  if’	  it	  is	  a	  complex	  system	  the	  characteristics	  so	  far	  identified	  with	  complex	  adaptive	  systems	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  present.	  This	  means	  that	  when	  assessing	  GI	  in	  light	  of	  the	  PRQ	  and	  hypotheses,	  weighting	  must	  be	  given	  to	  considering	  factors	  that	  result	  from	  its	  embeddedness	  in	  webs	  of	  complex	  systems	  and	  to	  knowledge	  of	  the	  behaviours	  of	  complex	  systems	  that	  provide	  alternative	  explanations	  for	  phenomena379.	  This	  study	  found	  instantiations	  of	  each	  of	  the	  following	  key	  features	  of	  complex	  systems	  in	  the	  Greenpeace	  data	  set:	  fitness	  landscapes,	  structural	  plurality	  and	  multi-­‐dimensionality,	  emergence,	  co-­‐evolution,	  sensitivity	  to	  initial	  conditions,	  path	  dependency	  and	  lock-­‐in,	  the	  effects	  of	  negative	  and	  positive	  feedback	  loops,	  ‘attractor’	  properties,	  exploration	  of	  ‘adjacent	  possible’	  opportunities	  and	  unintended	  consequences.	  Due	  to	  space	  limitations,	  this	  listing	  of	  observed	  features	  of	  complex	  systems	  is	  indicative	  only	  and	  far	  from	  exhaustive	  of	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  lenses	  that	  can	  be	  fruitfully	  applied	  to	  this	  data.	  The	  following	  are	  some	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377	  Dr.	  Kumi	  Naidoo	  was	  appointed	  Executive	  Director	  in	  November	  2009(GI	  Naidoo,	  2009;	  GI	  Naidoo,	  
2012b).	  
378	  In	  recent	  years,	  the	  rapid	  economic	  growth	  seen	  in	  the	  BRICs	  has	  slowed	  dramatically,	  prompting	  
forecasters	  to	  revise	  their	  earlier	  optimistic	  estimates.	  According	  to	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  
the	  economic	  growth	  rates	  in	  the	  BRICs	  have	  fallen	  much	  further	  than	  expected	  and	  the	  severity	  was	  
unanticipated.	  Moreover,	  the	  potential	  for	  growth	  has	  also	  fallen	  (IMF,	  2013:41).	  
379	  Where	  the	  international	  system	  is	  conceptualised	  as	  an	  extraordinarily	  complex,	  biotic,	  adaptive	  
system	  composed	  of	  interacting	  subsystem	  elements	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  For	  insights	  supporting	  this	  
approach	  see	  also	  Geyer	  and	  Rihani	  (2010:114-­‐115)	  and	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden	  (2011:72-­‐73).	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of	  the	  more	  readily	  apparent	  complex	  system	  traits	  and	  the	  behavioural	  alignments	  I	  have	  identified.	  	  
	  
 Fitness	  landscape	  embeddedness	  Greenpeace	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  have	  emerged	  due,	  inter	  alia,	  to	  the	  presence	  and	  convergence	  of	  a	  fortuitous	  assemblage	  of	  geographical,	  cultural,	  socio-­‐political,	  social	  bonding	  and	  interpersonal	  factors,	  in	  a	  specific	  place,	  at	  a	  specific	  time.	  Complexity	  insights	  tell	  us	  that	  this	  configuration	  would	  have	  been	  shaped	  by,	  and	  in	  response	  to,	  an	  assemblage	  of	  properties	  and	  powers	  in	  the	  social	  environment	  that	  enabled	  and	  constrained	  it	  —	  i.e.	  its	  particular	  fitness	  landscape.	  	  
	  Conditions	  that	  appear	  to	  have	  enabled	  this	  social	  configuration	  to	  emerge	  include:	  (i)	  the	  personal	  characteristics	  of	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  dissident	  community	  in	  Vancouver	  (e.g.	  passionate	  and	  outspoken	  convictions	  about	  then	  current	  controversies:	  the	  menace	  of	  global	  annihilation,	  warfare	  and	  preserving	  the	  environment;	  media-­‐savviness;	  and	  differentiating	  counter-­‐cultural	  attitudes	  and	  behaviours	  to	  the	  mainstream	  North	  American	  socio-­‐political	  climate;	  (ii)	  being	  based	  in	  an	  independent	  sovereign	  territory	  (Canada)	  whilst	  campaigning	  against	  the	  U.S.	  nuclear	  arms	  policy380;	  (iii)	  the	  nature	  and	  effects	  of	  the	  U.S.	  military	  conscription	  policy	  that	  had	  resulted	  in	  a	  large	  population	  of	  angry	  U.S.	  draft	  evaders	  in	  Canada;	  (iv)	  accessible	  knowledge	  of	  the	  anti-­‐nuclear	  voyages	  in	  the	  1950s;	  (v)	  memories	  of	  the	  confrontational	  civil	  protest	  movements	  in	  the	  U.S.A	  in	  the	  1960s,	  including	  the	  prominent	  role	  played	  by	  the	  mass	  media;	  	  (vi)	  the	  popular	  reinforcement	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  questioning	  authority	  on	  environmental	  matters	  had	  become	  essential	  to	  all	  societies	  (GP	  USA	  data,	  2005e);	  and	  (vii)	  advances	  in	  communications	  technologies	  and	  techniques	  that	  catalysed	  social	  interactions	  and	  increased	  the	  appetite	  and	  influence	  of	  the	  mass	  media	  industry.	  	  	  Fitness	  landscape	  conditions	  that	  appear	  to	  have	  constrained	  the	  group’s	  fitness	  in	  achieving	  early	  success	  include	  their	  naivety	  and	  conjecture	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  international	  relations	  and	  national	  security,	  and	  inability	  to	  accurately	  determine	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  complexity,	  nor	  properties	  of,	  the	  fitness	  landscape	  for	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380	  Hunter	  also	  raises	  this	  point	  (2004:16),	  asserting	  that	  such	  an	  anti-­‐government	  campaign	  could	  not	  
have	  been	  launched	  by	  U.S.	  citizens	  in	  the	  U.S.	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venture.	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  each	  of	  these	  factors	  still	  pertain	  to	  the	  international	  fitness	  landscape	  for	  Greenpeace	  and	  other	  TANs	  operating	  today.	  Wittner	  offers	  an	  historical	  perspective	  and	  valuable	  analysis	  of	  this	  environment	  (1997:462).	  In	  describing	  the	  once	  robust,	  globe-­‐spanning,	  anti-­‐nuclear	  weapons	  movements	  of	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s381,	  and	  the	  increasing	  complexity	  and	  consequent	  schisms	  that	  weakened	  them,	  Wittner	  asserts	  (ibid):	  	  […]	  many	   activists	  moved	   beyond	   emphasizing	   the	   dangers	   of	   the	   Bomb	   to	  developing	   systemic	   analyses.	  Proceeding	  down	   these	   lines	   they	  became	   the	  major	   reformers	  and	  social	   critics	  of	   their	   time.	  But	   their	   systemic	   critiques,	  although	  laying	  the	  groundwork	  for	  an	  attack	  on	  an	  array	  of	  other	  important	  problems,	  failed	  to	  contribute	  much	  to	  the	  campaign	  for	  nuclear	  disarmament.	  Quite	   the	   contrary,	   when	   it	   came	   to	   the	   nuclear	   menace,	   their	   systemic	  analyses	  often	  proved	  either	  futile	  or	  debilitating	  […]	  In	  their	  desperate	  efforts	  to	   cope	  with	   the	  multiple	   crises	   of	   the	  1960s,	  many	   activists	   had	   either	   lost	  sight	  of	  or	  failed	  to	  comprehend	  the	  driving	  force	  of	  the	  nuclear	  arms	  race	  —	  the	  pathology	  of	  the	  international	  	  system.	  And,	  inevitably,	  this	  misreading	  of	  the	  problem	  weakened	  their	  attempts	  to	  generate	  a	  solution.	  	  	  I	  posit	  that	  by	  examining	  the	  contingent	  circumstances	  of	  the	  original	  campaign	  and	  subsequent	  advocacy	  campaigning,	  we	  can	  recognise	  not	  only	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  fitness	  landscape	  for	  this	  particular	  protest	  model.	  There	  is	  evidence	  here	  also	  of	  underlying	  social	  structural	  influences,	  particularly	  in	  regard	  to	  political	  power	  disparity;	  adaptation;	  co-­‐evolution;	  responsiveness	  to	  positive	  and	  negative	  feedback;	  unpredictability;	  unintended	  consequences;	  sensitivity	  to	  initial	  conditions	  and	  early-­‐adopter	  advantages;	  and	  ‘adjacent	  possible’	  opportunism.	  	  	  Today,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  Greenpeace	  is	  embedded	  in	  a	  multitude	  of	  socio-­‐political	  landscapes,	  of	  different	  levels	  of	  complexity,	  in	  which	  its	  fitness	  to	  achieve	  its	  preferred	  outcomes	  is	  constantly	  challenged	  —	  and	  sometimes	  facilitated.	  It	  appears	  that	  this	  TAN	  is	  highly	  successful	  in	  its	  interactions	  at	  the	  comparatively	  lower	  levels	  of	  complexity	  that	  characterise	  its	  fitness	  landscapes	  for	  fundraising,	  ideological	  marketing,	  social	  network	  formation	  and	  maintenance,	  exposing	  global	  environmental	  problems,	  information	  dissemination,	  raising	  online	  petitions	  and	  campaigning	  against	  global	  commercial	  brands.	  Conversely,	  it	  seems	  less	  successful	  in	  the	  more	  hazardous	  international	  fitness	  landscapes	  for	  its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
381	  Bigelow’s	  voyage	  of	  the	  Golden	  Rule,	  and	  several	  other	  protest	  voyages	  that	  were	  inspired	  by	  his	  
actions,	  belong	  to	  this	  time	  (Bigelow,	  1959/2011;	  Wittner,	  1997:55).	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confrontational	  advocacy	  functions	  that	  aim	  to	  ‘force	  the	  solutions	  which	  are	  essential	  to	  a	  green	  and	  peaceful	  future’.	  Thus,	  I	  argue	  that	  a	  deep,	  complexity-­‐focused	  analysis	  of	  Greenpeace’s	  international	  systemic	  fitness	  landscape	  can	  help	  us	  to	  advance	  plausible	  arguments	  regarding	  this	  TAN’s	  regularly	  expressed	  disappointments	  and	  admitted	  failures	  in	  that	  sphere	  of	  operations,	  and	  help	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  outcomes	  of	  Greenpeace’s	  acts	  can	  be	  so	  different	  from	  its	  intentions382.	  
	  
 Structural	  plurality	  and	  multi-­‐dimensionality	  Evidence	  of	  underlying	  social	  structural	  dimensions	  is	  interwoven	  throughout	  the	  Greenpeace	  narrative.	  Among	  the	  most	  salient	  are:	  
	  (i)	  National	  and	  international	  security	  structures	  involving	  military	  power383.	  Since	  its	  beginnings,	  the	  Greenpeace	  story	  has	  shown	  evidence	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  military	  power	  structures	  —	  generating	  enablements	  and	  constraints	  for	  GI,	  such	  as	  those	  linked	  to	  Cold	  War	  and	  nuclear	  armaments	  anxieties	  and,	  more	  recently,	  to	  Russia’s	  vigorous	  defence	  of	  its	  interests	  in	  the	  Arctic,	  including	  capturing	  at	  gunpoint	  and	  gaoling	  GI	  activists	  and	  impounding	  the	  Arctic	  Sunrise	  (GI	  news,	  2014).	  	  (ii)	  Economic	  structural	  realities:	  as	  exemplified	  by	  various	  national	  governments	  and	  prominent	  multi-­‐national	  corporations	  in	  their	  conflictual	  relations	  with	  Greenpeace	  over	  such	  issues	  as	  nuclear	  energy;	  the	  Brent	  Spar	  incident;	  exploitation	  of	  Arctic	  oil;	  shale	  fracking	  and	  tar	  sands	  oil	  and	  gas	  extraction	  methods	  and	  oilspill	  regulation;	  whaling;	  deforestation;	  palm	  oil;	  and	  wildlife	  trafficking.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  past	  economic	  affluence,	  liberal	  democratic	  attitudes	  and	  increasing	  post-­‐materialist	  trends	  in	  the	  developed	  world,	  the	  recent	  economic	  downturn	  and	  subsequent	  financial	  austerity	  measures	  have	  noticeably	  impacted	  on	  Greenpeace	  advocacy	  and	  policies:	  arguably	  spurring	  a	  steep	  rise	  in	  rhetoric	  and	  activism	  aimed	  at	  anti-­‐capitalism	  and	  linking	  these	  socio-­‐political	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden	  explore	  some	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  combine	  to	  make	  policy	  formulation	  at	  
higher	  levels	  of	  international	  complexity	  so	  complicated	  and	  unpredictable	  (2011:181-­‐182)	  
383	  See	  Nye,	  2011:	  xv,	  for	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  paramount	  importance	  of	  military	  power	  in	  the	  social	  
world.	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(and	  arguably	  NIEO-­‐influenced)	  themes	  to	  the	  environmental	  cause	  (GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2012).	  	  	  	  (iii)	  Political	  structures:	  encompassing	  the	  differences	  in	  GI’s	  protest	  activity	  when	  engaging	  with	  liberal	  democratic,	  nominally	  democratic	  and	  non-­‐democratic	  systems.	  The	  shock	  expressed	  by	  Greenpeace	  over	  Russia’s	  use	  of	  force	  and	  lengthy	  gaoling	  of	  the	  entire	  ‘Arctic	  30’	  group	  of	  activists	  was	  arguably	  an	  instance	  in	  which	  Greenpeace	  was	  dismayed	  that	  it	  had	  miscalculated	  the	  likely	  severity	  of	  Russia’s	  political	  response	  to	  its	  strategy.	  	  (iv)	  Cultural	  dimensions:	  including	  the	  variety	  of	  dispositions	  to	  the	  Greenpeace	  model	  of	  confrontational	  advocacy.	  Cultural	  structures	  can	  also	  help	  to	  explain	  the	  disparate	  levels	  of	  opposition	  and	  support	  Greenpeace	  encounters	  in	  the	  recognition	  of	  environmental	  degradation	  and	  wild	  animal	  welfare,	  e.g.	  as	  seen	  in	  contrasting	  intra-­‐	  and	  trans-­‐national	  attitudes	  to	  the	  ivory,	  whale	  meat,	  shark	  fin,	  palm	  oil	  and	  fur	  trades.	  Transnational	  bonds	  of	  solidarity	  and	  support	  for	  Greenpeace	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  to	  cross	  cultural	  divides,	  but	  inevitably	  they	  come	  into	  conflict	  with	  diverse	  cultural	  and	  religious	  dispositions,	  including	  varying	  openness	  to	  essentially	  Western	  standards	  of	  norms	  and	  norm-­‐sharing.	  	  	  (v)	  Polarity	  tendencies:	  exemplified	  in	  orientation	  to	  a	  particular	  regional	  or	  hemispherical	  focus,	  such	  as	  the	  current	  appeal	  of	  the	  Greenpeace	  model	  to	  supporters	  in	  Europe,	  especially	  Germany,	  and	  advanced	  Western	  democracies,	  and	  the	  recent	  gravitation	  towards	  projects	  in	  the	  BRICSAMs384	  and	  the	  global	  South;	  and	  	  	  (vi)	  Technological	  structures.	  It	  is	  probably	  uncontroversial	  to	  claim	  that	  Greenpeace	  is	  primarily	  constituted	  by	  the	  communications	  technological	  capabilities	  and	  opportunities	  associated	  with	  a	  globalising	  mass	  media	  industry	  and	  globe-­‐spanning	  transportation	  networks.	  As	  an	  iconic	  TAN,	  Greenpeace	  could	  not	  exist	  in	  its	  present	  form	  and	  be	  competitive	  in	  the	  market	  for	  NGO	  funds	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384	  The	  BRICSAM	  countries	  are:	  Brazil,	  Russia,	  India,	  China,	  South	  Africa	  and	  Mexico.	  The	  acronyms	  BRIC	  
and	  BRICSAM	  are	  often	  used	  to	  denote	  two	  groups	  of	  large	  emerging	  economies	  that	  have	  shown	  rapid	  
growth	  in	  recent	  years	  and,	  it	  has	  been	  speculated,	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  transform	  the	  international	  
economic	  order	  (IMF,	  2013:41;	  Davos	  Global	  Economic	  Outlook	  2014;	  Magnus,	  2014).	  See	  also	  Section	  
7.4.6.	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without	  the	  ability	  to	  promote	  itself	  vigorously	  via	  the	  Internet	  and	  advanced	  communications	  technology.	  	  	  Importantly,	  I	  emphasise	  that	  complex	  situations	  are	  multi-­‐causal	  and	  no	  single	  structural	  account	  can	  explain	  an	  entire	  phenomenon385.	  Thus,	  an	  eco-­‐ethical	  argument	  based	  on,	  say,	  the	  cross-­‐border	  poaching	  of	  ivory	  in	  parts	  of	  Africa,	  cannot	  disregard	  structural	  enabling	  influences	  created	  by	  a	  daunting	  mixture	  of	  border	  security	  and	  political	  conditions,	  cultural	  attitudes,	  economic	  conditions,	  technological	  capabilities	  and	  geographical	  possibility.	  
	  
 Emergence	  Greenpeace	  has	  continually	  demonstrated	  the	  complex	  system	  characteristic	  of	  ‘emergence’,	  by	  which	  a	  system	  is	  seen	  to	  have	  tendencies	  for	  self-­‐organisation	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  order	  in	  response	  to	  internal	  and	  external	  conditions	  in	  its	  fitness	  landscape.	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  surmise	  that	  key	  attractors	  for	  GI’s	  emergence	  included	  geographical,	  cultural,	  socio-­‐political,	  social	  bonding	  and	  interpersonal	  factors.	  When	  Greenpeace	  is	  viewed	  ‘as	  if’	  it	  is	  a	  complex,	  dynamic	  and	  adaptive	  system	  with	  emergent	  properties,	  the	  organisation	  well	  fits	  Giddens’s	  description	  of	  a	  ‘shell	  institution’	  that	  has	  retained	  recognisable	  external	  features	  over	  time	  while	  undergoing	  constant,	  dynamic,	  transformations	  (Giddens,	  2002:18-­‐19).	  	  GI’s	  expressed	  frustrations	  with	  its	  international	  counterparts	  and	  at	  its	  inability	  to	  achieve	  its	  desired	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  system,	  appear	  to	  indicate	  the	  presence	  of	  significant	  barriers	  to	  its	  efficacy	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  The	  recent	  self-­‐organisation	  by	  NGOs	  (including	  Greenpeace),	  who	  united	  to	  stage	  a	  mass	  walkout	  at	  the	  recent	  COP19	  international	  Summit	  was	  arguably	  a	  manifestation	  of	  emergence	  resulting	  from	  the	  group’s	  dynamics	  and	  its	  interactions	  with	  international	  system	  entities.	  However,	  it	  is	  too	  early	  detect	  whether	  this	  systemic	  disruption	  will	  have	  any	  implications	  for	  new	  order	  of	  any	  sort.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  would	  be	  remiss	  to	  keep	  a	  watch	  out	  only	  for	  co-­‐evolutionary	  implications	  stemming	  from	  the	  walkout	  act	  (which	  would	  be	  a	  relatively	  easy	  task),	  whilst	  ignoring	  the	  possibility	  of	  new	  order	  emerging	  from	  the	  parties	  who	  did	  not	  walk	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
385	  	  See	  Cilliers,	  1998:ix;	  Byrne,	  2011:28-­‐31	  and	  Wight,	  2007:1.	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out	  and	  did	  not	  make	  public	  statements	  (which	  could	  be	  virtually	  impossible	  to	  assess	  but	  might	  become	  apparent	  over	  time).	  	  	  Collaborative	  relationships	  between	  Greenpeace	  and	  other	  TANs	  are	  generally	  not	  in	  evidence,	  other	  than	  in	  ad	  hoc	  instances386,	  which	  may	  show	  the	  presence	  of	  significant	  relationship	  barriers	  also	  at	  TAN	  cluster	  level	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  
	  
 Co-­‐evolution	  Patterns	  of	  adaptation	  over	  time	  show	  Greenpeace	  co-­‐evolving	  by	  way	  of	  reciprocal	  influences	  that	  change	  the	  behaviour	  of	  interacting	  entities	  in	  complex	  systems.	  I	  posit	  that	  the	  primary	  example	  of	  this	  effect	  of	  complex	  systems	  is	  the	  institutionalised	  adversarial	  position	  adopted	  by	  Greenpeace,	  as	  a	  corporate	  entity,	  in	  its	  relationships	  with	  many	  different	  state	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system	  (e.g.	  U.S.A.,	  France,	  UK,	  Russia),	  and	  with	  the	  international	  institutional	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  habitual	  bristling	  of	  the	  organisation,	  seen	  in	  macroscopic	  analyses	  of	  Greenpeace	  statements	  of	  international	  encounters,	  particularly	  those	  of	  its	  CEO	  (Naidoo),	  undoubtedly	  owes	  much	  to	  the	  institutionalised	  memories	  of	  the	  past	  behaviours	  of	  powerful	  states	  and	  the	  UN,	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  interests	  of	  Greenpeace.	  Thus,	  I	  suggest,	  Greenpeace	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  co-­‐evolving	  with	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system	  in	  a	  dysfunctional	  and	  divergent	  pattern.	  	  This	  antipathy	  was	  not	  always	  so.	  Greenpeace	  appears	  to	  have	  co-­‐evolved	  in	  a	  more	  collaborative	  way	  with	  the	  international	  anti-­‐nuclear	  movement	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s,	  when	  it	  adopted	  an	  advocacy	  role	  that	  gained	  widespread	  attention	  in	  the	  media.	  Disruptions	  in	  the	  co-­‐evolution	  of	  these	  relationships	  were	  arguably	  caused	  by	  the	  bombing	  of	  the	  original	  Rainbow	  Warrior	  in	  1985	  and	  the	  murder	  of	  a	  crewmember;	  the	  investigations	  by	  the	  UN	  Secretary-­‐General	  and	  the	  behaviours	  of	  various	  UN	  Member	  states;	  the	  ending	  of	  the	  Cold	  War;	  and	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  anti-­‐nuclear	  weapons	  debate	  to	  encompass	  an	  emphatic	  and	  controversial	  anti-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386	  Such	  as	  the	  mass	  NGO	  walkout	  at	  COP19	  (GI	  news,	  2014),	  and	  occasionally	  joining	  forces	  with	  TANs	  
such	  as	  WWF,	  Oxfam	  and	  Avaaz	  to	  present	  petitions	  (as	  can	  be	  established	  by	  reviewing	  press	  releases	  
on	  the	  Greenpeace	  International	  Website).	  There	  is	  no	  evidence	  of	  large	  scale,	  on-­‐going,	  cooperative	  
projects	  with	  other	  TANs.	  Secrett	  and	  others	  have	  sharply	  criticised	  environmental	  NGOs	  for	  being	  
fragmented	  and	  working	  in	  parallel,	  disinclined	  to	  pool	  their	  vast	  resources	  and	  make	  a	  real	  impact	  in	  
their	  advocacy	  (Secrett,	  2011a;	  2011b).	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nuclear	  energy	  position.	  
	  
 Sensitivity	  to	  Initial	  conditions	  Historical	  analysis	  of	  Greenpeace	  reveals	  a	  wealth	  of	  data	  and	  distinctive	  patterns	  that	  can	  be	  categorised	  as	  instances	  of	  sensitivity	  to	  initial	  conditions,	  path-­‐dependency/lock-­‐in	  and	  resistance	  to	  change.	  These	  features	  of	  complex	  systems	  are	  not	  only	  seen	  to	  be	  present	  in	  the	  corporate	  culture	  of	  Greenpeace	  but	  are	  constantly	  maintained	  through	  adherence	  to	  a	  revered	  set	  of	  founding	  principles,	  corporate	  beliefs,	  practices	  and	  behaviours	  that	  have	  become	  deeply	  institutionalised.	  Thus,	  the	  founding	  condition	  involving	  the	  choice	  of	  a	  seagoing	  vessel	  to	  deliver	  a	  protest	  message	  to	  authorities	  is	  perpetuated	  today	  in	  the	  maintenance	  and	  growth	  of	  the	  Greenpeace	  fleet	  of	  oceangoing	  ships.	  There	  is	  nothing	  inherent	  in	  environmental	  political	  protest	  that	  necessitates,	  even	  suggests,	  the	  amassing	  of	  such	  a	  fleet:	  it	  is	  essentially	  an	  enduring	  visual	  identity	  symbol	  associated	  with	  Greenpeace	  that	  is	  historically	  rooted	  in	  the	  initial	  conditions	  of	  the	  organisation’s	  emergence387.	  The	  strategic	  deployment	  of	  ships	  appear	  to	  enable	  the	  Greenpeace	  functions	  of	  fundraising	  and	  exposing	  global	  environmental	  problems,	  but	  may	  have	  less	  impact	  and	  influence	  in	  the	  more	  complex	  realm	  of	  international	  debate	  and	  policy	  formulation	  in	  such	  intractable	  challenges	  as	  climate	  change.	  As	  an	  advocacy	  tool,	  the	  Greenpeace	  ships	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  to	  have	  had	  a	  characteristic	  marine-­‐world	  influence	  on	  the	  organisation’s	  environmental	  issue	  selection	  over	  time	  	  —	  e.g.	  overfishing,	  marine	  reserves,	  shark-­‐finning,	  tuna	  fishing,	  whale	  hunting,	  polar	  oceans,	  and	  pirate	  fishing.	  	  
	  
 Path	  dependency/Lock-­‐in	  The	  Greenpeace	  data	  set	  portrays	  an	  organisation	  that	  has	  essentially	  remained	  faithful	  to	  a	  fixed	  prescriptive	  ethos	  and	  operational	  code,	  now	  over	  40	  years	  in	  service.	  In	  practice	  it	  entails	  an	  on-­‐going	  commitment	  to	  a	  high	  visibility,	  non-­‐violent,	  direct	  action,	  confrontational	  strategy	  that	  was	  designed	  at	  that	  time	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387	  An	  eco-­‐navy	  is	  also	  operated	  by	  the	  Sea	  Shepherd	  Conservation	  Society.	  Founded	  in	  1977	  by	  a	  former	  
Greenpeace	  co-­‐founder,	  Captain	  Paul	  Watson,	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  SSCS	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  
exaptation	  and	  commoditisation	  of	  the	  earlier	  Greenpeace	  protest	  model	  rather	  than	  the	  manifestation	  
of	  an	  original	  idea.	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  SSCS	  and	  Greenpeace	  both	  still	  display	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  initial	  
conditions	  of	  Greenpeace’s	  emergence	  (in	  which	  Watson	  played	  a	  leading	  role),	  and	  that	  SSCS	  shows	  
significant	  evidence	  of	  availing	  of	  ‘adjacent	  possible’	  opportunities	  in	  diverging	  from	  the	  Greenpeace	  
model	  of	  non-­‐violent	  confrontation.	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the	  aim	  of	  	  ‘forcing	  solutions	  to	  changing	  global	  problems	  that	  threaten	  the	  environment	  and	  peace’	  (GI	  data,	  2012a;	  GI	  Annual	  Report	  2010).	  However,	  the	  strategy	  was	  designed	  to	  shock	  and	  attract	  attention,	  mainly	  in	  North	  America,	  at	  a	  particular	  time	  with	  its	  own	  contingent	  circumstances	  influencing	  attitudes	  and	  events.	  Complexity	  theory	  holds	  that	  because	  contingencies	  change,	  optimal	  strategies	  also	  change	  over	  time.	  As	  Mitleton-­‐Kelly	  points	  out	  (2003:14):	  	  Complexity	  suggests	  that	  a	  single	  ‘optimum’	  strategy	  may	  be	  neither	  possible	  nor	  desirable.	  Any	  strategy	  can	  be	  optimal	  under	  certain	  conditions,	  and	  when	  these	  conditions	  change,	  the	  strategy	  may	  no	  longer	  be	  optimal.	  To	  survive	  an	  organisation	   needs	   to	   be	   constantly	   scouring	   the	   landscape	   and	   trying	  different	  strategies.	  	  Therefore,	  I	  posit	  that	  failure	  to	  identify	  changes	  in	  their	  fitness	  landscape	  over	  time,	  and	  adapt	  appropriately,	  could	  also	  explain	  why	  Greenpeace	  has	  experienced	  some	  notable	  instances	  of	  unpredictability	  and	  unintended	  consequences	  from	  its	  campaign	  strategies388.	  Only	  later	  were	  its	  milestones	  claimed,	  post	  hoc,	  as	  strategic	  successes.	  Indeed,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  corporate	  culture	  of	  routinely	  claiming	  conclusive	  victories	  for	  its	  strategies,	  whether	  they	  qualify	  as	  victories	  or	  not,	  is	  commensurable	  to	  cultivating	  a	  positive	  feedback	  loop	  in	  the	  organisational	  system	  that	  reinforces	  existing	  strategy	  policies,	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  are	  effective	  in	  achieving	  the	  collective	  aims389.	  	  Another	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  these	  institutionalised,	  locked-­‐in,	  practices	  suggests	  that	  while	  the	  world	  and	  its	  global	  problems	  have	  vastly	  changed	  in	  the	  past	  40+	  years,	  the	  distinctive	  ‘Greenpeace	  methodology’	  remains	  a	  largely	  predictable	  and	  inflexible	  formula390.	  Communications	  technology	  has	  helped	  to	  ensure	  that,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  a	  leading	  TAN	  executive,	  ‘the	  media	  is	  saturated	  by	  protest’.	  Tactically,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  Greenpeace	  founders	  had	  no	  intention	  to	  create	  an	  international	  
movement	  and	  the	  initial	  voyage	  was	  an	  acknowledged	  failure.	  
389	  In	  describing	  a	  ‘founder	  effect’,	  Arthur	  (1989)	  explains	  how	  the	  dynamics	  of	  increasing	  returns,	  
competition,	  and	  historical	  events	  may	  cause	  a	  complex	  system	  to	  become	  locked	  in	  to	  an	  outcome	  that	  
is	  not	  necessarily	  superior	  to	  alternatives,	  is	  not	  easily	  altered,	  and	  is	  not	  entirely	  predictable	  in	  
advance.	  	  
390	  In	  keeping	  the	  circumstances	  of	  its	  origins	  alive	  and	  in	  the	  foreground	  of	  its	  publicity,	  this	  thesis	  
posits	  that	  Greenpeace	  not	  only	  recreates	  an	  enduring	  cognitive	  framework	  for	  thinking	  about	  its	  
organisation	  and	  reinforces	  its	  provenance	  and	  supporter-­‐solidarity	  with	  an	  evocative	  narrative:	  it	  also	  
exemplifies	  aspects	  of	  complexity	  theory	  relating	  to,	  inter	  alia,	  path-­‐dependency	  or	  lock-­‐in,	  sensitivity	  to	  
initial	  conditions,	  increasing	  returns,	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  positive	  and	  negative	  feedback,	  as	  theorised	  by	  
Brian	  Arthur	  (1989;	  1994)	  and	  other	  complexity	  scholars	  (North,	  1990:99;	  Mahoney,	  2000;	  Mitleton-­‐
Kelly,	  2003:38-­‐40;	  Urry,	  2003:55-­‐56).	  North	  argues	  (cited	  also	  by	  Urry,	  ibid)	  that:	  ‘[O]nce	  a	  development	  
path	  is	  set	  on	  a	  particular	  course,	  the	  network	  externalities,	  the	  learning	  process	  of	  organizations,	  and	  
the	  historically	  derived	  subjective	  modeling	  of	  the	  issues	  reinforce	  the	  course’.	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the	  environmental	  movement	  might	  be	  regarded	  as	  having	  stalled	  and	  the	  ‘shock	  of	  the	  new’	  —	  so	  powerful	  in	  decades	  past	  —	  now	  barely	  raises	  a	  flicker	  of	  interest	  (Secrett,	  2011a).	  A	  founding	  member	  of	  Greenpeace,	  Paul	  Watson,	  derided	  Greenpeace	  as	  ‘the	  Avon	  ladies	  of	  the	  environmental	  movement’	  (The	  Guardian,	  2011b).	  Whatever	  inferences	  might	  be	  drawn	  from	  this	  metaphor,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  surmise	  that	  it	  refers	  to	  an	  uncomplimentary	  view	  that	  Greenpeace	  functions	  as	  a	  well-­‐known	  but	  otherwise	  uninspiring	  consumer	  brand	  in	  the	  global	  environmental	  movement.	  Certainly,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  in	  its	  application,	  the	  definitive	  Greenpeace	  strategic	  action	  today	  lacks	  the	  surprise,	  simplicity	  and	  guilelessness	  of	  the	  motivated	  amateur	  of	  earlier	  days391.	  	  Furthermore,	  belief	  in,	  and	  commitment	  to,	  a	  locked-­‐in	  charter	  appears	  to	  have	  resulted	  in	  Greenpeace	  continuing	  to	  hone	  its	  trademark	  strategy	  and	  apply	  it	  to	  new	  subject	  matter,	  despite	  a	  significant	  body	  of	  criticism	  from	  external	  observers	  that	  the	  strategy	  is	  incoherent	  in	  some	  crucial	  contexts,	  such	  as	  GI’s	  opposition	  to	  nuclear	  energy,	  ‘golden	  rice’	  and	  GM	  foods	  (see	  Brand,	  2009:153	  and	  2006;	  Shaw-­‐Bond,	  2000).	  This	  thesis	  hypothesises	  that	  this	  trademark	  strategy	  constitutes	  a	  barrier	  to	  Greenpeace	  achieving	  its	  aims	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system.	  Even	  Greenpeace	  regularly	  asserts	  that	  environmental	  campaigning	  is	  fractured	  and	  failing	  to	  tackle,	  at	  the	  international	  level	  of	  decision-­‐making,	  ‘the	  deepening	  environmental	  crisis’	  (GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2012:4).	  	  	  In	  the	  specific	  context	  of	  advocacy	  organisations,	  Pralle	  points	  out	  that	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  authors	  have	  suggested	  a	  rather	  ‘static	  model’	  for	  advocacy	  group	  behaviour,	  namely,	  that	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  decided	  on	  at	  the	  founding	  of	  an	  advocacy	  group	  shape	  its	  behaviours	  throughout	  its	  life	  (2010:190-­‐91).	  Expressed	  another	  way,	  the	  oft-­‐quoted	  insight	  of	  the	  late	  communications	  scholar	  McLuhan	  holds	  that	  ‘we	  shape	  our	  tools,	  and	  thereafter	  our	  tools	  shape	  us’392.	  When	  viewed	  in	  this	  light,	  Greenpeace’s	  actions	  and	  outcomes	  over	  the	  years	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  shaped	  irrevocably,	  and	  to	  a	  very	  large	  degree,	  by	  its	  distinctive	  methodology	  and	  tool	  selection.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391	  For	  exogenous	  comments	  on	  Greenpeace’s	  fighting	  form	  in	  the	  environmental	  campaigning	  arena,	  as	  
it	  passed	  its	  40-­‐year	  milestone,	  see	  The	  Guardian	  (2011b);	  The	  Times	  (2013);	  and	  Secrett	  (2011a	  and	  
2011b).	  
392	  There	  are	  many	  similar	  versions	  of	  this	  McLuhanism.	  This	  citation	  is	  from	  McLuhan,	  Marshall	  
(1994:ix).	  This	  notion	  appears	  to	  be	  commensurable	  with	  contemporary	  path-­‐dependency	  theory.	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 Feedback	  mechanisms	  There	  is	  considerable	  evidence	  that	  the	  UN’s	  NGO	  consultancy	  mechanism393	  	  provides	  valuable	  individual	  unit	  and	  cluster-­‐level	  feedback	  into	  the	  international	  system,	  as	  discussed	  in	  Section	  5.2.	  It	  is	  unclear	  from	  a	  macroscopic	  assessment	  whether	  Greenpeace	  is	  availing	  of	  the	  potential	  for	  this	  mechanism	  to	  assist	  collaboration	  and	  two-­‐way,	  symmetrical,	  feedback.	  However,	  the	  tone	  and	  frequency	  of	  condemnatory	  public	  statements	  by	  Greenpeace	  suggests	  that	  as	  far	  as	  it	  is	  concerned,	  its	  relationships	  with	  key	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system,	  at	  the	  more	  complex	  level	  of	  systemic	  interaction,	  is	  dysfunctional	  and	  futile	  (GI	  Naidoo,	  2014).	  I	  posit	  that	  this	  situation	  is	  	  (a)	  reminiscent	  of	  Thucydidean	  insights	  regarding	  conflictual	  international	  relations;	  (b)	  has	  determinative	  effects	  on	  the	  co-­‐evolution	  of	  Greenpeace	  and	  the	  international	  systemic	  elements	  with	  which	  it	  interacts;	  and	  (c)	  negatively	  affects	  Greenpeace’s	  effectiveness	  in	  achieving	  its	  preferred	  outcomes	  within	  the	  international	  system.	  
	  At	  the	  comparatively	  lower	  order	  of	  complexity	  of	  Greenpeace’s	  own	  internal	  systems,	  the	  implications	  of	  positive	  and	  negative	  feedback	  processes	  are	  very	  different.	  Complexity	  theorising394	  tells	  us	  that	  while	  negative	  feedback	  may	  indicate	  the	  need	  for	  change	  to	  rebalance	  a	  system,	  positive	  feedback	  tends	  to	  reinforce	  systemic	  behaviours	  and	  progressively	  amplify	  discrepancies	  in	  the	  normal	  operation	  of	  the	  system.	  Therefore,	  inaccurate	  or	  exaggerated	  assessments	  can	  greatly	  damage	  the	  functioning	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  complex	  systems.	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  weight	  of	  data	  that	  Greenpeace	  publishes	  about	  its	  claimed	  campaign	  successes	  and	  conclusive	  victories395,	  might	  indeed	  be	  regarded	  as	  misleading	  positive	  feedback	  that	  reinforces	  ineffective	  strategies.	  Examples	  have	  been	  presented	  throughout	  this	  thesis	  of	  situations	  in	  which	  Greenpeace	  has	  claimed	  instrumental	  victory	  for	  its	  strategic	  actions	  in	  the	  international	  sphere,	  when	  Greenpeace	  has	  not	  been	  the	  sole	  actor;	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  Greenpeace	  contribution	  to	  precipitating	  change	  cannot	  be	  verified;	  and	  an	  episode	  cannot	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393	  See	  Chapter	  5	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  NGOs	  and	  the	  
various	  facilitation	  mechanisms	  established	  by	  the	  UN,	  including	  affiliation	  via	  ECOSOC	  and	  
arrangements	  for	  NGO	  participation	  in	  UN	  World	  Conferences.	  
394	  See,	  for	  example,	  Mittleton-­‐Kelly	  (2003:15-­‐17).	  
395	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  summarised	  on	  the	  ‘Victories	  Timeline’	  of	  GI’s	  official	  Website	  (GI	  data,	  2014).	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regarded	  as	  concluded396.	  Expressing	  profound	  disappointment	  with	  ‘the	  deepening	  environmental	  crisis’	  the	  Greenpeace	  CEO	  frequently	  proclaims	  in	  his	  public	  statements:	  ‘We	  are	  winning	  battles,	  but	  we	  are	  losing	  the	  planet’	  (GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2012:3).	  Hence,	  the	  characteristic	  Greenpeace	  intimation	  that	  it	  is	  the	  singular	  spearhead	  of	  the	  global	  environmental	  campaign	  appears	  an	  example	  of	  false	  positive	  feedback.	  	  
 Attractor	  properties	  The	  multi-­‐level,	  macroscopic,	  analysis	  of	  Greenpeace	  enables	  a	  fresh	  conceptualisation	  of	  this	  TAN’s	  effectiveness	  in	  achieving	  its	  preferred	  outcomes.	  I	  believe	  that	  if	  one	  assesses	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  attractors	  at	  various	  levels	  of	  system	  complexity	  (in	  this	  case,	  TAN	  unit,	  TAN	  cluster	  and	  international	  system)	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  discern	  patterns	  in	  which	  attractors	  that	  stabilise	  the	  system	  and	  enhance	  cohesion	  and	  effectiveness	  at	  one	  level,	  in	  fact,	  are	  not	  present	  or	  in	  conflict	  with	  system	  elements	  at	  higher	  levels	  of	  systemic	  complexity.	  This,	  I	  submit,	  is	  the	  prime	  impediment	  to	  Greenpeace	  presently	  achieving	  the	  effectiveness	  it	  seeks	  in	  the	  international	  negotiation	  and	  policymaking	  arena.	  	  The	  strong	  system	  attractors	  that	  I	  consider	  to	  be	  present	  at	  the	  lowest	  level	  of	  GI’s	  relational	  interaction	  with	  its	  (potential	  and	  actual)	  donor	  funding	  sector,	  include:	  iconic	  status	  as	  an	  established	  environmental	  protest	  model;	  early	  adopter	  advantages	  of	  perceived	  pre-­‐eminence,	  authenticity,	  durability	  and	  a	  track	  record	  of	  success	  claims;	  cognitive	  associations	  with	  memorable	  acts	  of	  protest;	  cognitive	  impressions	  of	  popularity,	  enormous,	  globe-­‐spanning	  support	  base	  and	  consequent	  power	  to	  mobilise	  large	  numbers	  of	  people	  to	  apply	  political	  pressure	  on	  authorities397;	  cognitive	  associations	  with	  bravery	  (e.g.	  Warriors	  of	  the	  Rainbow	  legend),	  audacity,	  humanity,	  and	  ‘doing	  good’398;	  and	  perceived	  autonomy	  from	  unpopular	  institutions	  associated	  with	  the	  governing	  establishment,	  industry	  and	  big	  business.	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  trace	  changes	  in	  the	  status	  of	  certain	  key	  properties	  of	  the	  organisation,	  say,	  membership	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396	  Two	  cases	  in	  point	  are	  the	  continuing	  limbo	  status	  of	  the	  Comprehensive	  Nuclear-­‐Test-­‐Ban	  Treaty	  
(CTBT),	  since	  1995,	  and	  the	  overall	  failure	  of	  the	  environmental	  movement	  despite	  decades	  of	  widely	  
diffused	  protest	  actions,	  often	  claimed	  as	  singular	  Greenpeace	  victories	  by	  Greenpeace	  (see	  GI	  data,	  
2014;	  CTBTO	  data,	  2014;	  CTBTO	  data,	  2013b;	  UN	  GA	  Resolution,	  2009;	  UN	  GA	  Resolution,	  2010;	  GI	  
news,	  2012a;	  CTBTO	  data,	  2013a;	  FAS	  data,	  2013).	  
397	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  a	  mainstream	  impression,	  not	  necessarily	  a	  fact.	  
398	  See	  Fisher	  (1997)	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  association	  for	  NGOs.	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funding,	  in	  accordance	  with	  real,	  or	  perceived,	  changes	  in	  the	  attractors	  that	  help	  to	  give	  the	  system	  stability.	  In	  simple	  terms,	  these	  salient	  attractors	  could	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  qualities	  that	  keep	  Greenpeace	  looking	  like	  Greenpeace.	  	  At	  the	  cluster	  level	  (i.e.	  environmental	  TANS	  viewed	  as	  a	  group	  operating	  in	  the	  international	  system),	  the	  relative	  value	  of	  most	  of	  GI’s	  inimitable	  attractors	  to	  other	  (rival)	  TANs	  is	  debatable.	  At	  still	  higher	  levels	  complexity,	  involving	  systemic	  interactions	  within	  the	  international	  institutions,	  Greenpeace	  and	  its	  international	  counterparts	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  the	  properties	  and	  powers	  that	  are	  valued	  by	  each	  other399.	  Moreover,	  the	  institutional	  processes	  of	  the	  international	  arena	  are	  not	  ones	  readily	  associated	  with	  Greenpeace,	  being	  notoriously	  painstaking,	  egalitarian,	  diplomatic,	  legalistic,	  compromise-­‐oriented,	  and	  slow.	  	  
	  
 ‘Adjacent	  possible’	  opportunism	  A	  macroscopic	  perspective	  of	  Greenpeace	  spotlights	  patterns	  of	  this	  TAN’s	  development	  over	  time	  into	  adjacent	  fields.	  Even	  the	  original	  formation	  of	  Greenpeace	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  having	  its	  roots	  in	  an	  earlier,	  adjacent,	  situation.	  While	  this	  thesis	  holds	  that	  complex	  intersecting	  systems	  are	  non-­‐linear,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  trace	  processes	  of	  NGO	  formation	  through	  historical	  instances	  of	  self-­‐organising,	  in-­‐group	  dissatisfaction	  and	  disruption,	  bifurcation,	  and	  breakaway	  group	  exploration	  of	  alternative	  opportunities	  perceived	  to	  exist	  in	  adjacent	  environments.	  Greenpeace	  arguably	  exhibits	  such	  a	  pattern:	  bifurcating	  from	  the	  Sierra	  Club	  in	  the	  U.S.A.,	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  British	  Columbia	  branch	  of	  the	  Sierra	  Club	  (involving	  a	  contingent	  of	  pacifist	  Quakers400),	  to	  the	  Don’t	  Make	  a	  Wave	  Committee,	  to	  Greenpeace,	  to	  innumerable	  GI-­‐inspired	  adaptations	  (e.g.	  the	  	  militant	  breakaway	  group	  Sea	  Shepherd	  Conservation	  Society401	  and	  the	  radical,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399	  It	  was	  shown	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  that	  the	  UN	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  international	  system	  value	  the	  
dialectical	  participation	  of	  accredited	  NGOs	  in	  evidence-­‐based,	  decision-­‐making	  and	  policy	  formulation.	  
They	  also	  value,	  inter	  alia,	  supportive,	  collaborative	  arrangements	  with	  NGOs;	  service	  provision;	  
trustworthiness	  and	  tact;	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  credible	  scientific	  data.	  	  
400	  This	  is	  a	  colloquial	  name	  for	  The	  Religious	  Society	  of	  Friends.	  	  
401	  In	  1977,	  following	  disputes	  over	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  increasing	  bureaucracy	  and	  opposition	  to	  his	  direct	  
action	  tactics,	  one	  of	  the	  Greenpeace	  pioneers,	  Paul	  Watson,	  led	  a	  breakaway	  group	  to	  set	  up	  the	  Sea	  
Shepherd	  Conservation	  Society.	  The	  SSCA	  campaigns	  specifically	  to	  safeguard	  the	  marine	  environment	  
and	  frequently	  engages	  in	  violent	  confrontations	  with	  fishermen,	  whalers	  and	  seal	  hunters	  
(http://www.seashepherd.org/;	  The	  Guardian,	  2011b).	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ecotage-­‐promoting	  Earth	  First!402).	  	  In	  order	  to	  remain	  relevant,	  Greenpeace	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  to	  exploit	  this	  spillover	  characteristic	  of	  complex	  systems.	  While	  encountering	  barriers	  to	  achieving	  the	  ‘media	  mindbombs’	  it	  needs	  in	  pursuit	  of	  its	  major	  goals,	  this	  TAN	  shows	  a	  co-­‐evolutionary	  pattern	  of	  interventions	  into	  adjacent	  environmental	  campaigning	  opportunities.	  This	  was	  seen	  in	  GI’s	  history	  of	  organisational	  expansion	  and	  spillover	  effects:	  beginning	  with	  a	  peace	  campaign	  to	  stop	  a	  single	  nuclear	  bomb	  test,	  to	  adding	  	  ‘green’	  concerns	  for	  the	  environment	  in	  the	  test	  zone;	  followed	  by	  system	  extension	  into	  anti-­‐whaling,	  oceans,	  forests,	  ecological	  farming,	  toxic	  pollution,	  etc.	  In	  turn,	  campaigning	  on	  these	  themes	  has	  illuminated	  adjacent	  campaigning	  opportunities403.	  Thus,	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  pattern	  resembles	  the	  ultimately	  debilitating	  disposition	  of	  NGO	  ‘systemic	  critiques’	  identified	  by	  Wittner	  (1997:462).	  	  	  	  
 Unintended	  consequences	  Greenpeace	  publishes	  statements	  on	  its	  Website	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  original	  Amchitka	  campaign,	  the	  sinking	  of	  the	  first	  Rainbow	  Warrior	  and	  death	  of	  a	  crewmember,	  were	  unintended	  consequences	  of	  the	  protest	  strategies	  in	  force	  at	  the	  time.	  The	  reputational	  damage	  to	  Greenpeace	  during	  the	  Brent	  Spar	  campaign	  and	  the	  recent	  arrest	  and	  gaoling	  of	  30	  Greenpeace	  activists	  (the	  ‘Arctic	  30’)	  in	  Russia	  were	  unpredicted,	  and	  unintended	  negative	  consequences	  of	  strategic	  operations.	  Furthermore,	  Weyler	  (GI	  Naidoo,	  2011)	  recalls	  that	  the	  original	  group	  of	  activists	  had	  no	  intention	  to	  start	  an	  environmental	  campaigning	  organisation,	  and	  yet	  that	  is	  what	  they	  did.	  In	  mining	  the	  Greenpeace	  data	  for	  deeper	  explanations	  as	  to	  why	  the	  organisation’s	  advocacy	  strategies	  sometimes	  reap	  unintended	  results,	  a	  complex	  realism	  lens	  sheds	  light	  on	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  ontology	  of	  the	  fitness	  landscape	  for	  GI	  advocacy,	  at	  critical	  moments,	  was	  either	  not	  considered	  or	  was	  misread.	  And,	  furthermore,	  that	  these	  critical	  contingencies	  were	  inadequately	  assessed	  in	  developing	  effective,	  aim-­‐progressing,	  advocacy	  strategies.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
402	  Ecotage	  is	  a	  neologism	  for	  ecological	  sabotage	  and	  is	  used	  to	  describe	  acts	  of	  sabotage	  for	  
environmental	  purposes	  (Plows,	  Doherty	  and	  Wall,	  2004;	  OED,	  2012).	  
403	  The	  toxic	  pollution	  theme,	  for	  example,	  has	  led	  to	  increasingly	  targeting	  world	  famous	  brands	  in	  the	  
fashion,	  cosmetics	  and	  toiletries	  industries.	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7.5.2	  Assessment	  of	  Greenpeace	  using	  a	  political	  theoretical	  framework	  	  To	  understand	  Greenpeace’s	  effectiveness	  during	  its	  protracted	  anti-­‐nuclear	  campaigning	  in	  the	  80s	  and	  90s,	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  also	  necessary	  to	  understand	  the	  international	  climate	  of	  increasing	  trepidation.	  Realist	  theories	  focusing	  on	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  USSR	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  1989	  demand	  a	  place	  in	  any	  account	  of	  the	  anxieties	  being	  felt	  within	  the	  international	  system	  about	  the	  world	  order	  during	  the	  Soviet	  and	  ensuing	  post-­‐Soviet	  decades.	  Thus,	  the	  then	  heightened	  insecurities	  in	  international	  society,	  particularly	  widespread	  fears	  concerning	  the	  balance	  of	  power,	  can	  best	  explain	  why	  many	  world	  states	  might	  act	  within	  the	  UN	  to	  bring	  France	  to	  heel	  in	  regard	  to	  its	  development	  of	  nuclear	  weapons.	  Such	  concerted	  international	  opposition	  was	  not	  necessarily	  due	  to	  policies	  of	  opposition	  to	  nuclear	  weapons	  per	  se	  —	  since	  other	  countries	  had	  long	  compiled	  nuclear	  arsenals404	  and	  carried	  out	  thousands	  of	  tests	  —	  but	  to	  their	  united	  opposition	  to	  France	  having	  them	  amid	  the	  fluidity	  of	  the	  uncertain	  world	  order.	  In	  this	  alternative	  to	  the	  Greenpeace	  reading	  of	  the	  situation,	  a	  further	  argument	  can	  be	  made	  that	  France’s	  recalcitrance	  was	  overcome	  in	  1996	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  having	  almost	  reached	  the	  scheduled	  end	  of	  its	  nuclear	  testing	  programme	  anyway,	  and	  a	  contingent	  decision	  that	  its	  security	  interests	  —	  indeed,	  all	  its	  interests	  —	  could	  be	  better	  served	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  era	  by	  restoration	  of	  its	  image	  as	  a	  responsible	  and	  recognised	  member	  of	  international	  society.	  	  Nevertheless,	  Greenpeace	  still	  infers	  in	  its	  publicity	  that	  its	  anti-­‐nuclear	  campaign	  was	  a	  victory,	  with	  GI	  having	  been	  instrumental	  in	  contributing	  to	  ‘a	  number	  of	  important	  international	  success	  in	  1995’,	  most	  prominently,	  pressuring	  ‘France,	  the	  US,	  the	  UK,	  Russia	  and	  China	  to	  commit	  to	  signing	  a	  Comprehensive	  Test	  Ban	  Treaty	  (CTBT)	  and	  to	  pursue	  other	  nuclear	  disarmament	  measures	  […]’(GI	  Archive,	  1995;	  GI	  data,	  2012a).	  However,	  despite	  this	  inference,	  the	  CTBT	  remains	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
404	  In	  the	  five	  decades	  between	  the	  first	  nuclear	  test	  by	  the	  U.S.A.	  in	  1945,	  until	  the	  opening	  for	  
signature	  of	  the	  Comprehensive	  Nuclear-­‐Test-­‐Ban	  Treaty	  (CTBT)	  in	  1996,	  over	  2,000	  nuclear	  tests	  were	  
carried	  out	  worldwide.	  The	  U.S.A	  conducted	  1,032	  tests	  from	  1945	  to	  1992;	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  conducted	  
715	  from	  1949	  to	  1990;	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  carried	  out	  45	  from	  1952	  to	  1991;	  France	  carried	  out	  210	  
between	  1960	  and	  1996;	  and	  China	  performed	  45	  tests	  between	  1964	  and	  1996.	  After	  the	  CBTB	  was	  
opened	  for	  signature	  in	  September	  1996,	  around	  half	  a	  dozen	  nuclear	  tests	  have	  been	  conducted	  by	  
India,	  Pakistan	  and	  North	  Korea	  (CTBTO	  data,	  2012b).	  Israel	  is	  also	  widely	  speculated	  to	  have	  carried	  out	  
nuclear	  tests	  (Albright	  and	  Gay,	  1997;	  Dombey,	  2010).	  To	  suggest	  that	  the	  major	  players	  in	  international	  
society	  are	  convinced	  of	  the	  moral	  argument	  against	  nuclear	  weapons	  would,	  therefore,	  appear	  to	  be	  
both	  wrong	  and	  imply	  their	  hypocrisy.	  This	  thesis	  holds	  that	  leaders	  of	  world	  states	  appear	  to	  be	  
individually	  not	  so	  much	  against	  nuclear	  weapons	  as	  against	  their	  international	  fellows	  having	  them.	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an	  unfinished	  item	  on	  the	  international	  back	  burner	  (CTBTO	  data,	  2014,	  2013a)	  and	  has	  still	  not	  entered	  into	  force405.	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  pressures	  on	  states	  to	  uniformly	  agree	  to	  accept	  this	  nuclear	  testing	  constraint	  have	  been	  successful	  or	  significantly	  influenced	  by	  Greenpeace	  actions.	  	  	  	  
Competitive,	  crowded	  world	  of	  Green	  politics	  	  Despite	  the	  high-­‐visibility	  and	  levels	  of	  grassroots	  donor-­‐support	  achieved	  for	  its	  campaigning,	  the	  Greenpeace	  political	  ideology,	  vision,	  model	  of	  activism	  and	  strategic	  choices	  are	  not	  shared	  by	  some	  of	  its	  rivals	  in	  the	  crowded	  sector	  of	  environmental	  TANs	  (Prakash	  and	  Gugerty,	  2010:14-­‐15;	  Lecy,	  2010.235-­‐236;	  Barakso,	  2010:156-­‐162;	  Polis	  Report,	  2012:15-­‐16,18;	  Cooley	  and	  Ron,	  2002).	  GI	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  dangerously	  anti-­‐science406	  in	  its	  premises	  by	  some	  internationally	  prominent	  environmentalists	  (Plows,	  Doherty	  and	  Wall,	  2004;	  Moore,	  2007,	  2008,	  2013).	  Moreover,	  while	  GI’s	  confrontational	  tactics	  are	  able	  to	  garner	  media	  attention,	  they	  raise	  concerns	  among	  some	  members	  of	  the	  public	  that	  the	  organisation	  behaves	  unfairly	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  targets,	  and/or	  oversimplifies	  complex	  issues	  (Barakso,	  2010:155;	  AP	  news,	  2012;	  Moore,	  2008,	  2013).	  Inuit	  seal	  hunters	  in	  Greenland,	  for	  example,	  blame	  Greenpeace	  campaigns	  against	  seal	  hunting	  for	  nearly	  wiping	  out	  the	  demand	  for	  sealskins,	  a	  key	  part	  of	  their	  income	  (AP	  news,	  ibid).	  	  	  Areas	  of	  criticism	  (Brand,	  2009:86,	  208,	  215;	  2005;	  Moore,	  2005,	  2007,	  2008,	  2013;	  The	  Age,	  2007)	  include	  GI’s	  fierce	  opposition	  to	  nuclear	  energy	  and	  genetically	  modified	  organisms.	  Moore407	  (2005)	  wrote	  that	  the	  environmental	  movement	  had	  lost	  its	  way,	  asserting	  that	  ‘by	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  the	  environmental	  movement	  had	  abandoned	  science	  and	  logic	  in	  favor	  of	  emotion	  and	  sensationalism’.	  This	  strategy	  included	  using	  ‘chilling	  rhetoric	  and	  apocalyptic	  images	  to	  drive	  us	  in	  the	  wrong	  direction’.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
405	  China	  and	  the	  USA	  signed	  the	  CBTB	  on	  24	  September	  1996	  but	  have	  ever	  since	  declined	  to	  formally	  
ratify	  it	  (CTBTO	  data,	  2014;	  CTBTO	  data,	  2013b).	  See	  also	  UN	  GA	  Resolution,	  2009;	  UN	  GA	  Resolution,	  
2010;	  GI	  news,	  2012a;	  CTBTO	  data,	  2013a;	  FAS	  data,	  2013.	  
406	  The	  criticism	  that	  Greenpeace	  is	  ‘anti-­‐science’	  is	  disputed	  by	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Greenpeace	  Research	  
Laboratories	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Exeter,	  Dr.	  Paul	  Johnson	  (see	  Johnson,	  2011).	  
407	  Dr.	  Patrick	  Moore	  is	  a	  former	  Director	  of	  Greenpeace	  International.	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Effects	  of	  independent	  funding	  model	  on	  issue	  selection	  and	  transparency	  Greenpeace’s	  total	  reliance	  on	  funding	  from	  its	  worldwide	  mass	  membership	  and	  foundation	  grants	  also	  appears	  to	  have	  a	  determinative	  effect	  on	  the	  issues	  and	  targets	  the	  organisation	  pursues,	  the	  ways	  issues	  are	  framed	  and	  the	  outcomes	  it	  publicises.	  Observing	  the	  relationship	  between	  supporters	  and	  organisers	  of	  environmental	  groups,	  Lomborg	  408	  (2001:38)	  comments	  that	  the	  relationship	  is	  entirely	  symbiotic,	  with	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  organisation	  totally	  dependent	  on	  what	  the	  members,	  sympathisers	  and	  supporters	  believe	  is	  good	  and	  necessary	  ‘because	  without	  their	  backing	  the	  organisations’	  campaigns	  would	  be	  more	  or	  less	  worthless’.	  According	  to	  Bennie	  (1998:407),	  Greenpeace	  income	  ‘depends	  on	  the	  public	  thinking	  that	  it	  is	  getting	  something	  for	  its	  money’.	  Conversely,	  the	  problem	  with	  seeking	  quiet	  influence	  lies	  in	  persuading	  financial	  supporters	  that	  they	  are	  making	  an	  impact,	  since	  ‘[E]ven	  an	  unsuccessful	  stunt	  has	  more	  impact	  than	  successful	  insider	  negotiation’	  (ibid).	  	  Therefore,	  although	  dramatic	  media	  stunts	  —	  such	  as	  Greenpeace’s	  assaults	  on	  the	  Russian	  Gazprom	  oil	  platform	  in	  the	  Arctic	  in	  2012	  and	  again	  in	  2013	  	  —	  may	  be	  effective	  in	  terms	  of	  publicity	  and	  popular	  support,	  the	  actual	  political	  and/or	  industrial	  impact	  is	  unclear409	  (AP	  News,	  2012).	  An	  oil	  and	  gas	  expert	  at	  the	  World	  Wildlife	  Fund's	  Global	  Arctic	  Program	  (Babenko),	  observed	  (ibid):	  ‘It	  probably	  sounds	  a	  bit	  cynical,	  but	  if	  they	  invest	  billions	  of	  dollars	  it's	  not	  likely	  they	  will	  give	  it	  up	  just	  because	  somebody	  is	  attacking	  their	  oil	  rig’.	  Drawing	  a	  line	  between	  WWF	  and	  Greenpeace,	  Babenko	  continued	  (AP	  News,	  2012):	  	  	  We	  want	  to	  be	  part	  of	  this	  discussion.	  We	  don't	  want	  to	  stimulate	  oil	  and	  gas	  development,	  but	  if	  we	  follow	  (Greenpeace's)	  approach	  we	  will	  be	  simply	  out	  of	  the	  game410.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408	  Bjørn	  Lomborg	  is	  a	  former	  Greenpeace	  member,	  professor	  of	  statistics	  at	  Aarhus	  University	  and	  
author	  of	  the	  controversial	  academic	  text	  The	  Skeptical	  Environmentalist	  (Lomborg,	  2001).	  
409	  Furthermore,	  I	  submit,	  the	  stakes	  for	  the	  Russian	  Federation	  are	  inestimably	  high	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
state’s	  economy,	  internal	  stability	  and	  future	  security	  (US	  National	  Intelligence	  Report,	  2013:	  iv,	  62,	  80,	  
133).	  Russia’s	  declining	  economy	  is	  its	  Achilles’	  Heel.	  Its	  budget	  is	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  energy	  reserves	  
and	  an	  ageing	  workforce	  is	  a	  drag	  on	  economic	  growth.	  The	  Russian	  state	  is	  counting	  on	  revenue	  from	  
its	  Arctic	  oil	  and	  gas	  fields	  to	  revitalise	  the	  economy	  and	  so	  stave	  off	  potential	  internal	  discontent,	  as	  
well	  as	  external	  perceptions,	  notably	  from	  an	  aggressive	  China,	  that	  it	  is	  becoming	  debilitated.	  
410	  The	  possibility	  that	  the	  WWF	  spokesman’s	  disparaging	  comments	  on	  Greenpeace	  tactics	  are	  part	  of	  
WWF’s	  own	  differentiating	  strategies	  in	  their	  crowded	  environmental	  advocacy	  market	  is	  not	  
discounted.	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Importantly,	  WWF	  commenced	  its	  Global	  Arctic	  Programme	  over	  20	  years’	  ago411	  and	  has	  channeled	  many	  millions	  of	  dollars	  into	  Arctic	  research	  projects	  and	  advocacy.	  Greenpeace	  began	  its	  Save	  the	  Arctic	  campaign	  in	  2012412	  (WWF-­‐Int,	  2014;	  GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2012:4).	  
7.5.3	  Assessment	  of	  Greenpeace	  using	  an	  advocacy	  theoretical	  framework	  	  Arguably,	  the	  three	  most	  international	  headline-­‐grabbing	  campaigns	  in	  Greenpeace	  history	  —	  the	  Amchitka	  voyage,	  the	  sinking	  of	  the	  first	  Rainbow	  
Warrior	  and	  the	  Brent	  Spar	  campaign	  —	  were	  unmitigated	  setbacks,	  albeit	  ones	  that	  resulted	  in	  unexpected	  consequences	  and	  profile-­‐raising	  publicity	  that	  was	  not	  as	  planned	  at	  the	  time	  by	  individuals	  within	  Greenpeace.	  The	  post	  hoc	  interpretation	  of	  these	  events	  as	  Greenpeace	  tactical	  victories	  may	  be,	  therefore,	  more	  usefully	  explained	  by	  alternative	  theoretical	  means413.	  Thus,	  I	  argue	  that	  GI’s	  heavy	  reliance	  on	  methodological	  individualism	  to	  frame	  its	  advocacy	  messages	  —	  typically	  involving	  emotional	  first-­‐person	  story-­‐telling	  —	  is	  a	  barrier	  to	  this	  TAN	  achieving	  genuine	  influence	  in	  the	  demanding	  and	  legalistic	  arena	  of	  international	  debate414.	  	  	  Although	  both	  the	  Greenpeace	  and	  mainstream	  media	  narratives	  of	  the	  voyage	  to	  Amchitka	  emphasise	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  advocacy	  strategy	  to	  stop	  a	  nuclear	  bomb	  test,	  a	  more	  critical	  analysis	  suggests	  the	  Greenpeace	  strategy	  and	  actions	  worked	  in	  an	  altogether	  different	  way.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  advocacy	  strategy	  was	  principally	  effective	  in	  producing	  a	  dramatic	  news	  story:	  one	  that	  was	  strategically	  crafted	  by	  a	  band	  of	  independent	  young	  journalists	  and	  had	  widespread	  resonance	  at	  a	  time	  of	  significant	  social	  anxiety	  and	  uncertainty.	  A	  secondary	  result	  of	  the	  strategy	  was	  to	  introduce	  the	  name	  Greenpeace	  to	  the	  world	  and	  excite	  interest	  and	  support	  for	  a	  bold,	  new,	  protest	  model	  with	  a	  mission	  to	  confront	  the	  political	  Establishment	  and	  a	  refreshing	  capacity	  to	  shock	  conventional	  society.	  These	  desirable	  communications	  outcomes	  were	  a	  happy	  consequence	  of	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411	  In	  1992.	  
412	  There	  is	  a	  discrepancy	  between	  a	  Greenpeace	  statement	  that	  the	  Save	  the	  Arctic	  campaign	  was	  
launched	  following	  the	  Rio+20	  Earth	  Summit	  in	  2012,	  and	  a	  statement	  that	  the	  ‘Arctic	  and	  oil’	  campaign	  
‘began	  in	  earnest’	  in	  2011	  (GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2011:18;	  GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2012:4).	  
413	  Kahneman	  and	  Tversky’s	  concept	  of	  WYSIATI	  (‘what	  you	  see	  is	  all	  there	  is’)	  is	  highly	  relevant	  in	  
explaining	  the	  way	  the	  human	  mind	  treats	  information	  that	  is	  readily	  available	  and	  typically	  ignores	  
information	  it	  does	  not	  have,	  in	  order	  to	  quickly	  form	  coherent	  stories	  and	  ‘make	  sense	  of	  partial	  
information	  in	  a	  complex	  world’	  (Tversky	  and	  Kahneman,	  1974:425-­‐427;	  Kahneman,	  2011:85-­‐88).	  
414	  See	  also	  Barakso,	  2010:160,	  Robnett,	  2002:	  267-­‐268	  and	  Holyoke,	  2003.	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communications	  strategy.	  What	  the	  communications	  strategy	  did	  not	  do	  and,	  I	  submit,	  could	  not	  do,	  was	  stop	  the	  U.S.	  from	  pursuing	  a	  security	  aim	  by	  carrying	  out	  a	  nuclear	  test.	  At	  that	  level	  of	  complex	  intersectionality	  the	  Greenpeace	  advocacy	  strategy	  was	  a	  failure415.	  	  	  Considering	  the	  global	  scale	  of	  concerns	  about	  nuclear	  warfare,	  and	  the	  anti-­‐nuclear	  activities	  of	  many	  other	  influential	  campaigning	  and	  lobbying	  groups,	  acceptance	  of	  the	  Greenpeace	  post	  hoc	  claims	  of	  success	  in	  halting	  the	  testing	  programme	  seem	  unsafe.	  Facts	  that	  are	  known	  are	  that	  the	  U.S.	  Navy	  repulsed	  the	  Greenpeace	  protest,	  proceeded	  with	  the	  Amchitka	  bomb	  test,	  and	  many	  more	  tests	  until	  1992.	  The	  United	  States	  has	  never	  ratified	  the	  Comprehensive	  Nuclear-­‐Test-­‐Ban	  Treaty	  and	  remains	  today	  a	  leading	  nuclear	  power416.	  	  Although	  Greenpeace	  asserts	  that	  the	  Brent	  Spar	  campaign	  was	  a	  triumph	  for	  people	  power	  and	  green	  consumerism	  (GI	  data,	  2011),	  the	  campaign	  was	  probably	  more	  about	  a	  chance	  pattern	  of	  events	  —	  contingent	  circumstances	  —	  than	  strategy	  perfection	  (Bennie,	  1998:407;	  GI	  data,	  2011)417.	  Looking	  beyond	  the	  contested	  merits	  of	  the	  advocacy	  strategy,	  a	  complexity	  analysis	  of	  the	  situation	  focuses	  on	  how	  all	  of	  the	  actors	  co-­‐evolved	  during	  and	  after	  these	  events.	  Rather	  than	  assuming	  the	  environmental	  strategies	  in	  industry	  and	  big	  business	  were	  changed	  because	  the	  consumer	  lever	  used	  was	  ‘green’,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  prominent	  commercial	  enterprises	  are	  sensitive	  to	  any	  risks	  to	  their	  reputational	  capital	  and	  attendant	  shareholder	  and	  market	  censure,	  regardless	  of	  the	  belief	  systems	  of	  those	  activating	  the	  consumer	  lever.	  It	  can	  also	  be	  argued	  that	  Greenpeace	  co-­‐evolved	  by	  adapting	  its	  advocacy	  targeting	  strategies	  to	  capitalise	  on	  fresh	  insights	  into	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  commercial	  brand	  leaders	  to	  market	  censure.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
415	  I	  was	  a	  journalist	  in	  Australia	  and	  Hong	  Kong	  during	  this	  period	  and	  was	  highly	  attuned	  to	  the	  
extreme	  tensions	  generated	  by	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  on-­‐going	  Cold	  War	  proxy	  conflicts	  in	  Vietnam,	  
Cambodia	  and	  Laos,	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  conflict	  escalation	  into	  all	  out	  nuclear	  warfare	  involving	  the	  
world’s	  major	  powers.	  	  
416	  See	  CTBTO	  data,	  2012b.	  
417	  However,	  high	  quality	  research	  can	  be	  a	  determinative	  factor	  in	  campaign	  outcomes.	  For	  example,	  
the	  high	  quality	  of	  research	  is	  credited,	  by	  Van	  Roy	  and	  others,	  with	  being	  the	  determining	  factor	  in	  the	  
campaign	  to	  restrict	  the	  trade	  in	  conflict	  diamonds	  (Van	  Rooy,	  2004:83).	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Today,	  Greenpeace	  operates	  a	  fleet	  of	  oceangoing	  vessels	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  its	  campaigning.	  Its	  tactical	  craft	  include	  helicopters,	  small	  submarines,	  a	  thermal	  airship	  and	  a	  hot-­‐air	  balloon.	  The	  accompanying	  information	  technologies	  enable	  Greenpeace	  donor-­‐supporters	  and	  millions	  of	  people	  worldwide	  to	  vicariously	  accompany	  activists	  on	  their	  audacious	  missions	  and	  witness	  GI’s	  characteristic	  framing	  of	  specific	  environmental	  issues418.	  In	  this	  communications	  frame	  of	  analysis,	  GI’s	  eco-­‐navy	  vessels	  arguably	  assume	  the	  character	  of	  communications	  props,	  mobile	  telecommunications	  hubs	  and	  custom	  transportation	  for	  small	  teams	  of	  centrally-­‐directed	  activists.	  	  	  
Alternative	  framings	  involving	  abuse	  of	  power	  scandals	  	  Given	  the	  Greenpeace	  core	  value	  of	  non-­‐violence,	  its	  stated	  ‘battle	  to	  save	  planet	  Earth’	  is	  not	  a	  literal	  one	  but	  a	  notional	  ‘battle’	  to	  win	  hearts	  and	  minds	  via	  advocacy	  campaigns	  (GI	  data,	  2012a;	  GI	  Annual	  Report	  2010).	  Therefore,	  I	  posit	  that	  this	  factor	  necessitates	  using	  a	  communications	  lens	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  it.	  The	  creative	  framing	  of	  issues,	  especially	  the	  claiming	  of	  alleged	  instances	  of	  abuse-­‐of-­‐power,	  is	  a	  key	  technique	  used	  by	  Greenpeace	  to	  try	  to	  gain	  a	  major	  share	  of	  the	  advocacy	  donor	  market419	  and	  thereby	  secure	  political	  influence	  (CNN,	  1995c).	  For	  example,	  the	  seizure	  of	  Greenpeace	  boats	  and	  equipment	  might	  be	  usefully	  interpreted,	  according	  to	  a	  combination	  of	  communications	  and	  complexity	  theories,	  as	  instances	  of	  ‘globally	  mediated	  scandals’	  that	  involve	  what	  are	  seen	  in	  some	  societies/cultures	  as	  significant	  transgressions	  of	  particular	  norms	  of	  acceptable	  behaviour,	  especially	  if	  they	  relate	  to	  sexual	  behaviour,	  financial	  matters,	  or	  the	  use	  or	  abuse-­‐of-­‐power	  (Urry,	  2003:114-­‐5;	  Thompson,	  2000:15).	  	  	  Therefore,	  this	  thesis	  maintains	  that	  the	  David	  and	  Goliath	  symbolism	  and	  globally	  mediated	  scandal	  of	  Greenpeace’s	  original	  voyage	  to	  Amchitka,	  was	  very	  greatly	  surpassed	  —	  on	  assumed	  scales	  of	  newsworthiness,	  public	  interest,	  international	  affront	  and	  reprehensibility	  —	  by	  what	  was	  widely	  perceived	  as	  a	  French	  abuse	  of	  power	  in	  blowing	  up	  the	  original	  Rainbow	  Warrior,	  the	  culpable	  homicide	  of	  the	  Greenpeace	  photographer,	  and	  in	  using	  heavy-­‐handed	  military	  force	  for	  many	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
418	  This	  accords	  with	  Goffman’s	  seminal	  work	  on	  ‘interaction	  rituals’,	  which	  argues	  that	  humans	  have	  
tendencies	  that	  see	  them	  drawn	  to	  places	  where	  they	  can	  vicariously	  enjoy	  watching	  another’s	  
involvement	  in	  action,	  ‘someone	  like	  themselves,	  but	  someone	  else’	  (1967:269).	  
419	  The	  pressures	  and	  tensions	  generated	  by	  competition	  from	  other	  TANs	  and	  NGOs	  in	  the	  advocacy	  
representation	  and	  funding	  markets	  is	  discussed	  in	  Section	  8.3.2.	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years	  afterwards	  to	  deter	  a	  non-­‐violent,	  civil	  society	  protest	  group	  committed	  to	  bearing	  witness	  on	  behalf	  of	  humanity.	  Consequently,	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  becomes	  difficult	  to	  speculate,	  on	  a	  global	  scale,	  whether	  GI’s	  claimed	  inflammation	  of	  world	  opinion	  against	  France	  could	  be	  accurately	  attributed	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  outrage	  against	  that	  country’s	  nuclear	  weapons	  testing	  policy,	  or	  against	  its	  hauteur	  and	  seemingly	  arrogant	  abuse	  of	  power,	  measures	  of	  both,	  or,	  indeed,	  was	  due	  to	  a	  complex	  blend	  of	  some	  other	  anti-­‐French	  or	  political	  sentiments	  prevailing	  at	  that	  time.	  The	  principal	  framing	  of	  the	  matter	  as	  the	  generator	  of	  a	  significant	  upswing	  in	  worldwide	  anti-­‐nuclear	  solidarity	  is,	  therefore,	  unsafe	  and	  requires	  deeper	  analysis	  to	  discern	  possible	  causal	  mechanisms	  and	  contingencies	  that	  might	  have	  been	  also	  capable	  of	  producing	  the	  observed	  effects.	  	  	  	  A	  more	  recent	  example	  of	  an	  abuse-­‐of-­‐power	  framing	  is	  suggested	  by	  the	  Greenpeace	  missions	  to	  disrupt	  operations	  on	  a	  Russian	  oilrig	  in	  the	  Arctic	  in	  2012	  and,	  again,	  in	  September	  2013	  (GI	  news,	  2012c;	  GI	  Naidoo,	  2012c;	  BBC	  Archive,	  2012b;	  Russia	  Today,	  2012;	  BBC	  Archive,	  2013c;	  The	  Atlantic,	  2013)420.	  	  	  The	  extreme	  disparities	  in	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  most	  recent	  UN	  climate	  change	  conference,	  COP19,	  are	  also	  important	  considerations421.	  The	  UN	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change422	  announced	  significant	  progress	  had	  been	  made	  and	  the	  negotiation	  process	  was	  on	  track	  to	  achieve	  a	  universal	  climate	  change	  agreement	  in	  2015	  (UN-­‐COP19,	  2013).	  Meanwhile,	  Greenpeace	  joined	  a	  walkout	  by	  a	  group	  of	  NGOs	  attending	  the	  conference	  and	  issued	  a	  statement	  calling	  the	  talks	  ‘a	  sham’.	  Continuing	  a	  class-­‐based	  theme	  of	  the	  ‘powerful’	  oppressing	  ‘the	  people’	  (where	  the	  powerful	  included	  national	  governments,	  leading	  corporations	  and	  the	  coal,	  oil	  and	  nuclear	  energy	  industries),	  GI	  claimed	  states	  were	  blocking	  progress,	  were	  inclined	  to	  ‘ditch	  their	  responsibilities’,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
420	  Meanwhile,	  Russia	  arguably	  carried	  out	  a	  skilled	  tactical	  gambit	  by	  using	  the	  recent	  event	  for	  its	  own	  
international	  publicity	  purposes:	  framing	  it,	  inter	  alia,	  to	  show	  that	  the	  Russian	  state	  is	  powerful	  and	  
uncompromising	  in	  matters	  of	  its	  national	  interest	  and	  given	  to	  emphatic	  responses	  to	  foreign	  
intrusions.	  	  
421	  See	  Section	  3.4.3	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  substantive	  research	  underpinning	  the	  body	  of	  communication	  
theory	  that	  relates	  to	  the	  primacy	  of	  trust	  in	  relationships,	  particularly	  that	  pertaining	  to	  organisations.	  
This	  theory	  asserts	  that	  organisational	  relationships	  exactly	  mimic	  those	  of	  interpersonal	  relationships	  in	  
terms	  of	  the	  critical	  determinators	  of	  relationship	  quality,	  such	  as	  trust,	  access,	  mutual	  legitimacy,	  
mutual	  satisfaction,	  credibility,	  openness,	  mutual	  understanding	  and	  mutual	  respect	  (Ledingham	  and	  
Bruning,	  2001:5,	  31,	  83;	  Ledingham,	  2003;	  Grunig	  et	  al,	  2000:553-­‐554;	  Kovacs,	  2001;	  Dimmick	  et	  al,	  
2001:118).	  
422	  This	  UN	  body	  has	  a	  nearly	  universal	  membership	  of	  195	  countries.	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lacked	  commitment	  to	  address	  climate	  change	  issues.	  Moreover,	  there	  had	  been	  ‘a	  complete	  failure	  of	  rich	  countries’	  to	  honour	  their	  earlier	  promises	  on	  financing,	  thereby	  ‘putting	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  people	  at	  risk’	  (GI	  news,	  2013e;	  2013i).	  	  	  It	  might	  be	  timely	  to	  reiterate	  the	  assurance	  given	  in	  Chapter	  1	  that	  this	  thesis	  does	  not	  dispute	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  claims	  by	  Greenpeace,	  or	  other	  TANs,	  in	  their	  communications	  with	  their	  audiences.	  The	  point	  made	  here	  is	  that	  the	  way	  issues	  are	  strategically	  framed	  by	  Greenpeace’s	  advocacy	  professionals	  and	  presented	  to	  global	  audiences,	  especially	  in	  terms	  of	  high	  impact/high	  stakes	  scandals,	  provides	  a	  rich	  source	  of	  data	  on	  this	  TAN,	  which	  can	  be	  critically	  examined	  for	  clues	  to	  underlying	  outlooks	  and	  motivations,	  changing	  policies	  and	  (most	  importantly	  for	  this	  thesis),	  Greenpeace’s	  external	  relationships	  and	  effectiveness.	  	  A	  further	  issue	  concerning	  Greenpeace	  tactics	  in	  mounting	  high-­‐visibility	  advocacy	  campaigns	  to	  confront	  powerful	  Goliaths423	  relates	  to	  the	  ‘politics	  of	  trust’424	  (Thompson,	  2000:111-­‐113;	  Urry,	  2003:114-­‐115).	  This	  thesis	  suggests	  that	  Greenpeace	  struggles	  to	  recapture	  its	  pre-­‐Brent	  Spar	  reputation	  and	  influence	  —	  and	  that	  it	  characteristically	  does	  this	  by	  performing	  high-­‐visibility	  targeted	  acts,	  in	  strategic	  venues,	  that	  are	  intended	  to	  reinforce	  its	  brand	  integrity	  and	  keep	  the	  faith	  with	  supporters.	  A	  recent	  study	  of	  ‘brand	  personality’	  in	  non-­‐profit	  organisations	  in	  the	  USA	  indicates,	  however,	  that	  Greenpeace	  is	  challenged	  in	  this	  respect,	  with	  the	  public	  perception	  of	  Greenpeace’s	  integrity	  scoring	  low	  marks	  in	  comparison	  with	  other	  prominent	  non-­‐profits	  (Venable	  et	  al,	  2005;	  Barakso,	  2010:155).	  The	  study	  pointed	  out	  that	  due	  to	  the	  intangibility	  of	  the	  services	  that	  non-­‐profit	  organisations	  offer	  and	  the	  social	  nature	  of	  the	  exchange	  in	  their	  relationship	  with	  donors,	  reliability	  and	  integrity	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  way	  their	  external	  audiences	  evaluate	  them	  (Venable	  et	  al:	  ibid).	  	  	  The	  advocacy	  prism	  is	  especially	  useful	  for	  analysing	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  Greenpeace	  campaigns	  targeting	  global	  brands,	  which	  have	  shown	  a	  marked	  increase	  in	  recent	  years.	  In	  targeting	  famous	  brands	  that	  have	  allegedly	  flouted	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423	  Such	  as	  the	  military	  might	  of	  the	  USA	  and	  France.	  
424	  This	  theory	  was	  reinforced	  by	  the	  recent	  Polis	  report	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  comments	  contained	  in	  it	  by	  a	  
senior	  press	  officer	  (Ian	  Bray)	  at	  Oxfam,	  in	  which	  the	  close	  connection	  between	  transparency,	  
accountability,	  communications	  and	  trust	  were	  affirmed	  (Polis	  Report,	  2012:14;	  vide	  Section	  8.4.2).	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ethical	  norms	  relating	  to	  social	  responsibility,	  abuse-­‐of-­‐power,	  fairness	  and	  environmental	  protection,	  Greenpeace	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  link	  environmental	  issues	  to	  economic	  and	  political	  issues	  associated	  with	  anti-­‐capitalism	  and	  anti-­‐globalisation	  messages.	  Usually,	  the	  campaign	  messages	  imply,	  inter	  alia,	  that	  powerful	  entities	  are	  susceptible	  to	  the	  external	  pressure	  of	  sufficient	  numbers	  of	  right-­‐thinking	  campaigners	  and,	  moreover,	  that	  their	  compliance	  with	  activist	  demands	  is	  a	  testament	  to	  the	  power	  of	  the	  activists’	  strategy.	  However,	  somewhat	  counter-­‐intuitively,	  a	  body	  of	  communications	  research	  suggests	  that	  the	  larger	  the	  targeted	  corporation	  the	  more	  likely	  it	  is	  to	  accommodate	  the	  demands	  of	  a	  powerful	  external	  public,	  such	  as	  consumer	  activists	  (Reber,	  2006:2).	  This,	  I	  suggest,	  is	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  normal,	  contemporary,	  principles	  of	  commercial	  public	  relations	  best	  practice,	  which	  prizes	  reputation	  protection	  and	  damage	  limitation	  to	  business	  interests.	  I	  further	  suggest	  that	  the	  use	  of	  news	  media	  and	  social	  media	  to	  trigger	  this	  lever	  is	  very	  straightforward	  in	  situations	  of	  low	  systemic	  complexity,	  such	  as	  within	  single	  companies	  (and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent,	  within	  corporations),	  where	  chains	  of	  authority	  are	  comparatively	  confined	  in	  space	  and	  time.	  As	  will	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  other	  case	  studies,	  Greenpeace	  is	  not	  alone	  in	  implying	  that	  advocacy	  strategies	  that	  enlist	  the	  support	  of	  large	  numbers	  of	  individuals	  to	  coerce	  commercial	  organisations	  to	  yield	  to	  their	  demands	  (i.e.	  the	  pressure	  of	  ‘people	  power’),	  are	  equally	  efficacious,	  unconditionally,	  in	  the	  realms	  of	  domestic	  and	  international	  politics	  if	  sufficient	  numbers	  of	  people	  are	  mobilised	  to	  act	  (GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2012:4).	  But	  Greenpeace	  stands	  out	  in	  its	  longstanding	  commitment	  to	  large	  scale	  signature	  collecting	  and	  delivery	  of	  petitions	  in	  all	  its	  campaigns,	  with	  the	  inference	  that	  this	  tactic	  is	  commensurable	  in	  its	  instrumental	  power	  across	  a	  range	  of	  social	  sectors425.	  	  	  Greenpeace’s	  adversarial	  tactical	  approach	  towards	  specifically	  targeted	  global	  brands	  is	  in	  striking	  contrast	  to	  that	  of	  the	  similarly	  long-­‐lived,	  although	  one	  decade	  older	  and	  significantly	  larger,	  global	  environmental	  campaigning	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
425	  A	  case	  in	  point	  was	  the	  Greenpeace	  expedition	  to	  the	  North	  Pole	  in	  April	  2013	  to	  cut	  a	  hole	  in	  the	  ice	  
and	  lower	  a	  time	  capsule	  containing	  almost	  three	  million	  signatures	  to	  the	  sea	  floor.	  The	  petition	  asked	  
for	  the	  Arctic	  to	  be	  made	  a	  global	  sanctuary	  and	  protected	  from	  commercial	  operations	  (GI	  news,	  
2013g).	  Another	  instance	  was	  the	  delivery	  of	  a	  petition	  containing	  one	  million	  signatures	  to	  the	  EU	  
Commission	  in	  Brussels	  in	  December	  2010.	  The	  petition,	  jointly	  delivered	  by	  activists	  from	  Greenpeace	  
and	  Avaaz,	  called	  for	  a	  moratorium	  on	  genetically	  modified	  crops	  (GI	  news,	  2010).	  In	  both	  of	  these	  cases	  
of	  international	  political	  protest,	  the	  awareness-­‐raising	  information	  provided	  by	  GI	  was	  focused	  on	  the	  
people	  and	  processes	  involved	  in	  making	  and	  delivering	  the	  petitions.	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organisation,	  the	  WWF426.	  Although	  the	  environmental	  aims	  of	  both	  organisations	  are	  almost	  identical,	  their	  approaches	  could	  hardly	  be	  more	  different,	  with	  the	  WWF	  staunchly	  committed	  to	  engaging	  with	  the	  commercial	  world	  and	  using	  its	  influence	  in	  diplomatic	  networking	  and	  boardroom	  dialogues,	  while	  eschewing	  the	  overtly	  combative	  approaches	  pursued	  by	  Greenpeace.	  Observers	  have	  noted	  that	  despite	  their	  differing	  approaches	  the	  prominence	  achieved	  by	  both	  of	  these	  global	  brands	  is	  a	  testament	  to	  their	  success	  over	  the	  decades.	  However,	  considering	  that	  environmental	  concerns	  and	  degradation	  are	  universal,	  what	  is	  not	  clear	  is	  whether	  these	  types	  of	  NGO	  model	  actually	  work	  outside	  the	  Western	  democracies	  (The	  Guardian,	  2011a).	  	  
Effects	  of	  grassroots	  financial	  support	  on	  issue	  selection,	  message	  and	  tactics	  	  Advocacy	  organisations’	  funding	  sources	  have	  been	  found	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  tactical	  approaches	  they	  adopt	  (Prakash	  and	  Gugerty,	  2010:18;	  Cooley	  and	  Ron,	  2010:205,	  2002;	  Jenkins	  and	  Perrow,	  1977;	  Barakso,	  2010:157-­‐162).	  	  This	  normally	  means	  that	  NGO	  strategists	  choose	  to	  work	  for	  change	  either	  inside	  existing	  institutions,	  outside	  them,	  or	  while	  attempting	  to	  maintain	  a	  two-­‐pronged	  strategy	  involving	  both	  endo-­‐	  and	  ex-­‐institutional	  tactical	  fronts	  (Willetts,	  2011:62,	  Barakso,	  ibid).	  For	  example,	  ‘preservationist’	  environmental	  groups	  in	  general	  depend	  on	  funding	  by	  corporations	  and	  have	  an	  insider/conventional	  tactical	  repertoire427,	  while	  ‘ecocentric’	  groups	  are	  typically	  supported	  by	  members	  and	  have	  an	  outsider/contentious	  tactical	  orientation	  (Willetts,	  ibid)428.	  Greenpeace	  is	  frequently	  identified	  with	  ‘outsider’	  strategies,	  as	  it	  targets	  policy	  arenas	  such	  as	  the	  media,	  the	  public,	  and	  the	  marketplace	  (Pralle,	  2010:191).	  In	  pointing	  out	  some	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  advocacy	  models,	  Shaw-­‐Bond	  observes	  (2000)429	  that	  the	  large	  environmental	  activist	  groups	  rely	  chiefly	  on	  grassroots	  support	  and	  public	  pressure	  and	  do	  not	  depend	  on	  governmental	  acceptance,	  or	  co-­‐operation	  to	  achieve	  their	  ends	  —	  in	  contrast	  to	  those	  focused	  on	  either	  rights	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
426	  WWF	  stands	  for	  both	  the	  Worldwide	  Fund	  for	  Nature	  and	  World	  Wildlife	  Fund	  (its	  original	  name).	  
Founded	  in	  1961,	  the	  WWF	  today	  claims	  it	  is	  the	  world’s	  largest	  independent	  conservation	  organisation,	  
backed	  by	  over	  five	  million	  people	  throughout	  the	  world.	  The	  WWF	  further	  states	  that	  it	  has	  invested	  
well	  over	  US$1	  billion	  in	  more	  than	  12,000	  conservation	  initiatives	  since	  1985	  (WWF-­‐Int.,	  2014).	  	  	  
427	  An	  example	  of	  both	  insider	  and	  outsider	  tactics	  employed	  by	  an	  environmental	  advocacy	  NGO	  can	  be	  
seen	  in	  the	  Sierra	  Club’s	  acceptance	  of	  a	  US$50m	  corporate	  gift	  from	  the	  New	  York	  Mayor	  and	  
philanthropist,	  Michael	  Bloomberg,	  in	  July	  2011	  (Sierra	  Club,	  2011).	  
428	  Willetts	  also	  cites	  Carmin	  and	  Balser,	  2002.	  
429	  Cited	  also	  by	  Van	  Rooy	  (2004).	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development	  issues430,	  who	  require	  permissions	  to	  carry	  out	  their	  work	  within	  countries,	  and	  often	  receive	  international	  subsidies	  to	  assist	  under-­‐resourced	  national	  agencies.	  The	  constraining	  effect	  on	  the	  behaviours	  of	  transnational	  NGOs	  that	  springs	  from	  the	  necessity	  to	  tender	  for	  these	  subsidies	  and	  contracts	  in	  a	  crowded,	  competitive,	  development	  aid	  market431,	  has	  been	  increasingly	  noted	  by	  scholars	  (Cooley	  and	  Ron,	  2002;	  2010:205-­‐225).	  	  	  Given	  that	  Greenpeace	  relies	  on	  donations	  from	  its	  2.9	  million	  donors,	  independent	  trusts	  and	  foundation	  grants,	  to	  fund	  its	  operations	  —	  eschewing	  funding	  from	  governments,	  corporations,	  political	  parties	  or	  any	  sources	  that	  could	  present	  conflict	  of	  interest	  issues	  (GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2012:37)	  —	  it	  is	  unsurprising	  to	  find	  that	  publicity	  about	  its	  operations	  is	  highly	  geared	  towards	  attracting	  popular	  and	  media	  attention,	  encouraging	  continued	  commitments	  from	  supporters	  and	  highlighting	  victories,	  and	  differentiating	  itself	  from	  other	  environmental	  advocacy	  groups.	  Putting	  this	  more	  bluntly,	  Browne	  (2001),	  opines	  that	  ‘green	  groups	  —	  with	  revenues	  of	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  pounds	  a	  year	  —	  are	  using	  increasingly	  desperate	  scaremongering	  tactics	  to	  sustain	  donations’432.	  	  	  
Heightened	  urgency	  message	  and	  strategy	  shift	  to	  ‘war	  footing’	  In	  recent	  years,	  Greenpeace’s	  ‘creative	  confrontation’	  model	  of	  activism	  has	  been	  accompanied	  by	  impassioned	  publicity	  messages,	  containing	  heightened	  levels	  of	  urgency	  and	  frustration,	  asserting	  that	  the	  Earth	  is	  heading	  for	  environmental	  catastrophe	  of	  Man’s	  doing,	  while	  present	  systems	  of	  global	  governance	  are	  suffering	  a	  ‘leadership	  vacuum’	  and	  failing	  to	  take	  the	  necessary	  actions	  to	  avert	  it	  (GI	  news,	  2012a;	  2012b;	  AP	  News,	  2012;	  Moore,	  2007).	  GI	  CEO,	  Naidoo,	  has	  admonished	  world	  leaders,	  as	  a	  group,	  for	  ignoring	  danger	  warnings	  and	  ‘sleep-­‐walking’433	  into	  looming	  environmental	  catastrophes.	  Civil	  disobedience,	  he	  urges,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
430	  Such	  as	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  (rights)	  and	  Oxfam	  International	  (development	  and	  rights),	  which	  are	  
described	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  
431	  This	  observation	  has	  increasing	  significance	  in	  light	  of	  the	  trend	  for	  ‘local’	  recipients	  of	  humanitarian	  
and	  development	  aid	  to	  specify	  their	  assistance	  needs	  and	  the	  means	  of	  its	  provision	  (vide	  Section	  
8.3.1).	  
432	  This	  view	  is	  also	  supported	  by	  Patrick	  Moore	  (2005),	  et	  al.	  	  
433	  The	  metaphor	  of	  world	  leaders	  ‘sleepwalking’	  into	  environmental	  catastrophes	  is	  a	  familiar	  one	  in	  
Greenpeace	  publicity	  materials	  and	  has	  in	  recent	  years	  featured	  prominently	  in	  protest	  publicity	  issued	  
in	  connection	  with	  international	  meetings	  and	  conferences,	  such	  as	  the	  UN	  climate	  talks	  in	  Bonn	  in	  2009	  
(when	  Greenpeace	  activists	  campaigned	  in	  their	  pyjamas)	  and	  the	  World	  Economic	  Forum	  in	  Davos	  in	  
2012	  (GI	  Kumi	  Nadoo’s	  Blog,	  2012a;	  GI	  news,	  2009a,	  2009b,	  2009c).	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is	  the	  only	  way	  left	  for	  people	  to	  ‘push’	  their	  governments	  to	  listen	  and	  act	  with	  the	  urgency	  the	  situation	  demands	  (GI	  Naidoo,	  2009).	  	  	  Continuing	  this	  theme	  following	  the	  UN’s	  Earth	  Summit	  in	  2012	  	  (Rio+20),	  Naidoo	  called	  the	  event	  ‘a	  failure	  of	  epic	  proportions’	  (GI	  news,	  2012b)	  declaring:	  	  We	   didn’t	   get	   the	   Future	   we	   Want434	   in	   Rio,	   because	   we	   do	   not	   have	   the	  leaders	   we	   need.	   The	   leaders	   of	   the	   most	   powerful	   countries	   supported	  Business	   as	   Usual,	   shamefully	   putting	   private	   profit	   before	   people	   and	   the	  planet.	  […]	  The	  only	  outcome	  of	  this	  Summit	  is	  justifiable	  anger,	  an	  anger	  that	  we	  must	  turn	  into	  action.	  	  Greenpeace,	  he	  announced,	  now	  had	  no	  option	  but	  to	  change	  its	  strategy	  and	  start	  planning	  waves	  of	  civil	  disobedience,	  moving	  to	  a	  ‘war	  footing’	  (The	  Guardian,	  2012).	  This	  thesis	  notes	  that	  this	  statement	  appears	  to	  presage	  a	  significant	  shift	  in	  GI’s	  tactical	  repertoire	  and	  stakeholder	  relationship	  policy435.	  In	  fact,	  Naidoo	  has	  more	  recently	  reiterated	  his	  call	  on	  GI’s	  geographically	  dispersed	  support	  base	  to	  mobilise	  in	  local	  contexts	  and	  engage	  directly	  in	  acts	  of	  civil	  disobedience	  (GI	  Naidoo,	  2014;	  GI	  Naidoo,	  2013a,	  2013b).	  	  Up	  to	  now,	  Greenpeace	  protest	  actions	  could	  not	  be	  accurately	  termed	  ‘collective	  actions’,	  as	  they	  have	  invariably	  involved	  small	  bands	  of	  highly	  motivated	  and	  trained	  activists,	  acting	  in	  a	  coordinated	  manner	  under	  Greenpeace	  central	  direction	  and	  using	  the	  organisation’s	  formidable	  resources.	  This	  thesis	  asserts	  that	  it	  is,	  therefore,	  inappropriate	  to	  apply	  either	  collective	  action	  or	  conventional	  social	  movement	  lenses	  to	  Greenpeace	  theorising,	  which	  must	  take	  into	  account	  an	  advocacy	  strategy	  in	  which	  comparatively	  small	  numbers	  of	  Greenpeace	  campaigners	  act	  on	  behalf	  of	  GI’s	  global	  audiences	  (GI	  Naidoo,	  2012c),	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  whom	  have	  limited	  incentives	  to	  become	  actively	  involved	  in	  protests	  themselves	  and	  are	  remotely	  empowered	  to	  participate	  vicariously	  in	  large-­‐scale	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434	  All	  capitalisations	  are	  as	  per	  the	  original	  statement.	  
435	  Indeed,	  scholars	  have	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  say	  about	  the	  ‘repertoires	  of	  contention’	  that	  advocacy	  
organisations	  use	  to	  define	  themselves	  over	  time	  and	  which	  give	  them	  a	  sense	  of	  self	  and	  a	  tactical	  
consistency,	  even	  to	  the	  point	  of	  continuing	  to	  persist	  with	  particular	  tactics	  that	  are	  unlikely	  to	  yield	  
results	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  the	  censure	  of	  a	  board	  of	  directors,	  or	  membership,	  that	  expects	  such	  action	  
(Barakso,	  2010:160;	  Robnett,	  2002:	  267-­‐268;	  Holyoke,	  2003).	  By	  calling	  into	  question	  the	  continued	  
connection	  between	  a	  group’s	  values	  and	  an	  individual	  supporter’s	  values,	  radical	  changes	  in	  tactical	  
choices	  can	  be	  jarring	  to	  a	  group’s	  constituency	  of	  members,	  staff,	  volunteers	  and	  donors,	  inducing	  
negative	  reactions	  that	  range	  from	  disillusionment	  to	  abandonment	  (Barakso,	  ibid).	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acts	  of	  defiance	  while	  exposed	  to	  minimal	  costs436.	  	  In	  light	  of	  studies	  that	  support	  the	  premise	  of	  this	  thesis	  that	  advocacy	  organisations	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  ‘firms’	  and	  ‘brands’	  (Prakash	  and	  Gugherty,	  20120:3;	  Lecy	  et	  al,	  2010:229-­‐49;	  Barakso,	  2010:156-­‐57),	  another	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  the	  Greenpeace	  call	  to	  supporters	  to	  mobilise	  on	  a	  ‘war	  footing’,	  might	  be	  to	  see	  it	  as	  a	  strategic	  repositioning	  of	  the	  Greenpeace	  brand.	  But	  such	  projects	  are	  notoriously	  risk-­‐laden	  and	  there	  are	  no	  indications	  that	  Greenpeace	  has	  the	  resources,	  other	  than	  communications	  channels,	  rhetoric	  and	  optimistic	  expectations	  of	  ‘people	  power’,	  with	  which	  to	  make	  ‘war’	  on	  world	  leaders	  to	  ‘push’	  them	  into	  ideological	  conformity	  and	  action.	  Moreover,	  many	  scholars	  	  (such	  as	  Chandler,	  2004,	  2009;	  and	  Morazov,	  2011:191)	  are	  highly	  sceptical	  of	  suggestions	  that	  Internet-­‐enabled	  global	  advocacy	  supporters,	  sometimes	  called	  ‘slacktivists’	  	  (Morazov,	  ibid:	  189-­‐90)	  or	  ‘clicktavists’	  (Darnton	  and	  Kirk,	  2011:10)	  in	  general,	  have	  either	  the	  inclination	  or	  the	  required	  levels	  of	  political	  engagement	  to	  convert	  mere	  ‘awareness’	  into	  action.	  	  	  GI’s	  strategic	  aims	  underlying	  the	  call-­‐to-­‐action	  by	  its	  CEO	  are	  therefore	  perplexing	  from,	  at	  least,	  the	  standpoints	  of	  TAN	  mobilisation,	  communications	  best	  practice	  and	  complex	  systems	  theory.	  Such	  tactics	  are	  arguably	  effective	  in	  news-­‐making,	  fundraising	  and	  social	  boundary	  mechanism	  construction	  but	  are	  not	  highly	  valued	  in	  the	  esoteric	  world	  of	  international,	  evidence-­‐based,	  negotiation	  and	  policymaking.	  	  
Escalating	  costs	  of	  maintaining	  the	  ‘Greenpeace	  action’	  model	  It	  is	  evident	  that	  the	  scale	  of	  GI’s	  24/7	  news	  traffic	  and	  the	  newsworthiness	  and	  theatricality	  of	  the	  organisation’s	  ‘media	  mindbombs’	  has	  risen	  exponentially	  and	  comes	  with	  escalating	  costs.	  With	  offices	  in	  40	  countries	  the	  explosion	  in	  Greenpeace’s	  publicity	  traffic	  in	  recent	  years	  was	  to	  be	  expected	  —	  so	  too,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436	  Prakash	  and	  Gugerty	  (2010:12:	  see	  also	  Cooley	  and	  Ron,	  2010:211-­‐12)	  suggest	  this	  relationship	  
between	  advocacy	  NGOs	  and	  their	  supporters	  should	  be	  thought	  of	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘principals’	  and	  ‘agents’,	  
with	  advocacy	  being	  outsourced	  by	  concerned	  individuals	  to	  actors	  who	  have	  the	  organisational	  
capacities	  and	  willingness	  to	  do	  it.	  In	  this	  conceptualisation,	  Prakash	  and	  Gugerty	  explain	  (ibid),	  the	  
publics	  on	  behalf	  of	  whom	  advocacy	  NGOs	  agitate	  are	  de	  facto	  principals,	  as	  well.	  See	  also	  Metz	  
(2006:2-­‐3)	  for	  insights	  regarding	  the	  ideological	  make-­‐up	  of	  activist	  movements.	  Chandler	  and	  Morazov	  
are	  among	  those	  who	  similarly	  question	  the	  expansive	  power	  claims	  made	  for	  deterritorialised,	  de-­‐
socialised,	  virtual	  political	  participation	  in	  online	  networks	  (Chandler,	  2007;	  Morazov.	  2013:	  128).	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need	  to	  remain	  newsworthy	  amid	  the	  torrents	  of	  competing	  publicity	  from	  other	  TANs,	  NGOs	  and	  INGOs,	  many	  of	  whom	  have	  commoditised	  the	  Greenpeace	  model437	  for	  their	  own	  use.	  The	  ‘voice’	  impact	  that	  Greenpeace	  achieved	  with	  a	  small,	  rusty	  boat	  and	  a	  relatively	  shoestring	  budget	  in	  1971,	  today	  costs	  Greenpeace	  €274	  million438	  per	  year,	  to	  emulate	  (GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2012:44-­‐45),	  including	  nearly	  €25	  million	  for	  media	  and	  communications	  and	  a	  further	  €10	  million	  for	  public	  information	  and	  outreach.	  The	  new	  Rainbow	  Warrior	  III	  cost	  €20.3	  million	  (GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2010:17).	  
	  
7.5.4	  Assessment	  of	  Greenpeace’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  United	  Nations	  	  This	  section	  supports	  the	  macroscopic	  overview	  of	  the	  interface	  between	  TANs	  and	  the	  international	  system	  by	  highlighting	  observed	  signs	  and	  patterns	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  Greenpeace	  and	  elements	  of	  the	  UN	  system.	  Importantly,	  this	  section	  builds	  on	  the	  historical	  record	  of	  acrimony,	  contested	  outcomes	  and	  bitter	  memories,	  discussed	  earlier.	  
	  Conspicuously,	  there	  is	  very	  little	  balanced,	  or	  academically	  validated,	  information	  publicly	  available	  on	  the	  development	  of	  GI’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  UN	  system.	  In	  principle,	  one	  of	  the	  key	  institutional	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  for	  multi-­‐level	  interactions	  between	  these	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  parties	  does	  exist,	  given	  that	  in	  1998	  Greenpeace	  was	  granted	  General	  Consultative	  Status	  with	  the	  UN	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC	  NGO	  List,	  2011:4).	  What	  this	  formal	  consultancy	  status	  means	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  it	  allows	  for	  the	  application	  of	  a	  macroscopic	  systemic	  frame	  of	  analysis	  to	  explore	  relationships	  between	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  UN	  system,	  and	  furthermore	  between	  the	  elements	  of	  other	  systems	  to	  which	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  UN	  system	  are	  intersected,	  or	  connected	  in	  relations	  of	  exteriority	  (vide	  DeLanda,	  2006:	  10-­‐11,	  18).	  The	  UN	  consultancy	  status	  for	  Greenpeace	  also	  provides	  a	  scaleable	  frame	  of	  reference	  for	  using	  complex	  realism	  to	  theorise	  about	  the	  state	  of	  the	  relationships,	  the	  power	  differentials,	  and	  the	  points	  of	  analytical	  focus,	  from	  unit-­‐level,	  to	  cluster	  and	  system-­‐level.	  	  	  Such	  indications	  as	  are	  publicly	  available	  concerning	  GI’s	  interface	  with	  the	  UN	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
437	  Commoditised,	  for	  example,	  by	  the	  Sea	  Shepherd	  Conservation	  Society.	  
438	  Worldwide	  expenditure	  amounted	  to	  €274	  million	  in	  2012	  (GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2012:44-­‐45).	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provide	  glimpses	  of	  a	  relationship	  that	  is,	  overall,	  far	  from	  harmonious.	  Indeed,	  the	  few	  instances	  of	  direct,	  public,	  interaction	  between	  Greenpeace	  and	  the	  UN	  (touched	  on	  earlier)	  reveal	  a	  relationship	  that	  appears	  to	  be	  —	  from	  the	  Greenpeace	  perspective,	  at	  least	  —	  one	  of	  on-­‐going	  dysfunction,	  frustration	  and	  renunciation.	  At	  the	  UN	  summit	  on	  climate	  change,	  COP19	  in	  November	  2013,	  the	  Greenpeace	  CEO	  (Naidoo),	  was	  a	  prominent	  figure	  among	  NGO	  attendees	  who	  staged	  a	  high-­‐profile	  walkout	  from	  the	  negotiations	  (GI	  news,	  2013e).	  	  	  Thus,	  Greenpeace,	  as	  an	  element	  in	  the	  international	  system,	  appears	  to	  be	  currently	  divergent	  in	  its	  relationships	  with	  certain	  other	  elements	  in	  the	  system,	  most	  notably	  in	  relationships	  with	  state	  actors.	  Although	  GI’s	  former	  Political	  Advisor	  (Sack),	  is	  showcased	  on	  the	  GI	  Website	  directly	  addressing	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  in	  2004,	  and	  another	  major	  UN	  consultancy	  event	  in	  2005439,	  the	  study	  found	  no	  further	  public	  record	  that	  Greenpeace	  has	  availed	  of	  the	  UN’s	  NGO	  consultation	  mechanism,	  in	  a	  similar	  fashion,	  since	  2005440	  (GI	  news,	  2004a,	  2004b).	  If	  Greenpeace	  is	  also	  actuating	  the	  quieter	  mechanisms	  for	  engaging	  in	  the	  international	  decision-­‐making	  structures	  that	  its	  UN	  consultative	  status	  provides,	  there	  is	  currently	  no	  evidence	  of	  it	  in	  the	  public	  domain.	  The	  UN	  listing	  of	  accredited	  NGO	  participation	  in	  international	  conferences	  and	  meetings	  records	  that	  GI	  last	  participated	  in	  an	  international	  meeting	  in	  2009	  (UN-­‐DESA	  data,	  2012).	  This	  is	  a	  salient	  point,	  since	  collaborative	  strategies	  are	  supported	  by	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  literature	  as	  being	  the	  most	  effective	  in	  dealing	  with	  ‘wicked	  problems’	  that	  have	  many	  stakeholders	  amongst	  whom	  power	  is	  dispersed441.	  Such	  collaborative	  arrangements	  enable	  stakeholders	  to	  reach	  shared	  commitments	  to	  results	  and	  have	  at	  their	  core,	  a	  win-­‐win	  view	  of	  problem	  solving	  (AustGov,	  2007:10).	  The	  sleepwalking	  analogy	  that	  has	  been	  developed	  as	  a	  key	  message	  strategy	  in	  the	  intervening	  years,	  might	  suggest	  that	  Greenpeace,	  as	  an	  organisation,	  has	  taken	  the	  view	  that	  its	  voice	  in	  international	  debate	  is	  failing	  to	  awaken	  world	  leaders	  to	  their	  responsibilities.	  	  In	  2014,	  Naidoo	  expressed	  the	  view	  that	  Greenpeace	  needs	  to	  question	  whether	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
439	  United	  Nations	  Open-­‐ended	  Informal	  Consultative	  Process	  on	  Oceans	  and	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Sea	  	  
(UNICPOLOS),	  on	  7	  June	  2005).	  
440	  This	  assessment	  is	  based	  on	  accounts	  of	  what	  Greenpeace	  says	  it	  does	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  media	  
relations	  and	  publicity	  outputs	  as	  reflected	  on	  the	  GI	  Website.	  
441	  See	  also	  Tufekci	  and	  Kriess,	  2012.	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has	  any	  real	  influence	  at	  the	  international	  political	  level	  (GI	  Naidoo,	  2014),	  stating:	  	  	  We	   go	   into	   meetings	   with,	   say,	   the	   United	   Nations,	   and	   we	   think	   we	   have	  influence.	  But	  a	   lot	  of	   it	   is	  access	  without	   influence	  and	  we	  need	   to	  ask	  how	  much	  energy	  we	  should	  put	  into	  the	  formal	  inter-­‐governmental	  processes	  and	  how	   much	   we	   put	   into	   action	   with	   people	   and	   really	   mobilising	   real	  resistance.442	  	  Naidoo	  claimed	  that	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  climate	  change	  ‘[I]t	  is	  not	  that	  the	  solutions	  are	  not	  known’,	  but	  progress	  is	  being	  hampered	  by	  ‘dithering	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  will’,	  amongst	  leaders	  and	  ‘business	  elites’.	  In	  strongly	  reinforcing	  his	  call	  for	  members	  of	  the	  general	  public	  to	  engage	  in	  acts	  of	  civil	  disobedience	  on	  climate	  change,	  Naidoo	  said	  (ibid):	  	  	  	  History	   tells	   us	   that	   direct	   action	   is	   the	   best	   tool	   that	  we	   have	   to	   push	   our	  leaders,	  to	  get	  the	  political	  will	  to	  do	  that	  which	  they	  do	  know	  they	  really	  need	  to	  do,	  so	  that	  we	  can	  secure	  this	  planet	  for	  our	  children	  and	  grandchildren.	  	  	  As	  an	  advocacy	  organisation,	  Greenpeace	  is	  the	  only	  party	  to	  its	  formal	  consultancy	  agreement	  with	  the	  UN	  to	  be	  publicly	  outspoken	  about:	  (i)	  its	  disparaging	  views	  on	  international	  leaders,	  as	  a	  group,	  and	  their	  representatives	  at	  the	  UN;	  and	  (ii)	  about	  the	  quality	  of	  Greenpeace’s	  particular	  relationship	  with	  them	  (e.g.	  GI	  news,	  2012b	  and	  2013b).	  This	  thesis	  acknowledges	  that,	  as	  a	  multinational	  organisation,	  it	  is	  not	  in	  the	  least	  abnormal	  that	  the	  research	  underlying	  this	  study	  found	  no	  public	  official	  statements	  emanating	  from	  the	  UN	  on	  the	  organisation’s	  relationship	  with	  one	  of	  the	  139	  NGOs	  on	  its	  General	  Consultative	  list	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC	  NGO	  List,	  2011:1)	  —	  in	  this	  case,	  Greenpeace	  International.	  	  	  	  Meanwhile,	  Greenpeace’s	  current	  corporate	  viewpoint	  on	  the	  UN	  can	  be	  gauged	  from	  two	  further	  public	  statements	  made	  on	  behalf	  of	  his	  organisation.	  In	  a	  blog	  post,	  Naidoo,	  asserted	  (GI	  Naidoo,	  2012b):	  	  We	   live	   in	  a	  world	   today	   that’s	   seen	   first	  hand	   the	   failure	  of	   the	  multilateral	  process	  at	  events	  like	  Rio+20,	  the	  strengthening	  grip	  of	  corporate	  interests	  in	  the	   political	   arena	   and	   the	   shrinking	   democratic	   space	   around	   civil	   society	  movements.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442	  This	  text	  and	  the	  following	  one	  are	  based	  on	  my	  transcription	  of	  the	  lecture	  videocast	  (see	  original	  at	  
GI	  Naidoo,	  2014).	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And	  in	  a	  separate	  statement,	  quoted	  in	  newspaper	  articles	  in	  June	  2012,	  immediately	  following	  the	  UN	  Earth	  Summit	  in	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro,	  Naidoo,	  said	  that	  in	  order	  to	  overcome	  the	  ‘state	  parochialism’	  that	  was	  stopping	  any	  progress	  in	  multilateral	  talks	  to	  address	  environmental	  problems,	  Greenpeace	  would	  have	  to	  ‘give	  up	  on	  international	  negotiations	  and	  move	  to	  a	  campaign	  of	  civil	  disobedience’	  (The	  Age,	  2012;	  The	  Guardian,	  2012).	  Since	  that	  time,	  his	  messages	  have	  consistently	  castigated	  international	  negotiators	  over	  a	  range	  of	  global	  challenges,	  rebuking	  them	  for	  not	  only	  perceived	  incompetence	  and	  failure	  to	  achieve	  GI’s	  preferred	  outcomes,	  but	  questioning	  the	  morality	  of	  their	  motivations	  and	  commitment	  to	  safeguarding	  humanity	  (GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2012:4;	  GI	  Naidoo,	  2012f;	  GI	  Naidoo,	  2013).	  In	  a	  recent	  blog	  post,	  Naidoo	  commented	  (GI	  Naidoo,	  2013;	  BBC	  News,	  2013):	  	  It	   is	  obvious	   that	   too	  many	  corporations	  and	  governments	  do	  not	   listen	  and	  put	   power	   and	   profit	   over	   people,	   ignoring	   what	   is	   in	   the	   best	   interest	   of	  humanity.	  It	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  get	  their	  attention	  –	  but	  one	  thing	   that	   we	   know	   that	   works	   is	   civil	   disobedience	   and	   peaceful	   protest.	  Every	  act	  of	  rebellion	  –	  no	  matter	  how	  seemingly	  insignificant	  –	  adds	  up.	  	  Viewed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  most	  ordered	  aspects	  of	  the	  international	  system	  —	  as	  epitomised	  by	  the	  interaction	  of	  stable	  nation	  states	  within	  the	  UN	  framework443	  —	  the	  Greenpeace	  policy	  of	  praising	  ‘people	  power’	  and	  advocating	  mass	  acts	  of	  civil	  disorder	  appears	  to	  be	  greatly	  at	  variance	  with	  at	  least	  four	  of	  the	  undertakings	  it	  made	  to	  the	  UN	  to	  secure	  NGO	  consultancy	  status	  (GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2012:4,	  40).	  The	  NGO:	  ‘Must	  have	  aims	  and	  purposes	  that	  conform	  to	  the	  spirit,	  purposes	  and	  principles	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter.	  Furthermore,	  it	  should	  undertake	  to	  support	  the	  work	  of	  the	  UN	  and	  promote	  knowledge	  of	  its	  principles	  and	  activities’;	  ‘Must	  not	  engage	  in	  a	  politically	  motivated	  act	  against	  a	  Member	  State,	  or	  promote	  activities	  that	  are	  against	  the	  UN	  Charter’;	  ‘Cannot	  use	  or	  advocate	  violence’444;	  and	  “Must	  respect	  the	  norm	  of	  ‘non-­‐interference	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  states’.	  	  	  	  It	  can	  be	  determined	  from	  Greenpeace’s	  public	  statements,	  particularly	  in	  the	  past	  decade,	  that	  the	  interface	  between	  Greenpeace	  and	  the	  state	  actors	  and	  official	  agencies	  of	  the	  international	  system	  is	  a	  tense	  battleground	  of	  competing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
443	  See	  Geyer	  and	  Rihani,	  2010:114-­‐115	  for	  a	  complexity	  perspective	  on	  international	  order.	  
444	  See	  Galtung	  (1969)	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  difficulties	  faced	  in	  defining	  ‘violence’.	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narratives.	  Although	  it	  is	  axiomatic	  that	  Greenpeace’s	  public	  expressions	  of	  disgust	  and	  frustration	  with	  international	  bodies	  and	  officials	  are	  designed	  for	  publicity	  purposes,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  the	  assume	  that	  these	  interactions	  are	  less	  adversarial	  behind	  closed	  doors	  —	  as	  demonstrated	  recently	  by	  the	  NGO	  walkout	  at	  COP19	  (BBC	  Archive,	  2013d;	  GI	  news,	  2013e,	  GI	  news,	  2013f).	  	  	  Previously,	  the	  Greenpeace	  advocacy	  theme	  of	  alleging	  subhuman	  levels	  of	  greed,	  political	  incompetence,	  obtuseness,	  habitual	  neglect	  of	  duty	  and	  collective	  failure	  by	  international	  leaders	  and	  negotiators,	  had	  been	  expressed	  forcefully	  in	  public	  statements	  by	  Dr.	  Naidoo	  following	  the	  UN	  2012	  Climate	  Change	  Conference	  (COP18.CMP8),	  in	  Doha,	  Qatar	  (GI	  news,	  2012d).	  In	  a	  press	  statement	  (ibid),	  the	  Greenpeace	  CEO	  highlighted	  GI’s	  unchanging	  assessment	  of	  the	  international	  world,	  alleging:	  (1)	  the	  persistent	  failure	  of	  international	  negotiation	  processes;	  (2)	  the	  ‘glacial’	  pace	  of	  progress	  toward	  solving	  weather-­‐related	  natural	  disasters;	  (3)	  the	  inability	  of	  world	  leaders,	  governments,	  and	  politicians,	  collectively,	  to	  comprehend	  the	  gravity	  and	  urgency	  of	  climate	  change	  challenges;	  and	  (4)	  the	  ‘other-­‐world’-­‐ness	  of	  governments	  and	  politicians,	  versus	  a	  hypothetical	  universal	  community	  of	  concerned	  average	  people.	  It	  is	  on	  behalf	  of	  such	  an	  imagined	  global	  constituency	  that	  the	  Greenpeace	  media	  release	  states:	  ‘Today	  we	  ask	  the	  politicians	  in	  Doha:	  Which	  planet	  are	  you	  on?’(GI	  news,	  2012d).	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  Greenpeace	  ‘strategic	  portrayal’445	  of	  monumental	  failure,	  the	  official	  announcements	  at	  the	  Conference	  conclusion	  hailed	  the	  outcome	  as	  ‘an	  historic	  post-­‐Kyoto	  (Protocol)	  breakthrough’,	  by	  the	  representatives	  of	  194	  nations.	  The	  statements	  praised	  the	  skills	  of	  the	  negotiators	  and	  celebrated	  the	  fact	  that	  agreement	  had	  been	  achieved	  on	  setting	  a	  firm	  timetable	  for	  adopting	  a	  legally-­‐binding	  universal	  climate	  change	  treaty	  by	  2015,	  which	  would	  cover	  all	  countries	  by	  2020446	  (UN-­‐COP18.CMP8,	  2012a;	  2012b;	  2012c).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
445	  Vide	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:8.	  
446	  The	  COP10.CMP8	  Climate	  Change	  Conference,	  held	  in	  Doha	  in	  December	  2012,	  was	  the	  most	  recent	  
meeting	  of	  the	  world’s	  highest	  decision-­‐making	  body	  set	  up	  under	  the	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  
Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (UNFCCC),	  which	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  1994.	  The	  Parties	  to	  the	  
Convention	  (COP),	  comprising	  195	  nations	  of	  the	  world,	  meet	  annually	  to	  assess	  progress	  on	  dealing	  
with	  climate	  change	  —	  including	  analysing	  the	  most	  advanced	  scientific	  data.	  The	  Doha	  conference	  
comprised	  negotiators	  from	  194	  countries	  and	  around	  16,000	  participants,	  including	  6,868	  delegates	  
and	  5,829	  observers	  (UN-­‐COP18.CMP8,	  2012d;	  2012c).	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Without	  entering	  into	  the	  political	  cut	  and	  thrust	  of	  the	  climate	  change	  discourses	  here,	  it	  is	  necessary	  nevertheless	  to	  highlight	  countervailing	  evidence	  that	  the	  ‘attention’	  of	  the	  leading	  institutions	  of	  the	  international	  system	  is	  in	  fact	  intensely	  focused	  on	  urgently	  finding	  solutions	  to	  the	  world’s	  ‘wicked	  problems’,	  particularly	  the	  complex	  challenges	  of	  climate	  change	  and	  poverty.	  The	  UN	  Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (IPCC)	  reported	  in	  September	  2013	  that	  human	  activity	  was	  certainly	  the	  cause	  of	  much	  of	  the	  global	  warming	  seen	  in	  recent	  years,	  particularly	  due	  to	  the	  burning	  of	  fossil	  fuels.	  Prepared	  by	  hundreds	  of	  the	  world’s	  leading	  scientists,	  the	  report	  called	  for	  an	  urgent	  global	  response	  to	  halt	  any	  further	  rise	  in	  world	  temperatures	  (IPCC,	  2013:13,17,19).	  Moreover,	  the	  World	  Bank	  acknowledges	  climate	  change	  as	  a	  top	  priority	  and	  adopts	  robust	  policies	  for	  driving	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  action	  in	  its	  worldwide	  projects.	  The	  President	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  Group447	  recently	  warned	  that	  the	  world	  was	  now	  in	  a	  ‘make-­‐or-­‐break	  decade’	  for	  tackling	  the	  challenges	  of	  climate	  change.	  Pointing	  out	  that	  climate	  change	  and	  extreme	  poverty	  are	  interlinked,	  he	  declared	  that	  decades	  of	  progress	  to	  end	  poverty	  would	  be	  reversed	  unless	  concerted,	  immediate,	  action	  was	  taken	  to	  confront	  global	  warming448	  (World	  Bank,	  2013).	  	  	  If	  one	  follows	  Gidden’s	  suggestion	  (2002:61)	  and	  thinks	  of	  a	  relationship	  as	  the	  zone	  in	  which	  rewards	  become	  possible	  for	  the	  participants	  and	  that	  these	  are	  the	  main	  basis	  for	  the	  relationship	  to	  continue,	  GI’s	  record449	  of	  unsatisfactory	  experiences	  within	  the	  international	  system	  over	  many	  years	  could	  reasonably	  be	  taken	  as	  indicative	  of	  a	  poor	  relationship	  quality	  (and	  consequent	  limits	  to	  its	  expectations	  of	  rewards),	  or	  effectiveness	  in	  international	  political	  debates.	  Moreover,	  the	  relationship	  qualities	  of	  trust,	  tact,	  credibility450,	  mutual	  understanding	  and	  mutual	  respect,	  among	  others,	  are	  not	  in	  evidence	  in	  these	  public	  statements.	  What	  this	  means	  for	  Greenpeace	  and	  its	  stated	  aim	  to	  ‘force	  the	  solutions	  which	  are	  essential	  to	  a	  green	  and	  peaceful	  future’	  (vide	  Section	  7.2.1;	  GI	  data,	  2012a),	  is	  difficult	  to	  predict	  at	  the	  present	  time	  since,	  at	  the	  global	  level,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
447	  Dr.	  Jim	  Yong	  Kim	  
448	  Dr.	  Kim	  was	  speaking	  at	  the	  Opening	  Ceremony	  of	  Climate	  Week	  NYC	  2013	  in	  New	  York.	  
449	  For	  example,	  the	  UN	  Secretary-­‐General’s	  ruling	  in	  the	  Rainbow	  Warrior	  affair	  and	  GI’s	  outspoken	  
criticisms	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  world	  leaders.	  
450	  The	  credibility	  of	  information	  has	  been	  assessed	  as	  being	  crucial	  to	  effectiveness	  of	  advocacy	  
organisations	  in	  the	  outcomes	  of	  campaigns	  (Van	  Rooy,	  2004:83;	  Forini,	  2000:234).	  For	  example,	  the	  
high	  quality	  of	  research	  is	  credited,	  by	  Van	  Roy	  and	  others,	  with	  being	  the	  determining	  factor	  in	  the	  
campaign	  to	  restrict	  the	  trade	  in	  conflict	  diamonds	  (ibid).	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climate	  change	  adaptation	  —	  a	  Greenpeace	  priority	  area	  —	  is	  anchored	  in	  the	  UN’s	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (UNFCCC)	  451.	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  to	  influence	  the	  international	  response	  to	  climate	  change,	  it	  is	  clearly	  necessary	  for	  non-­‐state	  interest	  groups,	  as	  well	  as	  state	  agencies,	  to	  be	  able	  to	  exert	  influence	  in	  the	  international	  deliberative	  process.	  	  	  For	  purposes	  of	  comparison,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Oxfam	  International,	  the	  Red	  Cross	  and	  Red	  Crescent	  Movement	  (IFRC)452,	  World	  Wide	  Fund	  for	  Nature	  International	  and	  many	  leading	  advocacy	  NGOs	  collaborate	  closely	  on	  global	  threats,	  including	  climate	  change,	  with	  the	  UN	  Office	  for	  Disaster	  Risk	  Reduction	  (UNISDR),	  and	  participate	  in	  the	  world’s	  foremost	  forum	  on	  reducing	  disaster	  risks	  —	  The	  Global	  Platform	  on	  Disaster	  Risk	  Reduction	  —	  while	  Greenpeace	  International	  does	  not453	  (vide	  UNISDR,	  2013).	  Both	  the	  Red	  Cross	  and	  Red	  Crescent	  Movement	  and	  Oxfam	  International	  have	  also	  adopted	  the	  UN’s	  Hyogo	  Framework	  for	  Action	  (HFA,	  2005),	  to	  guide	  their	  work454.	  Indeed,	  the	  IFRC	  has	  recently	  published	  a	  guide	  to	  global	  disaster	  risk	  advocacy	  in	  which	  it	  unequivocally	  asserts):	  ‘The	  art	  of	  advocacy	  lies	  in	  persuasion,	  not	  confrontation’	  (Red	  Cross,	  2012c:12).	  	  	  In	  accordance	  with	  the	  ontological	  and	  epistemological	  underpinnings	  of	  the	  thesis,	  which	  asserts	  the	  imperative	  to	  examine	  how	  the	  parts	  of	  a	  complex	  open	  system	  interact	  and	  not	  how	  they	  act	  taken	  separately	  (as	  advised	  by	  Ackoff,	  1999:9;	  Meadows,	  2009:13-­‐14,	  et	  al),	  the	  quality	  of	  GI’s	  interface	  with	  the	  UN	  is	  regarded	  in	  this	  thesis	  as	  having	  a	  critical	  bearing	  on	  its	  effectiveness	  in	  influencing	  policy	  discourses	  in	  the	  international	  arena	  (i.e.	  the	  inter-­‐relational	  problem	  space	  of	  this	  study).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
451	  This	  international	  treaty,	  to	  which	  195	  countries	  are	  a	  party,	  was	  agreed	  on	  at	  the	  2009	  climate	  
summit	  in	  Copenhagen,	  to	  set	  general	  international	  goals	  and	  rules	  for	  tackling	  climate	  change	  (Red	  
Cross,	  2012c).	  
452	  The	  International	  Federation	  of	  Red	  Cross	  and	  Red	  Crescent	  Societies	  (IFRC),	  commonly	  known	  as	  
either	  The	  Red	  Cross	  or	  the	  Red	  Cross	  and	  Red	  Crescent	  Movement,	  is	  the	  world's	  largest	  humanitarian	  
network,	  reaching	  150	  million	  people	  in	  187	  National	  Societies	  through	  the	  work	  of	  over	  13	  million	  
volunteers	  (Red	  Cross	  data	  (2012d).	  
453	  Participants’	  lists	  for	  the	  biennial	  Global	  Platform	  for	  Disaster	  Risk	  Reduction	  conferences	  (2007,	  
2009,	  2011	  and	  2013)	  are	  available	  on	  the	  UNISDR	  Website	  (UNISDR,	  2013).	  
454	  The	  Hyogo	  Framework	  for	  Action	  2005-­‐2015:	  Building	  the	  Resilience	  of	  Nations	  and	  Communities	  to	  
Disasters	  is	  the	  UN	  Member	  States’	  key	  blueprint	  for	  worldwide	  collaborative	  efforts	  to	  reduce	  the	  
vulnerabilities	  of	  nations	  and	  communities	  to	  extreme	  hazards	  that	  threaten	  lives	  and	  development	  
gains	  (HFA,	  2005).	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  If	  one	  were	  examining	  here	  only	  GI’s	  relations	  with	  other	  specific	  units	  within	  the	  international	  system,	  such	  as	  individual	  governments	  and	  political	  leaders,	  an	  uneven	  and	  extremely	  limited	  picture	  would	  necessarily	  emerge	  that	  could	  tell	  us	  little	  about	  GI’s	  effectiveness	  in	  influencing	  policy	  transformation	  within	  the	  wider	  sphere	  of	  international	  political	  processes.	  Separate	  studies	  would	  be	  required	  to	  try	  to	  untangle	  the	  particular	  intersectionalities	  of	  the	  actors	  and	  gauge	  individual,	  unit-­‐level,	  contingencies	  and	  relationship	  qualities455.	  International	  meetings	  on	  the	  environment	  have	  tended	  to	  provide	  a	  suitable	  context	  for	  this	  analysis.	  	  	  In	  its	  most	  recent	  denouncement	  of	  the	  outcome	  of	  an	  international	  summit	  conference456,	  Greenpeace	  castigated	  the	  multi-­‐national	  Arctic	  Council’s	  ministerial	  meeting	  of	  Foreign	  Ministers	  for	  what	  GI	  claimed	  was	  the	  forum’s	  overriding	  failure	  to	  achieve	  any	  ‘concrete’	  progress,	  listening	  only	  to	  the	  ‘rich	  and	  powerful’	  and	  being	  ‘in	  the	  thrall	  of	  business	  interests’	  (GI	  news,	  2013b).	  The	  rhetoric	  of	  GI’s	  statement	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  its	  condemnation	  of	  world	  leaders	  after	  the	  UN’s	  Rio	  +20	  process	  in	  2012,	  when	  GI	  rebuked	  heads-­‐of-­‐state,	  as	  a	  group,	  for	  ‘shamefully	  putting	  private	  profit	  before	  people	  and	  the	  planet’	  (GI	  news,	  2012b).	  Evidently,	  this	  latest	  protest	  statement,	  issued	  by	  Greenpeace,	  is	  a	  reliable	  reflection	  of	  GI’s	  current	  corporate	  stance	  on	  international	  dialectical	  practices,	  as	  well	  as	  GI’s	  current	  issue-­‐construction	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  international	  measures	  to	  protect	  the	  Arctic	  environment.	  It	  should	  be	  noted,	  however,	  that	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  GI	  statement	  is	  at	  considerable	  variance	  with	  documentation	  on	  the	  composition457	  of	  the	  Arctic	  Council	  and	  its	  work,	  reports	  on	  the	  relevant	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
455	  To	  illustrate	  this	  point,	  one	  could	  examine	  the	  recent	  meeting	  between	  the	  President	  of	  Indonesia	  
and	  GI’s	  CEO	  (Naidoo),	  aboard	  the	  Rainbow	  Warrior	  III,	  in	  Jakarta.	  This	  encounter	  was	  reportedly	  
characterised	  by	  a	  new	  and	  unprecedented	  spirit	  of	  bonhomie	  in	  the	  relationship	  and	  mutually	  
supportive	  publicity	  statements	  were	  issued.	  Whatever	  the	  underlying	  contingent	  circumstances	  that	  
led	  to	  this	  conciliatory	  meeting	  at	  this	  time,	  it	  was	  a	  far	  cry	  from	  the	  country’s	  past	  pattern	  of	  
harassment	  of	  Greenpeace	  activists	  (GI	  news,	  2013a;	  Jakarta	  Post	  2013).	  	  	  
Such	  a	  relatively	  dramatic	  thaw	  in	  GI’s	  bilateral	  relationship	  with	  a	  specific	  country	  leader,	  however,	  
contrasts	  strikingly	  with	  GI’s	  on-­‐going,	  outspoken,	  criticism	  of	  national	  leaders	  and	  officials,	  collectively,	  
over	  their	  deliberative	  processes	  and	  stewardship	  of	  the	  Earth’s	  resources.	  Therefore,	  the	  analytical	  
framework	  for	  this	  problem	  space	  must	  be	  capable	  of	  encompassing	  the	  ontology	  of	  the	  processes,	  
practices	  and	  interrelationships	  that	  have	  emerged	  from	  Greenpeace	  relations	  with	  a	  plurality	  of	  states,	  
considered	  collectively	  at	  cluster	  and/or	  system	  level.	  
456	  Held	  in	  Kiruna,	  Sweden	  in	  May	  2013	  (Arctic	  Council,	  2013b).	  
457	  The	  Arctic	  Council	  is	  composed	  of	  eight	  Member	  States	  and	  six	  Permanent	  Participants,	  the	  latter	  
being	  leading	  Arctic	  indigenous	  peoples’	  organisations	  with	  full	  consultation	  rights	  in	  the	  Council	  	  (Arctic	  
Council,	  2012;	  2013d).	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stakeholders	  and	  indigenous	  interest	  groups	  participating	  in	  the	  negotiating	  process,	  and	  the	  material	  decisions	  and	  workplans	  prescribed	  in	  the	  Arctic	  Council’s	  meeting	  outcome	  document,	  Vision	  for	  the	  Arctic458	  (Arctic	  Council,	  2013b;	  2013c).	  	  	  To	  say	  the	  international	  joint	  agreement	  does	  not	  go	  far	  enough,	  or	  fast	  enough	  in	  specific	  areas,	  might	  be	  considered	  fair	  comment	  in	  some	  quarters.	  But	  the	  Greenpeace	  message	  states	  unequivocally,	  and	  evidently	  incorrectly,	  that	  important	  voices	  ‘of	  those	  most	  affected’	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  deliberations	  and	  scientific	  evidence	  was	  routinely	  and	  perversely	  ignored.	  It	  further	  states	  that	  the	  meeting	  concluded	  with	  ‘no	  plans	  for	  binding	  international	  agreements	  to	  regulate	  black	  carbon	  emissions	  or	  curb	  the	  Arctic	  oil	  rush’,	  disregarding	  (a)	  the	  purposes	  and	  constitutional	  powers	  of	  the	  Arctic	  Council;	  (b)	  the	  impossibility	  that	  this	  forum,	  let	  alone	  one	  of	  its	  biennial	  ministerial	  meetings,	  could	  produce	  binding	  international	  treaties	  on	  these	  thorny	  issues;	  and	  (c)	  the	  complex	  reality	  of	  international	  politics.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  record,	  the	  high-­‐level	  meeting	  was	  attended	  by	  approximately	  300	  ministers,	  delegates	  from	  eight	  Arctic	  states,	  official	  representatives	  from	  12	  non-­‐Arctic	  countries,	  representatives	  of	  indigenous	  peoples,	  scientists,	  nine	  inter-­‐governmental	  and	  inter-­‐parliamentary	  organisations	  and	  11	  NGOs	  designated	  as	  formally-­‐accredited	  ‘Observers’459	  (Arctic	  Council,	  2013a,	  2013b,	  2013c).	  Greenpeace	  International	  was	  not	  one	  of	  them.	  A	  notable	  inclusion	  was	  the	  NGO,	  World	  Wide	  Fund	  for	  Nature	  (Global	  Arctic	  Program),	  which	  was	  one	  of	  the	  11	  NGOs	  accorded	  Observer	  status	  at	  the	  meeting.	  The	  WWF,	  with	  over	  five	  million	  supporters	  worldwide	  and	  a	  global	  network	  active	  in	  over	  100	  countries,	  including	  offices	  in	  Arctic	  countries,	  has	  campaigned	  to	  safeguard	  the	  Arctic	  environment	  since	  1992,	  working	  in	  close	  co-­‐operation	  with	  the	  Arctic	  Council,	  the	  UN,	  World	  Bank	  and	  other	  international	  institutions	  (WWF-­‐Int,	  2013).	  	  Although	  Greenpeace	  is	  clearly	  wrong	  in	  asserting	  that	  world	  leaders,	  governments	  and	  politicians	  do	  not	  listen	  to	  scientific	  arguments	  and	  do	  not	  treat	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458	  This	  latter	  document,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  multi-­‐national	  joint	  agreement,	  was	  described	  by	  the	  Swedish	  
foreign	  minister	  as:	  […]	  ‘a	  vision	  statement	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Arctic,	  shared	  by	  the	  Arctic	  states	  and	  
the	  indigenous	  peoples.	  This	  sends	  an	  important	  signal	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world’.	  	  
459	  The	  accredited	  Observers	  were	  groups	  that	  the	  Council	  determined	  could	  ‘contribute	  to	  its	  work’.	  
They	  included	  the	  official	  representatives	  from	  12	  non-­‐Arctic	  countries,	  scientists,	  nine	  inter-­‐
governmental	  and	  inter-­‐parliamentary	  organisations	  and	  the	  11	  NGOs	  (Arctic	  Council,	  2013).	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climate	  change	  and	  environmental	  degradation	  with	  seriousness	  and	  effort,	  Greenpeace	  appears	  to	  be	  correct	  in	  stating	  that	  it	  is	  finding	  it	  harder	  to	  gain	  the	  attention	  of	  international	  policymakers	  and	  that	  they	  are	  not	  listening	  to	  Greenpeace’s	  arguments.	  	  	  	  	  
7.6	  Summary	  This	  chapter	  has	  shown	  that	  GI	  conspicuously	  embodies	  all	  eight	  referent	  criteria	  for	  an	  archetypal	  TAN	  and	  is	  an	  element	  in	  the	  international	  system460.	  Its	  UN	  consultancy	  role,	  or	  function,	  possesses	  considerable	  analytical	  value,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  GI’s	  frequent	  negative	  statements	  regarding	  its	  inter-­‐relationships	  and	  perceived	  lack	  of	  influence	  in	  the	  international	  fora.	  The	  conclusion	  arising	  from	  this	  pattern	  is	  that	  GI’s	  place	  in	  the	  international	  system	  is	  in	  a	  constant	  state	  of	  flux461	  and	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  fluctuate	  in	  relation	  to	  GI’s	  adaptations	  to:	  (i)	  its	  role	  and	  value	  to	  other	  sub-­‐elements	  of	  the	  system	  (such	  as	  allies	  who	  facilitate	  its	  activity	  and	  opponents	  who	  restrict	  it);	  (ii)	  perceptions	  of	  its	  role,	  reputation462	  and	  the	  value	  it	  derives	  from	  the	  system;	  and	  (iii)	  its	  contribution	  to	  the	  collectively-­‐determined	  purposes,	  joint	  agreements	  and	  continuing	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  overall	  system	  (H1,H2	  ,H3)463.	  Consequently,	  GI’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
460	  Although	  Greenpeace	  arguably	  began	  to	  interact	  with	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system	  in	  the	  
early	  1970s,	  in	  its	  composition	  (mostly	  Canadians	  and	  Americans)	  and	  focus	  on	  U.S.	  nuclear	  policy,	  it	  
was	  predominantly	  a	  North	  American	  organisation.	  By	  1975,	  the	  group	  was	  opposing	  the	  French	  
government’s	  atmospheric	  nuclear	  testing	  in	  the	  South	  Pacific	  and	  had	  launched	  its	  anti-­‐whaling	  
campaign	  and	  begun	  to	  physically	  confront	  international	  whaling	  fleets	  on	  the	  high	  seas	  and	  lobby	  the	  
International	  Whaling	  Commission.	  It	  could	  then	  be	  said	  to	  have	  established	  ad	  hoc	  associations	  with	  
elements	  of	  the	  international	  system,	  rather	  than	  a	  place	  in	  the	  system,	  and	  that	  it	  was	  functioning	  in	  
the	  system	  as	  a	  supplier	  of	  information	  and	  sometime	  lobbying	  ally	  and	  publicist,	  especially	  in	  the	  
international	  anti-­‐nuclear	  campaign.	  	  
461	  This	  observation	  regarding	  the	  analytical	  value	  of	  complexity	  perspectives	  and	  the	  constant	  
fluctuation	  of	  interacting	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system	  was	  also	  noted	  by	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden	  
(2011:64).	  
462	  For	  example,	  the	  commentaries	  on	  the	  Brent	  Spar	  protest	  action	  showed	  that	  Greenpeace’s	  
international	  reputational	  capital	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  fluctuations	  in	  perception,	  therefore	  affecting	  its	  
standing.	  
463	  H1:	  Contemporary	  TANs	  are	  an	  important	  NGO	  variant	  in	  international	  politics	  that	  have	  
unprecedented	  properties	  and	  powers	  emerging	  from	  their	  advocacy	  communications,	  which	  are	  
typically	  neglected	  in	  politics	  theorising.	  
H2:	  The	  international	  system	  is	  struggling	  to	  accommodate	  TANs	  and	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  
institutions	  have	  a	  distinctively	  troubled	  interface	  with	  modern	  TAN-­‐type	  NGOs.	  
H3:	  The	  adversarial	  advocacy	  strategies	  typically	  adopted	  by	  TANs	  constitute	  a	  barrier	  to	  them	  achieving	  
their	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  policy-­‐making	  environment.	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function	  in	  the	  international	  system	  is	  constantly	  shaped,	  inter	  alia,	  by	  its	  interactions	  with	  other	  sub-­‐elements	  in	  the	  system	  (H4)464.	  	  	  The	  study	  found	  no	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  Greenpeace	  key	  claim	  that	  world	  leaders	  and	  the	  international	  world	  are	  ‘sleepwalking’	  into	  global	  catastrophe	  and	  doing	  little	  to	  find	  answers	  to	  the	  world’s	  intractable	  ecological	  challenges.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  evidence	  of	  intensive	  efforts	  and	  concerns,	  the	  contradictory	  Greenpeace	  message	  framing	  appears	  likely	  to	  strengthen	  barriers	  to	  the	  TAN’s	  international	  influence-­‐brokering	  and	  goal	  attainment	  (H1,	  H2	  ,	  H3	  ).	  	  	  Greenpeace’s	  ongoing	  condemnations	  of	  state	  actors	  and	  international	  fora,	  and	  calls	  for	  mass	  civil	  disobedience,	  are	  arguably	  at	  variance	  with	  at	  least	  four	  of	  the	  undertakings	  it	  made	  to	  secure	  NGO	  consultancy	  accreditation	  to	  the	  UN	  in	  1998	  (H2	  ,	  H3).	  In	  its	  recent	  announcement	  to	  prioritise	  the	  fostering	  of	  Internet-­‐enabled	  activism	  and	  ‘people	  power’465,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  Greenpeace	  elides	  the	  notions	  of	  ‘collectivity’	  and	  ‘connectivity’	  in	  estimating	  the	  potential	  of	  Internet-­‐enabled	  activism	  and	  the	  possible	  mobilisation	  of	  ‘people	  power’	  (H1,	  H3).	  	  The	  study	  found	  that	  Greenpeace	  has	  developed	  a	  distinctive	  style	  of	  interpreting	  and	  framing	  complex	  global	  environmental	  and	  political	  issues	  according	  to	  a	  narrow	  set	  of	  campaign	  issue	  areas,	  which	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  developed	  to	  suit	  its	  organisational	  capabilities.	  The	  subject	  matter	  within	  those	  categories	  has	  been	  typically	  framed	  by	  GI	  in	  emotive	  language.	  This	  tends	  to	  produce	  publicity	  outputs	  containing	  oversimplified	  personal	  viewpoints;	  linear	  snapshots	  of	  complex	  problems;	  popular	  assumptions,	  often	  employing	  stereotypes	  and	  humour466.	  There	  is	  a	  high	  incidence	  of	  human-­‐interest	  detail,	  often	  involving	  anthropomorphised	  wild	  animals467.	  However,	  a	  fundamental	  consideration	  in	  communication	  praxis	  is	  that	  intended	  audiences	  need	  to	  be	  accurately	  identified	  and	  the	  issues	  framed	  for	  those	  audiences	  in	  ways	  that	  resonate	  with	  different	  degrees	  of	  expertise,	  information	  needs,	  and	  resistance.	  There	  was	  no	  evidence	  of	  either	  unqualified	  representation	  or	  information	  shortage	  within	  the	  international	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464	  H4:	  A	  complex	  realist	  approach	  has	  exemplary	  merit	  in	  approaching	  the	  subject	  area	  and	  primary	  
research	  question	  of	  the	  thesis.	  
465	  GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2012:40-­‐41	  
466	  This	  tactic	  is	  described	  by	  Wyler	  and	  Naidoo	  (GI	  Naidoo,	  2011;	  GI	  News,	  2004c).	  
467	  This	  tactic	  is	  demonstrated	  in	  Figure	  7.4	  and	  in	  the	  strategic	  deployment	  of	  the	  huge	  papier-­‐mâché	  
polar	  bear	  described	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter.	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decision-­‐making	  sphere	  (H1,	  H2,	  H3).	  On	  the	  contrary,	  Keohane	  and	  Nye	  referred	  to	  the	  surfeit	  of	  information	  at	  that	  level	  as	  torrents	  of	  ‘white	  noise’	  and	  consequent	  ‘gridlock’468.	  	  There	  was	  no	  clear	  evidence	  that	  the	  trademark	  ‘Greenpeace	  action’	  of	  creative	  confrontation	  is	  effective	  in	  matters	  impinging	  on	  a	  nation	  state’s	  security	  and	  macro-­‐economic	  issues	  (H3).	  	  	  For	  over	  40	  years,	  Greenpeace	  has	  developed	  and	  maintained	  a	  sector-­‐leading	  brand	  presence	  in	  the	  advocacy	  NGO	  sector,	  using	  the	  newest	  ideas	  and	  most	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  communications	  and	  brand	  marketing	  techniques	  and	  technologies.	  Today,	  we	  see	  a	  large-­‐scale	  decentralisation	  of	  resources	  and,	  arguably,	  degrees	  of	  strategy	  incoherence	  and	  decreasing	  effectiveness	  in	  which	  the	  numerous	  Greenpeace	  branded	  campaigns	  appear	  to	  compete	  with	  each	  other,	  and	  with	  other	  environmental	  TANs,	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  capacity	  to	  mount	  attention-­‐grabbing	  spectacles	  and	  secure	  resources.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  crowded,	  competitive,	  world	  of	  environmental	  politics,	  Greenpeace	  claims	  of	  effectiveness	  and	  conclusive	  victories	  for	  its	  confrontational	  activism	  model	  cannot	  be	  validated	  (H4).	  	  A	  growing	  body	  of	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  the	  formulaic	  ‘Greenpeace	  action’	  model	  of	  protest	  has	  become	  less	  effective	  as	  a	  news-­‐making	  strategy	  —	  a	  casualty	  of	  its	  own	  renowned	  success	  —	  and	  lacks	  novelty	  and	  impact.	  The	  political	  protest	  landscape,	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  complex	  interaction,	  is	  now	  crowded	  with	  later	  models	  of	  activism	  based	  on	  the	  Greenpeace	  prototype	  (H4).	  Yet	  Greenpeace	  continues	  to	  apply	  this	  locked-­‐in	  strategy,	  developed	  for	  a	  different	  media	  environment	  over	  40	  years	  ago,	  which	  arguably	  failed	  to	  achieve	  the	  intended	  aims	  then	  and,	  the	  organisation’s	  CEO	  admits,	  is	  not	  forcing	  the	  desired	  responses	  from	  the	  international	  system	  now	  (GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2012:4).	  	  	  Strong	  support	  was	  found	  for	  Wittner’s	  theory469	  that	  when	  faced	  with	  an	  impenetrable	  barrier	  to	  aim-­‐achievement	  in	  the	  international	  arena,	  some	  activists	  have	  shown	  a	  pattern	  of	  developing	  systemic	  analyses	  and	  fighting	  side	  battles	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
468	  See	  Keohane	  and	  Nye	  (1988:89).	  
469	  See	  section	  7.6.2	  and	  Wittner	  (1997:462).	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instead	  (H4)470.	  Similar	  outcomes	  were	  seen	  in	  GI’s	  gravitation	  towards	  ‘adjacent	  possible’	  opportunities	  to	  campaign	  against	  nuclear	  energy	  producers	  and,	  additionally,	  to	  battling	  climate	  change	  via	  vigorous	  campaigns	  aimed	  at	  shaming	  leading	  commercial	  brands	  for	  allegedly	  harming	  the	  environment.	  It	  was	  observed	  that	  all	  of	  the	  campaigns	  against	  prominent	  corporations	  —	  negatively	  framed	  as	  Goliaths	  and	  ‘business	  elites’	  —	  showed	  the	  discursive	  emblems	  of	  an	  underlying	  anti-­‐capitalist	  agenda:	  the	  populist	  rhetoric,	  arguably,	  indicative	  of	  a	  NIEO	  revivalist	  vision.	  	  Strong	  corroboration	  was	  found	  for	  the	  hypothesis	  (H5)	  that	  the	  funding	  model	  Greenpeace	  has	  adopted	  to	  finance	  its	  operations	  has	  a	  deterministic	  influence	  on	  the	  communications	  strategies	  it	  selects;	  and	  that	  this,	  in	  turn,	  has	  a	  critical	  bearing	  on	  this	  TAN’s	  place	  and	  function	  in	  the	  international	  system	  and	  on	  its	  effectiveness	  in	  achieving	  its	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  In	  stark	  terms,	  the	  high	  visibility	  self-­‐promotion471	  and	  adversarial	  rhetoric	  that	  Greenpeace	  invariably	  adopts	  in	  its	  public	  advocacy	  regarding	  the	  UN,	  and	  other	  international	  actors,	  is	  undoubtedly	  effective	  in	  resonating	  with	  diverse	  audiences	  in	  the	  news	  media,	  donors	  and	  supporters	  (H1,	  H2,	  H3).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  clearly	  indicative	  of	  poor	  relationship	  quality472	  with	  international	  system	  counterparts.	  In	  probing	  why	  this	  might	  be	  so,	  the	  study	  found	  wide	  contrasts	  between	  the	  relative	  unaccountability	  of	  Greenpeace	  in	  its	  trademark	  framing	  of	  global	  challenges,	  repetitive	  argumentation	  and	  pressure	  tactics,	  and	  the	  mature,	  ordered	  and	  institutionalised	  deliberative	  processes	  of	  contemporary	  international	  engagement	  (H1,	  H2,	  H3).	  	  	  	  There	  is	  clear	  evidence	  in	  numerous	  statements	  by	  the	  CEO,	  that	  Greenpeace	  does	  not	  consider	  itself	  to	  be	  effective	  in	  achieving	  its	  aims	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system.	  Naidoo’s	  ‘Message’473	  that	  ‘We	  are	  winning	  battles,	  but	  losing	  the	  planet’,	  is	  apposite,	  given	  that	  Greenpeace	  declares	  its	  main	  purpose	  is	  ‘to	  ensure	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  earth	  to	  nurture	  life	  […]’.	  I	  argue,	  therefore,	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
470	  Insights	  by	  Tufekci	  and	  Kriess	  (2012)	  regarding	  some	  activist	  tendencies	  to	  mistake	  the	  movement	  
itself	  to	  be	  the	  goal,	  rather	  than	  the	  means	  to	  pursue	  the	  movement’s	  goals,	  are	  relevant.	  
471	  See	  Section	  7.2.2	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Greenpeace	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  prioritise	  
self-­‐promotion	  in	  its	  advocacy.	  
472	  Communications	  theory	  relating	  to	  the	  components	  of	  relationship	  quality	  is	  discussed	  in	  Section	  
3.4.3.	  
473	  GI	  Annual	  Report,	  2012:4.	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Chapter	  8	  	  
	  
8.	  Oxfam	  International	  	  	  	  
Bear	  ye	  one	  another’s	  burdens,	  
and	  so	  fulfill	  the	  law	  of	  Christ.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Galatians	  6:2,	  The	  Bible	  (1957)	  	  
	  
	  
8.1	  	  	  Introduction	  Oxfam	  International	  (OI)	  exhibits	  the	  characteristics	  not	  only	  of	  an	  iconic	  TAN,	  but	  as	  this	  chapter	  shows,	  might	  be	  usefully	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  ‘mega-­‐TAN’.	  It	  is	  both	  older	  and	  larger	  (in	  terms	  of	  funding	  and	  global	  network	  reach)	  than	  either	  of	  the	  other	  two	  TANs	  examined.	  Oxfam’s	  embodiment	  of	  contemporaneous	  political	  activist	  concerns	  in	  the	  international	  arena	  over	  the	  past	  70	  years	  makes	  it	  ideally-­‐suited	  to	  a	  study	  of	  TANs	  and	  their	  interface	  with	  the	  international	  system.	  Amid	  the	  tumultuous	  events	  of	  the	  past	  we	  see	  that	  Oxfam’s	  track	  record	  is	  also	  a	  story	  of	  complex	  systemic	  intersectionality:	  of	  fitness	  landscapes	  traversed	  and	  survived,	  of	  emergence,	  co-­‐evolution,	  adaptation	  and	  growth474.	  Today,	  Oxfam	  is	  a	  confederation	  of	  17	  organisations	  networked	  together	  and	  operating	  in	  94	  countries.	  It	  has	  10,	  230	  staff	  and	  over	  47,000	  volunteers,	  35,000	  of	  whom	  are	  involved	  in	  running	  Oxfam’s	  signature	  charity	  shops	  (OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2011-­‐12:5,	  46,	  56;	  BBC	  news,	  2002).	  	  The	  chapter	  outlines	  Oxfam’s	  identity	  and	  aims,	  the	  socio-­‐historical	  context	  in	  which	  it	  emerged	  and	  developed,	  key	  milestones	  and	  the	  strategic	  choices	  that	  have	  shaped	  its	  trajectory.	  I	  then	  show	  how	  complex	  realism	  aids	  explanation	  of	  the	  PRQ	  and	  hypotheses.	  I	  introduce	  theoretical	  prisms	  from	  the	  politics	  and	  communications	  paradigms	  to	  show	  the	  alignments	  between	  Oxfam’s	  political	  aims	  and	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  strategies	  it	  chooses	  to	  achieve	  them.	  The	  focus	  on	  communications	  strategies	  also	  helps	  to	  conceptually	  disengage	  Oxfam’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
474	  See	  Section	  8.4.2	  for	  an	  independent	  observation	  of	  Oxfam’s	  co-­‐evolutionary	  behaviour	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  Oxfam’s	  interface	  with	  the	  World	  Bank.	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predominant	  advocacy	  function475	  from	  other	  aspects	  of	  its	  operations.	  This	  was	  a	  crucial	  methodological	  step	  in	  the	  study	  of	  Oxfam.	  Such	  a	  separation	  of	  operational	  functions	  was	  not	  necessary	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  in	  studying	  Greenpeace,	  which	  defines	  itself	  primarily	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  high-­‐profile	  (‘creative	  confrontation’)	  advocacy	  function,	  thereby	  making	  the	  prominent	  story	  of	  its	  advocacy	  seemingly	  more	  uni-­‐dimensional	  and	  easier	  to	  tell.	  	  This	  chapter	  progresses	  the	  thesis	  by	  closely	  examining	  the	  contexts	  in	  which	  Oxfam	  has	  engaged	  with	  the	  international	  system	  and	  has,	  I	  suggest,	  co-­‐evolved	  with	  it,	  gradually	  adapting	  to	  changing	  circumstances	  and	  developing	  the	  characteristics	  of	  an	  archetypal	  TAN.	  	  	  As	  will	  be	  shown,	  Oxfam	  tackles	  its	  complex	  objectives	  using	  a	  range	  of	  operational	  strategies	  on	  multiple	  fronts.	  Thus,	  OI’s	  strategic	  arsenal	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  include	  all	  of	  the	  following	  activities476:	  political	  diplomacy,	  formal	  lobbying	  and	  informal	  influence	  brokering,	  scientific	  research	  and	  knowledge-­‐sharing,	  humanitarian	  crisis	  response	  capability,	  development	  aid	  and	  field	  support,	  coalition	  and	  stakeholder	  relations,	  media	  relations,	  public	  outreach	  and	  information,	  public	  and	  institutional	  fund-­‐raising	  and	  fund	  disbursement.	  What	  Oxfam’s	  characteristic	  patterns	  of	  adaptation	  and	  effectiveness	  might	  mean	  for	  this	  organisation	  and	  other	  TANs,	  are	  questions	  that	  I	  suggest	  can	  be	  approached	  more	  constructively	  after	  examining	  the	  path	  travelled	  by	  Oxfam.	  	  	  
8.2	  Identity	  and	  Aims	  Oxfam,	  while	  allocating	  the	  largest	  portion	  of	  its	  budget	  to	  advocacy	  and	  campaigning	  and	  placing	  ‘advocacy’	  at	  the	  top	  of	  its	  list	  of	  primary	  activities	  (OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2010-­‐11:62;	  OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2011-­‐12:67),	  does	  not	  primarily	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
475	  Oxfam	  International’s	  Secretariat	  allocated	  some	  38%	  (£3.2m)	  of	  its	  expenditure	  to	  advocacy	  and	  
campaigning	  in	  the	  2010-­‐11	  reporting	  period	  and	  35%	  (£3.5m)	  in	  2011-­‐12.	  This	  was	  by	  far	  the	  largest,	  
single,	  category	  of	  OI’s	  total	  expenditure	  in	  both	  financial	  years.	  As	  the	  Secretariat’s	  main	  base	  of	  
operation	  is	  in	  the	  UK,	  its	  reporting	  currency	  is	  in	  GBP	  (OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2010-­‐11:48;	  OI	  Annual	  Report,	  
2011-­‐12:54).	  	  
476	  These	  functions	  were	  identified,	  by	  me,	  via	  an	  external	  communications	  audit	  of	  Oxfam’s	  advocacy	  
communications	  performance.	  The	  list	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  range	  of	  advocacy	  functions	  rather	  than	  an	  
attempt	  to	  be	  exhaustive.	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identify	  itself	  as	  a	  TAN,	  as	  yet477,	  and	  its	  several	  operational	  functions	  overlap	  each	  other	  —	  necessitating	  a	  temporary	  repression	  (or	  bracketing	  out)	  of	  some	  of	  Oxfam’s	  well-­‐known	  humanitarian	  and	  charitable	  activities	  in	  order	  to	  place	  a	  specific	  analytical	  focus	  on	  its	  advocacy	  function.	  Asked	  ‘What	  is	  Oxfam?’	  the	  popular	  response	  in	  the	  UK	  would	  very	  likely	  contain	  references	  to	  its	  operation	  of	  charity	  shops	  and	  fundraising	  for	  overseas	  disaster	  relief,	  particularly	  as	  these	  traditional	  activities	  of	  the	  group	  are	  highlighted	  in	  Oxfam	  GB’s	  publicity	  materials	  and	  Website	  (Oxfam	  GB,	  2012a).	  However,	  the	  strategy	  underlying	  Oxfam’s	  corporate	  identity	  construction,	  political	  ideological	  cues,	  commercial	  marketing	  tactics478	  and	  public	  relations	  activity	  —	  which	  prompt	  audiences	  to	  form	  these	  perceptions	  —	  is	  the	  critical,	  but	  easily	  overlooked,	  work	  of	  its	  dominant	  advocacy	  function479.	  	  Oxfam	  began	  without	  pretension	  in	  1942.	  A	  small	  group	  of	  citizens	  in	  Oxford,	  UK,	  met	  to	  discuss	  their	  concern	  over	  the	  starvation	  pervading	  Europe	  as	  a	  result	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  They	  included	  a	  successful	  Quaker	  businessman,	  Cecil	  Jackson-­‐Cole,	  who	  was	  to	  become	  the	  group’s	  Secretary	  and	  spearhead	  the	  novel	  introduction	  of	  sound	  business	  practices	  to	  the	  charity	  sector,	  launch	  the	  first	  Oxfam	  shop	  in	  1947,	  and	  steer	  Oxfam’s	  growth	  and	  expansion	  as	  a	  global	  charity	  	  (Oxfordshire	  data,	  2012).	  These	  founders	  subscribed	  to	  the	  ‘internationalist’	  ideology	  that	  had	  underlain	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  and,	  in	  Britain,	  in	  the	  1920s	  and	  1930s,	  a	  number	  of	  movements	  and	  societies	  dedicated	  to	  brotherhood	  and	  peace.	  As	  such,	  they	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
477	  My	  argument	  that	  Oxfam	  appears	  to	  be	  in	  the	  process	  of	  becoming	  an	  ever	  more	  advocacy-­‐focused	  
organisation,	  especially	  one	  promoting	  digital	  activism,	  is	  elaborated	  in	  Section	  8.4.2	  and	  the	  Outcomes	  
analysis	  in	  Section	  8.5.	  
478	  This	  thesis	  this	  argues	  that	  it	  was	  Oxfam’s	  inspired	  founding	  and	  ‘ownership’	  of	  the	  charity	  shop	  
sector	  for	  many	  decades	  that	  has	  sustained	  its	  high-­‐recognition	  levels	  and	  widespread	  reputation	  as	  a	  
global	  doer-­‐of-­‐good-­‐deeds.	  A	  major	  factor	  in	  this	  was	  undoubtedly	  the	  marketing	  ability	  to	  bring	  
international	  crises	  into	  domestic	  High	  Streets	  by	  providing	  ordinary	  people	  with	  a	  simple,	  practical	  and	  
affordable	  opportunity	  to	  express	  solidarity	  and	  kindheartedness	  to	  more	  needy	  souls	  in	  crisis	  situations	  
overseas	  —	  albeit	  combined	  with	  a	  convenient	  way	  for	  them	  to	  offload	  their	  unwanted	  clothes	  and	  
household	  paraphernalia.	  This	  forging	  of	  a	  cognitive	  link	  (or	  schema)	  between	  relatively	  low-­‐cost	  
opportunities	  to	  help	  others	  and	  relatively	  high	  satisfaction	  rewards	  was	  to	  prove	  a	  winning	  formula	  for	  
recognition	  and	  fundraising	  that	  continues	  to	  this	  day.	  	  
479	  The	  methodological	  steps	  that	  I	  have	  taken	  to	  identify	  the	  more	  influential	  underlying	  structures	  and	  
generative	  mechanisms	  for	  the	  observed	  social	  phenomena	  follow	  the	  critical	  realist	  philosophy	  and	  
methodology	  recommended	  by	  Bhaskar	  (2011:2-­‐4).	  Accordingly,	  the	  temporary	  bracketing-­‐out	  of	  some	  
Oxfam	  functions	  and	  activities	  that	  are	  not	  recognisably	  involved	  in	  advocacy	  is	  merely	  one	  analytical	  
prism	  amongst	  several	  that	  I	  use	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  inter-­‐relational	  reality	  of	  Oxfam’s	  connections	  
with	  the	  international	  institutional	  system.	  This	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  as	  showing	  an	  exclusionary	  
favouritism	  for	  either	  deconstruction	  or	  discourse	  analysis,	  above	  the	  other	  methodological	  tactics	  used	  
to	  ‘get	  at’	  the	  underlying	  structures.	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were	  appalled	  by	  the	  brutality	  and	  hatred	  that	  Hitler	  had	  unleashed	  across	  Europe,	  and	  were	  concerned	  about	  the	  consequent	  suffering	  inflicted	  on	  innocent	  civilians	  (Black,	  1992:	  1)480.	  Calling	  themselves	  the	  Oxford	  Committee	  for	  Famine	  Relief,	  they	  campaigned	  throughout	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  War	  for	  food	  supplies	  to	  be	  sent	  through	  an	  Allied	  naval	  blockade	  to	  starving	  women	  and	  children	  in	  enemy-­‐occupied	  Greece	  (OI	  data,	  2012a;	  Oxfam	  GB,	  2012a).	  	  	  Showing	  some	  parallels	  with	  the	  simple	  and	  unpropitious	  origins	  of	  Greenpeace,	  the	  original	  campaign	  aim	  to	  breach	  the	  blockade	  for	  famine	  relief	  was	  a	  failure.	  Resolutely	  opposed	  by	  the	  British	  government,	  the	  food	  aid	  was	  never	  allowed	  through	  the	  blockade.	  Nevertheless,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  the	  Oxford	  Committee’s	  publicity	  and	  charitable	  fund-­‐raising	  and	  support	  from	  eminent	  individuals	  in	  all	  walks	  of	  public	  life	  had	  attracted	  widespread	  attention.	  On	  closing	  its	  Greek	  Relief	  Fund	  in	  1945,	  with	  a	  then	  considerable	  balance	  of	  over	  £13,000481,	  the	  Committee	  resolved	  to	  enlarge	  its	  charitable	  objective	  to	  ‘the	  relief	  of	  suffering	  in	  consequence	  of	  war,’	  and	  press	  on	  with	  its	  work	  —	  holding	  firmly	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  	  ‘one	  humanity’.	  Amid	  the	  post-­‐war	  upheaval	  and	  hardships,	  Oxfam	  was	  born482	  (Black,	  
ibid:	  20-­‐21,	  24).	  	  
8.2.1	  Track	  record	  of	  emergence,	  adaptability,	  and	  pragmatism	  	  It	  can	  be	  deduced	  from	  Oxfam’s	  publicity	  materials	  and	  current	  Website483	  that	  Oxfam	  is	  at	  pains	  to	  project	  a	  sector-­‐leading	  image	  as	  an	  organisation	  that	  is	  continually	  striving	  to	  adapt	  and	  respond	  to	  changing	  conditions,	  whether	  natural	  or	  Man-­‐made,	  that	  bring	  suffering	  to	  people	  worldwide	  (OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2011-­‐12:5-­‐10;	  Oxfam	  GB	  Annual	  Report,	  2011;	  3;	  OI	  data,	  2012a;	  OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013).	  Unlike	  Greenpeace	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  which	  both	  assert	  their	  firm	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
480	  Arguably	  the	  most	  authoritative	  text	  on	  Oxfam,	  A	  Cause	  for	  our	  Times:	  Oxfam,	  the	  first	  50	  years,	  
(Black,	  1992),	  was	  a	  valuable	  source	  of	  facts	  and	  observations	  for	  this	  thesis.	  However,	  as	  its	  author,	  
Maggie	  Black,	  was	  a	  former	  Oxfam	  employee,	  the	  work	  could	  not	  be	  taken	  as	  entirely	  independent	  and	  
impartial.	  Nevertheless,	  Black’s	  careful	  attention	  to	  compiling	  Oxfam’s	  historical	  record,	  her	  intimate	  
knowledge,	  access	  to	  data	  sources	  and	  her	  obvious	  affection	  for	  the	  organisation,	  were	  invaluable	  in	  
providing	  authoritative,	  albeit	  secondary	  source,	  data	  for	  analysis.	  
481	  According	  to	  the	  UK	  National	  Archive	  currency	  converter,	  a	  sum	  of	  £13,000	  in	  1945	  would	  have	  had	  
an	  equivalent	  value	  of	  £337,350	  in	  2005—	  the	  last	  year	  in	  which	  the	  Archive’s	  currency	  converter	  was	  
updated	  (National	  Archive,	  2012).	  	  
482	  Despite	  its	  wider	  remit,	  the	  Oxford	  Committee	  kept	  its	  original	  name	  officially	  and	  did	  not	  formally	  
adopt	  the	  diminutive	  ‘Oxfam’	  until	  1965	  (Oxfam	  GB	  data,	  2012a).	  
483	  Oxfam	  International	  website	  at	  http://www.oxfam.org/.	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adherence	  to	  founding	  principles	  and	  ‘proven’	  methodologies484	  (GI	  data,	  2012;	  HRW	  Annual	  Report	  2011:24;	  HRW	  data,	  2012),	  Oxfam	  appears	  to	  celebrate	  its	  ability	  to	  morph	  over	  time	  in	  order	  to	  stay	  relevant	  to	  the	  task	  of	  relieving	  human	  suffering	  irrespective	  of	  context.	  	  	  A	  sense	  of	  this	  development	  and	  repositioning	  of	  organisational	  goalposts	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  a	  comparison	  of	  Oxfam’s	  stated	  aims	  over	  time.	  From	  the	  relief	  of	  suffering	  in	  one	  country	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  single	  war,	  in	  1942,	  the	  goal	  had	  been	  altered,	  by	  1945,	  to	  the	  relief	  of	  suffering	  caused	  by	  any	  wars.	  In	  1949,	  Oxfam’s	  objective	  was	  broadened	  to:	  ‘[T]he	  relief	  of	  suffering	  arising	  as	  a	  result	  of	  wars	  or	  of	  other	  causes	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world’	  (Black,	  ibid:	  37).	  After	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Oxfam	  International	  confederation	  in	  1995,	  the	  prime	  mandate	  485	  became	  ‘to	  relieve	  poverty,	  combat	  distress	  and	  alleviate	  suffering	  in	  any	  part	  of	  the	  world	  regardless	  of	  race,	  gender,	  creed	  or	  political	  convictions’	  (OI	  Constitution,	  2005).	  Today,	  Oxfam’s	  primary	  corporate	  aim	  is	  ‘finding	  lasting	  solutions	  to	  poverty	  and	  injustice’	  (OI	  data,	  2012a)486.	  
8.2.2	  People-­‐centred,	  rights-­‐based	  and	  ubiquitous	  	  While	  this	  globalised	  alliance	  bears	  only	  a	  passing	  resemblance	  to	  the	  Oxfam	  of	  earlier	  decades,	  it	  has	  adopted	  ‘Oxfam’	  as	  its	  primary	  brand	  and	  thereby	  is	  able	  to	  utilise	  all	  of	  the	  corporate	  capital,	  including	  brand	  identity	  and	  recognition,	  accumulated	  over	  the	  past	  70+	  years.	  OI	  lists	  its	  ‘[P]rimary	  activities’	  in	  the	  following	  order:	  ‘advocacy,	  social	  marketing,	  research,	  service	  provision,	  capacity	  building,	  humanitarian	  assistance,	  etc.’	  (OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2010-­‐11:62;	  OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2011-­‐12:67).	  Perhaps,	  the	  most	  useful	  indicator	  of	  Oxfam’s	  corporate	  worldview	  and	  intended	  purpose	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  its	  central	  commitment	  statement	  and	  performance	  pledge	  (OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2011-­‐12:5):	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
484	  Albeit,	  that	  both	  GI	  and	  HRW	  describe	  how	  they	  are	  broadening	  and	  deepening	  their	  mandates	  and	  
capabilities,	  literally	  doing	  more	  of	  the	  same	  but	  better,	  while	  remaining	  true	  to	  their	  original	  ethos.	  
485	  Paragraph	  (a)	  of	  Article	  2,	  Stichting	  Oxfam	  International	  Constitution.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  mandate,	  
covering	  paragraphs	  (b)	  and	  (c)	  of	  Article	  2,	  is:	  To	  research	  the	  causes	  and	  effects	  of	  poverty,	  distress	  
and	  suffering	  and	  to	  educate	  the	  general	  public	  and	  decision-­‐makers	  as	  to	  the	  same;	  and	  [with	  a	  view	  to	  
achieving	  its	  stated	  objectives]	  to	  work	  as	  an	  international	  partnership	  of	  goodwill	  (OI	  Constitution,	  
2005).	  
486	  An	  excellent	  overview	  of	  the	  what,	  why,	  when,	  where	  and	  how	  of	  Oxfam	  International	  is	  available	  on	  
the	  organisation’s	  official	  Website	  at	  http://www.oxfam.org/en/about	  (OI	  data,	  2012a).	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We	  are	  outraged	  by	  the	  poverty	  and	  injustice	  in	  the	  world.	  We	  must	  challenge	  unjust	  policies	  and	  practices	  and	  we	  must	  respect	  people’s	  rights.	  Together	  we	  can	  achieve	  a	  fair	  world	  without	  poverty.	  With	  partners	  and	  allies,	  we	  will	  act	  in	  solidarity	  with	  people	  living	  in	  poverty,	  especially	  women,	  to	  achieve	  their	  rights	  and	  assert	  their	  dignity	  as	  full	  citizens.	  	  In	  choosing	  to	  condition	  its	  aims	  with	  the	  requirement	  that	  solutions	  be	  ‘lasting’,	  Oxfam	  can	  be	  compared	  with	  Greenpeace	  in	  specifying	  an	  aim	  that	  is	  not	  only	  indefinable	  in	  any	  meaningful	  sense	  but	  is	  also	  unactualisable.	  Even	  if	  the	  concepts	  of	  ‘solutions’,	  ‘poverty’,	  ‘injustice’	  and	  ‘fair’	  could	  be	  defined	  in	  universally	  meaningful	  terms,	  amelioration	  of	  social	  adversity	  is	  always	  contingent	  and	  cannot	  be	  lasting.	  Furthermore,	  the	  organisation’s	  aims	  represent	  its	  specific	  corporate	  visions	  of	  social	  ideals	  and	  the	  way	  to	  closing	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  perceived	  status	  
quo	  and	  the	  achievement	  of	  these	  ideals.	  In	  a	  recent	  major	  restatement	  of	  its	  corporate	  vision,487	  Oxfam	  asserted:	  	  Oxfam’s	  vision	   is	   a	   just	  world	  without	  poverty:	   a	  world	   in	  which	  people	   can	  influence	   decisions	   which	   affect	   their	   lives,	   enjoy	   their	   rights,	   and	   assume	  their	  responsibilities	  as	  full	  citizens	  of	  a	  world	  in	  which	  all	  human	  beings	  are	  valued	   and	   treated	   equally.	   […]	   The	   ultimate	   goal	   of	   Oxfam	   is	   to	   end	   the	  injustice	  of	  poverty.	  	  In	  the	  same	  document,	  Oxfam	  presented	  its	  prescription	  for	  strategic	  action	  to	  tackle	  the	  challenges	  of	  poverty	  (OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013:	  5):	  ‘Ultimately,	  it	  will	  require	  people-­‐power	  to	  find	  a	  new	  and	  more	  sustainable	  path	  from	  poverty’.	  	  Oxfam’s	  current	  aims	  appear	  to	  be	  characterised	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  universally	  acknowledged	  referents	  and	  measurable	  aims.	  Departing	  markedly	  from	  the	  more	  practical	  aims	  of	  earlier	  decades,	  OI’s	  more	  recent	  goal	  statements	  might	  be	  seen	  instead	  to	  adopt	  a	  broad-­‐brushed,	  emotive,	  approach	  to	  portraying	  local	  situations	  in	  distant	  places	  to	  globalised	  audiences.	  To	  what	  extent	  Oxfam	  could	  be	  adopting	  the	  brand	  marketing	  tactic	  of	  delivering	  ‘fuzzy’	  brand	  promises	  to	  its	  audiences,	  is	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  chapter488.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
487	  The	  Power	  of	  People	  Against	  Poverty:	  Oxfam	  Strategic	  Plan	  2013-­‐2019	  (OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013:6).	  
488	  In	  ‘fuzzy	  promises’	  theorisation,	  brands	  deliver	  fuzzy	  functional,	  symbolic,	  and	  experiential	  promises	  
to	  their	  target	  consumers	  that	  result	  in	  behaviours	  that,	  inter	  alia,	  encourage	  consumers	  to	  use	  brands	  
as	  narrative	  material	  to	  communicate	  self-­‐identity;	  facilitate	  courses	  of	  consumer	  action	  that	  are	  
conducive	  to	  the	  promised	  functionality;	  and	  motivate	  consumers	  to	  adopt	  and	  play	  a	  social	  role	  
implicitly	  suggested	  and	  facilitated	  by	  the	  brand	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Anker	  et	  al,	  2012).	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8.2.3	  Identifying	  Oxfam	  International	  as	  a	  TAN	  Oxfam	  International	  is	  obviously	  many	  things	  to	  different	  people,	  but	  is	  it	  a	  TAN?	  I	  suggest	  the	  following	  observations	  indicate	  that	  the	  advocacy	  function	  of	  OI	  is	  sufficiently	  highly	  developed	  to	  fit	  my	  eight-­‐point	  referent	  model.	  	  
	  
Criterion	  #1:	  	  
• Distinctive,	  highly-­visual,	  transnational	  corporate	  identity	  	  The	  distinctive	  Oxfam	  corporate	  logo	  (Figures	  8.1	  to	  8.4),	  is	  prominently	  displayed	  on	  all	  OI	  corporate	  branded	  items.	  It	  shows	  a	  proprietary	  interest,	  even	  implied	  ownership,	  of	  the	  internationally	  recognised,	  stylised,	  ribbon	  symbol	  for	  awareness	  and	  solidarity	  with	  a	  social	  cause.	  The	  corporate	  identity	  reinforcement	  value	  of	  Oxfam	  signage	  on	  its	  charity	  shops	  and	  collection	  banks	  in	  community	  centres	  is	  inestimably	  high.	  	  	   	  	  
	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Figure	  8.1	  Oxfam’s	  distinctive	  corporate	  identity	  and	  logo	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  Figure	  8.3	  Displaying	  a	  distinctive,	  highly-­‐visual,	  corporate	  identity	  (Oxfam	  Int).	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  Figure	  8.4	  Brand	  promotion	  and	  fieldwork	  go	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  (Image:	  Oxfam	  Int).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Criterion	  #2:	  	  
• Demonstrable	  prioritising	  of	  self-­promotion	  
	  Oxfam	  branding,	  usually	  in	  the	  form	  of	  name,	  logo	  and	  corporate	  colour,	  is	  prominently	  positioned	  in	  all	  OI	  publicity	  outputs.	  A	  high	  proportion	  of	  Oxfam’s	  publicity	  outputs,	  such	  as	  media	  releases	  and	  Website	  content,	  is	  based	  on	  attention-­‐capturing	  revelations	  in	  Oxfam-­‐commissioned	  investigative	  reports.	  This	  advocacy	  strategy	  has	  multiple	  advantages	  in	  regard	  to	  self-­‐promotion:	  when	  news	  stories	  are	  generated	  from	  Oxfam	  reports,	  the	  media	  story	  will	  cite	  Oxfam	  (usually	  prominently)	  as	  the	  information	  source489;	  this	  tactic	  also	  drives	  reader	  traffic	  to	  the	  location	  of	  the	  source	  report,	  which	  ensures	  further	  name-­‐recognition	  and	  income	  to	  fund	  further	  reports.	  Oxfam	  thereby	  seeks	  to	  enhance	  its	  brand	  reputation	  as	  a	  source	  of	  independent,	  scientific	  data;	  it	  also	  serves	  to	  promote	  itself	  to	  media	  outlets	  as	  an	  on-­‐going	  valuable	  source	  of	  newsworthy	  stories.	  According	  to	  Lauren	  Gelfand490:	  ‘A	  lot	  of	  what	  Oxfam	  does	  is	  to	  sustain	  Oxfam’	  (Rothmeyer	  (2011).	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
489Ethical	  conventions	  on	  source-­‐citing	  are	  widely	  followed	  by	  reputable	  media	  organisations.	  	  
490	  A	  journalist	  who	  took	  a	  year	  off	  to	  work	  for	  Oxfam.	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  Figure	  8.5	  	  ‘A	  lot	  of	  what	  Oxfam	  does	  is	  to	  sustain	  Oxfam’	  (Rothmeyer,	  2011)	  (Image:	  Oxfam,	  UK).	  	  
Criterion	  #3:	  	  
• Demonstrable	  prioritising	  of	  voice-­amplification	  strategies	  in	  advocacy	  
	  Evidenced	  by	  OI’s	  demonstrable	  commitment	  to	  people-­‐centred,	  voice-­‐amplification	  strategies	  in	  its	  advocacy	  publicity	  outputs.	  The	  Oxfam	  Strategic	  Plan	  2013-­‐2019	  is	  explicit	  in	  its	  emphasis	  on	  combining	  ‘programming	  and	  influencing	  approaches’	  in	  Oxfam’s	  worldwide	  operations.	  It	  prioritises	  the	  advocacy	  strategy	  of	  	  ‘influencing	  others	  to	  address	  poverty	  and	  injustice’	  (OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013:5.	  For	  an	  example	  of	  this	  advocacy	  strategy	  in	  practice,	  see	  also	  OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2011-­‐12:	  30).	  	  
Criterion	  #4:	  	  
• Highly	  media-­savvy,	  with	  unremitting	  media	  relations	  activity	  
	  Exemplified	  by	  explicit	  statements	  on	  OI	  official	  Website491,	  OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2011-­‐12:	  5,	  7,	  12,	  24,	  25,	  30,	  34,	  43,	  63;	  and	  OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013-­‐2019.	  A	  job	  description	  for	  an	  Oxfam	  ‘Communication	  Advisor’	  reveals	  the	  organisation’s	  requirements	  for	  high-­‐level	  of	  professional	  communications	  expertise	  in	  its	  headquarters	  communications	  function	  (OI	  Ad,	  2010)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
491	  All	  Oxfam	  Websites	  project	  an	  image	  of	  a	  geographically	  extended	  TAN	  operating	  simultaneously	  
worldwide	  on	  a	  dizzying	  array	  of	  fronts.	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Criterion	  #5:	  	  
• Demonstrable	  high	  degree	  of	  adoption	  of	  sophisticated	  public/political	  
communications	  style	  and	  strategies	  
	  Clearly	  exemplified	  by	  statements	  on	  OI	  official	  Website.	  Oxfam	  is	  explicit	  in	  describing	  its	  advocacy	  approaches	  using	  contemporary	  brand	  marketing	  terminology.	  In	  its	  latest	  Annual	  Report	  (2011-­‐12:12-­‐13),	  OI	  reported	  on	  a	  major	  rebranding	  initiative,	  which	  frames	  the	  reorganisation	  of	  its	  relationships	  with	  affiliates	  as	  a	  new,	  global	  brand	  —	  a	  ‘One	  Oxfam’	  with	  ‘one	  brand	  and	  one	  voice’.	  It	  explains:	  	   The	   global	   identity	   is	  much	  more	   than	   a	   house	   style	   or	   introduction	   of	   new	  colors	  and	   logo.	   It	  articulates	  what	  we	  stand	   for	  and	  who	  we	  are.	  The	  global	  identity	  will	  be	  a	  key	  asset	  for	  SMS	  countries,	  where	  we	  are	  building	  the	  one	  Oxfam	   approach,	   and	   it	   will	   bring	   a	   very	   strong	   and	   unified	   brand	   to	   all	  affiliates.	  	  	  The	  recently-­‐published	  Oxfam	  Strategic	  Plan	  contains	  numerous	  references	  to	  Oxfam	  using	  its	  expertise	  and	  resources	  to	  politically	  empower	  grassroots	  communities	  through	  skills-­‐building	  in	  advocacy	  and	  campaigning	  operations	  (OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013:16,	  23	  -­‐	  26).	  	  	  
Criterion	  #6:	  	  
• Demonstrable	  high	  degree	  of	  adoption	  of	  advanced	  information	  and	  
communication	  technologies	  
	  Exemplified	  by	  explicit	  statements	  and	  high	  quality	  content	  on	  OI’s	  official	  Website.	  OI	  runs	  seven	  ‘Blog	  Channels’	  connected	  to	  its	  various	  campaigns	  on	  its	  Website,	  posts	  new	  videos	  and	  images	  every	  day	  and	  invites	  Website	  visitors	  to	  ‘tweet,	  pin,	  or	  share’	  their	  stories	  with	  Oxfam	  via	  social	  media	  dialogues.	  	  	  
Criterion	  #7:	  	  
• Demonstrable	  high	  degree	  of	  strategic	  social	  boundary	  mechanism	  
construction	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It	  is	  almost	  axiomatic	  to	  assert	  that	  Oxfam	  has	  established	  a	  compelling	  brand	  image	  centred	  on	  mobilising	  large-­‐scale	  humanitarian	  assistance	  to	  communities	  in	  need.	  It	  is	  equally	  straightforward	  to	  argue	  that	  Oxfam	  has	  been	  highly	  visible	  in	  expressing	  its	  appreciation	  to	  donors,	  volunteers	  and	  supporters:	  embracing	  them	  in	  its	  proclamation	  that	  people	  who	  support	  Oxfam	  are	  helping	  ‘to	  achieve	  a	  fair	  world	  without	  poverty’492.	  Thereby,	  these	  messages	  arguably	  imply	  that	  in	  supporting	  Oxfam,	  such	  supporters	  are	  joining	  ‘a	  global	  movement	  for	  change’	  (ibid).	  Oxfam	  GB	  compliments	  its	  supporters	  by	  stating	  that	  ‘Oxfam	  is	  a	  vibrant	  global	  movement	  of	  passionate,	  dedicated	  people	  fighting	  poverty	  together.	  Doing	  amazing	  work,	  together.	  People	  power	  drives	  everything	  we	  do’	  (OI	  data,	  2012a;	  Oxfam	  GB,	  2013).	  It	  is,	  therefore,	  reasonable	  to	  surmise	  that	  such	  statements	  constitute	  a	  social	  boundary	  mechanism	  that	  (a)	  confers	  on	  Oxfam	  supporters	  a	  measure	  of	  recognition	  that	  they	  possess	  certain	  virtues	  that	  are	  much	  valued	  by	  the	  group	  and	  by	  humanity-­‐at-­‐large493;	  (b)	  asserts	  that	  Oxfam’s	  ideology	  and	  supporter	  base	  are	  part	  of	  a	  coherent	  ‘global	  movement	  for	  change’;	  and	  (c)	  is	  implicitly	  reproachful	  of	  those	  who	  do	  not	  subscribe	  to	  its	  humanitarian	  messages.	  	  	  
	  
Criterion	  #8:	  	  
• Demonstrable	  differentiation	  strategies	  within	  the	  NGO	  sector	  and	  within	  
the	  typology	  of	  TANs	  
	  Just	  two	  of	  Oxfam’s	  outstanding	  differentiation	  strategies	  are	  its	  origination	  of	  the	  charity-­‐shop	  business	  model	  for	  NGO	  fundraising	  and	  its	  strategic	  positioning	  of	  itself	  as	  a	  founding	  member	  of	  the	  INGO	  Accountability	  Charter,	  which	  sees	  Oxfam	  adopt	  the	  role	  of	  doyen	  of	  an	  elite	  upper	  echelon	  of	  international	  NGOs.	  Its	  differentiation	  strategies	  within	  the	  TAN	  typology	  also	  include:	  its	  customary	  rejection	  of	  naming-­‐and-­‐shaming	  as	  an	  advocacy	  tactic;	  distinctive	  use	  of	  authentic,	  grassroots	  voices	  in	  its	  storytelling;	  and	  the	  eminence	  and	  range	  of	  A-­‐List	  celebrities	  in	  its	  advocacy	  outreach.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
492	  	  OI	  Annual	  Report	  2011-­‐12:5	  
493	  For	  insights	  into	  ‘interaction	  rituals’	  and	  ‘interaction	  ritual	  chains’	  see	  Goffman	  (1967:	  5-­‐15),	  Collins	  
(2004:150-­‐151)	  and	  Ross	  (2010).	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8.3	  Socio-­‐historical	  context	  The	  changing	  world	  appears	  to	  have	  had	  a	  far	  greater	  impact	  on	  Oxfam’s	  journey	  than	  fixed	  doctrines,	  or	  log	  entries	  describing	  its	  significant	  milestones.	  There	  have	  been	  two	  important	  changes	  in	  Oxfam’s	  operating	  environment,	  which	  have	  created	  vastly	  different	  conditions	  to	  those	  in	  which	  this	  organisation	  emerged:	  	  	  
8.3.1	  A	  new	  world	  order	  in	  humanitarian	  aid	  delivery	  	  Humanitarianism,	  as	  a	  human	  enterprise,	  has	  seen	  significant	  upheavals	  since	  the	  ‘70s	  and	  ‘80s	  —	  a	  time	  when	  disaster	  relief	  was	  not	  regarded	  as	  an	  issue	  of	  major	  concern	  to	  the	  international	  community	  (Kent,	  2004).	  However,	  that	  situation	  has	  since	  undergone	  a	  dramatic	  reversal	  (ibid).	  Factors	  that	  have	  been	  cited	  for	  reversing	  attitudes	  to	  crisis	  aid	  delivery	  include	  shifting	  international	  polarities;	  Post-­‐9/11	  and	  ‘War	  on	  Terror’	  security	  stabilisation	  policies;	  strategic	  disengagements	  from	  the	  international	  consultative	  fora;	  and	  ambivalence	  on	  the	  part	  of	  international	  players	  to	  intervene	  in	  each	  other’s	  sovereign	  affairs.	  Kent	  observes	  that	  international	  factors	  were	  particularly	  significant	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  period,	  when	  an	  ‘international	  community	  of	  indifference’	  seemed	  to	  have	  replaced	  the	  bipolar	  order	  and	  ‘humanitarian	  action’	  often	  became	  a	  substitute	  for	  bilateral	  political	  commitment	  or	  military	  intervention	  (Kent,	  2004;	  2010).	  Intimately	  connected	  to	  the	  outcomes	  (and	  often	  tragic	  failures)494	  of	  a	  number	  of	  highly-­‐politicised	  interventions,	  or	  denials,	  of	  both	  emergency	  and	  development	  assistance	  from	  foreign	  sources,	  has	  been	  an	  increasingly	  widespread	  view	  that	  humanitarian	  action	  is	  ultimately	  determined	  by	  the	  political,	  economic	  and	  socio-­‐cultural	  contexts	  in	  which	  it	  takes	  place	  (Kent:	  2010;	  OI	  Report	  2012).	  This	  realisation,	  in	  turn,	  is	  forcing	  a	  paradigmatic	  refocusing	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  local	  in	  humanitarian	  crisis	  intervention	  and	  aid	  delivery	  (UN	  GA	  Resolution,	  1991;	  OI	  Report,	  2012;	  Red	  Cross,	  2012a,	  2012c,	  1995;	  Collinson	  et	  al,	  2010)495.	  Kent	  points	  out	  that	  (ibid:2010):	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
494	  Kent	  (2004:854)	  posits	  that	  an	  ‘international	  community	  of	  indifference’	  that	  seemed	  to	  have	  
replaced	  the	  bipolar	  order,	  resulted	  in	  tragic	  consequences	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  Afghanistan,	  
Liberia,	  Sierra	  Leone,	  and	  especially	  Rwanda.	  
495	  Reflecting	  the	  evolving	  pattern	  in	  aid	  delivery,	  since	  1991	  the	  UN	  has	  recognised	  that	  crisis-­‐affected	  
states,	  and	  not	  the	  international	  agencies,	  have	  the	  primary	  role	  in	  providing	  humanitarian	  assistance	  
(UN	  GA	  Resolution,	  1991;	  OI	  Report,	  2012:2).	  As	  part	  of	  a	  programme	  to	  reform	  its	  humanitarian	  
responses	  and	  reflect	  the	  changing	  aid	  environment,	  the	  UN	  reorganised	  its	  Department	  of	  
Humanitarian	  Affairs	  in	  1998,	  expanded	  its	  mandate,	  and	  renamed	  it	  the	  Office	  for	  the	  Coordination	  of	  
Humanitarian	  Affairs	  (UNOCHA,	  2013).	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   A	  perceived	  paradox	  of	  globalisation	  is	  that	  the	  more	  globalised	  the	  world,	  the	  more	   “localized”	   it	   would	   seem	   to	   be.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   more	   one	   has	  focused	  on	   global	   commonalities	   and	   inter-­‐relationships,	   the	  more	  will	   local	  variations,	  reflected	  in	  customs,	  cultures	  and	  even	  language,	  come	  to	  the	  fore.	  Consistent	   with	   changes	   in	   government	   attitudes	   towards	   international	  humanitarian	  intervention	  […]	  governments,	  too,	  will	  be	  more	  inclined	  to	  opt	  for	   local	   over	   international.	   This	   would	  mean	   that	   humanitarian	   actors	   will	  increasingly	   be	   drawn	   from	   national	   and	   local	   community	   networks	   and	  organizations,	  and	  that	  external	  intervention	  will	  be	  less	  and	  less	  encouraged,	  and	  “localism”	  will	  be	  the	  preferred	  option.	  	  Oxfam	  demonstrates	  that	  it	  understands	  this	  paradigm	  shift	  well,	  stating	  in	  its	  annual	  report	  (OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2010-­‐11:9-­‐11;	  see	  also	  OI	  Annual	  Report	  2011-­‐12	  and	  OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013:	  5).	  	   Oxfam	  is	  committed	  to	  engaging	  with	  local	  communities,	  partners,	  supporters,	  and	  institutions	  and	  working	  with	  other	  NGOs	  to	  ensure	  that	  we	  listen	  to	  our	  stakeholders	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  our	  work.	  	  	  In	  2012,	  Oxfam	  published	  a	  report496	  stating	  the	  organisation’s	  belief	  that	  ‘a	  new	  world	  order’	  in	  humanitarian	  aid	  delivery	  was	  underway.	  It	  highlighted	  the	  importance	  of	  local	  engagement:	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  Western-­‐based	  donors,	  INGOs	  and	  the	  UN	  provided	  the	  bulk	  of	  assistance,	  to	  a	  new	  norm	  in	  which	  ‘new	  donors	  and	  NGOs	  from	  around	  the	  world	  now	  provide	  a	  significant	  share	  of	  humanitarian	  aid’.	  In	  many	  countries,	  it	  claimed,	  there	  had	  been	  a	  growing	  sentiment	  against	  Western-­‐based	  humanitarian	  agencies.	  The	  closer	  linking	  of	  the	  U.S.	  security	  agenda	  to	  development	  aid	  in	  the	  Post-­‐9/11	  and	  ‘War	  on	  Terror’	  era	  had	  also	  had	  a	  marked	  impact	  on	  this	  mood	  of	  ill	  feeling.	  Furthermore,	  the	  report	  was	  critical	  of	  what	  it	  viewed	  as	  imbalances	  and	  inconsistencies	  resulting	  from	  ‘media-­‐driven	  attention’	  that	  popularised	  some	  humanitarian	  crises	  but	  led	  to	  the	  neglect	  of	  others	  that	  ‘fail	  to	  grip	  the	  media’s	  attention’	  (Collinson	  et	  al,	  2010;	  OI	  Report,	  ibid;	  U.S.	  NSS,	  2002	  and	  2010).	  	  	  Further	  emphasising	  the	  changing	  environment	  for	  humanitarian	  projects,	  Oxfam	  was	  one	  of	  the	  eight	  founder	  signatories	  to	  the	  10-­‐point	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  for	  the	  
International	  Red	  Cross	  and	  Red	  Crescent	  Movement	  and	  NGOs	  in	  Disaster	  Relief,	  in	  1995	  (Red	  Cross,	  2012a,	  1995).	  Four	  principles	  of	  this	  Code	  commit	  NGOs	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
496	  Oxfam	  briefing	  paper,	  entitled	  Crises	  in	  a	  New	  World	  order:	  Challenging	  the	  humanitarian	  project	  (OI	  
Report,	  2012);	  see	  also	  Collinson	  et	  al	  (2010).	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operate:	  to	  attempt	  to	  build	  disaster	  response	  on	  local	  capacities;	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  involve	  programme	  beneficiaries	  in	  the	  management	  of	  relief	  aid;	  to	  strive,	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  relief	  aid,	  to	  reduce	  future	  vulnerabilities	  to	  disaster	  as	  well	  as	  meeting	  basic	  needs;	  and	  to	  hold	  themselves	  accountable	  to	  both	  those	  they	  seek	  to	  assist	  and	  those	  from	  whom	  they	  accept	  resources.	  Viewed	  in	  this	  light,	  Oxfam’s	  demonstrable	  and	  growing	  commitment	  to	  ‘glocalisation’497	  can	  be	  more	  readily	  understood.	  What	  we	  see	  is	  Oxfam	  adapting	  its	  capabilities	  for	  engaging	  with	  local	  agents	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  interpretations	  of	  their	  needs	  and	  demands,	  while	  concurrently	  continuing	  to	  function	  as	  a	  veteran,	  traditional	  model	  NGO	  with	  its	  own	  mandate,	  global-­‐scale	  structures	  and	  complex	  power	  relationships.	  	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  both	  Greenpeace	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  Oxfam	  acknowledges	  its	  collaborative	  network	  of	  	  ‘thousands	  of	  local	  partner	  organisations’.	  It	  makes	  frequent	  references	  in	  publicity	  materials	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  local	  knowledge	  it	  is	  able	  to	  bring	  to	  its	  research	  and	  to	  ‘working	  with	  our	  partners	  and	  allies’	  to	  achieve	  organisational	  goals	  as	  ‘part	  of	  a	  global	  movement	  for	  change’	  (OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2007).	  These	  comments	  arguably	  enhance	  Oxfam’s	  image	  as	  an	  organisation	  that	  has	  the	  capability	  to	  be	  both	  global	  and	  local	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  paradigmatic	  refocusing	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  local	  in	  humanitarian	  crisis	  intervention	  and	  aid	  delivery	  (Kent,	  2010;	  Jones,	  2006:116,	  190).	  	  Apart	  from	  its	  own	  member	  country	  network,	  Oxfam	  is	  currently	  working	  with	  more	  than	  1,000	  of	  its	  partner	  organisations	  on	  projects	  worldwide	  (Oxfam	  GB,	  2012a).	  Many	  of	  these	  are	  grassroots	  organisations	  (local	  NGOs,	  producer	  groups,	  co-­‐operatives	  and	  small	  businesses).	  These	  local	  views	  are	  then	  incorporated	  into	  designing,	  implementing,	  monitoring	  and	  evaluating	  the	  Oxfam	  programmes	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
497	  Glocalization/or	  glocalisation,	  is	  a	  neologism	  coined	  in	  the	  1980s	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  telescoping	  of	  the	  
global	  and	  local	  scales	  to	  form	  a	  blended	  concept.	  The	  original	  business	  applications	  of	  the	  term	  were	  
applied	  to	  the	  tailoring	  and	  advertising	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  on	  a	  global,	  or	  near-­‐global,	  basis	  to	  
increasingly	  differentiated	  local	  and	  particular	  markets.	  The	  concept	  was	  then	  developed	  in	  a	  social	  
theoretical	  sense	  to	  overcome	  what	  some	  sociologists	  perceived	  to	  be	  a	  weakness	  of	  the	  term	  
‘globalisation’,	  which	  was	  being	  used	  to	  describing	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  was	  cast	  in	  tension	  with	  
‘localisation’	  (the	  global-­‐local	  problematique	  in	  sociology).	  ‘Glocalisation’	  is,	  therefore,	  considered	  by	  
some	  scholars	  to	  be	  a	  preferable	  term	  to	  ‘globalisation’,	  as	  (a)	  it	  involves	  the	  creation	  and	  incorporation	  
of	  locality	  in	  its	  meaning,	  and	  (b)	  it	  makes	  the	  concern	  with	  space	  at	  least	  as	  important	  as	  the	  focus	  on	  
temporal	  issues.	  In	  fact,	  Jones	  asserts	  (2006:116,190)	  that	  contemporary	  globalisation	  is	  constituted	  
through	  various	  forms	  of	  glocalisation,	  although,	  he	  concedes	  that,	  in	  a	  wider	  sense,	  other	  forms	  of	  
globalisation	  could	  be	  possible.	  See	  Section	  8.5.3	  for	  my	  further	  discussion	  of	  the	  relevance	  of	  
glocalisation	  theory	  to	  the	  challenges	  faced	  by	  TANs	  in	  promoting	  global	  (and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Human	  
Rights	  Watch,	  non-­‐negotiable)	  political	  ideologies	  in	  local	  contexts.	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affect	  them	  (ibid:	  10).	  The	  following	  sections	  illustrate	  further	  ways	  in	  which	  Oxfam	  has	  adapted	  to	  meet	  changes	  and	  challenges	  in	  this	  new	  world	  order	  in	  humanitarian	  aid	  delivery	  —	  along	  the	  way,	  showing	  a	  gradual	  drift	  into	  matters	  it	  views	  as	  connected	  to	  human	  rights	  and	  injustice	  in	  local	  contexts.	  Indeed,	  this	  study	  found	  that	  in	  response	  to	  these	  changing	  circumstances,	  Oxfam	  has	  carried	  out	  a	  strategic	  gear	  change	  by	  placing	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  developing	  its	  role	  as	  a	  political	  organiser	  and	  civil	  society	  advocacy	  enabler	  in	  local	  contexts	  (vide	  OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013:14).	  This	  is	  discussed	  in	  Section	  8.4.3.	  	  Considering	  the	  globe-­‐spanning	  reach	  of	  the	  Oxfam	  confederation,	  the	  task	  of	  operationalising	  a	  single	  group	  ideological	  programme	  in	  scores	  of	  multi-­‐local,	  multicultural,	  contexts	  is	  undoubtedly	  immense.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  Oxfam	  system	  has	  grown	  by	  accumulating	  an	  array	  of	  national	  chapters.	  In	  a	  major	  organisational	  restructuring	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s498,	  Oxfam	  UK	  and	  Ireland	  amalgamated	  with	  Oxfam	  groups	  in	  eight	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  to	  form	  the	  confederation	  Oxfam	  International,	  which	  is	  a	  separate	  legal	  entity	  registered	  as	  a	  charitable	  foundation	  in	  The	  Netherlands	  (Oxfam	  GB,	  2012a;	  Oxfam	  GB	  Annual	  Report,	  2010-­‐11:32)499.	  Current	  plans	  are	  to	  remain	  on	  the	  expansion	  path,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  having	  20	  to	  25	  affiliates	  in	  the	  confederation	  by	  the	  year	  2020	  (OI	  data,	  2012b;	  OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2011-­‐12:13).	  	  In	  order	  to	  be	  relevant	  in	  the	  21st	  Century,	  Oxfam	  has	  declared	  that	  it	  needs	  a	  presence	  and	  will	  prioritise	  links	  with	  allies	  and	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  emerging	  economies	  of	  Brazil,	  Russia,	  India,	  China,	  South	  Africa,	  and	  Mexico	  (the	  so-­‐called	  BRICs	  or	  BRICSAMs),	  which	  have	  been	  forecast	  to	  be	  among	  the	  world’s	  largest	  economies	  by	  2050500.	  Moreover,	  Oxfam	  points	  out,	  these	  countries	  will	  also	  be	  increasingly	  important	  on	  issues	  such	  as	  climate	  change,	  food	  security	  and	  global	  inequality.	  Therefore,	  Oxfam	  has	  adapted	  by	  announcing	  its	  intention	  to	  increase	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
498	  There	  is	  some	  discrepancy	  as	  to	  the	  exact	  date	  Oxfam	  International	  was	  established.	  Oxfam	  GB	  
claims	  the	  date	  was	  1994	  (Oxfam	  GB,	  2012a),	  whereas	  Oxfam	  International	  claims	  it	  was	  set	  up	  in	  1995	  
(OI	  data,	  2012a).	  
499	  The	  eight	  joining	  Oxfam	  groups	  were	  Australia,	  New	  Zealand,	  America,	  Canada,	  Quebec,	  Hong	  Kong,	  
The	  Netherlands	  and	  Belgium	  (ibid).	  Oxfams	  in	  France,	  Germany,	  India,	  Spain	  and	  Mexico	  followed	  later.	  
In	  what	  may	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  the	  core	  network’s	  continuing	  growth	  and	  expansion,	  Oxfam	  Italy	  and	  
Oxfam	  Japan	  achieved	  full	  affiliate	  status	  in	  2012.	  
500	  I	  posit	  that,	  at	  this	  stage,	  it	  is	  too	  early	  to	  estimate	  what	  implications	  this	  situation	  will	  have	  on	  
Oxfam’s	  recent	  policy	  decisions	  that	  were	  evidently	  predicated	  on	  the	  increased	  economic	  power	  of	  the	  
global	  South.	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its	  advocacy	  and	  campaigning	  in	  these	  countries	  (OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2010-­‐11:8;	  OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013:	  13,18).	  However,	  there	  are	  signs	  emerging	  that	  this	  reorientation	  might	  not	  prove	  to	  be	  fructuous	  in	  the	  foreseeable	  economic	  climate	  (Davos	  Global	  Economic	  Outlook	  2014;	  IMF,	  2013;	  Magnus,	  2014)501.	  	  	  The	  appointment,	  in	  May	  2013,	  of	  a	  world-­‐recognised	  authority	  on	  human	  rights	  —	  Ugandan,	  Winnie	  Byanyima	  —	  as	  Executive	  Director	  of	  Oxfam	  International	  appears	  also	  to	  send	  out	  a	  strong	  message	  regarding	  Oxfam’s	  current	  and	  future	  imperatives	  (OI	  data,	  2013a).	  Mrs.	  Byanyima	  is	  described	  by	  OI	  as:	  a	  ‘grassroots	  activist,	  human	  rights	  advocate,	  senior	  international	  civil	  servant	  and	  world-­‐recognised	  expert	  on	  women’s	  rights’.	  Mindful	  of	  Oxfam’s	  current	  imperatives,	  as	  stated	  in	  its	  latest	  Strategic	  Plan,	  and	  clearly	  reflected	  in	  this	  biodata,	  I	  suggest	  that	  Oxfam’s	  listing	  of	  Mrs.	  Byanyima’s	  skills	  set,	  commencing	  with	  ‘grassroots	  activist’,	  is	  probably	  illustrative	  of	  the	  priority	  areas	  in	  which	  her	  expertise	  will	  be	  applied.	  
8.3.2	  Differentiation	  challenges	  in	  the	  competitive	  NGO	  market	  	  Weiss	  (2013)	  points	  to	  the	  strong	  market	  dynamics	  of	  the	  multi-­‐billion	  dollar502	  humanitarian	  aid	  delivery	  sector	  and	  challenges	  international	  humanitarians	  and	  their	  government	  donors	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  largely	  idealistic	  and	  passé	  model	  of	  the	  traditional	  NGO	  ‘relief’	  agency	  and	  think	  about	  their	  profession	  as	  a	  business.	  Indeed,	  notes	  Weiss,	  some	  federations,	  such	  as	  Oxfam	  and	  Save	  the	  Children	  are	  ‘big	  businesses’	  (Weiss,	  2013:7):	  	   […]	  like	  entrepreneurs,	  humanitarian	  agencies	  are	  concerned	  with	  image	  and	  marketing	   strategies	   in	   an	  expanding	  global	  business	   that	  over	   the	  past	   two	  decades	  has	  become	  increasingly	  competitive	  with	  a	  glut	  of	  suppliers	  vying	  for	  their	  share	  of	  the	  market.	  	  In	  scrutinising	  the	  operations	  of	  TANS,	  Lecy,	  Mitchell	  and	  Schmitz	  (2010:229-­‐251)	  endorse	  the	  business	  and	  marketing	  firm	  analogies.	  They	  found	  that	  while	  the	  majority	  of	  early	  studies	  in	  IR	  viewed	  advocacy	  organisations	  as	  ‘altruistic	  actors	  seeking	  to	  advance	  universally	  accepted	  principles’,	  more	  recent	  scholarship	  has	  argued	  that	  ‘they	  are	  better	  understood	  as	  interest-­‐driven	  actors	  motivated	  by	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
501	  By	  the	  end	  of	  2013/early	  2014,	  the	  rapid	  growth	  and	  momentum	  witnessed	  recently	  in	  the	  emerging	  
economies	  was	  slowing	  greatly,	  causing	  serious	  concerns	  amongst	  the	  world’s	  leading	  economic	  experts	  
regarding	  their	  structural	  deficiencies	  and	  ability	  to	  weather	  exogenous	  economic	  risks.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  
advanced	  economies	  were	  back	  on	  the	  road	  to	  modest	  recoveries	  after	  some	  seven	  years	  of	  hard	  times.	  
502	  U.S.	  dollars.	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imperative	  of	  organisational	  survival	  in	  a	  competitive	  environment’503.	  Ironically,	  the	  competitive	  pressures	  Oxfam	  encounters	  from	  NGO	  rivals	  may	  be	  due	  in	  no	  small	  measure	  to	  the	  visible	  success	  of	  the	  Oxfam	  model,	  which	  has	  been	  copied	  and	  commoditised	  on	  a	  global	  scale.	  Town	  centres	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  developed	  world	  are	  now	  home	  to	  an	  expanding	  range	  of	  NGO	  fundraising	  charity	  shops,	  all	  based	  on	  Oxfam’s	  original	  model.	  	  	  Contrary	  to	  its	  popular	  image,	  nearly	  40%	  of	  Oxfam’s	  funding	  comes	  from	  institutions	  such	  as	  governments	  (accounting	  for	  €344.9m	  in	  2011-­‐12);	  the	  United	  Nations	  (€46.5m),	  the	  European	  Union	  (€74m),	  other	  supranational	  institutions	  (€1.5m),	  NGOs	  and	  other	  institutions	  (€32m).	  Commenting	  on	  the	  2010-­‐11	  financial	  year,	  in	  which	  Oxfam	  reported	  a	  revenue	  shortfall	  of	  €17	  million,	  Oxfam’s	  then	  chairman504	  and	  executive	  director505	  cited	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  ‘created	  by	  the	  rich	  countries’	  as	  having	  an	  ‘impact’	  on	  fundraising	  in	  some	  countries	  (ibid:7).	  The	  ‘current	  financial	  climate’	  was	  also	  held	  to	  be	  ‘raising	  questions	  about	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  development	  and	  aid’	  (ibid:8).	  	  	  Balanced	  against	  Oxfam’s	  successful	  fundraising	  projects,	  its	  annual	  expenditure	  on	  present	  commitments	  is	  colossal	  and	  in	  recent	  years	  has	  been	  falling	  far	  short	  of	  its	  income	  (OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2010-­‐11:	  40-­‐42;	  OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2011-­‐12:	  48;	  OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013:19,	  27,	  30;	  The	  Guardian,	  2013).	  To	  tackle	  its	  extensive	  array	  of	  adopted	  causes,	  the	  Oxfam	  confederation	  dispersed	  some	  €920	  million	  and	  €911	  million	  in	  each	  of	  the	  past	  two	  financial	  years,506	  respectively	  (2011-­‐12	  and	  2010-­‐11).	  Although	  Oxfam,	  in	  its	  Annual	  Report	  2010-­11,	  singles	  out	  and	  offers	  ‘tremendous	  thanks’	  only	  to	  its	  thousands	  of	  regular	  donors	  throughout	  the	  world	  (OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2010-­‐11:40-­‐42),	  funding	  from	  this	  revenue	  source	  amounted	  to	  only	  17.1	  %	  of	  the	  total	  income	  for	  the	  year	  2011–12	  and	  17.8	  %	  in	  2010-­‐11.	  Oxfam	  shops	  and	  online	  trading	  brought	  in	  similar	  amounts.	  Community	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
503	  Further	  contemporary	  perspectives	  on	  the	  challenges	  of	  operating	  in	  an	  aggressively	  competitive	  
market	  for	  donor	  funds	  are	  contained	  in	  the	  Polis	  Report	  (2012:1).	  This	  Report,	  entitled	  ‘Who	  Cares?	  
Challenges	  and	  opportunities	  in	  communicating	  distant	  suffering’,	  showcases	  the	  concerns	  of	  a	  group	  of	  
NGO	  professionals	  (including	  a	  representative	  from	  Oxfam),	  who	  are	  involved	  in	  development	  and	  
humanitarian	  communications,	  advocacy	  and	  fundraising.	  	  	  
504	  Keith	  Johnson	  
505	  Jeremy	  Hobbs	  
506	  In	  its	  Annual	  Report	  for	  2010-­‐2011,	  Oxfam	  reported	  a	  shortfall	  (-­‐	  €17	  million)	  of	  income	  for	  the	  year	  
(€894m)	  over	  expenditure	  (€911m)	  —	  (OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2010-­‐11:42).	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fundraising	  events	  contributed	  just	  1.8%	  in	  2011-­‐12	  and	  1.1%	  in	  2010-­‐11,	  while	  public	  appeals	  netted	  11.5%	  in	  2011-­‐12	  and	  12.2%	  in	  2010-­‐11.	  	  Judging	  by	  the	  weight	  of	  arguably	  anti-­‐capitalist	  criticisms	  of	  ‘rich	  countries’,	  ‘corrupt	  governments’,	  ‘powerful	  vested	  interests’,	  ‘corporate	  dishonesty’‘,	  ‘profligacy	  in	  the	  rich	  world’	  and	  ‘reckless	  lending’,	  the	  constrictions	  on	  funding	  and	  recent	  income	  shortfalls	  are	  clearly	  a	  serious	  concern	  for	  Oxfam	  (OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2010-­‐11:7-­‐8.	  OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2011-­‐12:45;	  OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013:5).	  However,	  this	  thesis	  argues	  that	  these	  stereotypical	  references	  to	  exogenous	  causality,	  obscure	  structural	  challenges	  for	  transnational	  NGOs,	  such	  as	  Oxfam,	  in	  their	  quest	  to	  persuade	  others	  to	  provide	  the	  financial	  resources	  essential	  to	  their	  survival	  and	  pursuit	  of	  their	  goals.	  	  
8.4	  Milestones	  and	  salient	  strategies	  Oxfam	  International	  does	  not	  dwell	  on	  its	  past	  performances,	  conceding	  just	  three	  short	  paragraphs	  to	  its	  history	  on	  the	  official	  OI	  Website.	  There	  is	  no	  individual	  mention	  there	  of	  Oxfam’s	  founding	  ‘heroes’,	  nor	  the	  ups-­‐and-­‐downs	  of	  70	  years	  in	  the	  frontline	  of	  humanitarian	  crisis	  relief:	  neither	  the	  low	  points	  of	  a	  highly	  public	  scandal	  in	  1963	  when	  the	  UK’s	  Charity	  Commissioners	  challenged	  Oxfam’s	  status	  as	  a	  ‘charity’	  and	  its	  right	  to	  provide	  international	  ‘development’	  aid	  (Black,	  ibid:	  85);	  nor	  high	  points,	  such	  as	  the	  innovative	  and	  highly	  successful	  use	  of	  advertising	  and	  marketing	  techniques	  to	  promote	  charitable	  appeals	  in	  the	  media	  (which	  had	  the	  concomitant	  effect	  of	  making	  Oxfam	  a	  household	  name	  throughout	  Britain	  and	  beyond),	  and	  the	  enterprising,	  and	  original,	  establishment	  of	  Oxfam	  charity	  shops,	  selling	  donated	  clothing	  and	  other	  unwanted	  articles.	  These	  imaginative	  ventures,	  so	  novel	  in	  the	  late	  1940s	  and	  50s507,	  have	  evolved	  to	  become	  commoditised	  templates	  for	  legions	  of	  ‘charity	  shops’	  and	  charity	  fund-­‐raising	  strategies	  throughout	  the	  world	  (BBC	  news,	  2002).	  Today,	  Oxfam	  has	  1,200	  of	  its	  branded	  outlets	  operating	  in	  nine	  countries.	  	  	  If	  Oxfam’s	  salient	  milestones	  are	  not	  easy	  to	  discern	  amid	  the	  tumultuous	  events	  that	  have	  occurred	  during	  its	  lifetime	  —	  including	  provision	  of	  crisis	  aid	  during	  hundreds	  of	  natural	  calamities	  across	  the	  globe	  —	  its	  pattern	  of	  significantly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507	  The	  prototype	  of	  the	  charity	  shop	  model	  was	  opened	  in	  1948	  (Oxfam	  GB,	  2012a).	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changing	  its	  organisational	  aims	  and	  strategies	  seems	  somewhat	  better	  defined.	  Indeed,	  an	  analytical	  focus	  on	  Oxfam’s	  adapting	  strategies	  is	  rewarding	  not	  only	  because	  of	  its	  variety,	  but	  because	  it	  reveals	  the	  characteristics	  that	  have	  helped	  Oxfam	  to	  change	  and	  survive	  in	  its	  fitness	  landscape.	  	  	  The	  gradual	  morphing	  of	  Oxfam’s	  aims	  is	  easily	  traceable:	  from	  providing	  material	  relief	  to	  suffering	  communities	  to	  progressively	  incorporating	  strategies	  for	  tackling	  the	  socio-­‐political	  and	  economic	  causes	  of	  suffering	  communities.	  This	  thesis	  posits	  that	  from	  a	  political	  relations	  perspective	  the	  implications	  are	  profound:	  from	  organising	  community-­‐level	  emergency	  humanitarian	  relief	  and	  development	  assistance	  to	  states	  (which	  Oxfam	  still	  does),	  the	  confederation	  is	  evolving	  its	  advocacy	  capability	  to	  focus	  on	  influencing	  the	  political	  priority-­‐setting	  of	  states	  by	  organising	  grassroots	  communities	  to	  ‘drive	  change	  locally	  and	  globally’508.	  	  	  
8.4.1	  Reorienting	  strategies:	  From	  victims	  of	  war	  to	  wars	  of	  words	  	  Although	  OI	  does	  not	  specifically	  provide	  public	  information	  on	  the	  origins	  or	  development	  of	  its	  advocacy	  function,	  Oxfam	  GB	  (Oxfam	  GB,	  2012a)	  notes	  that	  in	  1979,	  ‘with	  Oxfam	  increasingly	  making	  a	  noise	  about	  the	  causes	  of	  poverty’,	  a	  dedicated	  Campaigns	  Department	  was	  established.	  As	  a	  further	  innovation,	  ‘area	  campaigners’	  were	  recruited	  in	  the	  early	  1980’s.	  Its	  Website	  went	  online	  in	  1996	  (OI	  data,	  2012a.	  In	  confronting	  poverty,	  Oxfam	  adopts	  a	  people-­‐centred,	  ideological	  position,	  predicated	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  ‘respect	  for	  human	  rights	  will	  help	  lift	  people	  out	  of	  poverty’	  (OI	  data,	  2012a).	  According	  to	  Oxfam’s	  50th	  Anniversary	  chronicler	  (and	  former	  staff	  member)	  Maggie	  Black	  (Black,	  1992:vii):	  	  	  There	  is	  almost	  no	  subject	   in	  the	  international	  pantheon	  of	  causes	  that	  Oxfam	  can	   bear	   to	   leave	   alone,	   not	   a	   geographical	   corner	   of	   the	   Third	  World	   that	   it	  abjures.	  	  This	  fundamental	  commitment	  prompts	  an	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  enormity	  of	  this	  open-­‐ended,	  multicultural,	  multi-­‐local,	  problem	  space	  has	  been	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  determining	  that	  as	  Oxfam	  developed	  it	  was	  compelled	  to	  make	  significant	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
508	  See	  the	  Foreword	  to	  the	  Oxfam	  Strategic	  Plan	  2013-­‐2019:	  The	  Power	  of	  People	  Against	  Poverty	  for	  an	  
overview	  of	  current	  policy	  and	  what	  Oxfam	  has	  described	  as	  ‘a	  clear	  change	  of	  direction’	  (OI	  Strategic	  
Plan,	  2013:5-­‐11).	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adjustments	  in	  its	  strategic	  focus	  and	  operations.	  Thus,	  from	  its	  origins	  as	  a	  small	  UK	  concern	  group	  involved	  in	  a	  single	  instance	  of	  famine	  relief,	  it	  has	  evolved	  to	  become,	  an	  international	  icon	  for	  charitable	  fundraising	  and	  a	  world	  leader	  in	  the	  management	  and	  delivery	  of	  emergency	  relief	  in	  humanitarian	  crises.	  Importantly,	  the	  organisation	  is	  also	  well	  known	  for	  its	  heavy	  engagement	  in	  service-­‐providing	  fieldwork	  to	  implement	  long-­‐term	  development	  programmes	  in	  communities	  it	  regards	  as	  ‘vulnerable’	  (OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2011-­‐12:6;	  OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013:5).	  	  
	  It	  is	  a	  striking	  feature	  of	  the	  organisation	  that	  in	  the	  highly	  fissiparous	  INGO	  sector,	  Oxfam	  has	  implemented	  a	  Single	  Management	  Structure	  (SMS),	  aimed	  at	  increased	  integration,	  efficiency	  and	  transparency	  (OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2010-­‐11:7).	  Although	  each	  Oxfam	  affiliate	  has	  its	  own	  strategic	  plan,	  these	  are	  ostensibly	  aligned	  with	  the	  overarching	  Oxfam	  International	  Strategic	  Plan	  2007-­2012:	  Demanding	  Justice	  and	  the	  Oxfam	  Strategic	  Plan	  2013-­2019:	  The	  Power	  of	  People	  Against	  Poverty,	  both	  of	  which	  set	  out	  OI’s	  strategy	  for	  achieving	  ‘a	  just	  world	  without	  poverty’509.	  Under	  these	  strategies,	  all	  OI’s	  work	  between	  2007-­‐12	  was	  framed	  by	  a	  commitment	  to	  ‘five,	  broad,	  rights-­‐based’	  aims;	  while	  from	  2013	  to	  2019,	  work	  is	  to	  be	  focused	  on	  	  ‘Six	  goals	  to	  change	  our	  world’.	  	  	  By	  comparing	  these	  goals	  we	  can	  see	  not	  only	  strategic	  shifts	  in	  emphasis	  on	  projects,	  but	  also	  evidence	  of	  theorising	  the	  possibility	  of	  goal	  attainment.	  In	  the	  earlier	  period	  (2007-­‐12),	  the	  five	  rights-­‐based	  goals	  were:	  the	  right	  to	  a	  sustainable	  livelihood;	  right	  to	  basic	  social	  services;	  right	  to	  life	  and	  security;	  right	  to	  be	  heard;	  and	  the	  right	  to	  an	  identity510.	  In	  the	  latter	  period	  (2013-­‐19:3),	  they	  are:	  ‘The	  Right	  to	  be	  Heard	  —	  People	  claiming	  their	  right	  to	  a	  better	  life’;	  ‘Advancing	  gender	  justice’;	  ‘Saving	  lives,	  now	  and	  in	  the	  future’;	  ‘Sustainable	  food’;	  ‘Fair	  sharing	  of	  natural	  resources’;	  ‘Financing	  for	  development	  and	  universal	  essential	  services’.	  A	  ‘right	  to	  be	  heard’	  has	  moved	  to	  the	  top	  of	  the	  agenda	  and	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
509	  These	  two	  strategic	  plans	  were	  extant,	  consecutively,	  during	  the	  research	  phase	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
510	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  apart	  from	  the	  right	  to	  life	  and	  security	  (which	  are	  enshrined	  in	  the	  UDHR),	  
these	  so-­‐called	  ‘rights-­‐based’	  aims	  all	  refer	  to	  controversial	  social	  and	  economic	  (or	  ‘positive’)	  rights	  that	  
remain	  aspirational,	  and	  reflect	  a	  distinctly	  cosmopolitan	  liberal	  left	  political	  philosophy.	  It	  is	  necessary	  
to	  note	  that	  freedom	  of	  speech	  and	  expression,	  which	  is	  enshrined	  in	  the	  UDHR,	  is	  not	  the	  same	  thing	  as	  
a	  ‘right	  to	  be	  heard’,	  which	  is	  not.	  Also,	  the	  right	  to	  ‘social	  security’	  (UDHR),	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  ‘a	  right	  to	  
basic	  social	  services’,	  and	  is,	  in	  any	  event,	  conditional	  on	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  including	  national	  
resources	  and	  inability	  to	  work	  due	  to	  circumstances	  beyond	  an	  individual’s	  control.	  See	  Brown	  
(2008:519)	  for	  an	  additional	  perspective	  on	  this	  debate.	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remaining	  goals	  have	  been	  framed	  more	  in	  the	  language	  of	  social	  justice	  rather	  than	  as	  universal	  rights511.	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  indicates	  a	  shift	  from	  benchmark	  goals	  to	  idealistic	  goals,	  which	  have	  no	  clear	  standards	  for	  attainment,	  while	  the	  ways	  to	  achieve	  them	  are	  essentially	  matters	  of	  political	  opinion.	  	  	  	  By	  adopting	  its	  Single	  Management	  Structure,	  Oxfam’s	  stated	  aim	  is	  to	  ensure	  it	  can	  more	  efficiently	  share	  its	  services	  throughout	  the	  network,	  raise	  funds	  jointly,	  and	  promote	  ‘one	  brand	  and	  one	  voice’,	  ‘one	  Oxfam’	  (OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2010-­‐11:7;	  OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013:22).	  In	  light	  of	  its	  present	  financial	  difficulties	  this	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  an	  efficient	  move.	  However,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  an	  apparent	  contradiction	  in	  this	  new	  organisational	  strategy:	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  Oxfam	  appears	  to	  be	  adapting	  to	  international	  institutional	  precepts	  in	  regard	  to	  subsidiarity512	  and	  localisation	  practices	  (see	  Section	  8.3.1),	  which	  manifests	  itself	  in	  a	  dispersal	  of	  central	  authority,	  while	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  adopting	  an	  organisational	  compliance	  strategy	  (the	  SMS)	  to	  strengthen	  its	  central	  control.	  
8.4.2	  Overview	  of	  Oxfam’s	  advocacy	  strategies	  	  	  This	  section	  discusses	  a	  number	  of	  communications	  strategies	  I	  have	  identified	  in	  Oxfam’s	  advocacy	  operations	  by	  way	  of	  an	  external	  communications	  auditing	  process513.	  From	  its	  inception	  as	  a	  campaigning	  organisation	  to	  raise	  funds	  for	  wartime	  famine	  relief,	  Oxfam	  now	  puts	  considerable	  advocacy	  expertise	  into	  framing	  international	  political	  issues	  in	  language	  that	  is	  colloquial,	  potentially	  influential	  and	  strategically	  motivational.	  The	  reason	  Oxfam	  currently	  gives	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
511	  This	  thesis	  notes	  the	  similarities	  between	  the	  ‘right	  to	  be	  heard’	  language	  of	  the	  Strategic	  Plan	  2013-­‐
2019	  and	  the	  ‘Right	  to	  Communicate’	  debates	  in	  support	  of	  the	  historical	  civil	  society	  campaign	  for	  a	  
New	  World	  Information	  and	  Communication	  Order	  (NWICO).	  The	  notion	  of	  a	  NWICO,	  in	  turn,	  is	  
regarded	  as	  an	  offspring	  of	  the	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order	  (NIEO)	  campaign	  that	  foundered	  in	  
the	  UN	  during	  the	  70’s	  and	  80’s.	  See	  Dakroury,	  et	  al,	  2009:2-­‐4,	  112-­‐114,	  127;	  OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013:13.	  
512	  The	  principle	  that	  tries	  to	  ensure	  that	  decisions	  are	  taken	  as	  close	  as	  possible	  to	  the	  citizen	  (see,	  for	  
example,	  Cini,	  2007:37,	  465).	  
513	  This	  process	  uses	  communications	  theory	  as	  an	  analytical	  lens	  to	  evaluate	  the	  external	  
communications	  of	  an	  organisation.	  There	  are	  some	  unavoidable	  areas	  of	  overlap	  between	  this	  section	  
and	  the	  following	  section	  outlining	  political	  strategies,	  as	  it	  is	  in	  many	  instances	  impractical	  to	  try	  to	  
separate	  the	  political	  messages	  of	  advocacy	  strategies	  (which	  can	  be	  analysed	  from	  both	  political	  and	  
communications	  standpoints),	  and	  the	  advocacy/branding	  aspects	  of	  political	  strategies	  (which,	  again,	  
can	  be	  analysed	  from	  both	  of	  these	  theoretical	  positions).	  I	  argue,	  however,	  that	  if	  TANs	  are	  analysed	  
using	  only	  political	  theoretical	  frameworks	  then	  important,	  indeed	  crucial,	  explanatory	  insights	  into	  
political	  relationships	  are	  missed	  as	  these	  can	  be	  only	  partially	  explained	  by	  Politics	  theories.	  I	  suggest,	  
therefore,	  that	  at	  least	  a	  basic	  overview	  of	  the	  following	  Oxfam	  advocacy	  strategies	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  
to	  understand	  how	  it	  expresses	  itself	  to	  its	  targeted	  audiences	  —	  so	  portraying	  its	  corporate	  qualities	  
and	  strategic	  purposes.	  The	  reactions	  to	  these	  activities	  by	  both	  targeted	  and	  untargeted	  audiences	  can	  
also	  be	  observed	  in	  the	  discourses	  and	  analysed.	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selecting	  this	  methodology	  is	  to	  ‘raise	  public	  awareness	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  poverty	  and	  encourage	  ordinary	  people	  to	  take	  action	  for	  a	  fairer	  world’.	  Its	  campaigns	  are	  major,	  on-­‐going,	  commitments	  and	  are	  waged,	  as	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  global	  movement,	  to	  end	  ‘unfair	  trade	  rules’,	  demand	  better	  health	  and	  education	  services	  for	  all,	  combat	  climate	  change,	  support	  causes	  related	  to	  food	  and	  agriculture,	  and	  fight	  for	  arms	  control	  and	  an	  end	  to	  conflicts	  and	  disasters	  (OI	  data,	  2012a)	  514.	  	  	  What	  then	  does	  a	  contemporary	  Oxfam	  campaign	  involve?	  A	  typical	  example	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  protracted	  ‘Control	  Arms’	  campaign.	  OI	  describes	  this	  campaign	  on	  its	  Website	  as	  ‘a	  global	  civil	  society	  alliance’	  that	  is	  calling	  for	  a	  global,	  legally	  binding	  Arms	  Trade	  Treaty	  (ATT)	  to	  control	  the	  international	  arms	  trade	  (OI	  news,	  2013a,	  2013b;	  OI	  data	  2013c;	  OI	  Report,	  2013b)	  515.	  While	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly’s	  adoption	  of	  this	  Treaty,	  was	  claimed	  by	  Oxfam	  and	  other	  NGOs	  as	  a	  conclusive	  victory	  for	  civil	  society	  instrumentalism	  —	  ‘a	  truly	  historic,	  astonishing	  day’,	  ‘the	  dawn	  of	  a	  new	  era’	  (OI	  news,	  2013a)	  —	  the	  reality	  is	  that	  the	  ATT	  is	  an	  unfinished	  project	  on	  the	  international	  back-­‐burner,	  widely	  regarded	  as	  toothless	  and	  ‘littered	  with	  loopholes’	  (vide	  OI	  news,	  2013b;	  The	  Washington	  Times,	  2013;	  
Ceasefire,	  2013).	  Nevertheless,	  Oxfam’s	  campaign	  perseveres	  in	  its	  quest	  for	  a	  legally-­‐binding	  instrument	  that	  is	  a	  definitive	  treaty	  in	  more	  than	  name	  only516.	  Assessing	  its	  current	  value	  is,	  I	  suggest,	  dependent	  on	  whether	  one	  is	  optimistic	  about	  the	  prospects	  for	  blocking	  warring	  factions	  from	  acquiring	  lethal	  weapons	  on	  globalised	  markets517.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  envisage	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  50	  of	  the	  world’s	  smaller	  states	  could	  compel	  any	  one	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  sovereign	  states	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
514	  This	  thesis	  notes	  an	  apparent	  contradiction	  in	  Oxfam’s	  stated	  ambition	  to	  raise	  public	  awareness	  of	  
the	  causes	  of	  poverty	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  imposing	  self-­‐restraint	  in	  its	  advocacy	  in	  regard	  to	  naming-­‐
and-­‐shaming,	  or	  referring	  to	  social,	  cultural,	  religious	  and	  political	  structural	  factors	  as	  the	  possible,	  or	  
even	  probable,	  causes	  of	  others’	  misfortunes	  and	  the	  poverty	  that	  afflicts	  their	  lives	  (see	  Red	  Cross,	  
2012a).	  The	  distortions	  of	  complex	  reality	  and	  the	  ethical	  questions	  raised	  by	  over-­‐positive	  messaging	  
by	  transnational	  NGOs	  were	  specific	  subject	  areas	  investigated	  in	  the	  Polis	  Report	  (Polis	  Report,	  2012).	  
515	  The	  Oxfam	  International	  Website	  text	  implies	  that	  Oxfam	  was	  the	  principal	  driver	  of	  the	  petition	  and	  
campaign	  (using	  the	  words:	  ‘When	  Oxfam	  and	  the	  Control	  Arms	  coalition	  launched	  this	  campaign	  a	  
decade	  ago…’).	  In	  fact,	  Oxfam	  was	  just	  one	  of	  around	  100	  NGO	  members	  of	  the	  Control	  Arms	  campaign,	  
which	  includes	  many	  large	  and	  prominent	  worldwide	  organisations,	  such	  as	  Amnesty	  International	  and	  
the	  International	  Action	  Network	  Against	  Small	  Arms	  (IANSA)	  —	  (OI	  data,	  2013b;	  CAC	  data,	  2013).	  
516	  Despite	  strong	  inferences	  on	  the	  Oxfam	  Website	  that	  following	  the	  UN	  vote	  ‘this	  ATT	  may	  soon	  
become	  a	  reality’,	  the	  ATT	  is	  widely	  considered	  to	  be	  many	  years	  away,	  if	  ever.	  China,	  Russia,	  Iran,	  North	  
Korea	  and	  Syria	  are	  among	  the	  powerful	  states	  that	  have	  not	  endorsed	  it.	  Some	  U.S.	  Senators	  described	  
the	  ATT	  as	  ‘dead	  on	  arrival’.	  Although	  154	  states	  approved	  the	  ATT	  in	  April	  2013,	  by	  year’s	  end	  only	  144	  
had	  followed	  up	  by	  signing	  it	  and	  only	  eight	  had	  ratified	  their	  earlier	  endorsement.	  The	  Treaty	  will	  not	  
be	  considered	  formally	  completed	  until	  50	  countries	  have	  both	  signed	  and	  ratified	  it.	  
517	  As	  this	  thesis	  was	  nearing	  completion,	  the	  Ukraine	  crisis	  added	  strength	  to	  this	  concern.	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to	  abide	  by	  the	  Arms	  Trade	  Treaty	  against	  its	  will	  (OI	  news,	  2013a;	  The	  
Washington	  Times,	  2013;	  UNODA,	  2013;	  Ceasefire,	  2013;	  The	  Independent,	  2013b).	  Indeed,	  Ceasefire	  (Ibid)	  claimed	  ‘NGOs	  mis-­‐sold	  the	  treaty	  to	  their	  supporters’.	  	  	  This	  study	  noted	  striking	  parallels	  between	  the	  role	  played	  by	  NGOs	  in	  the	  ATT	  campaign	  and	  other	  disarmament	  treaty	  campaigns	  —	  the	  Comprehensive	  Test	  Ban	  Treaty	  and	  the	  Mine	  Ban	  Treaty	  (1997)	  518,	  promoted	  by	  the	  International	  Campaign	  to	  Ban	  Landmines	  (ICBL),	  (CTBTO	  data,	  2013c;	  ICBL	  data,	  2013).	  Although	  the	  landmine	  campaign	  is	  routinely	  cited	  by	  scholars519	  and	  journalists	  as	  one	  of	  a	  handful	  of	  outstanding	  successes	  of	  advocacy	  NGOs,	  the	  misleading	  impression	  that	  landmines	  are	  an	  aberration	  of	  the	  past	  is	  incorrect	  but	  widely	  believed	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  Intriguingly,	  the	  ICBL	  Website	  describes	  the	  current	  status	  of	  the	  project	  to	  secure	  universal	  support	  for	  the	  ban	  ‘a	  success	  in	  progress’	  (ICBL	  data,	  2013;	  The	  Independent,	  2013b).	  Similarly,	  the	  Comprehensive	  Test	  Ban	  Treaty	  remains	  unsigned	  and/or	  ratified	  by	  a	  substantial	  group	  of	  states,	  whose	  endorsement	  is	  essential	  for	  it	  to	  become	  international	  law	  (CTBTO	  data,	  2013c).	  	  
	  Oxfam’s	  campaign	  strategies	  are	  operationalised	  using	  an	  extensive	  array	  of	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  communications	  techniques	  and	  technologies	  from	  the	  current	  transnational	  advocacy	  toolbox.	  As	  may	  be	  gauged	  from	  its	  Website	  and	  mass	  media	  coverage	  (OI	  data,	  2012a),	  these	  tools	  include:	  developing	  a	  strategic	  brand	  identity	  through	  communications	  techniques	  and	  technologies;	  framing	  and	  disseminating	  news	  stories	  and	  analyses;	  issuing	  press	  releases,	  feature	  articles	  and	  status	  reports;	  providing	  links	  to	  FAQs,	  reports,	  documents,	  other	  Websites,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
518	  Formally	  entitled	  the	  Convention	  on	  the	  Prohibition	  of	  the	  Use,	  Stockpiling,	  Production	  and	  Transfer	  
of	  Anti-­‐Personnel	  Mines	  and	  on	  their	  Destruction	  (UNTC	  data,	  2013b).	  The	  global	  landmine	  ban,	  which	  
began	  in	  1997	  with	  a	  similar	  treaty	  to	  the	  Arms	  Trade	  Treaty,	  currently	  has	  161	  states	  signed	  up	  to	  it	  
(UNTC	  data,	  2013b).	  However,	  the	  world’s	  largest	  landmine	  manufacturers,	  including	  the	  U.S.A,	  Russia,	  
China,	  Iran,	  India	  and	  Pakistan,	  have	  refused	  to	  support	  it.	  As	  a	  result,	  landmines	  are	  still	  routinely	  
available	  and	  are	  still	  being	  used.	  
519	  For	  example,	  Willetts	  (2011:54,	  161)	  and	  Florini	  (2000:2).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Tarrow,	  (2005:	  163,173-­‐
175)	  provides	  unusually	  deep	  insights	  that	  do	  not	  tell	  the	  story	  from	  any	  one	  perspective	  or	  attribute	  
achievement	  of	  the	  international	  agreement	  to	  a	  single,	  or	  principal,	  causality	  (i.e.	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  
coalitions	  of	  NGOs).	  Tarrow	  identifies	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  contributing	  factors	  that	  resulted	  in	  the	  successful	  
landmines	  Convention	  of	  1997.	  Tarrow	  notes:	  ‘These	  groups	  might	  have	  made	  scant	  headway	  had	  it	  not	  
been	  for	  the	  convergence	  of	  their	  efforts	  with	  international	  institutions	  like	  the	  International	  Committee	  
of	  the	  Red	  Cross	  and	  the	  UN,	  and	  with	  three	  medium-­‐sized	  states,	  Canada,	  France	  and	  Norway,	  which	  
gave	  the	  movement	  legitimacy,	  provided	  for	  its	  meetings,	  and	  formed	  the	  core	  of	  a	  bloc	  of	  interested	  
governments.	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academic	  papers	  and	  texts;	  posting	  photo	  images,	  videos,	  podcasts	  and	  blogs;	  maintaining	  a	  presence	  on	  leading	  social	  media	  sites	  (Twitter,	  Facebook,	  YouTube	  and	  Flickr);	  maintaining	  media	  centres	  and	  media	  liaison	  officers	  worldwide:	  providing	  spokespersons	  and	  celebrity	  ‘influencers’	  for	  media	  interviews;	  launching	  	  polls,	  appeals	  and	  petitions;	  and	  collecting	  donations	  though	  Donate	  
Now	  ‘hot’	  buttons	  on	  its	  Website.	  	  	  Thus,	  Oxfam	  conforms	  with	  the	  communications	  strategies	  of	  both	  Greenpeace	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  in	  the	  way	  it	  uses	  advanced	  advocacy	  tools,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  has	  differed	  until	  recently,	  by	  using	  a	  less	  sensationalist	  and	  more	  politically	  sensitive	  messaging	  tone	  to	  frame	  its	  messages.	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  emphasis	  on	  framing	  and	  individual	  storytelling	  at	  the	  micro-­‐sociological	  level	  is	  distinctive520	  and	  in	  line	  with	  international	  communications	  best	  practice	  techniques—	  emphasising	  the	  authentic	  ‘voices’	  of	  the	  poor	  and	  their	  suffering,	  on	  whose	  behalf	  Oxfam	  makes	  representative	  claims521.	  	  	  In	  opting	  to	  publicise	  ‘distant	  suffering’	  in	  this	  way,	  Oxfam	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  following	  two,	  contemporary,	  ‘best-­‐practice’	  trends	  in	  humanitarian	  NGO	  communications	  praxis:	  (i)	  adherence	  to	  Principle	  No.10	  of	  the	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  for	  the	  International	  Red	  Cross	  and	  Red	  Crescent	  Movement	  and	  NGOs	  in	  Disaster	  Relief,	  to	  which	  Oxfam	  is	  a	  signatory	  (Red	  Cross,	  2012a,	  2012b,	  1995522):	  	  	  In	   our	   information,	   publicity	   and	   advertizing	   activities,	   we	   shall	   recognize	  disaster	  victims	  as	  dignified	  human	  beings,	  not	  hopeless	  objects.	  
	  And	  (ii)	  attempting	  to	  deepen	  the	  engagement	  of	  supporters	  by	  using	  narrative	  styles	  that	  go	  beyond	  eliciting	  feelings	  of	  sympathy	  and	  focusing	  more	  on	  creating	  strategic	  cognitive	  and	  emotional	  cues	  and	  biases	  that	  convey	  meaning	  to	  cross-­‐cultural	  audiences.	  This,	  it	  is	  argued,	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  highlighting	  universal	  needs	  and	  aspirations	  and	  key	  moments	  in	  life	  that	  people	  everywhere	  recognise	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
520	  These	  include,	  most	  prominently,	  OI’s	  Website	  and	  the	  messages,	  news	  articles,	  videos	  and	  
publications	  available	  there	  (OI	  data,	  2012).	  
521	  See	  Saward	  (2010)	  for	  a	  recent	  treatise	  on	  the	  use	  of	  a	  claim-­‐based	  approach	  to	  political	  
representation.	  For	  an	  alternative	  view	  of	  TANs	  as	  self-­‐interested	  actors	  competing	  in	  an	  aggressive	  
market	  for	  resources,	  see	  Lecy,	  Mitchell	  and	  Schmitz	  (2010:229-­‐251).	  
522	  The	  1995	  document	  is	  the	  original	  Code	  of	  Conduct,	  while	  the	  2012	  wording	  cited	  here	  is	  the	  
contemporary,	  abridged,	  version.	  Oxfam	  International	  was	  one	  of	  the	  eight	  leading	  NGOs	  who	  
developed	  and	  signed	  the	  original	  Code	  (Red	  Cross,	  1995,	  2012a).	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as	  resembling	  features	  of	  their	  own	  life	  experiences	  (vide	  also	  Polis	  Report,	  2012:18).	  Weiss	  (2013:2):	  proffers	  the	  dispassionate	  view	  that:	  	  NGOs	   need	   contributions	   from	   donors	   who	   wish	   to	   have	   their	   heartstrings	  pulled	  with	  a	  story	  of	  one	  suffering	  child	  (indeed,	  two	  is	  often	  too	  many	  for	  the	  most	  effective	  image)	  who	  is	  caught	  in	  the	  crosshairs	  of	  war	  and	  can	  only	  be	  saved	  by	  their	  donations.	  
 However,	  many	  NGO	  advocacy	  professionals	  have	  admitted	  that	  while	  emotion	  is	  vital	  for	  creating	  a	  personal	  connection	  and	  motivating	  people	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  solidarity	  with	  others	  supporting	  a	  cause,	  the	  use	  of	  emotion	  in	  strategies	  can	  antagonise	  and	  lead	  people	  to	  feel	  manipulated	  through	  feelings	  of	  guilt.	  Consequently,	  techniques	  to	  promote	  sympathy	  can	  cause	  disengagement,	  resistance	  and	  criticism	  (Polis	  Report,	  2012:5)	  523.	  In	  our	  information-­‐dense	  environment,	  states	  the	  Polis	  report,	  ‘people	  know,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  necessarily	  act’	  (ibid:1):	  	   It	   seems	   that	   there	   is	   a	   gap	   between	   knowledge	   and	   action;	   between	   what	  people	  know	  about	  suffering	  and	  how	  they	  act	  and	  react.	  We	  know	  very	  little	  about	  this	  gap:	  how	  people	  respond	  to	  messages	  about	  suffering,	  what	  elicits	  certain	   responses	   and	   what	   blocks	   or	   works	   on	   people’s	   hearts,	   minds	   and	  pockets.	   […]	   Some	   commentators	   have	   suggested	   that	   audience	  disengagement	   can	   be	   caused	   by	   the	   approaches	   and	   cultural	   frames	   NGOs	  themselves	   have	   used	   to	   communicate:	   that	   the	   emphasis	   on	   urgency,	   small	  donations,	  “giver	  power”	  and	  grateful	  recipients	  may	  be	  part	  of	  the	  problem.	  	  To	  differentiate	  itself	  in	  this	  crowded	  and	  competitive	  market,	  Oxfam	  harnesses	  the	  media	  attraction	  of	  high-­‐profile	  influencers	  and	  celebrity	  ‘global	  ambassadors’	  to	  tell	  its	  stories.	  In	  adopting	  a	  personalised	  style	  of	  portrayal,	  this	  thesis	  suggests,	  the	  enormity	  and	  complexity	  of	  situations	  such	  as	  drought	  and	  warfare	  can	  be	  reduced	  in	  regard	  to	  cognitive	  effort524	  and	  framed	  in	  the	  minimalist	  terms	  of	  individual	  human	  experiences	  and	  emotions,	  to	  which	  external	  mass	  audiences	  can	  more	  readily	  relate	  and,	  possibly,	  be	  more	  motivated	  to	  assist.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
523	  In	  late	  2011,	  the	  academic	  research	  team	  responsible	  for	  the	  Polis	  report	  ‘Who	  Cares?	  Challenges	  
and	  opportunities	  in	  communicating	  distant	  suffering’,	  held	  a	  public	  debate	  at	  the	  LSE	  in	  London,	  to	  
gather	  the	  contemporary	  perspectives	  of	  NGO	  professionals	  involved	  in	  development	  and	  humanitarian	  
communications,	  advocacy	  and	  fundraising	  (Polis	  Report,	  2012:1).	  	  
524	  Kahneman	  (2011:7-­‐15,	  59-­‐70,	  71-­‐78,	  105,	  209)	  discusses	  the	  human	  inclination	  towards	  simplifying	  
heuristics,	  appeals	  to	  cognitive	  biases	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  ‘System	  1’	  (automatic)	  and	  ‘System	  2’	  
(effortful)	  thinking.	  He	  explains	  how	  persuasive	  messages	  can	  be	  made	  more	  effective	  and	  believable	  by	  
appealing	  to	  the	  cognitive	  ease	  of	  our	  dominant	  System	  1	  thinking,	  which	  inter	  alia	  relies	  on	  
resemblances,	  is	  ready	  to	  jump	  to	  conclusions,	  and	  focuses	  on	  existing	  evidence	  (which	  may	  be	  flimsy,	  
vague	  or	  wrong),	  and	  ignores	  absent	  evidence.	  Moreover	  the	  ‘affect	  heuristic’	  describes	  situations	  in	  
which	  judgements	  and	  decisions	  are	  guided	  directly	  by	  feelings	  of	  liking	  and	  disliking,	  with	  little	  
deliberation	  or	  reasoning	  (Ibid:12).	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  Indeed,	  the	  placement	  at	  centre	  stage	  of	  those	  most	  affected	  by	  an	  issue	  —	  emphasising	  the	  ‘dependent	  affectedness’	  of	  people	  —	  has	  been	  shown	  also	  to	  have	  the	  greatest	  effect	  in	  establishing	  authenticity	  for	  advocacy	  organisations	  and	  enhancing	  validity	  of	  ‘voice’	  in	  political	  deliberations525.	  This	  strategy	  stands	  in	  sharp	  contrast	  to	  that	  of	  Greenpeace,	  which	  tends	  to	  concentrate	  on	  its	  own	  activities.	  A	  further	  advantage	  of	  Oxfam’s	  use	  of	  situated	  actors	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  foreground	  the	  involvement	  of	  both	  receivers	  and	  providers	  of	  aid	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  Therefore,	  Oxfam’s	  storytelling	  tactic	  of	  using	  grassroots	  and	  frontline	  spokespersons	  to	  deliver	  both	  information	  and	  authenticity	  cues	  to	  its	  audiences	  in	  news	  articles	  is	  a	  logical	  one.	  Of	  special	  relevance	  to	  this	  argument	  is	  Kahneman’s	  work	  on	  people’s	  natural	  inclination	  to	  construct	  fast,	  seemingly	  coherent,	  narratives	  that	  help	  them	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  partial	  information	  in	  a	  complex	  world	  (2011:87-­‐88).	  Examples	  of	  Oxfam’s	  use	  of	  this	  communications	  technique	  can	  be	  found	  on	  the	  OI	  Website,	  with	  advocacy	  news	  articles	  deploying	  a	  human	  interest	  editorial	  style	  (e.g.	  OI	  news,	  2012).	  	  	  This	  account	  of	  personal	  struggles	  in	  adverse	  circumstances	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  cynical	  treatment	  of	  these	  texts,	  or	  one	  that	  is	  intended	  to	  drain	  the	  accounts	  of	  socio-­‐political,	  or	  other,	  meaning.	  The	  editorial	  crafting	  of	  complex	  political	  and	  humanitarian	  issues	  as	  individual	  human-­‐interest	  stories	  is	  just	  one	  of	  a	  number	  of	  possible	  editorial	  styles	  that	  could	  have	  been	  chosen	  by	  Oxfam	  writers526.	  Oxfam’s	  underlying	  motivation	  in	  adopting	  this	  editorial	  style	  is	  considered	  in	  this	  thesis	  to	  be	  significant.	  In	  particular,	  it	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  an	  indicator	  of	  Oxfam’s	  understanding	  of	  its	  audiences	  and,	  by	  extension,	  assumptions	  about	  sources	  of	  income.	  It	  is	  less	  obvious	  how	  Oxfam	  attracts	  its	  funding	  from	  international	  institutions.	  However,	  in	  view	  of	  Oxfam’s	  demonstrable	  adaptability	  (vide	  Section	  8.3.1	  and	  Malloch	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
525	  Bendell	  (2006)	  has	  shown	  that	  there	  are	  five	  primary	  bases	  upon	  which	  a	  ‘voice’	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  
have	  value	  in	  political	  deliberations	  —	  a	  subject	  of	  particular	  significance	  for	  those	  who	  advocate	  on	  
behalf	  of	  others.	  Providing	  these	  findings	  in	  a	  UN	  Dossier,	  Bendell	  lists	  the	  following	  five	  evaluative	  
criteria:	  relevant	  experience	  of	  the	  speaker,	  expertise,	  novelty,	  content,	  and	  what	  can	  be	  called	  the	  
‘dependent	  affectedness,’	  of	  a	  voice.	  Of	  these,	  Bendell	  asserts	  that	  the	  last	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  key	  
to	  effectiveness.	  This	  theory	  holds	  that	  those	  most	  affected	  by	  an	  issue	  are	  considered	  to	  have	  the	  
greatest	  ‘validity	  of	  voice’	  in	  discourses	  on	  that	  subject.	  
526	  Given	  the	  international	  professional	  level	  of	  Oxfam’s	  external	  communications	  it	  would	  be	  
inconceivably	  naïve	  to	  assume	  the	  organisation’s	  external	  affairs	  executives	  were	  aiming	  their	  
communications	  at	  unidentified	  audiences.	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Brown’s	  observation	  in	  Section	  8.4.2)	  it	  is	  hypothesised	  that	  Oxfam	  is	  coevolving527	  with	  the	  institutions	  with	  which	  it	  has	  relationships.	  	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  framing	  of	  issues	  by	  both	  Greenpeace	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  Oxfam’s	  storylines	  have	  avoided	  pointing	  fingers	  at	  political	  or	  structural	  causation,	  focusing	  instead	  on	  harmful	  effects	  on	  real	  lives	  and	  the	  situated	  nature	  of	  much	  human	  misfortune	  and	  suffering.	  In	  my	  analysis,	  Oxfam	  typically	  positions	  its	  represented	  subjects	  as	  under-­‐recognised	  heroes,	  who	  carry	  on	  their	  lives	  with	  determination	  and	  dignity,	  despite	  great	  hardships	  or	  injury,	  and	  having	  no	  effective	  political	  voice.	  In	  marketing	  and	  PR	  communications	  practice	  this	  is	  widely	  understood	  as	  capitalising	  on	  the	  Panda	  effect528	  to	  project	  subliminal	  cues	  to	  presumed	  commonalities	  in	  human	  experiences,	  including	  admired	  attributes,	  in	  order	  to	  influence	  audiences	  in	  forming	  judgements	  (Prendergast,	  2000:450).	  	  	  	  From	  the	  1980s	  ‘flies-­‐in-­‐the-­‐eyes’	  imagery529	  of	  starving	  African	  children,	  Oxfam	  has	  adopted	  its	  current,	  humanising,	  style	  of	  portrayal	  of	  distant	  suffering,	  presenting	  aid	  beneficiaries	  as	  resilient,	  empowered	  and	  able	  to	  make	  real	  changes	  to	  their	  lives	  and	  their	  communities530.	  This	  is	  in	  accordance	  with	  Oxfam’s	  commitment	  to	  the	  Red	  Cross	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  for	  NGOs	  in	  disaster	  relief	  (Red	  Cross	  2012a,	  1995).	  This	  Code	  (Red	  Cross,	  2012b)	  contains	  the	  principles:	  ‘The	  humanitarian	  imperative	  comes	  first’;	  ‘We	  shall	  endeavour	  not	  to	  act	  as	  instruments	  of	  government	  foreign	  policy’;	  and	  ‘We	  shall	  respect	  culture	  and	  custom’.	  	  While	  Oxfam	  has	  historically	  refrained	  from	  commenting	  on	  deep	  structural	  mechanisms	  that	  may	  have	  determining	  causality	  in	  the	  communities	  in	  which	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
527	  See	  Chapter	  3	  for	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  interaction	  of	  agents	  and	  the	  outcomes	  for	  agency,	  as	  separate	  
from	  the	  effects	  agents	  have	  on	  systemic	  outcomes.	  See	  also	  Archer,	  1995:247-­‐48,	  for	  a	  definition	  of	  the	  
‘double	  morphogenesis’	  that	  is	  involved	  in	  this	  process.	  In	  Archer’s	  theorisation,	  agency	  leads	  to	  
structural	  and	  cultural	  elaboration,	  but	  is	  itself	  elaborated	  in	  the	  process	  (ibid:147).	  
528	  The	  concept	  of	  a	  Panda	  effect	  in	  marketing	  practice	  is	  linked	  to	  China’s	  use	  of	  so-­‐called	  ‘Panda	  
diplomacy’	  to	  humanise	  its	  image	  and	  soften	  psychological	  opposition	  in	  intractable	  political	  situations	  
(L.A.	  Times,	  2006).	  For	  a	  more	  scientific	  basis	  to	  this	  mainstream	  communications	  conceptualisation,	  see	  
relevant	  work	  on	  ‘associative	  activation’	  and	  ‘judgemental	  heuristics’	  by	  Kahneman	  (2011:50-­‐58,	  419),	  
and	  Tversky	  and	  Kahneman	  (1974).	  	  
529	  This	  neologism	  is	  used	  in	  the	  humanitarian	  aid	  sector	  and	  is	  not	  this	  author’s	  construct	  (e.g.	  Polis	  
Report,	  2012:4).	  
530This	  paradigm	  shift	  in	  NGO	  portrayals	  of	  international	  aid	  recipients	  is	  examined	  in	  the	  Polis	  report	  on	  
the	  portrayal	  of	  ‘distant	  suffering’	  (Polis	  Report,	  2012:4).	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works,	  there	  have	  been	  signs	  during	  2013	  and	  early	  2014531	  that	  Oxfam’s	  previous	  pattern	  of	  mainly	  concentrating	  on	  alleviating	  suffering	  through	  assisting	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  material	  goods	  in	  needy	  communities,	  and	  avoiding	  blame	  attribution,	  may	  be	  changing.	  The	  period	  during	  which	  these	  changes	  have	  appeared	  are	  broadly	  coterminous	  with	  the	  arrival	  of	  Winnie	  Byanyima	  as	  Oxfam	  International’s	  new	  CEO	  in	  May	  2013	  and	  the	  presentation,	  shortly	  afterwards,	  of	  a	  new	  five-­‐year	  Strategic	  Plan,	  entitled	  The	  Power	  of	  People	  Against	  Poverty	  (OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013).	  	  
	  Oxfam	  has	  recently	  begun	  targeting	  major	  multinational	  corporate	  brands	  in	  its	  advocacy	  and	  linking	  them,	  through	  their	  supply	  chains,	  back	  to	  sugar	  producers,	  alleged	  ‘land	  grabs’	  and,	  ultimately,	  to	  individual	  cases	  of	  poverty.	  In	  a	  report	  and	  video	  released	  in	  October	  2013	  (OI	  Report,	  2013a;	  OI	  video,	  2013),	  Oxfam	  cited	  Coca-­‐Cola,	  Pepsi	  and	  Associated	  British	  Foods	  as	  benefiting	  from	  sugar	  obtained	  unethically	  (Figure	  8.6).	  In	  2013,	  Oxfam	  launched	  an	  exposé-­‐oriented	  initiative	  entitled	  ‘Behind	  the	  Brands’,	  calling	  on	  governments	  and	  companies	  to	  build	  a	  more	  equitable	  food	  system.	  The	  ‘Behind	  the	  Brands	  Scorecard’	  tracks	  10	  of	  the	  world’s	  biggest	  food	  and	  beverage	  companies532	  and	  assesses	  their	  policies	  and	  commitment	  in	  seven	  areas:	  women,	  small-­‐scale	  farmers,	  farm	  workers,	  water,	  land,	  climate	  change,	  and	  transparency.	  Oxfam	  claimed	  the	  ‘Big	  10’	  lack	  adequate	  policies	  to	  ensure	  local	  communities’	  land	  rights	  are	  protected	  along	  their	  supply	  chains,	  and	  none	  has	  declared	  zero	  tolerance	  in	  regard	  to	  ‘land	  grabbing’	  (OI	  Report,	  2013a:	  2).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
531	  See	  the	  OI	  briefing	  paper	  ‘Working	  for	  the	  Few:	  Political	  capture	  and	  economic	  inequality’	  (OI	  Report,	  
2014),	  which	  was	  released	  to	  coincide	  with	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  2014	  World	  Economic	  Forum	  annual	  
conference	  at	  Davos.	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  briefing	  paper	  both	  complies	  with,	  and	  progresses,	  the	  sea	  change	  
in	  advocacy	  policy,	  towards	  greater	  politicisation,	  outlined	  in	  the	  Strategic	  Plan	  2013-­‐19.	  Oxfam’s	  
criticism	  of	  its	  Oxfam	  Global	  Ambassador	  of	  eight	  years,	  the	  actress	  Scarlett	  Johansson,	  for	  concurrently	  
becoming	  a	  global	  brand	  ambassador	  for	  the	  Israeli	  fizzy	  water	  company	  SodaStream	  International	  Ltd.,	  
was	  also	  overtly	  political	  and	  partisan	  in	  its	  message	  and	  prompted	  mass	  media	  headlines	  in	  January	  
2014	  (see	  OI	  news,	  2014;	  The	  Independent,	  2014;	  The	  Huffington	  Post,	  201;	  The	  Times,	  2014).	  Oxfam’s	  
public	  rebuke	  of	  the	  actress,	  who	  has	  a	  long	  record	  of	  worldwide	  advocacy	  work	  on	  Oxfam’s	  behalf,	  was	  
attributed	  to	  SodaStream’s	  operation	  of	  a	  factory	  in	  an	  Israeli	  settlement	  on	  the	  West	  Bank.	  In	  a	  
statement	  on	  its	  Website,	  OI	  stated:	  ‘Oxfam	  believes	  that	  businesses	  that	  operate	  in	  settlements	  further	  
the	  ongoing	  poverty	  and	  denial	  of	  rights	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  communities	  that	  we	  work	  to	  support.	  Oxfam	  
is	  opposed	  to	  all	  trade	  from	  Israeli	  settlements,	  which	  are	  illegal	  under	  international	  law’.	  Ms	  Johansson	  
ended	  her	  relationship	  with	  Oxfam	  at	  end-­‐January,	  stating	  that	  she	  supported	  building	  bridges	  between	  
the	  West	  Bank	  communities	  and	  not	  boycotts,	  divestments	  and	  sanctions	  (The	  Times,	  2014).	  	  
532	  The	  'Big	  10'	  companies	  are:	  Associated	  British	  Foods	  (ABF),	  Coca-­‐Cola,	  Danone,	  General	  Mills,	  
Kellogg,	  Mars,	  Mondelez	  International,	  Nestlé,	  PepsiCo,	  and	  Unilever.	  	  
	   301	  
	  
Figure	  8.6	  Media-­‐savvy	  advocacy	  links	  giant	  brands	  to	  poverty,	  via	  sugar	  and	  ‘land	  grabs’	  (Image:	  Oxfam	  Int).	  	  	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  Greenpeace	  case	  study,	  empirical	  research533	  suggests	  that	  a	  corporation’s	  size	  matters	  in	  confrontations	  such	  as	  those	  listed	  above,	  with	  the	  larger	  corporations	  often	  more	  likely	  to	  accommodate	  a	  powerful	  external	  public	  such	  as	  consumer	  activists	  (Reber,	  2004:2).	  In	  light	  of	  this	  theory,	  the	  apparent	  mega-­‐brand	  capitulation	  victories	  frequently	  publicised	  by	  Oxfam	  and	  Greenpeace,	  for	  example,	  could	  be	  portrayed	  as	  ‘straw	  man’	  situations	  with	  easy	  targets.	  Thus,	  I	  suggest,	  the	  extrapolation	  of	  apparent	  advocacy	  strategy	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  commercial	  sphere	  to	  infer	  that	  equivalent	  success	  is	  being	  obtained	  with	  the	  same	  advocacy	  strategies	  in	  other	  spheres	  —	  such	  as	  in	  the	  international	  political	  arena	  —	  is,	  at	  best,	  misleading	  and	  unsound.	  	  	  I	  argue	  that	  by	  framing	  advocacy	  messages	  in	  terms	  of	  ordinary	  individuals	  who	  suffer	  life	  setbacks,	  injustices	  and	  denials	  of	  universal	  rights	  and	  norms	  —	  while	  skirting	  the	  contentious	  structural	  and	  political	  realities	  of	  their	  situations	  and	  the	  particular	  properties	  of	  the	  actors	  —	  OI	  generates	  publicity	  outputs	  that	  are	  typically	  politically	  thin.	  Such	  analysis,	  from	  a	  communications	  perspective,	  suggests	  that	  in	  its	  adoption	  of	  communications	  technology	  and	  marketing	  tactics	  that	  were	  developed	  commercially,	  Oxfam	  encounters	  a	  TAN	  dilemma:	  Oxfam	  needs	  to	  communicate	  a	  consistent	  brand	  identity	  and	  specific	  messages	  that	  resonate	  with	  audiences,	  but	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  its	  advocacy	  —	  deterritorialised	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
533	  Applying	  the	  communications	  paradigm’s	  Contingency	  Theory	  in	  public	  relations	  (Reber,	  2004:2).	  
	   302	  
social	  ideals	  and	  belief	  in	  universal	  norms	  —	  does	  not	  suit	  the	  globe-­‐encircling	  media	  and	  the	  cultural	  understandings	  of	  heterogeneous	  audiences.	  	  	  Therefore,	  the	  thesis	  maintains	  that	  Oxfam’s	  efforts	  to	  promote	  its	  ideology	  manifests	  itself	  in	  Oxfam’s	  simplification	  of	  critical	  issues	  to	  levels	  of	  assumed	  understandings	  that	  fail	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  complexity	  —	  especially	  the	  multi-­‐causality	  and	  disparate	  fitness	  landscapes	  —	  of	  the	  challenges	  communities	  face	  in	  humanitarian	  crisis	  situations.	  Support	  for	  this	  argument	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  authoritative	  Polis	  Report,	  which	  surveyed	  the	  opinions	  of	  numerous	  NGO	  professionals,	  including	  Oxfam	  executives,	  who	  are	  involved	  in	  development	  and	  humanitarian	  advocacy	  and	  fundraising	  (Polis	  Report,	  2012:1,7).	  The	  study	  found	  that	  NGOs	  admitted	  they	  were	  seriously	  challenged	  in	  the	  tasks	  of	  raising	  public	  awareness,	  enhancing	  understanding	  and	  encouraging	  long-­‐term	  commitments	  beyond	  immediate	  reaction,	  without	  losing	  audience	  attention534.	  Commented	  one	  NGO	  communications	  director	  (ibid:	  7):	  	   We’re	   trying	   to	   engage	  people,	   to	   get	   them	   interested	   in	  development,	   think	  about	  the	  world	  and	  that	  they	  need	  to	  take	  action,	  whereas	  what	  is	  successful	  often	  is	  appeals	  that	  pull	  at	  heartstrings,	  that	  use	  extreme	  images	  which	  don’t	  necessarily	   engage.	   […]	   That	   way	   of	   messaging	   works	   in	   terms	   of	   raising	  money	  but	  it	  doesn’t	  work	  in	  terms	  of	  engagement.	  	  The	  report	  acknowledged	  that	  professional	  advocates	  in	  NGOs	  were	  alert	  to	  the	  criticisms	  that	  their	  depictions	  of	  distant	  suffering	  can	  produce	  dehumanising	  imagery	  and	  simplistic	  misrepresentations	  of	  complex	  situations	  (ibid:4,	  also	  Moyo,	  2010:	  xviii-­xix	  and	  Weiss,	  2013:49-­‐52).	  From	  an	  ethical	  perspective,	  some	  saw	  the	  messaging	  as	  potentially	  dangerous	  —	  actually	  masking	  reality535	  —	  and	  there	  were	  notable	  differences	  of	  opinion	  between	  the	  separate	  functional	  categories	  	  (policy	  and	  programme	  workers	  and	  fundraising	  staff)	  over	  the	  framing	  of	  issues536.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
534	  See	  also	  Darnton	  and	  Kirk	  (2011:	  5-­‐6)	  for	  their	  Oxfam-­‐initiated	  study	  on	  the	  ‘precarious’	  situation	  
faced	  by	  NGOs/TANs	  in	  gaining	  and	  sustaining	  public	  engagement	  and	  funding.	  	  
535	  For	  example,	  concern	  was	  expressed	  that	  messaging	  about	  superficial	  aspects	  of	  aid	  victims’	  lives	  
often	  failed	  not	  only	  to	  address	  violence	  but,	  in	  fact,	  masked	  violence.	  An	  advocacy	  director	  asserted:	  ‘it	  
actually	  makes	  a	  lot	  of	  people	  feel	  good	  but	  it	  is	  masking	  reality’	  (Polis	  Report,	  2012:4).	  
536	  Zambian	  economist	  Dambisa	  Moyo	  is	  scathing	  in	  her	  criticism	  of	  misconceived	  Western	  portrayals	  of	  
African	  countries	  as	  hopeless	  charity	  cases	  in	  order	  to	  encourage	  ‘giving	  alms	  to	  the	  poor’.	  The	  notion	  
that	  aid	  can	  alleviate	  systemic	  poverty,	  and	  has	  done	  so,	  is	  a	  myth,	  she	  asserts.	  Instead,	  Moyo	  laments	  
that	  aid	  has	  been	  a	  disaster	  for	  developing	  countries	  and	  has	  ruined	  Africa	  (Moyo,	  2010:xviii-­‐xx)	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To	  progress	  the	  possibility	  of	  audience	  uptake	  of	  its	  messages	  and	  consequent	  motivation,	  an	  organisation	  might	  choose	  an	  audience	  messaging	  strategy	  geared	  to	  either	  particularity	  (horses-­‐for-­‐courses),	  or	  generalisation	  (one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all),	  or	  some	  form	  of	  compromise.	  Global	  commercial	  brands	  manage	  this	  situation	  through	  collaboration	  with	  their	  agents,	  and	  customising	  their	  brand	  communications	  using	  terms	  and	  motivational	  cues	  that	  are	  locally	  appropriate	  for	  specific	  audiences	  and	  stakeholders537	  (see	  also	  Pendergrast,	  2013:348).	  What	  Coca-­‐Cola	  does,	  with	  undoubted	  success,	  is	  to	  identify	  commonalities	  of	  human	  experience538	  and	  then	  forge	  cognitive	  links	  between	  these	  pleasurable	  experiences	  and	  their	  products,	  without	  any	  intention	  to	  alter	  cultures	  and	  beliefs.	  (Pendergrast,	  ibid).	  Plainly,	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  Coca-­‐Cola	  business	  model	  is	  to	  sell	  more	  fizzy	  beverages,	  not	  proselytise	  Western	  values,	  although	  some	  	  forge	  negative	  cognitive	  links	  between	  the	  two.	  	  	  A	  further	  strategy	  is	  the	  move	  in	  2006	  by	  Oxfam,	  Greenpeace,	  Amnesty	  International	  and	  other	  prominent	  NGOs	  to	  found	  the	  INGO	  Accountability	  Charter,	  a	  self-­‐regulatory	  code	  of	  conduct	  for	  international	  NGOs,	  (INGO	  Charter,	  2012;	  OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2010-­‐11:11).	  This	  appears	  to	  be	  not	  only	  a	  creditworthy	  enterprise	  in	  an	  ethical	  sense,	  but	  also	  suggests	  a	  more	  self-­‐preserving	  motive:	  the	  possibility	  that	  its	  establishment	  is	  a	  move	  by	  these	  NGOs/TANs	  to	  redraw	  the	  boundaries	  of	  their	  social	  groups,	  framing	  a	  new	  differentiating	  identity,	  and	  dissociating	  themselves	  from	  other	  NGOs/TANs	  that	  are	  crowding	  the	  market	  and	  do	  not	  meet	  their	  membership	  criteria.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
537	  This	  point	  is	  argued	  from	  authority.	  The	  author	  is	  a	  former	  Coca-­‐Cola	  International	  Communications	  
Manager,	  responsible	  for	  the	  company’s	  corporate	  communications	  function	  in	  over	  60	  countries	  
throughout	  the	  Middle	  and	  Far	  East.	  
538	  For	  example,	  boy-­‐meets-­‐girl,	  family	  celebration,	  friendship,	  sporting	  achievement,	  thirst,	  laughter,	  
enjoyment	  of	  music,	  love	  of	  nature.	  The	  pejorative	  term	  ‘Coca-­‐Colonisation’	  is	  sometimes	  used	  loosely	  
by	  the	  media	  as	  a	  metaphor	  for	  unwanted	  effects	  associated	  with	  modernity	  that	  are	  perceived,	  in	  non-­‐
Western	  countries,	  to	  have	  emanated	  from	  the	  West.	  This	  author	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  
Coca-­‐Cola	  signage	  and	  products	  in	  modernising	  countries	  renders	  the	  Company	  a	  highly	  visible	  target	  for	  
such	  critics,	  belying	  the	  fact	  that	  far	  greater,	  confusing,	  and	  unrecognised	  social	  disruptions	  are	  normally	  
taking	  place	  within	  globalising	  markets	  than	  are	  caused	  by	  the	  energetic	  marketing	  of	  a	  brand	  of	  non-­‐
alcoholic	  beverages.	  Kahneman	  (2011:	  50-­‐58)	  explains	  that	  the	  cognitive	  mechanism	  that	  causes	  such	  an	  
association	  of	  ideas	  has	  been	  known	  for	  a	  long	  time.	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If	  this	  initiative	  to	  form	  an	  exclusive	  INGO	  accountability	  ‘club’	  in	  2006,	  and	  the	  earlier	  joining	  of	  the	  Red	  Cross	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  539,	  is	  indeed	  part	  of	  a	  differentiating	  strategy	  for	  a	  number	  of	  the	  more	  established	  INGOs	  like	  Oxfam,	  it	  would	  fit	  a	  theory	  about	  the	  self-­‐interest	  and	  material	  concerns	  of	  market-­‐driven	  TANs	  that	  is	  now	  gaining	  ground	  among	  some	  scholars	  (Lecy	  et	  al,	  2010;	  229;	  Cooley	  and	  Ron,	  2002,	  2010:205;	  Ron,	  Ramos	  and	  Rodgers,	  2005).	  As	  an	  indication	  of	  Oxfam’s	  standing	  among	  its	  peers,	  its	  former	  Executive	  Director,540	  was	  concurrently	  the	  honorary	  Chairman	  of	  the	  INGO	  Accountability	  Charter’s	  Board	  of	  Directors.	  	  	  In	  the	  realm	  of	  transnational	  advocacy,	  it	  is	  noted	  that	  Oxfam’s	  Honorary	  President	  from	  2002	  to	  2012	  was	  the	  renowned	  human	  rights	  scholar	  and	  campaigner,	  Professor	  Mary	  Robinson,	  former	  President	  of	  Ireland	  and	  former	  UN	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights.	  Its	  Honorary	  Adviser	  is	  the	  distinguished	  economics	  scholar	  Professor	  Amartya	  Sen,	  who	  is	  Professor	  of	  Economics	  and	  Philosophy	  at	  Harvard	  University,	  a	  former	  Nobel	  Prize	  winner	  in	  Economic	  Sciences,	  and	  until	  recently	  the	  Master	  of	  Trinity	  College,	  Cambridge.	  	  	  In	  2007,	  Oxfam	  launched	  a	  Global	  Ambassador’s	  Programme	  involving	  media-­‐friendly	  celebrities,	  including	  actors	  Scarlett	  Johansson541,	  Colin	  Firth,	  Dame	  Helen	  Mirren	  and	  Minnie	  Driver;	  pop	  music	  artists	  Coldplay	  and	  Annie	  Lennox;	  Senegalese	  singer	  Baaba	  Maal;	  and	  Archbishop	  Desmond	  Tutu.	  Although	  the	  involvement	  of	  advocates	  could	  be	  thought	  of	  in	  terms	  of	  Oxfam’s	  political	  strategy,	  their	  engagement	  suggests	  a	  sophisticated	  communications	  strategy:	  one	  that	  ensures	  Oxfam’s	  reputation	  is	  enhanced	  by	  association	  with	  transnational	  influencers	  and	  thought	  leaders;	  virtually	  guarantees	  media	  coverage;	  and	  is	  attuned	  to	  the	  types	  of	  entrée	  Oxfam	  aims	  to	  secure	  and	  the	  audiences	  it	  desires	  to	  influence.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
539	  The	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  for	  the	  International	  Red	  Cross	  and	  Red	  Crescent	  Movement	  and	  NGOs	  in	  
Disaster	  Relief.	  Like	  most	  professional	  codes,	  this	  is	  a	  voluntary	  one.	  It	  was	  developed	  and	  agreed	  upon	  
in	  1994	  by	  eight	  of	  the	  world’s	  largest	  disaster	  response	  agencies.	  Today,	  it	  has	  492	  NGO	  signatories	  
(Red	  Cross,	  1995,	  2012).	  	  
540	  Jeremy	  Hobbs	  was	  Executive	  Director	  of	  Oxfam	  International	  from	  2001	  to	  the	  end	  of	  April	  2013.	  He	  
has	  remained	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Directors	  of	  the	  INGO	  Accountability	  Charter,	  sitting	  as	  an	  
Independent	  Director.	  
541	  Following	  a	  public	  disagreement	  with	  Oxfam	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  2014,	  Ms	  Johansson	  ceased	  her	  
association	  with	  the	  INGO	  after	  eight	  years	  in	  the	  Global	  Ambassador	  role	  (OI	  news,	  2014;	  The	  Times,	  
2014).	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  Oxfam	  competes	  in	  a	  transactional	  market	  for	  welfare	  services	  where	  its	  primary	  raw	  material	  is	  donor	  funds.	  Weiss	  (2013:2)	  argues	  that	  transnational	  NGOs	  may	  be	  usefully	  regarded	  as	  ‘agents	  engaged	  in	  resource	  acquisition	  and	  distribution’.	  Thus,	  Oxfam’s	  advocacy	  is	  bound	  up	  with	  motivational	  messages	  to	  encourage	  supporters	  to	  provide	  the	  donor	  funds	  needed.	  Oxfam	  then	  aggregates	  these	  ‘raw	  materials’	  and	  converts	  them	  into	  its	  primary	  product:	  resource	  redistribution	  services.	  I	  argue	  that	  Oxfam’s	  funding	  —	  about	  half	  of	  it	  provided	  by	  national	  governments	  and	  national,	  international,	  and	  supranational	  institutions	  —	  is	  central	  to	  understanding	  the	  organisation’s	  choice	  of	  advocacy	  strategies.	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  in	  regard	  to	  Oxfam’s	  characteristic	  avoidance	  of	  adversarial	  rhetoric	  and	  eschewal	  of	  the	  naming-­‐and-­‐shaming	  tactics	  directed	  at	  governments	  and	  politicians	  that	  are	  characteristic	  of	  other	  TANs	  (see	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:	  16,	  23).	  Oxfam’s	  typical	  advocacy	  mien	  —	  as	  projected	  to	  external	  audiences	  —	  contrasts	  strikingly	  with	  those	  of	  GI	  and	  HRW	  in	  this	  regard.	  While	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  assess	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  harmonious	  relations	  affect	  allocations	  by	  funding	  agencies	  to	  NGO	  service-­‐providers,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  hostility	  in	  such	  relationships	  would	  have	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  this	  allocation	  and	  hence	  their	  capability	  and	  effectiveness.	  In	  Oxfam’s	  case,	  the	  sources	  of	  funding	  and	  the	  essential	  permissions	  for	  in-­‐country	  logistical	  facilitation	  could	  not	  be	  sustained	  other	  than	  by	  symbiotic	  institutional	  relationships	  that	  have	  been	  consolidated	  over	  many	  years542.	  	  Conflict	  between	  Oxfam’s	  funding	  difficulties	  and	  its	  operational	  priorities	  was	  seen	  in	  October	  2013	  when	  The	  Guardian543	  newspaper	  reported	  prominently	  that	  Oxfam	  GB	  was	  ‘poised	  to	  axe	  125	  UK	  jobs	  as	  global	  strategy	  shift	  looms’	  (The	  
Guardian,	  2013).	  This	  story	  quoted	  Oxfam	  GB	  executives	  as	  revealing	  that,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  financial	  pressures,	  Oxfam	  would	  accelerate	  its	  strategy	  to	  scale	  back	  the	  delivery	  of	  large	  development	  projects	  in	  middle-­‐income	  countries	  (i.e.	  in	  several	  unidentified	  countries	  in	  the	  Caucasus	  and	  Asia),	  in	  order	  to	  reinvest	  the	  savings	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
542	  McGann	  and	  Sabatini	  (2011:69-­‐70);	  Howell	  (2013);	  Barakso,	  (2010:155-­‐158);	  Cooley	  and	  Ron	  
(2010:205);	  Young	  (2010:53);	  Bob	  (2010:	  134-­‐135);	  Lecy,	  Mitchell	  and	  Schmitz	  (2010:235).	  An	  example	  
of	  this	  type	  of	  symbiotic	  relationship	  was	  the	  six-­‐month	  study,	  entitled	  Finding	  Frames:	  New	  Ways	  to	  
Engage	  the	  UK	  Public	  in	  Global	  Poverty,	  which	  was	  initiated	  by	  Oxfam	  UK	  and	  supported	  by	  the	  UK	  
Department	  for	  International	  Development	  (Darnton	  and	  Kirk,	  2011).	  
543	  The	  Guardian	  maintains	  a	  dedicated	  Webpage	  for	  Global	  Development	  news	  and	  views	  and	  appears	  
to	  maintain	  close	  contacts	  with	  sources	  in	  the	  development	  sector.	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policy-­‐influencing	  work	  and	  advocacy.	  The	  Chief	  Executive	  of	  Oxfam	  GB,	  Mark	  Goldring,	  was	  quoted	  as	  saying	  (The	  Guardian,	  ibid):	  	  We	  are	  spread	  too	  thin	  [sic],	  working	  in	  too	  many	  countries.	  In	  middle-­‐income	  countries,	  we	  can't	  make	  a	  large	  impact	  through	  delivery	  but	  by	  gathering	  and	  sharing	   information…	   A	   lot	   of	   our	   work	   is	   focused	   on	   the	   UK,	   the	   EU	   and	  international	   financial	   institutions.	   We	   want	   to	   reduce	   our	   focus	   there	   and	  seek	  to	  influence	  governments	  in	  the	  south.	  	  He	  added	  that	  Oxfam	  would	  concentrate	  on	  women's	  rights,	  food,	  climate	  and	  inequality	  in	  countries	  in	  the	  global	  South,	  with	  reports	  on	  policy	  and	  strategy.	  Although	  the	  statement	  that	  Oxfam	  is	  currently	  disposed	  to	  pulling	  back	  on	  its	  commitments	  because	  it	  is	  ‘spread	  too	  thin,	  working	  in	  too	  many	  countries’,	  appears	  to	  contradict	  the	  statement	  by	  Black	  (1992:vii)	  that	  there	  is	  almost	  no	  cause	  that	  Oxfam	  ‘can	  bear	  to	  leave	  alone’,	  nor	  ‘a	  geographical	  corner	  of	  the	  Third	  World	  that	  [Oxfam]	  abjures’,	  it	  is	  premature	  to	  try	  to	  evaluate	  the	  strategic	  implications.	  	  The	  recent	  appointment	  of	  an	  international-­‐level	  negotiator	  to	  the	  post	  of	  Executive	  Director	  of	  OI	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  an	  indicator	  of	  Oxfam’s	  imperatives	  in	  international	  relationships.	  Crediting	  the	  ‘astuteness’	  of	  Oxfam’s	  development	  strategy	  via	  its	  lobbying	  expertise,	  Malloch	  Brown544	  (2011:140-­‐48)	  recalls	  that	  during	  his	  tenure	  at	  the	  World	  Bank	  (1994-­‐99),	  Oxfam	  fought	  and	  won	  numerous	  battles	  with	  the	  Bank	  over	  debt	  relief	  and	  securing	  World	  Bank	  investment	  in	  education	  and	  health.	  These	  strategies,	  he	  observed,	  had	  resulted	  in	  a	  far	  more	  consequential	  use	  of	  Oxfam’s	  resources	  than	  if	  the	  NGO	  had	  spent	  them	  on	  direct	  relief	  in	  a	  poor	  village	  (ibid:	  141).	  Furthermore,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  these	  associations,	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  management	  had	  become	  closer	  to	  Oxfam	  than	  to	  their	  government	  shareholders.	  It	  is	  suggested,	  therefore,	  that	  Oxfam’s	  strategic	  engagement	  in	  this	  lobbying	  reveals	  an	  organisation	  that	  is	  co-­‐evolving	  with	  counterparts	  in	  its	  institutional	  environment	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  less	  adversarial,	  more	  conducive	  to	  collaboration	  and	  mutual	  understanding,	  and	  more	  promising	  of	  worthwhile	  outcomes,	  than	  in	  previous	  stages	  of	  its	  development545.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
544	  Mark	  Malloch	  Brown,	  now	  Lord	  Malloch-­‐Brown,	  is	  a	  former	  director	  of	  global	  communications	  of	  the	  
World	  Bank,	  former	  Administrator	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme	  and	  an	  ex-­‐Deputy	  
Secretary-­‐General	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  (Malloch	  Brown,	  2011).	  	  
545	  My	  argument	  here	  does	  not	  ignore	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  now	  unprecedented	  numbers	  of	  politically	  
powerful	  international	  institutions	  to	  lobby.	  I	  merely	  observe	  that	  Oxfam	  chooses	  to	  do	  so.	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8.4.3	  Overview	  of	  Oxfam’s	  political	  strategies	  	  	  
Linking	  poverty	  and	  rights	  as	  a	  political	  solution	  There	  is	  no	  clear	  link	  between	  Oxfam’s	  ideology	  that	  people	  will	  be	  released	  from	  lives	  of	  material	  poverty	  by	  notions	  held	  by	  distant	  others	  regarding	  their	  human	  rights.	  Although	  this	  overarching	  egalitarian	  rhetoric	  may	  link	  Oxfam’s	  commitments	  across	  a	  network	  of	  heterogeneous	  supporters,	  it	  is	  theoretically	  weak	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  explain	  the	  implied	  mechanism	  that	  will	  liberate	  people	  from	  poverty,	  or	  the	  particular	  rights	  provision	  that	  is	  sufficient	  to	  trigger	  the	  beneficial	  effect.	  While	  vast	  numbers	  of	  poor	  people	  across	  the	  world	  do	  lack	  basic	  human	  rights,	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  duality546	  is	  not	  absolute	  —	  to	  which	  the	  substantial	  numbers	  of	  impoverished	  people	  in	  developed,	  human	  rights-­‐protecting,	  countries	  attest.547	  However,	  Oxfam’s	  campaign	  rhetoric	  has	  evaded	  speculating	  that	  social	  and	  political	  structural	  factors	  might	  be	  the	  causes	  of	  others’	  misfortunes,	  promoting	  instead	  guidance	  on	  what	  publics	  should	  care	  about	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  universal	  norms,	  which,	  it	  can	  be	  observed,	  are	  essentially	  Western	  norms548.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  other	  international	  authorities	  (see	  UN	  Earth	  Summit,	  2012,	  paras	  8-­‐9;	  and	  Malloch	  Brown,	  2011:96,	  122)	  hold	  that	  adoption	  of	  a	  democratic	  model	  and	  economic	  reforms	  provide	  the	  best	  solution	  to	  overcoming	  poverty.	  	  
Retaining	  internationalist	  core	  activities	  	  Oxfam	  appears	  to	  be	  evolving	  as	  a	  hybrid	  NGO	  model,	  combining	  aspects	  of	  its	  traditional,	  internationalist,	  NGO	  model	  —	  sometimes	  associated	  with	  notions	  of	  	  ‘doing	  good’,	  unencumbered	  and	  untainted	  by	  the	  politics	  of	  government	  or	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
546	  Furthermore,	  I	  submit,	  the	  research	  maxim	  that	  ‘correlation	  does	  not	  imply	  causality’	  is	  relevant	  here	  
(Utts,	  2005:206).	  
547	  According	  to	  Oxfam	  GB,	  over	  13	  million	  people	  in	  the	  UK	  live	  in	  poverty	  —	  ‘That’s	  one	  in	  five	  without	  
enough	  to	  live	  on,	  discriminated	  against	  and	  stereotyped,	  forgotten	  by	  the	  government,	  and	  given	  far	  
fewer	  opportunities	  than	  the	  rest’	  (Oxfam	  GB,	  2012b).	  Yet,	  few	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  UK	  is	  lacking	  in	  
human	  rights	  provisions	  and	  protections.	  
548	  A	  different	  perspective	  to	  Oxfam’s	  corporate	  view	  on	  causality	  and	  effectiveness	  is	  expressed	  by	  an	  
international	  development	  authority	  and	  former	  head	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme,	  
who	  asserts	  that	  the	  real	  key	  to	  poverty	  reduction	  in	  the	  contemporary,	  globalising,	  world	  is	  the	  
adoption	  of	  the	  democratic	  political	  model	  (with	  its	  implicit	  provision	  for	  accountability	  to	  the	  poor)	  
firmly	  coupled	  with	  economic	  reform	  (Malloch	  Brown,	  2011:96,	  122).	  A	  similar	  view,	  also	  asserting	  an	  
essential	  connection	  between	  democracy	  and	  the	  eradication	  of	  poverty,	  was	  expressed	  in	  the	  outcome	  
document	  ‘The	  Future	  We	  Want’	  	  (UN	  Earth	  Summit,	  2012,	  paras	  8-­‐9)	  published	  recently	  at	  the	  
conclusion	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Sustainable	  Development	  (aka	  the	  UN	  Earth	  Summit,	  
Rio	  +20).	  Although	  the	  report	  reaffirms	  the	  ‘importance’	  that	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  international	  system	  
place	  on	  ‘respect	  for	  all	  human	  rights’	  (ibid:	  paras.	  8,9),	  there	  is	  no	  suggestion	  that	  respect	  for	  human	  
rights	  is	  considered	  by	  current	  world	  leaders	  to	  be	  either	  a	  sufficient,	  or	  necessary,	  condition	  for	  lifting	  
people	  out	  of	  poverty.	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presumed	  greed	  of	  the	  market	  (Fisher,	  1997)	  —	  with	  an	  increasingly	  assertive,	  ICT-­‐enabled,	  TAN	  model.	  Thus	  Oxfam	  mounts	  its	  distinctive	  emergency	  responses,	  summing	  up	  its	  hybrid	  roles	  by	  stating	  (OI	  Strategic	  Plan	  2013:22):	  	  	  We	  deliver	  latrines	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  disasters	  and	  write	  carefully	  reasoned	  and	  respected	  reports	  on	  the	   future	  of	  development.	  We	  couldn’t	  do	  one	  without	  the	  other,	  and	  there	  are	  few	  others	  who	  try.	  	  This	  thesis	  suggests	  that	  these	  widely-­‐admired	  functions	  are	  vital	  to	  the	  dynamic	  mixture	  of	  old	  and	  new	  functions	  within	  the	  Oxfam	  confederation	  as	  they	  reinforce	  Oxfam’s	  reputation	  for	  moral	  substance	  and	  doing	  good,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  more	  overt	  fundraising	  advocacy.	  There	  is	  a	  maxim	  in	  public	  relations	  practice	  that	  there	  can	  be	  ‘no	  publicity	  without	  performance’549	  and	  Oxfam	  appears	  to	  have	  ample	  instances	  of	  ‘doing	  good’	  to	  highlight	  in	  its	  campaigning	  materials.	  As	  a	  result,	  Oxfam	  appears	  to	  have	  created	  a	  successful	  symbiotic	  relationship	  between	  its	  traditional	  service-­‐providing	  and	  newer	  advocacy	  functions.	  This	  suggests	  also	  that	  Oxfam	  considers	  its	  hybridity	  to	  be	  a	  brand	  differentiator	  in	  the	  NGO	  market.	  	  
Dedicated	  offices	  for	  international	  institutional	  lobbying	  OI	  maintains	  six	  offices	  in	  strategic	  locations	  for	  campaigning	  and	  high-­‐level	  advocacy.	  These	  are	  in	  Washington	  (focusing	  on	  the	  international	  financial	  institutions	  —	  primarily	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund550);	  New	  York	  (leading	  Oxfam’s	  work	  at	  the	  UN	  Headquarters);	  Brussels	  (lobbying	  the	  EU);	  and	  Geneva	  (focusing	  on	  influencing	  key	  international	  organisations,	  such	  as	  the	  UNHCR,	  OCHA,	  ICRC,	  WHO,	  UNCTAD	  and	  WTO).	  The	  location	  of	  Oxfam’s	  remaining	  two	  offices	  —	  in	  Brasilia	  and	  Addis	  Ababa	  —	  are	  a	  striking	  indicator	  of	  changing	  geo-­‐political	  polarities	  and	  new,	  strengthening,	  regional	  alliances.	  It	  might	  also	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  establishment	  of	  these	  offices	  is	  yet	  another	  portent	  that	  in	  an	  increasingly	  multi-­‐polar	  international	  order,	  powerful,	  new,	  regional	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
549	  It	  is	  not	  suggested	  that	  this	  maxim,	  of	  unknown	  origin,	  is	  to	  be	  taken	  literally.	  In	  my	  professional	  
experience	  its	  meaning	  relates	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  if	  an	  individual	  or	  organisation	  has	  done	  nothing	  of	  
substance,	  it	  will	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  find	  a	  basis	  for	  generating	  any	  worthwhile	  publicity,	  especially	  
independent	  media	  coverage.	  
550	  Malloch	  Brown,	  recalls	  	  (2011:140)	  that	  he	  was	  ‘initially	  alarmed	  when	  NGOs	  like	  Oxfam	  set	  up	  
advocacy	  offices	  in	  Washington’	  because	  of	  their	  presumed	  intention	  to	  target	  the	  WB	  and	  other	  official	  
international	  developmental	  institutions.	  Although	  he	  mentions	  that	  he	  was	  furious	  with	  Oxfam’s	  tactics	  
during	  a	  protest	  (distributing	  a	  pamphlet	  that	  was	  ostensibly	  increasing	  hostility	  and	  misunderstanding	  
of	  the	  WB’s	  position),	  he	  came	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  astuteness	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  Oxfam’s	  
development	  strategy.	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bodies	  are	  emerging	  to	  challenge	  the	  power	  and	  roles	  of	  the	  contemporary	  international	  institutions.	  OI	  describes	  its	  Brasilia	  office	  as	  focusing	  mainly	  on	  economic	  justice	  and	  women’s	  issues	  while	  seeking	  to	  influence	  Brazil’s	  global	  and	  regional	  engagement	  as	  a	  key	  player	  and	  emerging	  power	  within	  the	  emerging	  BRICSAM	  countries.	  Oxfam’s	  presence	  in	  Addis	  Ababa	  is	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  Liaison	  Office	  with	  the	  African	  Union.	  Recognising	  the	  African	  Union	  as	  ‘a	  positive	  force	  for	  realising	  social,	  economic,	  political	  and	  cultural	  rights	  of	  Africans’,	  Oxfam	  claims	  to	  have	  supported,	  for	  many	  years,	  the	  emergence	  of	  strong	  civil	  society	  coalitions	  in	  Africa	  to	  engage	  and	  support	  the	  AU.	  The	  range	  of	  issues	  is	  extensive	  —	  from	  social	  and	  economic	  rights,	  HIV/AIDS,	  peace	  and	  security,	  poverty,	  gender	  equality	  and	  women’s	  empowerment,	  to	  good	  governance,	  information	  technology,	  economic	  policies	  and	  shared	  growth.	  	  
8.5	  Outcomes-­‐in-­‐process	  and	  indicative	  macroscopic	  patterns	  	  This	  section	  applies	  theoretical	  lenses	  from	  complex	  realism,	  politics	  and	  communications.	  
8.5.1	  Assessment	  of	  Oxfam	  using	  a	  Complex	  Realism	  analytical	  framework	  The	  following	  key	  features	  associated	  with	  complex	  systems	  were	  observed:	  suitability	  to	  fitness	  landscape	  modeling,	  structural	  multi-­‐dimensionality,	  emergence,	  sensitivity	  to	  initial	  conditions	  and	  cumulative	  advantage,	  resilience,	  path	  dependency	  and	  lock-­‐in,	  co-­‐evolution,	  the	  effects	  of	  negative	  and	  positive	  feedback	  loops,	  exploration	  of	  ‘adjacent	  possible’	  opportunities,	  instability,	  unpredictability	  and	  unintended	  consequences.	  	  
	  
 Fitness	  landscape	  embeddedness	  It	  is	  relatively	  simple	  to	  think	  about	  Oxfam	  as	  embedded	  in	  a	  fitness	  landscape	  during	  its	  early	  years.	  The	  structural	  and	  agency	  aspects,	  even	  the	  contingent	  circumstances	  of	  its	  operating	  environment,	  seem	  much	  easier	  to	  understand	  and	  less	  complex	  than	  they	  are	  today551.	  Oxfam	  emerged	  as	  it	  did,	  when	  it	  did,	  due	  to	  a	  range	  of	  contingent	  factors,	  embedded	  in	  complex	  social	  systems,	  converging	  and	  intersecting	  at	  a	  particular	  moment	  and,	  through	  immanent	  social	  activity,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
551	  For	  a	  discussion	  on	  this	  point	  see	  Kahneman	  (2011:85-­‐88)	  and	  Watts	  (2011:	  27).	  Both	  Kahneman	  and	  
Watts	  warn	  that	  we	  learn	  far	  less	  from	  history	  than	  we	  think	  we	  do,	  owing	  to	  the	  human	  propensity	  to	  
form	  conclusions	  based	  on	  partial	  information	  and	  paper	  over	  narrative	  gaps	  caused	  by	  information	  we	  
do	  not	  have.	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producing	  a	  novel	  configuration	  with	  group-­‐specific	  properties.	  When	  Oxfam	  is	  viewed	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  ‘fitness’	  of	  the	  newly	  emerged	  configuration	  to	  engage	  with	  others	  in	  its	  multi-­‐dimensional	  environments	  becomes	  apparent.	  	  
	  
 Structural	  multi-­‐dimensionality	  Underlying	  structural	  dimensions	  that	  appear	  throughout	  the	  Oxfam	  narrative	  to	  have	  conditioned	  its	  place,	  function	  and	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  international	  system	  have	  been:	  (i)	  Security	  structures:	  enablements	  and	  constraints	  in	  times	  of	  war;	  	  (ii)	  economic	  structures	  (ordinary	  citizens	  to	  crowdfund	  charitable	  projects;	  and	  constraints	  due	  to	  current	  financial	  austerity);	  	  (iii)	  political	  structures	  (including	  engaging	  with	  democratic	  and	  non-­‐democratic	  systems);	  	  (iv)	  cultural	  dimensions	  (including	  different	  religious	  dispositions	  and	  relative	  openness	  to	  essentially	  Western	  notions	  of	  norms	  and	  norm-­‐sharing);	  	  (v)	  polarity	  (exemplified	  in	  strategic	  orientation	  to	  a	  particular	  regional	  or	  hemispherical	  focus,	  such	  as	  Oxfam’s	  recent	  gravitation	  towards	  projects	  that	  involve	  the	  BRICSAMs	  and	  the	  global	  South);	  and	  	  (vi)	  technological	  capability	  structures	  (evidenced	  by	  Oxfam’s	  expressed	  conviction	  that	  grassroots	  communities	  are	  restricted	  in	  asserting	  their	  rights	  and	  political	  preferences	  through	  lack	  of	  digital	  communications	  capabilities)552.	  	  	  
	  
 Emergence	  The	  agential	  attributes	  of	  the	  original	  Oxford	  Committee	  for	  Famine	  Relief	  in	  1942	  included553:	  a	  shared	  internationalist	  philosophy;	  business	  and	  organisational	  skills;	  humanitarian	  and	  anti-­‐war	  ideologies;	  and	  pragmatic	  inclinations	  to	  collaborative	  ideology	  and	  responsiveness	  to	  changing	  circumstances.	  In	  complexity	  thinking,	  these	  attributes	  might	  also	  be	  considered	  systematising	  ‘attractors’	  —	  some	  stronger	  than	  others	  —	  that	  would	  not	  individually	  have	  resulted	  in	  the	  Oxfam	  prototype,	  but	  did	  so	  when	  combined.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
552	  Thus,	  Oxfam	  has	  made	  technological	  capacity-­‐building	  a	  strategic	  priority	  in	  its	  quest	  to	  end	  poverty.	  
553	  Based	  on	  Black’s	  findings	  (1992).	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  Oxfam’s	  chameleon-­‐like	  functional	  hybridity	  appears	  to	  have	  emerged	  from	  its	  original	  mixture	  of	  corporate	  properties.	  Furthermore,	  while	  Oxfam	  has	  undergone	  changes	  during	  its	  evolution,	  it	  has	  continued	  to	  sustain,	  and	  be	  sustained	  by,	  these	  favourable	  primary	  drivers	  and	  the	  corporate	  capital	  they	  have	  helped	  to	  amass.	  I	  posit	  that	  Oxfam’s	  typically	  pragmatic	  approach	  to	  refraining	  from	  blaming	  and	  shaming	  specific	  governments	  (who	  may	  be	  donors),	  show	  that	  Oxfam,	  as	  a	  collective	  entity,	  has	  emerged	  with	  a	  capacity	  to	  adapt	  to	  suit	  changing	  circumstances.	  This	  does	  not	  contradict	  the	  path	  dependency	  effects	  of	  complex	  systems.	  Rather,	  a	  high	  measure	  of	  pragmatism	  is	  among	  a	  number	  of	  locked-­‐in	  corporate	  qualities	  that	  demonstrate	  path-­‐dependency.	  	  	  The	  group	  emerged	  in	  the	  form	  it	  did,	  notwithstanding	  the	  state	  of	  war,	  because	  of	  the	  contingent	  enabling	  properties	  in	  its	  fitness	  landscape,	  such	  as	  the	  UK’s	  democratic	  political	  system	  (including	  tolerance	  for	  alternative	  viewpoints,	  respect	  for	  human	  rights	  and	  freedom	  of	  speech);	  an	  influential	  and	  vibrant	  news	  media	  interested	  in	  covering	  new	  ideas	  and	  enterprises;	  and	  widespread	  religious	  and	  social	  dispositions	  to	  charitable	  gestures	  and	  generosity	  towards	  those	  less	  well	  off	  than	  oneself.	  	  While	  the	  collective	  humanitarian	  instincts	  of	  the	  Oxford	  committee	  is	  emphasised	  in	  the	  historical	  accounts,	  this	  study	  found	  no	  explanation	  for	  why	  the	  Committee	  focused	  its	  concern	  on	  the	  famine	  in	  Greece	  when	  far	  greater	  numbers	  of	  people	  were	  concurrently	  starving	  in	  China	  and	  elsewhere?554.	  However,	  signs	  of	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  for	  Oxfam’s	  emergence	  (i.e.	  enablements	  and	  constraints)	  include	  the	  following:	  (i)	  Their	  narrative	  suggests	  that	  the	  underlying	  enablements	  and	  constraints	  predisposed	  them	  to	  tackling	  a	  cause	  they	  believed	  they	  could	  win;	  (ii)	  The	  inclusion	  in	  the	  group	  of	  a	  ‘Greek	  scholar’	  (Black,	  ibid)	  may	  also	  have	  favoured	  the	  decision	  to	  focus	  their	  relief	  efforts	  on	  Greece;	  and	  (iii)	  Despite	  the	  apparent	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  fund-­‐raising	  and	  awareness-­‐raising	  strategies,	  official	  opposition	  in	  time	  of	  war	  (showing	  compatibility	  with	  military	  structures)	  proved	  to	  be	  an	  insurmountable	  barrier	  and	  the	  consequence	  was	  failure.	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  group	  misread	  the	  prevailing	  conditions	  in	  the	  fitness	  landscape	  for	  their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
554	  Some	  three	  million	  people	  were	  reported	  to	  have	  starved	  to	  death	  in	  China’s	  Henan	  Province	  alone	  
in	  the	  same	  year	  (1942),	  (N.Y.	  Times,	  2012c).	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enterprise,	  especially	  the	  risks,	  power	  differentials	  and	  security	  concerns.	  In	  due	  course,	  they	  reassessed	  their	  options,	  adapted	  their	  goal	  and	  struck	  out	  in	  a	  fresh	  direction.	  This,	  I	  consider,	  shows	  the	  systemic	  behaviour	  of	  emergence,	  co-­‐evolution,	  the	  effects	  of	  feedback	  loops	  and	  the	  availing	  of	  a	  ‘next	  adjacent’	  possibility	  	  —	  i.e.	  on	  encountering	  a	  barrier	  to	  attainment	  of	  their	  preferred	  goal	  (failure	  to	  send	  relief	  supplies	  to	  Greece),	  the	  Committee	  members	  evidently	  retained	  their	  group	  dynamic	  and	  accrued	  corporate	  capital	  and	  applied	  these	  resources	  to	  championing	  a	  revised	  goal.	  	  	  The	  attraction	  of	  the	  group	  to	  a	  businessman,	  Cecil	  Jackson-­‐Cole,	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  perturbation	  that	  resulted	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  marketing	  strategy	  that	  generated	  the	  charity	  shop	  phenomenon.	  I	  posit	  also	  that	  the	  application	  of	  this	  expertise	  established	  cumulative	  advantage	  conditions	  for	  Oxfam’s	  communications	  and	  advocacy	  functions555.	  	  	  I	  submit	  that	  Oxfam’s	  periodic	  resetting	  of	  its	  strategic	  aims	  is	  evidence	  of	  this	  complex	  system’s	  characteristic	  adaptive	  and	  emergent	  behaviour	  patterns	  in	  response	  to	  (a)	  disruptive	  changes	  in	  its	  fitness	  landscape;	  (b)	  the	  influence	  of	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system,	  as	  well	  as	  intersectional	  impacts	  with	  elements	  of	  other	  complex	  social	  systems;	  and	  (c)	  pragmatic	  gravitation	  towards	  enabling	  conditions	  for	  its	  operations	  —	  including	  a	  tendency	  to	  embrace	  the	  tools	  of	  information	  communications	  technologies.	  Oxfam’s	  development	  and	  growth	  from	  a	  single	  committee	  to	  a	  worldwide	  confederation	  operating	  in	  94	  countries	  exhibits	  classical	  characteristics	  of	  emergent	  behaviour	  in	  complex,	  dynamic,	  systems556.	  	  
 Co-­‐evolution	  Patterns	  of	  adaptation	  show	  Oxfam	  co-­‐evolving	  in	  relation	  to	  influences	  from	  other	  elements	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  Examples	  include	  its	  strategic	  reactions	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
555	  This	  included	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  dedicated	  Campaigns	  Department	  to	  amplify	  advocacy	  messages	  
regarding	  the	  causes	  of	  poverty.	  
556	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  the	  emergent	  traits	  of	  the	  various	  national	  groups	  as	  they	  joined	  the	  Oxfam	  
system	  (or,	  looking	  at	  this	  from	  a	  different	  perspective,	  as	  Oxfam	  joined	  them).	  A	  case	  in	  point	  is	  that	  of	  
Oxfam	  Australia,	  which	  emerged	  as	  an	  Oxfam	  affiliate	  in	  2005,	  having	  itself	  emerged	  out	  of	  an	  earlier	  
merger	  between	  two	  leading	  Australian	  international	  development	  organisations	  that	  traced	  their	  roots	  
back	  to	  1953	  (Oxfam	  Australia,	  2013).	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changing	  international	  attitudes	  to	  the	  localisation	  of	  humanitarian	  and	  development	  aid;	  and	  reorientation	  of	  its	  strategies	  and	  operations	  to	  changing	  socio-­‐economic,	  climate	  and	  political	  conditions	  in	  Africa	  and	  the	  BRICSAM	  countries.	  	  	  Co-­‐evolutionary	  forces	  appear	  responsible	  also	  for	  strategy	  reshaping	  in	  Oxfam’s	  current	  five-­‐year	  strategy	  (OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013-­‐2019).	  Two	  salient	  areas	  are:	  (a)	  Severe	  funding	  constraints	  appear	  to	  have	  driven	  Oxfam	  to	  place	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  developing	  its	  advocacy	  function	  (OI	  Annual	  Report	  2011-­‐12:67).	  Advocacy,	  Oxfam	  asserts,	  is	  cost-­‐effective	  and	  capable	  of	  influencing	  local	  structural	  factors	  underlying	  poverty	  in	  national	  contexts;	  and	  (b)	  the	  changing	  attitudes	  to	  humanitarian	  aid,	  leading	  to	  Oxfam’s	  increasing	  emphasis	  on	  promoting	  localised	  political	  empowerment	  in	  developing	  countries.	  	  	  	  
 Sensitivity	  to	  initial	  conditions	  Indications	  of	  Oxfam’s	  sensitivity	  to	  its	  founding	  conditions	  and	  consequent	  cumulative	  advantage	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  longevity,	  growth	  and	  worldwide	  commoditisation	  of	  its	  novel	  charity	  shop	  funding	  model.	  	  	  The	  ‘shell	  institution’	  phenomenon,	  described	  by	  Giddens	  (2002:18-­‐19),	  may	  owe	  properties	  to	  the	  ‘sensitivity	  to	  initial	  conditions’	  aspect	  of	  complex	  systems.	  Oxfam	  shows	  continuing	  resemblances	  to	  properties	  associated	  with	  its	  longstanding	  and	  iconic	  corporate	  identity,	  even	  though	  its	  aims,	  functioning,	  personnel	  and	  fortunes	  have	  undergone	  extensive	  revisions	  over	  the	  course	  of	  seven	  decades.	  Some	  of	  these	  enduring	  and	  intrinsic	  properties	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  framed	  so	  that	  they	  perform	  the	  role	  of	  social	  institutional	  ‘attractors’.	  These	  attractors	  are	  a	  cognitive	  phenomenon,	  a	  type	  of	  norm	  totem	  to	  which	  some	  people	  are	  drawn	  (Geyer	  and	  Rihani,	  2010:38-­‐39).	  Oxfam’s	  core	  ideologies	  of	  humanitarianism	  and	  internationalism	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  strong	  attractors,	  despite	  extensive	  changes	  in	  attitudes	  towards	  humanitarian	  projects557.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
557	  Oxfam	  exemplifies	  the	  expression	  ‘plus	  ça	  change,	  plus	  c'est	  la	  même	  chose’,	  which	  I	  consider	  
denotes	  not	  something’s	  immutability	  but	  a	  complex	  system’s	  sensitivity	  to	  initial	  conditions	  and	  the	  
presence	  of	  attractors.	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 Path	  dependency/Lock-­‐in	  From	  the	  outset,	  Oxfam	  was	  constituted	  as	  a	  collective	  entity	  with	  a	  recognisable	  beginning,	  a	  goal	  and	  a	  plan	  for	  goal	  attainment	  and	  organisational	  survival.	  Therefore,	  as	  Oxfam	  has	  survived	  and	  progressed,	  we	  can	  deduce	  that	  what	  happened	  to	  Oxfam	  was	  determined	  by	  its	  own	  history	  and	  properties	  and	  the	  contingent	  properties	  of	  its	  fitness	  landscape.	  Although	  the	  full	  extent	  of	  these	  influences	  cannot	  be	  known,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  overarching	  raison	  d’être,	  or	  ideological	  attractor	  for	  the	  original	  collectivity	  that	  became	  Oxfam	  was,	  and	  is,	  humanitarianism.	  This	  locked-­‐in	  notion	  and	  driving	  force	  to	  bear	  one	  another’s	  burdens	  can	  explain	  Oxfam’s	  preferred	  causes,	  strategic	  choices	  and	  spillover	  effects	  that	  have	  led	  to	  the	  organisation’s	  growth	  into	  a	  worldwide	  confederation558.	  In	  revealing	  this	  growth	  pattern,	  Oxfam	  exemplifies	  the	  notion	  of	  path	  dependency	  reinforced	  by	  positive	  feedback,	  which	  encourages	  a	  complex	  system	  to	  maintain	  its	  course.	  Thus,	  I	  argue	  that	  Oxfam’s	  spillover	  tendencies	  appear	  to	  have	  no	  braking	  mechanism	  other	  than	  in	  disparate	  areas	  where	  the	  system	  shows	  signs	  of	  failing559.	  	  Many	  distinctive	  corporate	  characteristics	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  locked	  into	  Oxfam’s	  corporate	  identity	  from	  its	  earliest	  times	  —	  it	  is	  Oxfam’s	  particular	  mixture	  of	  these	  characteristics	  that	  has	  contributed	  to	  its	  durable	  existence.	  Although	  it	  has	  had	  a	  single	  focus	  on	  humanitarian	  projects	  in	  its	  ethos,	  other	  qualities	  locked	  in	  from	  the	  start	  have	  been	  an	  internationalist	  philosophy,	  business	  expertise,	  pragmatism,	  a	  collaborative	  philosophy	  and	  responsiveness	  to	  changing	  contingencies.	  There	  are	  indications	  that	  Oxfam’s	  hybridity	  emerged	  from	  these	  core	  properties	  and,	  furthermore,	  that	  the	  evolved	  hybrid	  model	  has	  continued	  to	  sustain	  these	  favourable	  primary	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
558	  Thus,	  with	  humanitarianism	  at	  the	  core	  of	  its	  corporate	  values	  and	  identity,	  it	  is	  relatively	  easy	  to	  
understand	  the	  comment	  that:	  There	  is	  almost	  no	  subject	  in	  the	  international	  pantheon	  of	  causes	  that	  
Oxfam	  can	  bear	  to	  leave	  alone,	  not	  a	  geographical	  corner	  of	  the	  Third	  World	  that	  it	  abjures	  (Black,	  
1992:vii).	  
559	  e.g.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Oxfam	  GB	  has	  recently	  announced	  hundreds	  of	  staff	  redundancies	  
necessitated	  by	  serious	  funding	  constraints	  and	  being	  ‘stretched	  too	  thin	  (sic),	  working	  in	  too	  many	  
countries’	  on	  development	  projects	  (The	  Guardian,	  2013).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  OI’s	  annual	  reports	  and	  
strategic	  plans	  show	  a	  confederation	  that	  is	  still	  adding	  countries	  and	  projects	  to	  its	  network	  and	  
planning	  to	  expand	  significantly	  further	  into	  policy	  and	  advocacy	  activities	  in	  local	  communities,	  
especially	  in	  the	  global	  South,	  in	  a	  strategic	  endeavour	  to	  try	  to	  influence	  the	  thinking	  of	  policy-­‐makers	  
and	  corporations	  (OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013:13-­‐20,	  24).	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drivers.	  The	  mixture	  of	  locked-­‐in	  core	  properties	  appears	  crucial	  to	  examining	  such	  organisations560.	  	  
	  
 Feedback	  mechanisms	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  Oxfam	  system	  exhibits	  an	  array	  of	  positive	  feedback	  mechanisms	  that	  reinforce	  the	  system,	  and	  negative	  ones	  that	  disrupt	  the	  system	  and	  force	  adaptations.	  Examples	  are:	  (1)	  Oxfam	  is	  an	  active	  participant	  in	  the	  formal	  consultancy	  mechanism	  to	  facilitate	  liaison	  and	  symmetrical,	  two-­‐way,	  feedback	  within	  the	  UN	  system.	  This	  formal	  mechanism	  appears	  to	  benefit	  both	  intersecting	  systems	  (when	  viewed	  at	  the	  international	  level	  of	  complexity),	  enabling	  them	  to	  co-­‐evolve	  and	  constantly	  reconfigure	  their	  relationship;	  (2)	  Oxfam	  has	  established	  dedicated	  liaison	  offices	  to	  work	  closely	  with	  international	  institutions	  to	  facilitate	  symmetrical,	  two-­‐way,	  feedback	  and	  enhance	  responsiveness	  and	  cooperation;	  (3)	  	  Recently,	  Oxfam	  introduced	  its	  Single	  Management	  System	  to	  ensure	  the	  confederation’s	  responsiveness	  to	  central	  directives	  and	  facilitate	  feedback;	  (4)	  Adjustment	  to	  negative	  feedback	  was	  recently	  seen	  when	  Oxfam	  GB	  implemented	  extensive	  staff	  redundancies	  and	  a	  review	  of	  priorities	  in	  the	  face	  of	  income	  shortfalls.	  	  	  
 Unintended	  consequences	  The	  Oxford	  Committee	  for	  Famine	  Relief	  encountered	  an	  unexpected	  barrier	  to	  achieving	  its	  primary	  aim	  in	  wartime	  Britain.	  Thwarted	  in	  achieving	  a	  preferred	  outcome,	  and	  left	  with	  the	  unexpected	  consequence	  of	  excess	  funds,	  they	  adapted	  by	  continuing	  to	  operate	  with	  a	  broader	  amended	  goal.	  	  	  An	  unintended	  consequence	  of	  foreign	  aid	  practices	  over	  decades	  prompted	  a	  backlash	  among	  some	  developing	  nations	  and	  a	  worldwide	  shift	  towards	  a	  new	  aid-­‐sector	  order,	  emphasising	  locally-­‐appropriate	  solutions,	  rather	  than	  imposed	  solutions	  from	  geographically	  distant	  benefactors561.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
560	  As	  ancillary	  and	  intersecting	  systems	  connect	  in	  the	  changing	  system,	  interdependencies	  are	  
established	  and	  the	  overall	  complexity	  of	  the	  burgeoning	  system	  increases	  and	  it	  becomes	  harder	  to	  
change	  it.	  Moreover,	  physical	  and	  notional	  structures,	  mechanisms	  and	  practices	  become	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  
functioning	  of	  the	  system	  and	  become	  established	  as	  pathways	  and	  locked	  in.	  The	  more	  ancillary	  
systems	  a	  system	  supports	  the	  more	  difficult	  it	  is	  to	  change,	  since	  those	  involved	  have	  so	  much	  invested	  
in	  it	  (Root,	  2013:	  111-­‐113).	  
561	  See	  Moyo	  (2010:	  xviii-­‐xx).	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Unregulated	  portrayals	  of	  distant	  suffering	  by	  NGO	  campaigning	  in	  the	  aid	  sector	  have	  led	  to	  pressure562	  on	  NGOs	  to	  show	  self-­‐restraint	  and	  a	  higher	  regard	  for	  human	  dignity	  in	  their	  framings	  of	  the	  lives	  and	  hardships	  of	  aid	  recipients.	  Oxfam	  reacted	  by	  switching	  to	  differentiating	  advocacy	  strategies.	  	  	  	  
 ‘Adjacent	  possible’	  opportunism	  As	  Oxfam’s	  relief-­‐delivery	  model	  evolved,	  a	  pattern	  can	  be	  seen	  of	  development	  into	  adjacent	  fields,	  including	  reorienting	  its	  focus	  from	  a	  single	  theatre	  of	  war	  to	  all	  wars	  anywhere;	  outreach	  into	  campaigning;	  being	  an	  early	  adopter	  of	  the	  fruits	  of	  ICTs,	  especially	  the	  Internet;	  developing	  digital	  activism	  skills;	  and	  offering	  advocacy	  knowledge-­‐transfer	  to	  grass-­‐roots	  organisations.	  	  Oxfam’s	  historical	  development	  also	  shows	  patterns	  of	  adaptation	  to	  changing	  conditions	  by	  availing	  of	  opportunities	  that,	  in	  retrospect,	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  adjacent	  earlier	  along	  the	  ‘arrow	  of	  time’563.	  Unfortunately,	  we	  cannot	  know	  the	  ontological	  reality	  of	  opportunities	  that	  existed	  for	  the	  Committee	  but	  were	  not	  taken	  up.	  Historiography	  is	  not	  very	  interested	  in	  recording	  un-­‐events	  and	  ‘what	  ifs’.	  From	  within	  the	  organisation	  this	  pattern	  would	  have	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  natural	  process	  of	  simply	  reviewing	  options	  and	  making	  choices,	  rather	  than	  of	  taking	  obvious	  neighbouring	  opportunities.	  I	  suggest	  that	  use	  of	  the	  word	  ‘adjacent’	  is	  only	  relevant	  to	  the	  way	  something	  appears	  in	  retrospect;	  but	  ‘possible’	  is	  certainly	  apt564.	  Nevertheless,	  considering	  Oxfam’s	  trajectory	  in	  this	  way	  is	  extremely	  useful	  to	  understanding	  how	  events	  played	  out.	  For	  example:	  the	  Oxford	  Committee’s	  emergence	  as	  an	  NGO,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  faith-­‐based	  assemblage	  or	  in	  some	  other	  form,	  arguably	  shows	  a	  convergence	  of	  micro-­‐level	  individual	  interests	  and	  a	  collective	  availing	  of	  conditions	  that	  favoured	  their	  reconfiguration	  and	  development	  as	  a	  new	  social	  entity	  at	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  complexity.	  After	  the	  war,	  having	  failed	  in	  its	  primary	  strategic	  aim,	  the	  Committee	  was	  facing	  a	  different	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
562	  For	  example,	  by	  the	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  for	  the	  international	  Red	  Cross	  and	  Red	  Crescent	  Movement	  
and	  NGOs	  in	  Disaster	  Relief.	  
563	  See	  Geyer	  and	  Rihani	  (2010:37-­‐38)	  for	  clarity	  on	  this	  term.	  
564	  I	  suggest	  the	  word	  ‘adjacent’	  is	  not	  applicable	  in	  all	  instances,	  but	  only	  seems	  to	  be	  so	  in	  
retrospective	  analysis	  because	  of	  the	  illusion	  that	  courses	  of	  events	  were	  obvious	  (because	  we	  know	  the	  
outcome).	  Watts	  describes	  this	  effect	  (2011:127-­‐134).	  Thinking	  in	  terms	  that	  presume	  an	  opportunity	  
was	  explored	  and	  chosen	  because	  it	  was	  obvious	  or	  nearby	  when	  using	  building	  blocks	  already	  available	  
(see	  Mitleton-­‐Kelly,	  2003:15	  and	  Kauffman,	  2000:142-­‐143,	  243-­‐244),	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  
many	  instances	  when	  a	  chosen	  course	  is	  a	  ‘long	  shot’,	  and	  yet	  when	  these	  succeed	  they	  are	  all	  the	  more	  
interesting	  and	  we	  are	  inclined	  to	  use	  them	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  theorising	  about	  the	  present	  and	  future.	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range	  of	  contingencies,	  including	  accumulated	  corporate	  capital,	  knowledge	  and	  reputation.	  History	  tells	  us	  that	  sufficient	  enabling	  conditions	  existed	  for	  the	  Committee	  to	  alter	  its	  aim	  substantially	  and	  progress	  in	  a	  new	  direction	  and	  to	  survive	  —	  because	  that	  is	  what	  happened565.	  	  
8.5.2	  Assessment	  of	  Oxfam	  using	  a	  political	  theoretical	  framework	  	  This	  thesis	  has	  presented	  evidence	  that	  OI	  reached	  its	  present	  place	  and	  function	  in	  the	  international	  political	  sphere	  through	  adopting	  a	  pragmatic,	  robust,	  and	  multi-­‐pronged	  strategic	  approach566	  to	  developing	  and	  consolidating	  its	  relationships	  with	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system	  and	  to	  maintaining	  its	  value	  to	  them.	  Indeed,	  it	  appears	  that	  Oxfam,	  by	  way	  of	  its	  increasing	  information	  exchanging	  and	  awareness-­‐raising	  activities,	  provides	  an	  important	  feedback	  mechanism	  and	  legitimising	  role	  to	  the	  UN	  and	  other	  leading	  international	  institutions	  —	  further	  consolidating	  its	  functional	  value	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system.	  Oxfam	  receives	  about	  half	  of	  its	  funding	  from	  the	  UN	  and	  UN	  Member	  States	  and	  in	  return	  provides	  expert	  crisis	  aid	  and	  development	  services.	  The	  shift	  in	  the	  pattern	  of	  humanitarian	  aid	  delivery	  in	  the	  70s	  and	  80s	  appears	  to	  have	  enhanced	  Oxfam’s	  value	  to	  the	  international	  community,	  given	  the	  organisation’s	  exceptional	  experience	  and	  embedded	  position	  in	  resource	  networks	  that	  link	  local-­‐scale	  crises	  and	  humanitarian	  causes	  with	  global-­‐scale	  assistance	  provision.	  	  	  Oxfam’s	  movement	  into	  more	  outspoken	  advocacy	  in	  human	  rights	  and	  social,	  economic	  and	  climate	  justice	  is	  undoubtedly	  more	  controversial	  than	  its	  humanitarian	  aid-­‐delivery	  work.	  This	  intersection	  of	  functions	  is	  where	  this	  thesis	  locates	  the	  point	  of	  greatest	  potential	  relationship	  tension	  between	  Oxfam’s	  hybrid	  TAN	  model	  and	  the	  international	  system.	  It	  is	  also	  the	  point	  at	  which	  the	  analytical	  lenses	  of	  advocacy	  communications	  and	  political	  science	  overlap.	  Thus,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  activities	  of	  Oxfam’s	  advocacy	  function	  that	  most	  resemble	  my	  eight-­‐point	  TAN	  referent	  model	  affect	  the	  organisation’s	  place	  and	  function	  in	  the	  contemporary	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
565	  Watts	  advises	  caution	  in	  accepting	  historical	  explanations,	  which	  tend	  to	  downplay	  multiple	  causes	  
and	  omit	  things	  that	  might	  have	  happened	  but	  didn’t,	  while	  emphasising	  simple,	  linear	  determinism	  
over	  complexity,	  randomness,	  and	  ambiguity	  (2011:131-­‐134).	  
566	  As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  chapter	  introduction,	  these	  strategies	  include	  political	  diplomacy,	  formal	  
lobbying	  and	  informal	  influence	  brokering,	  scientific	  research	  and	  knowledge-­‐sharing,	  humanitarian	  
crisis	  response	  capability,	  development	  aid	  and	  field	  support,	  coalition	  and	  stakeholder	  relations,	  media	  
relations,	  public	  outreach	  and	  information,	  fund-­‐raising	  and	  fund	  disbursement.	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international	  system	  and	  constitute	  a	  barrier	  to	  its	  effectiveness	  in	  achieving	  its	  political	  aims	  in	  that	  environment.	  In	  calling	  for	  a	  new	  world	  economic	  order	  propelled	  by	  ‘people	  power’	  (OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013:5-­‐11),	  Oxfam	  appears	  to	  be	  reviving	  the	  grievances	  and	  power	  struggles	  that	  characterised	  the	  failed	  New	  International	  Economic	  Order	  (NIEO)	  campaign	  by	  ‘Third	  World’	  countries,	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s.	  See	  comments	  by	  Gareau	  (2001:126),	  regarding	  the	  tendency	  for	  this	  contested	  issue	  to	  ‘burst	  open’	  from	  time	  to	  time.	  	  	  This	  thesis	  also	  found	  that	  in	  Oxfam’s	  championing	  of	  communications	  rights	  as	  a	  means	  of	  grassroots	  emancipation	  and	  equality,	  there	  were	  reverberations	  of	  the	  Right	  to	  Communicate	  debates	  and	  the	  controversial	  New	  International	  Information	  and	  Communication	  Order	  project.	  In	  this	  context,	  OI’s	  current	  advocacy	  messages	  calling	  for	  radical	  political	  and	  economic	  change	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  echoing	  the	  alter-­‐globalisation	  and	  anti-­‐capitalist	  political	  lobbies	  of	  the	  developed	  West567	  and	  the	  grievances	  of	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  bloc	  of	  developing	  countries.	  As	  such,	  this	  strategy	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  cause	  significant	  relationship	  strain	  between	  Oxfam	  and	  the	  states	  of	  the	  international	  community	  who	  consider	  their	  interests	  lie	  in	  preserving	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  By	  the	  same	  reasoning,	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  OI’s	  recent	  use	  of	  politically-­‐charged	  labels	  for	  popular	  stereotypes	  will	  have	  any	  bearing	  on	  Oxfam’s	  relationships	  and	  funding	  from	  international	  institutional	  sources.	  These	  pejorative	  stereotypes	  encompass	  such	  nebulous	  entities	  as:	  ‘the	  polluting	  rich	  world’,	  ‘the	  children	  of	  the	  rich’,	  ‘the	  rich	  countries’	  and	  just	  ‘the	  rich’.	  International	  institutions,	  national	  governments,	  political	  leaders,	  financiers	  and	  commercial	  corporations,	  are	  also	  variously	  accused568	  of:	  endemic	  political	  weakness,	  irresponsibility,	  exacerbating	  social	  injustice	  and	  perpetuating	  inequality569.	  I	  posit	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
567	  Indications	  of	  these	  political	  positions	  may	  be	  found,	  for	  example,	  in	  each	  of	  the	  three	  most	  recent	  
annual	  reports.	  In	  particular,	  the	  assertions	  that	  political	  decision-­‐makers	  and	  multinational	  
corporations	  must	  be	  pressured	  to	  adopt	  policies	  and	  practices	  that	  are	  ‘fair’,	  rather	  than	  those	  that	  
‘reinforce	  poverty	  and	  injustice’	  point	  to	  some	  of	  the	  most	  contentious	  debates	  in	  world	  politics	  (OI	  
Annual	  Report	  2010-­‐11:6).	  See	  also	  OI	  Annual	  Report	  2009-­‐10;	  and	  2011-­‐12).	  Oxfam’s	  vigorous	  
transnational	  advocacy	  on	  the	  mooted	  imposition	  of	  a	  global	  Financial	  Transition	  Tax	  	  —	  the	  so-­‐called	  
‘Robin	  Hood	  Tax’	  —	  is	  one	  such	  debate	  (OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2011-­‐12:24).	  
568	  See	  OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013.	  
569	  Other	  accusations	  include	  profligacy	  and	  reckless	  lending,	  corporate	  dishonesty	  and	  excesses,	  
resource	  overconsumption	  and	  squandering,	  corruption,	  lack	  of	  accountability	  and	  transparency,	  
unwillingness	  and	  failure	  to	  protect	  vulnerable	  social	  sectors,	  self-­‐serving	  policies	  tied	  to	  personal	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that	  associative	  biases	  might	  make	  many	  of	  these	  rhetorical	  terms	  intensely	  meaningful	  for	  individuals,	  but	  in	  the	  service	  of	  serious,	  evidence-­‐based,	  international	  argumentation	  they	  are	  unhelpful.	  	  While	  the	  extent	  is	  unmeasurable,	  it	  appears	  that	  Oxfam	  is	  effective	  in	  achieving	  desired	  outcomes	  within	  the	  United	  Nations	  system	  and	  other	  multilateral	  international	  institutions	  (including	  the	  World	  Bank,	  IMF,	  and	  European	  Union).	  Presumably,	  Oxfam’s	  relationships	  with	  international	  actors	  are	  healthy	  enough	  for	  these	  bonds	  to	  continue,	  as	  evidenced	  by:	  (i)	  Oxfam	  retaining	  its	  status	  as	  an	  accredited	  consultant	  NGO	  to	  the	  United	  Nations,	  since	  2002;	  (ii)	  on-­‐going	  patterns	  of	  engagement,	  and	  continuing	  close	  involvement	  in,	  collaborative	  projects	  with	  these	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system;	  (iii)	  receiving	  almost	  half	  of	  its	  funding	  from	  international	  institutions;	  and	  (iv)	  expanding	  its	  network	  of	  international	  liaison	  and	  lobbying	  offices.	  	  
8.5.3	  Assessment	  of	  Oxfam	  using	  a	  communications	  theoretical	  framework	  	  Oxfam	  has	  fully	  availed	  of	  modern	  communications	  tools	  in	  order	  to	  adapt	  its	  campaigning	  to	  suit	  its	  purposes	  and	  audiences.	  It	  also	  projects	  a	  powerful	  and	  unified	  corporate	  brand	  identity.	  This	  maintenance	  of	  a	  single,	  global,	  brand	  identity	  for	  over	  70	  years	  could	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  remarkable	  feat	  of	  corporate	  communications	  strategy	  and	  practice,	  bearing	  in	  mind	  Giddens’s	  identification	  of	  ‘shell	  institutions’	  to	  explain	  the	  rapid	  transformation	  of	  traditional	  and/or	  familiar	  social	  forms	  that,	  due	  to	  the	  forces	  of	  globalisation,	  retain	  their	  outer	  shell	  although	  they	  have	  changed	  substantially	  inside.	  I	  submit	  that	  this	  brand	  identity	  is	  Oxfam’s	  ‘outer	  shell’,	  the	  familiar	  face	  of	  Oxfam	  that	  many	  believe	  they	  know,	  and	  expect	  to	  see,	  because	  the	  end	  product	  and	  user	  interface	  appear	  to	  be	  unchanging.	  When	  considering	  how	  Oxfam	  has	  burgeoned	  from	  a	  tiny	  group	  of	  individuals	  to	  becoming	  a	  global	  NGO	  colossus	  that	  has	  revised	  its	  strategic	  aims	  and	  directions	  significantly	  throughout	  the	  years,	  the	  endurance	  of	  this	  brand	  identity	  is	  extraordinary.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
enrichment,	  protection	  of	  vested	  interests	  and	  inappropriate	  collusive	  practices	  between	  socially	  
privileged	  actors	  (ibid).	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There	  can	  be	  little	  doubt	  that	  Oxfam	  has	  been	  extremely	  effective	  in	  (a)	  promoting	  its	  position	  as	  a	  doyen	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  humanitarian	  relief	  provision,	  (b)	  amplifying	  its	  ‘voice’	  and	  the	  voices	  of	  others	  on	  humanitarian	  issues,	  and	  (c)	  advocacy	  in	  support	  of	  its	  fundraising.	  In	  this,	  Oxfam’s	  advocacy	  has	  had	  the	  immense	  advantage	  of	  a	  simple	  key	  message:	  selflessly	  helping	  others	  in	  need.	  It	  seems	  probable	  that	  the	  attractiveness	  and	  universality	  of	  this	  message570	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  easy	  to	  broadcast	  to	  worldwide	  audiences.	  Oxfam	  did	  not	  invent	  the	  idea	  of	  charity.	  The	  world’s	  religions,	  for	  example,	  have	  long	  spread	  the	  idea	  of	  charity:	  What	  Oxfam	  did	  was	  to	  develop	  and	  institutionalise	  mechanisms	  for	  individuals	  to	  express	  charitable	  tendencies	  to	  others	  in	  distant	  locations.	  Importantly,	  this	  project	  requires	  ongoing	  motivational	  advocacy	  to	  keep	  the	  machinery	  running.	  Indeed,	  to	  understand	  the	  appeal	  of	  the	  charity	  message	  and	  the	  inseparable	  function	  of	  advocacy,	  one	  can	  compare	  the	  advocacy	  issues	  and	  outputs	  of	  Oxfam	  with	  those	  of	  major	  religious	  charities571.	  I	  argue,	  therefore,	  that	  the	  similarities	  between	  the	  advocacy	  ‘face’	  of	  these	  organisations,	  with	  their	  emotive	  human	  interest	  stories,	  eye-­‐catching	  graphics	  and	  prominent	  ‘Donate’	  hot	  buttons,	  attest	  to	  the	  extensive	  commoditisation	  of	  the	  TAN	  advocacy	  model	  throughout	  the	  charity	  development	  aid	  sector.	  Where	  Oxfam	  has	  had	  an	  edge	  in	  this	  market	  is	  that	  it	  promotes	  the	  key	  message	  of	  helping	  others	  but	  without	  the	  divisive	  and	  obligating	  trappings	  of	  religion.	  	  	  Thus,	  Oxfam’s	  ‘traditional	  NGO’	  advocacy	  strategy	  in	  support	  of	  its	  operations	  in	  disaster	  zones	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  relatively	  uncomplicated	  in	  its	  audience	  messaging,	  targeting	  and	  tactics;	  uncontroversial	  in	  its	  issue-­‐framing;	  and	  outstandingly	  effective	  in	  achieving	  communications	  aims.	  Undoubtedly	  the	  skilled	  handling	  of	  the	  corporate	  image,	  when	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  world	  were	  upon	  its	  major	  relief	  interventions,	  contributed	  greatly	  to	  the	  Oxfam’s	  enviable	  reputation.	  However,	  this	  thesis	  holds	  that	  Oxfam’s	  newer	  methodology	  aimed	  at	  achieving	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
570	  This	  thesis	  holds	  that	  an	  organisation’s	  key	  message	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  same	  as	  its	  stated	  aim.	  A	  
key	  message	  can	  be	  conveyed	  by	  various	  means,	  language	  or	  behaviour,	  for	  example.	  I	  argue	  that	  far	  
more	  people	  believe	  they	  know	  what	  Oxfam	  ‘is	  about’,	  than	  know	  the	  organisation’s	  strategy	  
underpinnings	  or	  policies.	  	  
571	  Such	  as	  Christian	  Aid,	  the	  Catholic	  church’s	  Caritas	  and	  Catholic	  Agency	  for	  Overseas	  Development	  
(CAFOD),	  and	  Tearfund,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  their	  Websites.	  For	  a	  comparison	  of	  Websites	  see	  Christian	  Aid:	  
https://www.christianaid.org.uk/	  ;	  Caritas:	  http://www.caritas.org/;	  Caford:	  
http://www.cafod.org.uk/;and	  Tearfund:	  http://www.tearfund.org/.	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broad	  socio-­‐political	  goals	  is	  of	  a	  different	  macro-­‐sociological	  theoretic	  nature	  and	  requires	  the	  following	  separate	  analysis.	  	  	  I	  argue	  that	  Oxfam’s	  current	  primary	  aim	  to	  ‘raise	  public	  awareness	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  poverty	  and	  encourage	  ordinary	  people	  to	  take	  action	  for	  a	  fairer	  world’	  sees	  Oxfam	  functioning	  in	  the	  distinctive	  marketing	  style	  of	  a	  contemporary	  TAN.	  This	  study	  found	  two	  key	  differences	  between	  Oxfam’s	  traditional	  crisis	  aid	  communications	  and	  those	  of	  its	  current	  TAN	  campaigning	  model.	  The	  TAN	  model	  outputs	  revealed:	  (1)	  an	  increasing	  tendency	  to	  project	  conspicuous	  brand	  differentiating	  qualities	  in	  the	  crowded	  NGO	  market;	  and	  (2)	  the	  application	  of	  sophisticated	  advocacy	  skills	  and	  creativity	  in	  order	  to	  frame	  complex	  political	  issues	  in	  simplified	  storylines	  that	  assume	  phenomena	  are	  orderly	  and	  linear	  and	  that	  causes	  lead	  to	  known	  effects	  in	  a	  predictable	  and	  repeatable	  manner572.	  In	  Oxfam’s	  current	  five-­‐year	  strategy,	  the	  nebulous	  ‘people	  power’	  sector	  is	  identified	  as	  a	  priority	  target	  audience	  for	  Oxfam’s	  advocacy	  messages	  and	  empowerment	  strategies.	  See	  Section	  6.6.2	  for	  my	  discussion	  on	  the	  contested	  merits	  of	  	  ‘people	  power’	  as	  a	  synonym	  for	  mass	  mobilisation.	  While	  their	  advocacy	  strategy	  based	  in	  methodological	  individualism	  appears	  effective	  in	  achieving	  	  desired	  outcomes	  with	  uncritical	  audiences,	  the	  downside	  of	  this	  strategy	  is	  that	  its	  messages	  and	  aims	  do	  not	  stand	  up	  well	  to	  a	  critical	  appraisal	  and	  appear	  to	  be	  not	  only	  unobtainable	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  but	  lack	  unambiguous	  referents	  and	  benchmarks.	  	  These	  advocacy	  practices	  point	  to	  a	  potential	  barrier	  to	  Oxfam’s	  effectiveness	  and	  influence	  in	  international	  conversations.	  Even	  Oxfam	  has	  begun	  referring	  in	  its	  publicity	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  ’blockers’,	  who	  obstruct	  progress	  in	  its	  areas	  of	  operation573,	  and	  ‘drivers’,	  who	  enable	  it.	  Considering	  the	  real	  world	  complexity	  of	  the	  political	  issues	  that	  Oxfam	  champions	  and	  the	  tendency	  for	  oversimplified	  and	  inadequate	  premises	  to	  contain	  misdiagnoses	  of	  causality	  and	  errors574,	  this	  form	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572	  See	  Geyer	  and	  Rihani	  (2010:6)	  for	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  important	  differences	  in	  conceptualising	  social	  
phenomena	  as	  being	  linear	  and	  orderly,	  or	  non-­‐linear	  and	  disorderly.	  	  
573	  OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013:11.	  
574	  Kahneman	  uses	  the	  acronym	  WYSIATI	  	  (What	  You	  See	  Is	  All	  There	  Is)	  to	  describe	  the	  human	  
propensity	  to	  jump	  to	  conclusions	  of	  the	  basis	  of	  one’s	  own	  limited	  knowledge	  and	  experience,	  while	  
completely	  ignoring	  information	  we	  do	  not	  have	  (Kahneman,	  2011:85-­‐88).	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of	  advocacy	  strategy	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  considered	  useful	  by	  specialists	  engaged	  in	  international	  political	  debate.	  	  	  On	  a	  more	  affirmative	  reading	  of	  the	  advocacy	  strategy,	  Oxfam’s	  practice	  of	  communicating	  messages	  in	  terms	  of	  presumed	  universal	  norms,	  evading	  questions	  of	  national	  contexts,	  has	  obvious	  advantages	  for	  both	  social	  boundary	  construction	  and	  facilitating	  fundraising.	  Oxfam	  advocacy	  implies	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  humanitarian	  diaspora	  of	  like-­‐minded,	  socially	  ‘responsible’,	  caring	  souls,	  who	  require	  greater	  awareness,	  mass	  mobilisation	  facilitation	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  ‘outrage’575	  in	  order	  to	  support	  forceful	  messages	  of	  discontent	  and	  threats	  of	  people-­‐powered	  retribution576	  against	  Oxfam’s	  identified	  ‘blockers’577.	  However,	  this	  communications	  strategy	  assumes	  that	  attitudinal	  changes	  will	  necessarily	  cause	  a	  domino	  topple,	  activating	  (i)	  behavioural	  changes	  that	  result	  in	  (ii)	  sufficient	  political	  pressure	  being	  applied	  to	  (iii)	  accurate	  levers	  to	  (iv)	  cause	  the	  desired	  change	  in	  (v)	  ‘the	  policies	  and	  practices	  of	  governments,	  institutions	  and	  business,	  to	  improve	  equality	  and	  inclusion	  and	  help	  people	  rise	  out	  of	  poverty’	  (ibid:	  11).	  Indeed,	  some	  NGO	  professionals	  have	  raised	  concerns	  that	  the	  framing	  of	  issues	  by	  NGOs/TANs,	  for	  their	  own	  purposes,	  typically	  mask	  the	  multiple	  causes	  of	  complex	  social	  problems	  and	  the	  true	  scale	  of	  the	  tasks	  faced	  in	  addressing	  them578.	  	  	  Furthermore	  audience	  awareness	  may	  not	  be	  the	  obstacle	  to	  achieving	  Oxfam’s	  aims.	  Audience	  engagement	  and	  commitment	  to	  their	  causes	  have	  been	  notoriously	  difficult	  to	  mobilise,	  beyond	  spontaneous	  charitable	  gestures	  or	  verbal	  support.	  I	  argue	  that	  further	  study	  may	  show	  that	  this	  intransigence	  may	  originate	  with	  what	  Kahneman	  (2011:105)	  identifies	  as	  our	  System	  I,	  or	  automatic,	  cognitive	  capabilities,	  which	  are	  vital	  to	  responding	  to	  stimuli	  and	  making	  sense	  of	  partial	  information	  in	  a	  complex	  world.	  But	  this	  type	  of	  thinking	  is	  unsuited	  to	  effortful	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
575	  This	  thesis	  takes	  at	  face	  value	  Oxfam’s	  assertion	  that	  it	  is	  a	  characteristic	  of	  the	  organisation	  that	  it	  is	  
‘outraged	  by	  the	  poverty	  and	  injustice	  in	  the	  world’.	  No	  guide	  is	  provided	  as	  to	  what	  this	  means.	  
576	  See	  Foreword	  to	  the	  Oxfam	  Strategic	  Plan:	  The	  Power	  of	  People	  Poverty	  2013-­‐2019	  (OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  
2013:	  5–11).	  As	  has	  been	  argued	  in	  Chapter	  5,	  mainstream	  assumptions	  about	  the	  existence	  of	  ‘public	  
opinion’	  and	  ’people-­‐power’	  are	  contested	  topics	  in	  communications	  and	  politics	  scholarship.	  
577	  This	  thesis	  noted	  Oxfam’s	  new	  commitment	  to	  progressing	  development	  via	  ‘power	  analysis’	  and	  
social	  structural	  change.	  The	  terms	  ‘blockers’	  and	  ‘drivers’	  are	  now	  used,	  evidently	  to	  refer	  to	  foes	  and	  
friends,	  or	  constraining	  and	  enabling	  conditions	  of	  possibility,	  in	  development	  situations.	  
578	  See	  Polis	  Report	  (2012:2,4).	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thinking	  about	  complex	  information	  and	  structured	  problem-­‐solving.	  Moreover,	  communicators	  have	  raised	  concerns	  that	  audience	  disengagement	  is	  caused	  by	  the	  approaches	  and	  cultural	  frames	  that	  NGOs	  themselves	  have	  used	  to	  communicate	  their	  issues.	  They	  suggest	  that	  the	  emphasis	  on	  urgency,	  small	  donations,	  ‘giver	  power’	  and	  grateful	  recipients	  may	  be	  part	  of	  the	  current	  disengagement	  problem.	  	  	  Extending	  this	  line	  of	  enquiry	  to	  the	  international	  level,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  Oxfam’s	  advocacy	  campaigns	  in	  influencing	  policy	  transformations	  is	  unclear.	  The	  requirement	  to	  show	  victorious	  outcomes	  to	  demonstrate	  effectiveness	  and	  maintain	  credibility	  and	  support	  leads	  Oxfam	  to	  impose	  time	  limitations	  on	  its	  advocacy	  performance.	  For	  example,	  when	  a	  significantly	  diluted	  version	  of	  the	  Arms	  Trade	  Treaty	  was	  accepted	  by	  the	  UN	  in	  2013,	  Oxfam	  was	  vociferous	  in	  claiming	  that	  it	  had	  achieved	  an	  ‘historic’	  victory,	  despite	  the	  considerable	  on-­‐going	  debate	  that	  it	  was	  nothing	  of	  the	  sort	  and	  that	  it	  is	  still	  far	  from	  achieving	  its	  stated	  aim.	  In	  comparison	  with	  TAN	  demands	  for	  urgent,	  politically	  prescriptive	  solutions	  and	  global	  decrees,	  international	  society	  —	  as	  exemplified	  by	  the	  UN	  	  —	  relies	  on	  carefully	  diagnosed	  issues,	  formalised	  processes	  and	  context:	  predicated	  on	  the	  concepts	  of	  each	  state’s	  exceptionality,	  context	  differentials	  and	  sovereignty.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  appointment	  of	  celebrated	  influencers	  is	  a	  strategy	  by	  Oxfam	  to	  ‘scale	  shift’	  its	  issues	  to	  different	  levels	  of	  social	  influence	  by	  grafting	  intersections	  between	  its	  own	  globe-­‐spanning	  complex	  systems	  and	  the	  systems	  in	  which	  these	  individuals	  are	  embedded.	  This	  strategy	  is	  effective	  and	  advantageous	  for	  Oxfam	  in	  bridging	  communications	  strategies,	  which	  emphasise	  information	  exchanging,	  and	  political	  strategies,	  which	  require	  political	  expertise	  and	  opportunities	  to	  access	  and	  influence	  policy-­‐makers579.	  	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  is	  the	  matter	  of	  Oxfam’s	  central	  commitment	  in	  its	  advocacy	  communications	  to	  ‘finding	  lasting	  solutions	  to	  poverty	  and	  injustice’,	  since	  understandings	  of	  both	  ‘poverty’	  and	  ‘injustice’	  have	  no	  universally	  accepted	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
579	  While	  OI	  continues	  to	  appoint	  celebrities	  from	  the	  world	  of	  entertainment	  to	  the	  list,	  Mary	  Robinson	  
stood	  down	  as	  Honorary	  President	  in	  2012	  and	  the	  foremost	  role	  of	  eminent	  international	  influencer	  
has	  remained	  unfilled.	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referents	  and	  are	  always	  relatively	  conditioned.	  To	  gain	  some	  sense	  of	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  challenge	  in	  disseminating	  culturally-­‐grounded	  ideologies	  and	  norms,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  over	  thousands	  of	  years	  of	  human	  history	  none	  of	  the	  world’s	  major	  religions	  or	  political	  philosophies	  has	  ever	  achieved	  universal	  resonance	  and	  adoption.	  	  	  	  	  
8.5.4	  Assessment	  of	  Oxfam’s	  relationships	  with	  the	  UN	  	  Oxfam’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  UN	  system	  could	  may	  summed	  up	  in	  three	  words:	  accreditation,	  funding	  and	  dialogue.	  In	  2002,	  OI	  became	  an	  accredited	  consultancy	  organisation	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  appears	  on	  the	  General	  Consultancy	  List	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC	  NGO	  List,	  2011:6).	  The	  reasons	  underlying	  Oxfam’s	  decision	  to	  seek	  formal	  consultancy	  status	  with	  the	  UN	  then	  are	  not	  documented.	  Nevertheless,	  there	  are	  reasons	  for	  surmising	  that	  Oxfam	  has	  an	  active	  interface	  with	  the	  UN	  system	  on	  a	  diverse	  range	  of	  issues	  (vide	  OI	  Report,	  2012).	  A	  particularly	  visible	  indicator	  of	  relationship	  quality	  is	  Oxfam’s	  substantial	  funding	  from	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  UN	  institutions.	  	  In	  view	  of	  the	  nexus	  that	  this	  thesis	  takes	  to	  exist	  between	  the	  three	  phenomena	  of	  globalisation,	  current	  global	  challenges	  and	  TANs	  it	  is	  apposite	  that	  OI	  has	  a	  on-­‐going	  association	  with	  the	  UN	  Office	  for	  Disaster	  Risk	  Reduction	  (UNISDR)	  in	  pursuing	  its	  goals	  regarding	  global	  challenges.	  Evidence	  of	  this	  relationship	  and	  some	  indications	  of	  the	  relationship	  quality	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  numerous	  references	  to	  Oxfam	  on	  the	  UNISDR	  Website;	  in	  Oxfam’s	  response	  document	  to	  the	  UNISDR	  mid-­‐term	  review	  of	  the	  UN-­‐backed	  Hyogo	  Framework	  for	  Action	  (HFA);	  and	  in	  Oxfam’s	  formal	  recognition	  of,	  and	  use	  of,	  the	  HFA	  as	  the	  key	  global	  instrument	  for	  disaster	  risk	  reduction.	  Oxfam	  acknowledges	  that	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  cases,	  its	  global	  affiliates	  are	  currently	  using	  the	  HFA	  to	  frame,	  or	  inform,	  their	  advocacy	  strategy	  (UNISDR,	  2012;	  OI	  Report,	  2010;	  HFA,	  2005).	  	  
	  While	  Oxfam	  is	  critical	  that	  ‘UN	  leadership	  and	  co-­‐ordination	  is	  inconsistent’,	  with	  too	  little	  international	  aid	  achieving	  optimum	  impact	  through	  ‘working	  with	  local	  organizations	  on	  the	  ground’	  (OI	  Report,	  2012:2),	  glocalisation	  is	  a	  priority	  policy	  area	  for	  Oxfam	  itself	  (idem:15)	  and	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  a	  degree	  of	  political	  posturing	  is	  sometimes	  to	  be	  expected	  in	  its	  external	  statements,	  without	  causing	  undue	  damage	  to	  its	  relationships	  with	  UN	  counterparts.	  Taking	  into	  account	  the	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expertise	  amassed	  over	  time	  within	  the	  Oxfam	  system,	  it	  can	  be	  presumed	  that	  executives	  within	  Oxfam	  understand	  where	  the	  line	  is	  drawn	  between	  justifiable	  claim-­‐making	  and	  causing	  long	  term,	  relationship-­‐damaging,	  offence.	  Given	  the	  increasing	  levels	  of	  effort	  and	  investment	  being	  put	  into	  its	  high-­‐level	  lobbying	  and	  liaison	  work	  with	  the	  UN	  and	  other	  international	  actors,	  Oxfam	  does	  appear	  to	  be	  satisfied	  that	  engagement	  is	  worthwhile	  and	  that	  it	  is	  making	  some	  headway	  towards	  achieving	  its	  preferred	  outcomes	  within	  the	  international	  institutional	  system.	  	  
8.6	  Summary	  This	  chapter	  has	  shown	  that	  OI	  embodies	  all	  eight	  referent	  criteria	  for	  an	  archetypal	  TAN.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  distinction	  because	  Oxfam	  is	  recognised	  primarily	  for	  its	  traditional	  service-­‐providing	  NGO	  function,	  which	  has	  evolved	  in	  a	  complementary	  relationship	  with	  its	  advocacy	  function580.	  However,	  the	  increasing,	  ICT-­‐enabled	  assertiveness	  of	  OI’s	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  ideological	  advocacy	  on	  matters	  that	  are	  not	  tied	  to	  specific	  humanitarian	  projects	  does	  not	  yet	  appear	  to	  be	  widely	  recognised	  as	  an	  OI	  policy	  change581(H1,	  H2,	  H3).	  This	  strategic	  redirection	  shifts	  OI’s	  focus	  away	  from	  service	  delivery	  in	  favour	  of	  ideological	  political	  advocacy,	  including	  a	  range	  of	  activities	  supporting	  a	  new	  world	  economic	  order582.	  This	  rhetoric	  is	  suggestive	  of	  a	  NIEO	  revivalist	  campaign	  (H1,	  H2,	  H3).	  
	  Oxfam	  has	  maintained	  a	  ‘place’	  in	  the	  international	  system	  since	  1945.	  This	  stems	  from	  its	  adaptation	  to	  a	  new	  fitness	  landscape	  at	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II	  and	  its	  redrafted	  strategic	  aim	  (viz.	  to	  provide	  ‘relief	  of	  suffering	  caused	  by	  any	  wars’583),	  which	  necessitated	  the	  establishment	  of	  inter-­‐relationships	  with	  international	  actors.	  OI	  also	  has	  a	  recognised	  place,	  in	  the	  UN	  system	  by	  way	  of	  its	  accredited	  NGO	  consultant	  status.	  This	  status	  provides	  a	  mutually	  beneficial	  mechanism:	  it	  gives	  Oxfam	  direct	  access	  to	  international	  audiences,	  while	  also	  providing	  for	  the	  TAN	  to	  function	  as	  part	  of	  the	  international	  system’s	  feedback	  mechanism	  and	  legitimising	  substructure.	  Oxfam’s	  ‘place’	  and	  ‘function’	  in	  the	  international	  system	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
580	  OI	  asserts	  this	  duality	  of	  functions	  (see	  OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013:	  22).	  	  
581	  See	  OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013:	  5-­‐11,	  22	  and	  OI	  Report,	  2014.	  
582	  See	  OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013:	  22.	  
583	  From	  1942	  to	  1945	  the	  Oxford	  Committee	  for	  Famine	  Relief	  was	  a	  UK	  domestic	  NGO	  with	  limited	  
intersectionality,	  if	  any,	  with	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system.	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are	  further	  indicated	  by	  its	  strategic	  involvement	  in	  a	  complex	  array	  of	  institutional	  relationships,	  especially	  as	  a	  prominent	  advocate	  of	  human	  welfare,	  rights	  and	  social	  justice	  issues	  and	  as	  a	  long-­‐established	  provider	  of	  international	  crisis	  and	  development	  aid	  services	  (H1).	  	  	  Considering	  the	  huge	  proportion	  of	  Oxfam’s	  funding	  that	  comes	  from	  international	  sources	  the	  strategic	  maintenance	  of	  an	  embedded	  position	  in	  the	  international	  system	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  shrewd	  policy	  (H2).	  There	  are	  indications	  that	  Oxfam’s	  funding	  model	  has	  had	  a	  determinative	  effect	  on	  its	  advocacy	  strategy	  of	  avoiding	  ‘naming	  and	  shaming’	  governments	  (H5).	  	  	  Oxfam	  has	  traditionally	  founded	  its	  reputation	  on	  a	  platform	  of	  apolitical	  and	  areligious	  aims	  and	  practices.	  It	  cannot	  be	  predicted	  where	  the	  observed	  tendencies	  towards	  more	  overt	  political	  advocacy	  will	  lead	  OI	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  influence	  and	  instrumentality	  of	  public	  relations	  and	  communications	  strategies	  are	  notoriously	  difficult	  to	  measure;	  can	  have	  unpredictable	  and	  unintended	  consequences;	  generally	  need	  to	  be	  administered	  over	  time;	  and	  are	  difficult	  to	  interpret	  in	  value-­‐for-­‐money	  terms	  —	  none	  of	  which	  are	  likely	  to	  prove	  appealing	  in	  the	  donor-­‐funding	  market	  (H5).	  	  	  Using	  complex	  realism	  to	  trace	  and	  interpret	  its	  historical	  path,	  Oxfam	  revealed	  an	  array	  of	  key	  features	  associated	  with	  complex	  systems584.	  There	  were	  strong	  indications	  that	  Oxfam’s	  functional	  hybridity	  emerged	  from	  its	  original	  mixture	  of	  core	  attractor	  properties585.	  Furthermore,	  it	  was	  noted	  that	  while	  it	  has	  undergone	  significant	  changes	  during	  its	  evolution,	  the	  organisation	  has	  continued	  to	  sustain,	  and	  be	  sustained	  by,	  these	  locked-­‐in	  primary	  drivers	  and	  the	  corporate	  capital	  they	  amassed.	  This	  approach	  provided	  analytical	  tools	  to	  extend	  understanding	  of	  Oxfam	  and	  its	  relationships,	  and	  was	  far	  from	  exhausted	  by	  this	  study	  (H4).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
584	  See	  Chapter	  3	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  these	  features	  of	  complex	  systems,	  and	  also	  
Geyer	  and	  Pickering	  (2011),	  Mitleton-­‐Kelly	  (2003)	  and	  Walby	  (2007).	  See	  also	  Annex	  2.	  
585	  An	  internationalist	  philosophy,	  humanitarian	  principles,	  pragmatism,	  strategic	  business	  and	  
communications	  expertise,	  collaborative	  ideology	  and	  responsiveness	  to	  changing	  circumstances	  in	  its	  
fitness	  landscape.	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In	  its	  extrapolation	  of	  the	  issues	  and	  understandings	  of	  	  ‘dependent	  affected’	  individuals	  to	  explain	  complex	  macro-­‐sociological	  challenges586	  Oxfam	  demonstrates	  a	  TAN	  characteristic:	  the	  conflation	  of	  scales	  of	  complex	  social	  reality	  to	  emphasise	  particular	  rhetorical	  arguments	  (H1,	  H2,	  H3).	  	  	  Of	  the	  three	  case	  studies,	  OI	  was	  distinctive	  in	  one	  particular	  aspect:	  it	  exhibited	  the	  most	  striking	  historical	  pattern	  of	  restructuring	  its	  strategic	  approaches	  to	  fit	  the	  changing	  circumstances	  in	  its	  worldwide	  bailiwick.	  When	  faced	  with	  changes	  in	  its	  operating	  environment,	  Oxfam	  characteristically	  readjusted	  its	  strategic	  goals	  and	  forged	  new	  paths	  to	  achieve	  them.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  other	  two	  TANs	  showed	  strong,	  complex	  systems	  path-­‐dependency	  attributes	  by	  strict	  adherence	  to	  their	  foundational	  aims	  and	  imperatives,587	  irrespective	  of	  altered	  socio-­‐political	  and	  power	  contexts.	  However,	  there	  are	  signs	  emerging588	  that	  OI	  is	  placing	  increasing	  emphasis	  on	  tackling	  its	  primary	  goal	  of	  ending	  poverty	  and	  injustice	  via	  advocacy	  strategies.	  	  	  Until	  recently,	  Oxfam’s	  strategic	  communications	  have	  not	  adopted	  an	  adversarial	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other	  international	  actors	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  overall	  linguistic	  tone	  of	  its	  public	  communications	  has	  apparently	  not	  constituted	  a	  significant	  barrier	  to	  its	  place,	  function	  and	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  However,	  there	  are	  indications	  that	  its	  impartiality,	  as	  stated	  in	  its	  constitution589	  may	  be	  changing.590	  Parallels	  are	  now	  appearing	  between	  Oxfam	  and	  Greenpeace	  in	  their	  use	  of	  the	  same	  social	  stereotypes	  and	  political	  ideological	  cues.	  Oxfam’s	  drift	  into	  more	  outspoken	  advocacy	  in	  human	  rights	  and	  social	  justice	  is	  undoubtedly	  more	  controversial	  than	  its	  humanitarian	  aid-­‐delivery	  work	  has	  been.	  Oxfam’s	  commitment	  to	  assisting	  grassroots	  political	  organising	  and	  fostering	  Internet-­‐enabled	  activism	  and	  ‘people	  power’	  is,	  arguably,	  at	  variance	  with	  its	  UN	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
586	  For	  example,	  climate	  change,	  multi-­‐lateral	  trade	  relationships,	  international	  peace-­‐keeping	  and	  world	  
income	  inequalities.	  	  
587	  By	  comparison,	  Greenpeace	  is	  committed	  to	  an	  institutionalised	  advocacy	  strategy	  based	  on	  ‘creative	  
confrontation’	  and	  ‘media	  mind-­‐bombs’,	  while	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  as	  a	  rights-­‐championing	  
organisation,	  is	  committed	  to	  an	  uncompromising	  confrontational	  posture	  in	  its	  advocacy,	  since	  to	  
assert	  a	  right	  is	  essentially	  to	  declare	  it	  non-­‐negotiable.	  See	  Ignatieff	  (2001:20)	  for	  a	  discussion	  on	  this	  
point.	  
588	  OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013.	  
589	  i.e.	  ‘to	  relieve	  poverty,	  combat	  distress	  and	  alleviate	  suffering	  in	  any	  part	  of	  the	  world	  regardless	  of	  
race,	  gender,	  creed	  or	  political	  convictions’	  (OI	  Constitution,	  2005).	  
590	  For	  example,	  Oxfam’s	  statements	  during	  its	  highly	  public	  quarrel	  with	  its	  ex-­‐Global	  Ambassador,	  
Scarlett	  Johansson,	  in	  January	  2014,	  were	  unequivocally	  political	  and	  partisan	  (see	  Section	  8.4.2).	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consultancy	  undertakings	  to	  refrain	  from	  engaging	  in	  any	  ‘politically	  motivated	  act	  against	  a	  Member	  State’	  and	  respecting	  ‘the	  norm	  of	  non-­‐interference	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  states’	  (H2,	  H3).	  	  	  Arguably,	  OI’s	  advocacy	  messages	  now	  echo	  the	  alter-­‐globalisation	  and	  anti-­‐capitalist	  political	  lobbies	  of	  the	  developed	  West591.	  Income	  inequality	  and	  redistribution	  has	  recently	  become	  a	  political	  theme	  and	  there	  is	  strong	  evidence	  of	  social-­‐boundary	  construction	  in	  Oxfam’s	  portrayals	  of	  implied	  wrong-­‐doing	  by	  those	  perceived	  as	  the	  ‘rich’	  and	  powerful	  in	  societies,	  against	  the	  interests	  of	  ‘ordinary	  people’,	  and	  ‘everyone	  else’592.	  Oxfam	  appears	  to	  be	  reviving	  the	  grievances	  and	  power	  struggles	  that	  characterised	  the	  NIEO	  campaign	  in	  the1970s	  and	  80s.	  Right	  to	  Communicate	  and	  New	  World	  Information	  and	  Communication	  Order	  (NWICO)	  themes	  are	  also	  in	  evidence	  in	  Oxfam’s	  communications	  outputs593.	  	  Oxfam	  has	  carried	  out	  policy	  changes	  in	  line	  with	  assumptions	  regarding	  predictions	  of	  favourable	  socio-­‐political	  conditions	  in	  the	  emerging	  BRICSAM	  economies.	  However	  recent	  economic	  analysis594	  has	  shown	  that	  this	  interpretation	  of	  shifting	  polarity	  in	  the	  world	  economic	  order	  has	  been	  overestimated.	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  OI’s	  recent	  strategic	  repositioning	  in	  solidarity	  with	  social	  mobilisation	  in	  the	  BRICSAMs	  and	  more	  adversarial	  rhetoric	  directed	  at	  the	  ‘rich	  countries’,	  will	  have	  a	  bearing	  on	  OI’s	  international	  institutional	  funding,	  its	  place	  and	  function	  in	  the	  international	  arena,	  and	  its	  effectiveness	  in	  achieving	  its	  globe-­‐spanning	  aims.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
591	  Indications	  of	  these	  political	  positions	  may	  be	  found,	  for	  example,	  in	  each	  of	  the	  three	  most	  recent	  
annual	  reports,	  the	  current	  Strategic	  Plan	  2013-­‐2019,	  and	  the	  Working	  Paper,	  OI	  Report	  2014.	  In	  
particular,	  the	  assertions	  that	  political	  decision-­‐makers	  and	  multinational	  corporations	  must	  be	  
pressured	  to	  adopt	  policies	  and	  practices	  that	  are	  ‘fair’,	  rather	  than	  those	  that	  ‘reinforce	  poverty	  and	  
injustice’,	  point	  to	  some	  of	  the	  most	  contentious	  debates	  in	  world	  politics	  (OI	  Annual	  Report	  2010-­‐11:6).	  
See	  also	  OI	  Annual	  Report	  2009-­‐10;	  and	  2011-­‐12.	  Oxfam’s	  vigorous	  transnational	  advocacy	  on	  the	  
mooted	  imposition	  of	  a	  global	  Financial	  Transition	  Tax	  	  —	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘Robin	  Hood	  Tax’	  —	  is	  one	  such	  
debate	  (OI	  Annual	  Report,	  2011-­‐12:24).	  
592	  See	  OI	  Strategic	  Plan,	  2013:14	  and	  OI	  Report,	  2014:2.	  	  
593	  See	  Wight	  (2013:92-­‐94)	  for	  insights	  on	  analysing	  trends.	  
594	  See	  Davos	  Global	  Economic	  Outlook	  (2014),	  IMF	  (2013:41),	  and	  Magnus	  (2014).	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Chapter	  9	  
	  
9.	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  	  	  	  
All	  human	  beings	  are	  born	  free	  and	  equal	  in	  dignity	  and	  rights.	  	  
They	  are	  endowed	  with	  reason	  and	  conscience	  	  
and	  should	  act	  towards	  one	  another	  in	  a	  spirit	  of	  brotherhood.	  
	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  Article	  1,	  The	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (UDHR,	  1948)	  
	  	  
	  
9.1	  Introduction	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  does	  not	  self-­‐identify	  as	  a	  TAN,	  labeling	  itself	  	  ‘one	  of	  the	  world’s	  leading	  independent	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  dedicated	  to	  defending	  and	  protecting	  human	  rights’	  (HRW	  data,	  2012a).	  However,	  this	  chapter	  shows	  that	  when	  HRW	  is	  analysed	  in	  respect	  of	  its	  overall	  operations,	  this	  iconic	  human	  rights	  agency	  is,	  like	  Oxfam,	  a	  hybrid	  TAN	  with	  an	  increasingly	  conspicuous	  advocacy	  function.	  By	  focusing	  on	  HRW’s	  communications	  operations,	  I	  show	  that	  HRW	  exhibits	  a	  high	  proportion	  of	  the	  TAN-­‐like	  advocacy	  characteristics	  that	  I	  argue	  have	  determinative	  properties	  that	  impact	  on	  its	  amalgamated	  functions	  and	  fortunes.	  	  	  Following	  the	  same	  structure	  as	  the	  previous	  two	  chapters,	  this	  chapter	  examines	  the	  history	  and	  context	  of	  HRW’s	  development,	  and	  its	  current	  status	  in	  an	  evidently	  exceptional	  place	  and	  function	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  It	  also	  points	  out	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  HRW	  is	  different	  to	  other	  TANs,	  not	  least	  in	  the	  fewer	  barriers	  it	  encounters	  in	  its	  access	  to	  politicians	  and	  policymakers	  and	  in	  its	  interactions	  within	  policy-­‐making	  institutions.	  Indeed,	  HRW	  is	  shown	  here	  to	  have	  forged	  an	  evidently	  established	  place	  in	  the	  international	  sphere595.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  common	  complaint	  of	  many	  TANs	  that	  their	  protest	  voices	  lack	  high-­‐level	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
595	  Whether,	  or	  not,	  HRW	  considers	  its	  international	  relationships	  to	  be	  in	  a	  ‘satisfactory’	  state	  is	  beyond	  
the	  scope	  of	  this	  macroscopic	  study.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis,	  these	  relationships	  are	  considered	  
to	  be	  satisfactory	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  abundant	  and	  increasing.	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impact	  —	  exemplified	  by	  the	  Greenpeace	  CEO’s	  statement:	  ‘we	  have	  access	  without	  influence’	  —	  HRW’s	  track	  record	  shows	  that	  when	  this	  TAN	  speaks	  the	  international	  community	  invariably	  listens596	  and	  responds.	  It	  also	  shows	  how	  HRW’s	  advocacy	  communications	  function,	  invigorated	  by	  recent	  advances	  in	  ICTs	  and	  communications	  techniques,	  is	  now	  transforming	  this	  almost	  40-­‐year-­‐old	  organisation597	  into	  a	  globe-­‐spanning,	  rights	  abuse-­‐oriented,	  news	  agency	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  	  
9.2	  Identity	  and	  Aims	  	  HRW	  is	  active	  in	  90	  countries	  (HRW	  Annual	  Report,	  2013:5).	  It	  maintains	  a	  headquarters	  in	  New	  York	  and	  a	  network	  of	  17	  principal	  offices	  in	  major	  cities.	  As	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  importance	  HRW	  places	  on	  advocacy,	  the	  post	  of	  	  ‘Advocacy	  Director’	  has	  been	  established	  to	  head	  this	  function	  in	  10	  of	  its	  offices.	  In	  addition,	  HRW	  has	  ‘field	  presences’	  in	  20	  other	  locations	  	  —	  although	  it	  is	  notable	  that	  up	  to	  now	  only	  one	  of	  its	  principal	  offices,	  Johannesburg,	  could	  be	  deemed	  to	  be	  in	  the	  global	  ‘South’	  (HRW	  World	  Report,	  2012).	  	  	  Today,	  HRW	  employs	  a	  worldwide	  staff	  of	  ‘roughly	  400	  human	  rights	  professionals	  including	  country	  experts,	  lawyers,	  journalists,	  and	  academics	  of	  diverse	  backgrounds	  and	  nationalities’	  (HRW	  data,	  2014c).	  This	  thesis	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  a	  useful	  conceptualising	  device	  to	  use	  metaphors	  that	  personify	  the	  different	  segments	  of	  HRW’s	  operations	  and	  corporate	  identity,	  and	  to	  think	  of	  them	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  functional	  roles:	  part	  advocate	  (lawyers	  and	  journalists),	  part	  warrior	  (political	  activists),	  part	  academic	  and	  part	  diplomat.	  To	  illustrate	  the	  organisation’s	  extraordinary	  growth,	  two	  years	  earlier	  this	  figure	  stood	  at	  approximately	  280	  staff	  (HRW	  data,	  2012a).	  HRW	  highlights	  the	  fact	  that	  ‘[A]t	  the	  heart	  of	  our	  work	  are	  more	  than	  80	  researchers	  on	  staff’’(ibid).	  As	  a	  consequence,	  this	  chapter	  argues,	  HRW	  has	  always	  presented	  a	  more	  intellectual	  outward	  face	  than	  either	  Greenpeace	  or	  Oxfam	  and	  this	  is	  a	  differentiating	  property	  that	  sets	  it	  apart	  from	  many	  other	  TANs.	  This,	  I	  argue,	  also	  increases	  HRW’s	  value	  within	  the	  international	  system	  and	  tends	  to	  ameliorate	  the	  barriers	  to	  engagement	  that	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
596	  See	  GI	  Naidoo	  (2014);	  GI	  news	  (2013e);	  Hansard	  (2013);	  UN-­‐OHCHR	  (2008:6);	  HRW	  video	  (2014a)	  and	  
Columbia	  U	  (2009).	  
597	  The	  forerunner	  to	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  Helsinki	  Watch,	  was	  founded	  in	  1978	  (HRW	  data,	  2012a).	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faced	  by	  those	  TANs	  that	  openly	  express	  their	  deep-­‐rooted	  hostility	  to	  the	  current	  international	  order.	  HRW	  claims	  (HRW	  data,	  2014):	  	  	   Because	   of	   our	   meticulous	   field	   research	   and	   reputation	   for	   impartiality,	  reporters,	   columnists,	   broadcasters,	   and	   editors,	   as	   well	   as	   policymakers	   of	  concerned	   governments,	   the	   United	   Nations,	   and	   other	   intergovernmental	  entities	  worldwide	  rely	  on	  our	  reports,	  citing	  our	  findings	  in	  their	  work.	  	  	  To	  mainstream	  observers,	  HRW	  might	  appear	  to	  have	  won	  its	  sector-­‐leading	  reputation	  for	  championing	  human	  rights	  on	  normative	  moral	  grounds,	  arguably	  assisted	  by	  its	  diligence	  and	  the	  immense	  scale	  of	  rights	  abuse	  issues	  it	  faces.	  Unlike	  Amnesty	  International,	  HRW	  does	  not	  credit	  campaigning	  as	  its	  foremost	  driver598:	  its	  brief	  self-­‐label	  statement599	  sets	  out	  only	  HRW’s	  relational	  orientation	  to	  official	  bodies	  and	  others	  —	  i.e.	  its	  ‘non-­‐governmental’	  status	  —	  and	  its	  primary	  goals.	  However,	  I	  submit	  that	  HRW	  achieved	  its	  present	  prominence	  largely	  through	  the	  strategic	  publicising	  of	  its	  own	  work600.	  This	  analysis	  does	  not	  denigrate	  the	  innovative	  and	  acclaimed	  quality	  of	  HRW’s	  work,	  but	  emphasises	  only	  that	  other	  bodies	  are	  involved	  in	  human	  rights	  work	  but	  do	  not	  possess	  the	  communications	  capabilities	  of	  HRW	  and	  so	  remain	  uncelebrated601.	  Until	  recently,	  HRW’s	  reputation	  was	  undoubtedly	  achieved	  through	  cultivating	  an	  enabling	  environment	  in	  the	  traditional	  mass	  media.	  	  	  	  Despite	  HRW’s	  self-­‐description,	  its	  external	  communications-­‐prioritising	  function	  is	  clearly	  prefigured	  in	  the	  following	  statement	  on	  its	  official	  Website	  (HRW	  data,	  2014c):	  	  	  […]	   Human	   Rights	   Watch	   is	   known	   for	   its	   accurate	   fact-­‐finding,	   impartial	  reporting,	  effective	  use	  of	  media,	  and	  targeted	  advocacy,	  often	  in	  partnership	  with	   local	   human	   rights	   groups.	   Each	   year,	   Human	   Rights	   Watch	   publishes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
598	  Amnesty	  International,	  with	  whom	  HRW	  is	  often	  compared,	  does	  identify	  itself	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  
advocacy	  function,	  asserting	  on	  its	  UK	  country	  Website:	  “We	  are	  a	  campaigning	  organization:	  it’s	  what	  
we	  do”	  (AI	  data,	  2012).	  
599	  As	  quoted	  in	  the	  opening	  of	  this	  chapter:	  ‘one	  of	  the	  world’s	  leading	  independent	  non-­‐governmental	  
organisations	  dedicated	  to	  defending	  and	  protecting	  human	  rights’	  (HRW	  data,	  2012a)	  
600	  Once	  information	  reached	  the	  public	  domain,	  this	  thesis	  posits	  that	  it	  seems	  plausible	  that	  its	  
widespread	  cognition	  was	  greatly	  assisted	  by	  what	  Kahneman	  describes	  as	  the	  ‘availability	  heuristic’	  
(2011:8-­‐9),	  and	  what	  Watts	  explains	  as	  the	  human	  inclination	  to	  rely	  on	  ‘circular	  reasoning’	  to	  make	  
sense	  of	  certain	  happenings	  and	  explain	  why	  some	  things	  succeed	  and	  others	  fail	  	  —	  i.e.	  ‘X	  succeeded	  
because	  it	  had	  the	  attributes	  of	  X’	  (Watts,	  2011,	  57-­‐61).	  Ergo,	  we	  understand	  HRW	  to	  be	  a	  world-­‐leading	  
rights	  crusader	  because	  it	  has	  just	  the	  right	  attributes,	  but	  the	  only	  attributes	  we	  know	  about	  are	  the	  
ones	  HRW	  possesses;	  thus	  we	  conclude	  that	  these	  are	  the	  attributes	  that	  must	  have	  been	  responsible	  
for	  HRW	  becoming	  a	  world-­‐leading	  rights	  crusader.	  
601	  For	  example	  see	  UN-­‐OHCHR	  data	  (2012)	  and	  UN-­‐OHCHR	  (2008).	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more	  than	  100	  reports	  and	  briefings	  on	  human	  rights	  conditions	   in	  some	  90	  countries,	   generating	   extensive	   coverage	   in	   local	   and	   international	   media.	  With	  the	  leverage	  this	  brings,	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  meets	  with	  governments,	  the	  United	  Nations,	  regional	  groups	   like	   the	  African	  Union	  and	  the	  European	  Union,	   financial	   institutions,	   and	   corporations	   to	   press	   for	   changes	   in	   policy	  and	  practice	  that	  promote	  human	  rights	  and	  justice	  around	  the	  world.	  	  Furthermore,	  HRW	  claims,	  it	  is	  this	  operational	  formula	  —	  combining	  its	  traditional	  on-­‐the-­‐ground	  fact-­‐finding	  with	  ‘new	  technologies	  and	  innovative	  advocacy’	  —	  that	  keeps	  HRW	  ‘on	  the	  cutting	  edge’	  of	  promoting	  respect	  for	  human	  rights	  throughout	  the	  world	  (HRW	  data,	  2012a).	  It	  is	  ‘a	  proven	  methodology	  to	  achieve	  long-­‐term,	  meaningful	  impact’	  (ibid):	  Furthermore:	  	  	   Our	   work	   has	   resulted	   in	   sustained,	   positive	   change	   in	   the	   behaviour	   of	  governments,	   lawmakers,	  court	  systems,	  rebel	  groups,	  corporations,	  regional	  bodies,	  and	  the	  United	  Nations.	  	  	  Although	  its	  advocacy	  function	  shows	  similarities	  with	  those	  of	  the	  other	  two	  case	  study	  TANs,	  this	  thesis	  argues	  that	  HRW	  differs	  to	  varying	  degrees	  from	  them	  in	  at	  least	  four	  important	  ways:	  (i)	  it	  focuses	  exclusively	  on	  human	  rights	  issues;	  (ii)	  it	  is	  not	  a	  mass-­‐membership,	  grassroots,	  organisation	  reliant	  on	  funding	  from	  this	  source602;	  (iii)	  it	  does	  not	  demonstrate	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  strategic	  social	  boundary	  mechanism603	  construction	  (or,	  put	  simply,	  it	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  deliberately	  construct	  alter-­‐cultural	  barriers	  between	  ‘us-­‐and-­‐them’);	  and	  (iv)	  while	  HRW	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  having	  a	  conspicuous	  advocacy	  function,	  as	  an	  NGO	  it	  is	  more	  a	  hybrid	  in	  the	  way	  it	  functions	  than	  either	  of	  the	  other	  two	  organisations.	  	  	  Over	  the	  years,	  HRW’s	  workload	  has	  burgeoned,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  organisation	  now	  divides	  its	  programme	  into	  six	  parts	  (one	  for	  each	  region	  plus	  the	  United	  States),	  and	  thematic	  programmes	  devoted	  to	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  topics604:	  	  HRW	  has	  recently	  begun	  using	  statistical	  research,	  satellite	  photography	  and	  bomb-­‐data	  analysis,	  among	  other	  new	  methodologies,	  and	  is	  also	  increasingly	  applying	  its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
602	  Greenpeace	  International	  states	  that	  it	  is	  financially	  independent	  from	  political	  or	  commercial	  
interests	  and	  relies	  on	  grassroots	  support	  (vide	  Section	  7.5.1.4	  and	  7.5.2.2),	  while	  Oxfam	  International	  
receives	  only	  around	  17%	  of	  its	  funding	  from	  direct	  public	  donations	  (vide	  Section	  8.4.1).	  
603	  Social	  boundary	  mechanism	  indicators	  assessed	  in	  this	  author’s	  model	  are:	  prominence	  and	  
repetition	  of	  symbols,	  heroes,	  myths,	  mysticism	  and	  empty	  signifiers	  in	  the	  organisation’s	  grand	  
narrative.	  See	  Tilly	  (2004).	  
604	  Including	  torture,	  women’s	  rights,	  children’s	  rights,	  refugees,	  arms	  and	  military	  affairs,	  free	  speech,	  
international	  justice,	  terrorism	  and	  counterterrorism,	  the	  human	  rights	  responsibilities	  of	  corporations,	  
gay	  and	  lesbian	  rights,	  health	  and	  human	  rights,	  disability,	  extractive	  industries,	  the	  CIA,	  the	  United	  
Nations	  and	  European	  Commission,	  and	  ‘killer	  robots’.	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research	  methodology	  to	  economic,	  social,	  and	  cultural	  rights,	  particularly	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  education	  and	  housing	  (HRW	  data,	  2014a,	  2014c).	  	  	  
Behind-­the-­	  scenes	  analysing,	  lobbying	  and	  diplomacy	  An	  element	  of	  HRW’s	  work	  is	  in	  behind-­‐the-­‐scene	  research	  of	  human	  rights	  issues,	  followed	  by	  representation	  within	  the	  various	  international	  institutions,	  and	  then	  highlighting	  the	  results	  in	  its	  publicity	  and	  advocacy	  materials	  (HRW	  Annual	  Report,	  2013:5).	  Arguably,	  this	  helps	  not	  only	  to	  achieve	  publicity	  goals	  and	  show	  HRW’s	  capacities	  and	  multi-­‐pronged	  approaches.	  An	  example	  may	  be	  seen	  in	  this	  Website	  post,	  under	  the	  heading	  ‘Success	  Stories’605	  (HRW	  data,	  2012):	  	  Burma	  Frees	  at	  Least	  200	  Political	  Prisoners	  –	  Oct	  12,	  2011	  	  The	  Burmese	  government	  yesterday	  freed	  at	   least	  200	  of	   its	  estimated	  2,000	  political	   prisoners.	   Officially,	   Burma	   denies	   having	   any	   such	   prisoners	   –	   but	  Human	   Rights	   Watch	   has	   worked	   hard	   to	   make	   sure	   these	   imprisoned	  activists	   weren’t	   forgotten.	   We	   held	   high-­‐level	   meetings	   with	   UN	   and	  government	  officials	  visiting	  Burma,	  arming	  them	  with	  the	  evidence	  they	  used	  to	   pressure	   Burma	   into	   releasing	   these	   journalists,	   artists,	   and	   Buddhist	  monks.	  	  A	  more	  recent	  example	  of	  HRW’s	  view	  of	  its	  intermediary	  role	  is	  provided	  in	  its	  depiction	  of	  its	  work	  during	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  upheavals.	  A	  senior	  executive606	  claims	  that,	  through	  its	  work	  in	  Libya,	  HRW	  	  ‘found	  itself	  in	  constant	  dialogue’	  with	  the	  United	  Nations,	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department,	  and	  the	  governments	  of	  France	  and	  Britain:’	  […]	  telling	  them	  not	  only	  what	  was	  happening	  on	  the	  ground,	  but	  what	  they	  needed	  to	  do’	  (HRW	  video,	  2012).	  The	  official	  further	  asserted	  that	  HRW	  played	  ‘a	  significant	  role’	  in	  lobbying	  for	  UN	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1970,	  which	  referred	  Libya	  to	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  in	  an	  ‘unprecedented’	  four	  days,	  instrumentally	  due	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  HRW	  data	  (ibid).	  HRW	  officials	  claim	  they	  have	  worked	  ‘incessantly’	  to	  push	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  EU	  to	  establish	  targeted	  sanctions	  against	  the	  Syrian	  Government.	  	  	  Overall,	  I	  argue,	  HRW	  projects	  an	  image	  that	  portrays	  its	  role	  in	  diplomatic	  affairs	  as	  that	  of	  a	  valued	  ‘insider’,	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  international	  collaborative	  projects,	  yet	  uncompromisingly	  autonomous.	  To	  what	  extent	  this	  might	  be	  due	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
605	  At	  URL	  http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/12/burma-­‐frees-­‐least-­‐200-­‐political-­‐prisoners	  
606	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  Executive	  Director,	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  Division,	  New	  York	  Office,	  	  
	  	  	  	  Sarah	  Leah	  Whitson	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its	  origins	  and	  independence	  from	  official	  influence	  and	  public	  funding,	  is	  assessed	  later.	  The	  diplomatic/international	  consultative	  role	  is	  arguably	  one	  that	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  values	  greatly.	  
9.2.1	  Identifying	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  as	  a	  TAN	  	  The	  following	  analysis	  shows	  that	  the	  advocacy	  function	  of	  HRW	  is	  sufficiently	  highly	  developed	  and	  distinctive	  to	  support	  the	  argument	  that	  it	  fits	  the	  referent	  model	  for	  this	  thesis	  and	  is	  a	  TAN.	  	  
	  
Criterion	  #1:	  	  
• Distinctive,	  highly-­visual,	  transnational	  corporate	  identity	  	  The	  distinctive	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  corporate	  logo,	  shown	  below,	  is	  prominently	  displayed	  on	  all	  HRW	  publicity	  outputs,	  including	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  world,	  country	  and	  issue-­‐based	  reports,	  press	  releases,	  videos,	  posters	  and	  Internet-­‐based	  social	  media	  websites,	  such	  as	  YouTube,	  Twitter,	  Facebook	  and	  StumbleUpon.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Figure	  9.1	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  logo	  	  	  
	  
	  
Criterion	  #2:	  	  
• Demonstrable	  prioritising	  of	  self-­promotion	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Criterion	  #3:	  	  
• Demonstrable	  prioritising	  of	  voice-­amplification	  strategies	  in	  advocacy	  
	  HRW	  projects	  commitment	  to	  people-­‐centred,	  voice-­‐amplification	  strategies	  in	  its	  publicity	  outputs.	  Capturing	  this	  aspect	  of	  HRW’s	  work	  in	  the	  video	  title	  ‘Giving	  a	  voice	  to	  those	  who	  have	  none’,	  graphic	  examples	  of	  personal	  accounts	  by	  rights	  abuse	  victims	  can	  be	  seen	  on	  the	  HRW	  Website,	  You	  Tube	  and	  StumbleUpon	  (HRW	  data,	  2014d;	  HRW	  video,	  2014a;	  2014b).	  	  	  	  
	  	  	   	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  Figure	  9.2	  A	  range	  of	  HRW	  report	  covers	  that	  prioritise	  voice-­‐amplification	  on	  behalf	  of	  ‘dependent	  affected’	  
persons	  	  This	  study	  found	  that	  HRW	  routinely	  adopts	  the	  communications	  tactic	  of	  using	  the	  voices	  of	  the	  ‘dependent	  affected’	  victims	  of	  human	  rights	  abuses.	  Individual	  stories	  involving	  bloodshed	  and	  brutality,	  especially	  those	  relating	  to	  murder,	  torture	  and	  rape,	  are	  prioritised	  in	  publicity	  releases,	  over	  less	  dramatic	  and	  less	  photogenic	  subject	  matter.	  This	  adoption	  of	  newsworthiness	  criteria	  in	  rights	  abuse	  publicity	  selection	  prompts	  obvious	  comparisons	  of	  HRW’s	  communications	  function	  with	  the	  operations	  of	  international	  news	  agencies607.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
607	  This	  thesis	  makes	  no	  moral	  judgment	  on	  the	  adoption	  of	  this	  advocacy	  tactic.	  The	  aim	  here	  is	  to	  point	  
out	  that	  the	  use	  of	  a	  particular	  storytelling	  style,	  rather	  than	  another,	  is	  the	  result	  of	  an	  intentional	  
communications	  strategy.	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Criterion	  #4:	  	  
• Highly	  media-­savvy,	  with	  unremitting	  media	  relations	  activity	  
	  Demonstrated	  by	  the	  large	  volume	  and	  professional	  quality	  of	  HRW’s	  media	  releases,	  social	  media	  presence,	  and	  all	  other	  publicity	  outputs.	  Reporting	  and	  disseminating	  rights	  abuse	  news	  speedily	  to	  worldwide	  audiences	  is	  clearly	  a	  HRW	  priority	  (HRW	  data,	  2014d;	  HRW	  video,	  2014a;	  2014b).	  
	  
Criterion	  #5:	  	  
• Demonstrable	  high	  degree	  of	  adoption	  of	  sophisticated	  public/political	  
communications	  style	  and	  strategies	  
	  Demonstrated	  by	  the	  high	  quality	  of	  HRW’s	  communications	  outputs,	  reflecting	  advanced	  international	  public	  communications	  ‘best	  practice’	  standards.	  HRW	  makes	  explicit	  statements	  concerning	  the	  importance	  of	  its	  ‘cutting	  edge’	  communications	  resources,	  which	  combine	  ‘new	  technologies	  and	  innovative	  advocacy’	  (HRW	  data,	  2012a).	  These	  statements	  can	  be	  found	  on	  the	  HRW	  Website.	  	  	  
Criterion	  #6:	  	  
• Demonstrable	  high	  degree	  of	  adoption	  of	  advanced	  information	  and	  
communication	  technologies	  







	   337	  
Criterion	  #7:	  	  
• Demonstrable	  high	  degree	  of	  strategic	  social	  boundary	  mechanism	  
construction	  
	  Of	  the	  three	  case	  study	  TANs,	  HRW	  was	  the	  least	  engaged	  in	  demonstrable	  social	  boundary	  construction.	  However,	  in	  its	  promotion	  of	  its	  absolutist	  humanitarian	  core	  values,	  HRW	  arguably	  implies	  that	  those	  who	  subscribe	  to	  its	  corporate	  vision	  are	  just	  and	  joined	  in	  solidarity	  with	  rights	  supporters,	  who	  are	  ring-­‐fenced	  from	  all	  others	  who	  do	  not	  share	  its	  uncompromising	  worldview608.	  	  
Criterion	  #8:	  	  
• Demonstrable	  differentiation	  strategies	  within	  the	  NGO	  sector	  and	  within	  
the	  typology	  of	  TANs	  
	  HRW’s	  emphasis	  on	  its	  reputation	  for	  high	  academic	  standards	  in	  its	  on-­‐the-­‐ground,	  fact-­‐finding	  and	  research	  methodologies	  and	  report	  production	  is	  a	  differentiating	  factor.	  By	  comparison,	  most	  TANs,	  as	  a	  cluster,	  aim	  to	  appeal	  to	  popular	  audiences,	  rather	  than	  to	  narrower	  intellectual	  sectors,	  especially	  those	  whose	  existence	  depends	  on	  funding	  by	  the	  public.	  HRW	  also	  emphasises	  the	  value	  of	  its	  human	  rights	  abuse	  exposés	  to	  the	  media,	  governments	  and	  international	  policy-­‐makers.	  The	  sheer	  volume	  of	  HRW’s	  rights	  abuse	  claims	  is	  a	  differentiator.	  HRW’s	  prioritisation	  of	  high-­‐level	  lobbying,	  and	  the	  claimed	  scale	  of	  this	  communications	  activity,	  is	  a	  further	  differentiator	  among	  TANs.	  	  	  HRW	  has	  arguably	  developed	  the	  following	  attributes	  in	  the	  TANs	  sector:	  (i)	  an	  identifiable,	  differentiated,	  brand	  image	  and	  reputation	  as	  a	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  leading	  champions	  of	  human	  rights;	  (ii)	  an	  authoritative	  international	  TAN	  ‘voice’;	  (iii)	  a	  reputation	  as	  an	  international	  mass	  media	  ‘go	  to’	  rights	  watchdog;	  and	  (iv)	  an	  extensive	  global	  network	  of	  ‘listening	  posts’	  and	  first	  responders	  (HRW	  Annual	  Report,	  2013).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
608	  Social	  boundary	  construction	  is	  arguably	  reflected	  in	  the	  opening	  remarks	  to	  readers	  of	  HRW’s	  
Annual	  Report	  (2013:1):	  ‘Thank	  you	  for	  the	  part	  that	  you	  play	  in	  supporting	  our	  vision	  for	  a	  more	  just	  
world’.	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HRW	  underpins	  its	  advocacy	  strategies	  with	  its	  own	  research	  and	  verification	  processes.	  Apart	  from	  its	  ‘effective	  use	  of	  the	  media’	  and	  ‘generating	  extensive	  coverage	  in	  local	  and	  international	  media’	  and	  using	  this	  to	  leverage	  its	  position	  in	  pressing	  for	  changes	  in	  policy	  and	  practice,	  HRW	  might	  arguably	  be	  seen	  until	  recently	  as	  closer	  to	  the	  model	  of	  a	  low-­‐profile	  ‘think	  tank’609	  than	  to	  the	  publicity-­‐driven	  model	  characteristic	  of	  many	  TANs.	  McGann	  and	  Sabatini	  (2011:97)	  include	  HRW	  on	  their	  list	  of	  successful	  global	  think	  tanks.	  These	  authors	  claim	  that	  while	  the	  transnational	  bodies	  on	  their	  list	  do	  share	  some	  commonalities,	  hybridisation	  is	  strongly	  evident	  in	  the	  way	  each	  has	  evolved	  uniquely	  by	  blending	  previously	  defined	  boundaries	  and	  transforming	  themselves	  into	  ‘amalgams	  of	  policy	  research,	  advocacy,	  political	  affiliations	  and	  academics’.	  Moreover,	  they	  claim,	  those	  entities	  that	  could	  be	  described	  as	  ‘advocacy	  tanks’,	  tend	  to	  be	  differentiated	  in	  having	  strong	  value	  positions	  and	  taking	  institutional	  positions	  on	  policy	  issues,	  thereby	  facing	  a	  tension	  between	  maintaining	  consistent	  value	  positions	  and	  perceptions	  of	  objectivity	  and	  completeness	  (ibid:	  21)610.	  Furthermore,	  McGann	  and	  Sabatini	  explain:	  	  	  To	   the	   extent	   that	   their	   messages	   are	   perceived	   to	   reflect	   inflexible	   values	  rather	  than	  ‘objective’	  analysis	  they	  may	  simply	  be	  ignored	  by	  a	  large	  part	  of	  their	  potential	  audience.	  	  This	  observation	  has	  obvious	  implications	  for	  TANs,	  such	  as	  Greenpeace	  and	  HRW,	  which	  make	  truth	  claims	  based	  on	  their	  own	  research.	  But,	  above	  all,	  McGann	  and	  Sabatini	  point	  out,	  the	  primary	  objective	  of	  a	  TAN	  is	  to	  raise	  global	  consciousness	  (ibid:	  70).	  At	  this	  point	  of	  analysis,	  I	  suggest,	  HRW	  parts	  company	  with	  the	  traditional	  ‘think	  tank’	  model	  (as	  adopted	  by	  McGann	  and	  Sabatini)	  and	  exploits	  the	  relatively	  recent,	  consciousness-­‐raising,	  communications	  resources	  that	  now	  facilitate	  the	  agency	  of	  TANs.	  Such	  differences	  in	  perceptions	  by	  external	  observers	  further	  strengthens	  the	  argument	  that	  HRW	  is	  a	  NGO/TAN	  hybrid	  with	  a	  significant	  and	  growing	  advocacy	  function.	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  McGann	  and	  Sabatini	  provide	  a	  particularly	  clear	  definition	  of	  ‘think	  tanks’,	  including	  TANs	  and	  other	  
hybrids	  (2011:17-­‐20,	  21,	  69-­‐70,	  91).	  
610	  The	  damage	  to	  Greenpeace’s	  reputation	  and	  credibility	  following	  the	  Brent	  Spar	  campaign	  may	  be	  
better	  understood	  in	  light	  of	  this	  observation.	  See	  Section	  6.1.	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9.3	  Socio-­‐historical	  context	  	  Formerly	  Helsinki	  Watch	  (Moyn,	  2010:172;	  HRW	  data,	  2012a),	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  was	  established	  in	  1978	  as	  a	  private	  American	  NGO	  to	  support	  citizens	  groups	  that	  formed	  throughout	  the	  Soviet	  bloc	  to	  monitor	  government	  compliance	  with	  the	  1975	  Helsinki	  Accords.	  This	  support	  included	  exposing	  human	  rights	  abuses	  behind	  the	  Iron	  Curtain	  and	  encouraging	  democratic	  reform	  and	  liberalisation	  (Foreman,	  2010;	  Bernstein,	  2009).	  According	  to	  HRW’s	  account	  (HRW	  data,	  2012),	  Helsinki	  Watch	  adopted	  a	  methodology	  of	  	  ‘naming	  and	  shaming’	  abusive	  governments	  through	  media	  coverage	  and	  through	  direct	  exchanges	  with	  policymakers.	  HRW	  claims	  (ibid):	  	  	  By	  shining	  the	  international	  spotlight	  on	  human	  rights	  violations	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	   and	   Eastern	   Europe,	   Helsinki	   Watch	   contributed	   to	   the	   dramatic	  democratic	  transformations	  of	  the	  late	  1980s.	  	  Reflecting	  the	  political	  upheavals	  in	  Central	  America,	  Americas	  Watch	  was	  founded	  in	  1981	  to	  critically	  observe	  the	  civil	  wars	  then	  engulfing	  the	  region.	  This	  role	  included	  the	  investigation	  not	  only	  of	  abuses	  and	  crimes	  against	  international	  humanitarian	  law,	  but	  also	  the	  involvement	  of	  foreign	  governments,	  particularly	  the	  United	  States,	  in	  providing	  military	  support	  to	  abusive	  regimes	  (ibid).	  A	  swatch	  of	  ‘Watch	  Committees’	  followed	  during	  the	  1980s:	  Asia	  Watch,	  Africa	  Watch	  and	  Middle	  East	  Watch.	  In	  1988,	  these	  watchdog	  bodies	  amalgamated	  and	  adopted	  the	  all-­‐inclusive	  name,	  Human	  Rights	  Watch.	  	  	  Underscoring	  the	  importance	  of	  such	  developments,	  Clark	  (2008:566-­‐567)	  relates	  that	  ‘it	  is	  often	  argued	  that	  the	  growth	  of	  concern	  with	  rights	  in	  the	  former	  Eastern	  Europe	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  period	  had	  a	  corrosive	  effect	  on	  the	  maintenance	  of	  authoritarian	  political	  systems	  in	  the	  region’,	  thereby	  contributing	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  bloc	  in	  1989611.	  Unsurprisingly,	  that	  event	  was	  portrayed	  as	  a	  major	  step	  forward	  in	  extending	  the	  liberal	  order	  with	  its	  focus	  on	  rights	  (ibid).	  However,	  there	  was	  no	  dawning	  of	  a	  new	  liberal	  age	  in	  human	  rights	  worldwide,	  nor	  indeed	  in	  a	  liberal	  order:	  the	  rights	  battleground	  simply	  moved	  elsewhere	  and	  expanded	  to	  include	  the	  controversial	  concepts	  of	  economic	  and	  collective	  rights.	  Moreover,	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  HRW	  also	  makes	  this	  claim	  that	  demands	  for	  human	  rights	  helped	  to	  bring	  the	  Cold	  War	  to	  an	  end.	  
See	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  World	  Report	  1989:	  Introduction.	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the	  Western	  origin	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  rights	  had	  come	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  problematic	  in	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  era	  (Brown,	  2008:507).	  Consequently,	  the	  promotion	  of	  a	  type	  of	  universalism	  associated	  with	  this	  international	  human	  rights	  regime	  is	  today	  widely	  contested	  in	  non-­‐Western	  societies	  and	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  evoking	  forms	  of	  religious	  and	  cultural	  resistance	  (Clark,	  ibid;	  Brown,	  ibid;	  Root,	  2013:4-­5,	  66-­69,	  
143-­145).	  
9.4	  Milestones	  and	  salient	  strategies	  
9.4.1	  Milestones	  	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  both	  Greenpeace	  and	  Oxfam,	  HRW’s	  identity	  is	  not	  headlined	  as	  a	  major	  part	  of	  its	  historical	  narrative	  in	  its	  own	  published	  material.	  Instead,	  it	  concentrates	  on	  factual	  accounts	  of	  the	  issues	  it	  tackles,	  and	  claims	  specific	  instrumentality	  in	  a	  long	  list	  of	  successes,	  or	  milestones,	  during	  its	  almost	  40	  years	  of	  operation.	  This	  list	  of	  ‘successes’	  in	  advancing	  respect	  for	  human	  rights	  runs	  to	  25	  pages	  on	  HRW’s	  Website612.	  These	  include:	  	  	  
• Accreditation,	  in	  1993,	  to	  hold	  Special	  Consultancy	  Status	  with	  the	  United	  Nations	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC	  NGO	  List,	  2011:39).	  	  
• Leading	  an	  international	  coalition	  to	  press	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  treaty	  banning	  the	  use	  of	  child	  soldiers;	  
• Documenting	  alleged	  abuses	  by	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  ‘war	  on	  terror,’	  including	  the	  CIA’s	  secret	  detention,	  interrogation	  and	  rendition	  programme,	  the	  torture	  of	  detainees	  held	  in	  Iraq,	  Afghanistan	  and	  Guantánamo	  Bay,	  and	  unfair	  trials	  at	  Guantánamo	  Bay;	  
• In	  1997,	  sharing	  the	  Nobel	  Peace	  Prize	  as	  a	  founding	  member	  of	  the	  International	  Campaign	  to	  Ban	  Landmines.	  	  
• Documenting	  violations	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  war	  in	  numerous	  conflicts,	  including	  Afghanistan,	  Bosnia,	  Chechnya,	  Colombia,	  Congo,	  Kosovo,	  Georgia,	  Israel	  and	  the	  Occupied	  Palestinian	  Territories,	  Iraq,	  Lebanon,	  Somalia,	  and	  Sudan;	  
• Working	  with	  international	  war	  crimes	  tribunals	  and	  providing	  evidence	  of	  abuses	  leading	  to	  convictions	  of	  officials	  from	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  (including	  the	  former	  President	  Slobodan	  Milosovic),	  and	  in	  Rwanda;	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  HRW	  Website	  at	  http://www.hrw.org/about/success-­‐stories.	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• Playing	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  pressing	  for	  the	  former	  President	  of	  Liberia,	  Charles	  Taylor,	  to	  stand	  trial	  before	  an	  international	  tribunal	  in	  The	  Hague	  for	  war	  crimes	  and	  crimes	  against	  humanity;	  
• Helping	  to	  focus	  attention	  on	  abuses	  in	  China	  ahead	  of	  the	  2008	  Olympic	  Games;	  
• Documenting	  the	  killing	  and	  maiming	  of	  civilians	  by	  cluster	  munitions	  in	  Kosovo,	  Afghanistan,	  Iraq,	  Lebanon,	  and	  Georgia,	  and	  helping	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  international	  treaty	  ban;	  and	  
• In	  2008,	  being	  one	  of	  the	  recipients	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Prize	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  in	  recognition	  of	  the	  role	  HRW	  has	  played	  in	  ending	  human	  rights	  abuses.	  	  	  In	  addition,	  during	  the	  preparation	  of	  this	  thesis,	  HRW	  was	  highlighting	  the	  success	  of	  its	  globalised,	  real	  time,	  media	  coverage	  documenting	  human	  rights	  abuses	  throughout	  the	  Middle	  Eastern	  countries	  involved	  in	  the	  ‘Arab	  Spring’	  and	  the	  subsequent,	  ongoing	  conflicts.	  This	  coverage	  included,	  Internet-­‐enabled	  field	  reporting,	  video	  recording	  and	  intensive	  social	  media	  activity	  (HRW	  data,	  2014a;	  HRW	  Annual	  Report,	  2012).	  As	  discussed	  later,	  HRW	  is	  advantaged	  in	  demonstrating	  its	  effectiveness	  by	  being	  factually	  specific	  about	  its	  goals.	  Importantly,	  its	  communications	  strategies	  are	  tied	  to	  its	  communications	  goals.	  	  Apart	  from	  recording	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  its	  successes,	  HRW,	  like	  Oxfam,	  shows	  little	  nostalgia	  for	  its	  corporate	  past	  and	  relates	  its	  history	  in	  a	  dispassionate,	  matter-­‐of-­‐fact,	  style.	  This	  thesis	  suggests	  that	  this	  difference	  from	  some	  other	  TANs	  (notably	  Greenpeace),	  is	  arguably	  related	  to	  HRW’s	  donor	  support	  base	  and	  indicates	  that	  the	  body	  takes	  pride	  in	  its	  record	  of	  goal	  attainment	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  its	  research,	  which	  has	  been	  HRW’s	  trademark	  since	  its	  earliest	  days	  (vide	  HRW	  data,	  2014a;	  Ellis,	  2012).	  	  
9.4.2	  Overview	  of	  HRW’s	  advocacy	  strategies	  	  Also	  in	  contrast	  to	  Greenpeace,	  HRW	  has	  not	  deployed	  advocacy	  strategies	  that	  involve	  high-­‐visibility,	  activist	  confrontations	  in	  specific	  locations613.	  Nor	  has	  HRW	  been	  remarkable	  for	  scandal,	  apart	  from	  the	  routinely	  high	  levels	  of	  criticism	  that	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  Such	  as	  Greenpeace	  staged	  at	  the	  Brent	  Spar	  site	  in	  the	  North	  Sea,	  the	  South	  Pacific	  during	  the	  
France’s	  nuclear	  testing,	  or,	  more	  recently,	  at	  oil	  exploration	  sites	  in	  the	  Arctic.	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it	  attracts	  from	  those	  with	  whom	  it	  crosses	  swords	  over	  rights	  abuse	  cases,	  its	  North	  American	  image	  and	  Western	  values,	  or	  its	  modus	  operandi).	  Instead	  of	  milestones,	  the	  HRW	  story	  is	  arguably	  distinguished	  more	  by	  its	  steady	  development	  process:	  its	  capabilities	  having	  been	  progressively	  scaled	  up	  over	  three	  decades	  in	  order	  to	  do	  more	  of	  the	  same,	  in	  more	  locations,	  with	  more	  and	  better	  resources.	  Simultaneously,	  HRW	  has	  cultivated	  a	  reputation	  for	  credibility	  in	  its	  reporting	  and	  trustworthiness	  (Syracuse	  U,	  2005;	  HRW	  Annual	  Report,	  2013:	  3-­‐5,	  13-­‐15).	  	  
As	  a	  recent	  example,	  the	  then	  British	  Foreign	  Secretary614	  stated,	  in	  the	  UK	  Parliament,	  that	  HRW	  had	  issued	  ‘a	  very	  detailed	  report’	  stating	  that,	  based	  on	  its	  own	  independent	  evidence	  and	  assessment,	  ‘Human	  Rights	  Watch	  finds	  that	  Syrian	  
government	  forces	  were	  almost	  certainly	  responsible	  for	  the	  August	  21	  attacks,	  and	  
that	  a	  weapons-­grade	  nerve	  agent	  was	  delivered	  during	  the	  attack	  using	  specially	  
designed	  rocket	  delivery	  systems’	  (Hansard,	  2013;	  HRW	  video,	  2014a).	  This	  level	  of	  trust	  in	  a	  private	  sector	  information	  source,	  on	  a	  matter	  of	  critical	  international	  relations	  importance,	  is	  exceptional.	  It	  also	  demonstrates	  the	  Minister’s	  faith	  in	  the	  reputation	  of	  HRW	  to	  impress	  and	  convince	  his	  audience.	  	  	  
Today.	  HRW	  is	  an	  acknowledged	  power	  in	  the	  field	  of	  promoting	  human	  rights.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  another	  watchdog	  organisation,	  NGO	  Monitor	  (NGO	  Monitor,	  2009:7):	  	   With	  its	  global	  reach,	  plentiful	  funds,	  wide	  access	  to	  media,	  and	  the	  contacts	  to	  influence	   policy	   makers	   in	   the	   United	   States,	   HRW	   has	   become	   an	   NGO	  superpower.	  	  But	  what	  does	  ‘an	  NGO	  superpower’	  look	  like,	  apart	  from	  having	  a	  globally	  recognised	  public	  face	  and	  reputation	  as	  a	  formidable	  adversary	  in	  human	  rights	  issues?	  Although	  this	  study	  could	  not	  extend	  to	  an	  internal	  examination	  of	  HRW,	  indications	  suggest	  HRW	  might	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  composite	  of	  several	  core	  operations,	  or	  communities	  of	  professional	  practice615.	  Thus,	  this	  organisation	  does	  not	  suggest	  the	  same	  degree	  of	  organisational	  logic	  that	  is	  projected,	  for	  example,	  by	  Oxfam.	  It	  seems	  possible	  from	  an	  organisational	  perspective	  that	  HRW	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
614	  The	  then	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Foreign	  and	  Commonwealth	  Affairs,	  The	  Rt.	  Hon	  William	  Hague.	  
615	  The	  ‘advocate	  (lawyers	  and	  journalists),	  part	  warrior	  (political	  activists),	  part	  academic	  and	  part	  
diplomat’	  as	  referred	  to	  in	  Section	  9.2.	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faces	  inherent	  challenges	  in	  amalgamating	  its	  hybrid	  of	  functional	  forms,	  and	  particularly	  in	  combining	  its	  vociferous	  advocacy	  and	  activist	  roles616	  with	  the	  deliberative	  and	  circumspect	  requirements	  of	  its	  diplomatic	  and	  lobbying	  roles.	  While	  these	  communities	  of	  practice	  within	  HRW	  evidently	  contribute	  individually	  and	  jointly	  to	  HRW’s	  mission	  and	  growth,	  they	  suggest	  distinctively	  different	  approaches	  to	  the	  quest	  of	  protecting	  human	  rights.	  By	  comparison,	  this	  challenge	  is	  faced	  differently	  by	  Greenpeace,	  which	  tends	  to	  apply	  its	  trademark	  confrontational	  strategy	  in	  its	  engagements	  with	  all	  complex	  macro-­‐level	  systems	  (e.g.	  the	  international	  system,	  Russia,	  the	  whaling	  industry,	  the	  ivory	  trade).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  HRW,	  however,	  macro-­‐	  and	  micro-­‐level	  interactions	  intersect	  not	  only	  with	  the	  organisation	  as	  an	  entity	  but	  with	  each	  of	  HRW’s	  communities	  of	  practice,	  each	  having	  their	  own	  relations	  of	  exteriority	  and	  requirements	  for	  relationship	  maintenance.	  	  	  What	  might	  HRW’s	  emerging	  pattern	  of	  prioritising	  ‘cutting	  edge’	  communications	  mean	  for	  its	  corporate	  identity?	  The	  primary	  strategy	  of	  a	  TAN	  is	  ‘to	  raise	  global	  consciousness’	  (vide	  McGann	  and	  Sabatini,	  2011:70.	  However,	  if	  we	  take	  HRW	  to	  be	  a	  hybrid	  organisation	  amalgamating	  a	  number	  of	  less	  visible	  human	  rights	  protecting	  functions,	  internal	  cross-­‐functional	  disharmony	  and	  incompatibility	  over	  organisational	  resources	  allocation	  begin	  to	  emerge617.	  Brown	  and	  Duguid	  (2002:160-­‐61),	  shed	  light	  on	  a	  syndrome	  that	  emerges	  when	  organisations	  adopt	  the	  new	  information-­‐enhancing	  technologies	  in	  some	  corporate	  divisions	  and	  to	  lesser	  extents	  in	  others.	  They	  highlight	  the	  contention	  associated	  with	  resource	  allocation	  from	  a	  central	  source,	  and	  the	  difficulties	  involved	  in	  building	  bridges	  between	  separate	  ‘communities	  of	  practice’	  in	  order	  for	  the	  cross-­‐functional	  parts	  to	  work	  as	  a	  synergistic	  whole.	  	  	  As	  an	  illustration,	  a	  high-­‐visibility	  schism	  in	  2009	  brought	  to	  light	  signs	  of	  internal	  tensions	  and	  accusations	  that	  the	  body	  had	  undergone	  significant	  detrimental	  change	  (reminiscent	  of	  Gidden’s	  observations	  regarding	  ‘shell	  institutions’,	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
616	  For	  example,	  see	  HRW’s	  annual	  report	  (HRW	  Annual	  Report,	  2013)	  showcasing	  a	  more	  dramatic	  and	  
confrontational	  style	  of	  fact-­‐finding,	  pursued	  by	  individual	  HRW	  investigators,	  than	  in	  past	  publicity	  
outputs.	  	  
617	  This	  theory	  casting	  doubt	  on	  HRW’s	  current	  and	  future	  corporate	  logics	  and	  identity	  emerged	  from	  
the	  study	  and	  requires	  further	  exploration.	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‘appear	  the	  same	  as	  they	  used	  to	  be	  from	  the	  outside,	  and	  carry	  the	  same	  names,	  but	  inside	  have	  become	  quite	  different’	  (2002:18-­‐19).	  HRW’s	  founder,	  Robert	  Bernstein,	  denounced	  it	  for	  having	  strayed	  too	  far	  from	  its	  founding	  mission.	  In	  protest,	  Bernstein	  left	  HRW	  and	  established	  the	  rival,	  Internet-­‐centred	  organisation,	  Advancing	  Human	  Rights	  (AHR).	  AHR,	  Bernstein	  explained,	  would	  leverage	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Internet	  to	  help	  ‘online	  activists	  and	  cyber	  dissidents’,	  whom	  he	  said,	  ‘are	  the	  new	  generation	  of	  cutting	  edge	  human	  rights	  proponents’	  (Bernstein,	  2009;	  Bloomberg,	  2011;	  AHR,	  2013;	  N.Y.	  Times,	  2012b).	  Although	  these	  patterns	  appear	  to	  have	  implications	  for	  the	  way	  HRW’s	  advocacy	  function	  is	  developing,	  it	  is	  too	  early	  to	  tell	  whether	  they	  will	  have	  any	  effect	  on	  HRW’s	  interface	  with	  the	  international	  system.	  	  Nevertheless	  HRW	  now	  claims	  (HRW	  data,	  2014c):	  ‘In	  times	  of	  crisis,	  we're	  at	  the	  forefront,	  releasing	  up-­‐to-­‐the-­‐minute	  information	  and	  advocating	  for	  action’.	  The	  adoption	  of	  these	  new	  communications	  capabilities	  dramatically	  and	  irrevocably	  helped,	  inter	  alia,	  to	  change:	  (i)	  the	  global	  face	  of	  human	  rights	  advocacy;	  (ii)	  the	  ethos	  and	  operations	  of	  HRW;	  (iii)	  the	  relational	  interface	  between	  HRW	  and	  international	  actors.	  	  	  As	  part	  of	  a	  major	  initiative	  to	  build	  a	  more	  global	  organisation,	  a	  new	  advocacy	  office	  is	  being	  planned	  for	  São	  Paulo	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  developing	  new	  ties	  to	  Brazil’s	  media	  and	  policy	  communities	  (HRW	  Annual	  Report	  2011:35).	  This	  initiative	  is	  part	  of	  HRW’s	  Global	  Challenge	  Campaign,	  launched	  in	  2010,	  to	  address	  the	  changing	  world	  situation	  by	  deepening	  the	  organisation’s	  advocacy	  capacity	  throughout	  Africa,	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Latin	  America	  and	  Asia.	  The	  rationale	  given	  for	  this	  project	  is	  to	  ‘meet	  the	  challenges	  of	  a	  world	  in	  which	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  has	  shifted	  and	  governments	  in	  the	  global	  South	  play	  an	  ever-­‐increasing	  role	  in	  shaping	  and	  influencing	  human	  rights	  policy’	  (ibid).	  	  
9.4.3	  Overview	  of	  HRW’s	  political	  strategies	  	  Throughout	  its	  life,	  HRW’s	  criticisms	  of	  national	  political	  leaders	  and	  their	  instruments	  of	  governance	  have	  been	  magnets	  for	  drawing	  criticism	  in	  return.	  Often	  these	  have	  been	  connected	  to	  perceived	  biases	  and	  imbalances	  over	  whom	  HRW	  selects	  to	  report	  on,	  and	  over-­‐report	  on	  (especially	  Israel),	  and	  whom	  it	  chooses	  to	  ignore	  (such	  as	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Iran)	  (Foreman,	  2010;	  Bernstein,	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2009;	  NGO	  Monitor,	  2012).	  It	  seems	  self-­‐evident	  that	  HRW’s	  commitment	  to	  challenging	  authorities	  over	  alleged	  human	  rights	  violations	  will	  be	  controversial,	  whether	  relating	  to	  national	  sovereignty,	  security,	  cultural	  difference,	  international	  relations,	  national	  governance,	  or	  law	  and	  order.	  This	  thesis	  suggests	  that	  despite	  HRW’s	  declarations	  of	  being	  apolitical,	  non-­‐partisan	  and	  neutral	  in	  conflict	  situations	  (HRW	  data	  2014c),	  the	  organisation’s	  political	  dispositions	  and	  strategies	  have	  been	  evident	  from	  its	  beginnings,	  although	  they	  have	  changed	  substantially	  over	  time	  —	  even	  as	  concepts	  of	  what	  constitutes	  rights,	  and	  their	  abuse,	  have	  evolved	  and	  proliferated.	  These	  patterns	  of	  change	  are	  borne	  out	  in	  public	  statements	  made	  by	  HRW’s	  founder,	  which	  are	  included	  later	  in	  this	  section.	  	  	  From	  an	  external	  perspective,	  HRW	  might	  be	  viewed	  as	  having	  begun	  as	  a	  comparatively	  staid	  and	  small,	  private,	  NGO,	  monitoring	  compliance	  with	  the	  Helsinki	  Accords,	  and	  having	  nominally	  apolitical	  but	  recognisably	  liberal	  democratic	  underpinnings	  concerning	  individual	  freedoms	  and	  protections	  (Bernstein	  bio,	  2014).	  Today,	  HRW’s	  outputs	  portray	  an	  organisation	  that	  is,	  like	  Oxfam,	  stretched	  in	  addressing	  a	  dizzying	  array	  of	  projects	  across	  the	  world.	  Maintaining	  that	  it	  is	  apolitical,	  HRW	  nevertheless	  exhibits	  a	  characteristic	  targeting	  of	  the	  leaders	  of	  authoritarian	  regimes.	  A	  recent	  example	  is	  on	  the	  HRW	  Website:	  Uprising:	  The	  Arab	  Spring	  (HRW	  video,	  2012).	  HRW’s	  message	  is	  of	  political	  opposition	  not	  only	  to	  all	  authoritarian	  regimes,	  but	  to	  all	  the	  leaders	  and	  governments	  of	  countries	  involved	  in	  the	  Arab	  Spring.	  Conflating	  the	  social,	  religious,	  cultural,	  historical,	  economic	  and	  political	  differences	  between	  each	  of	  these	  countries	  —	  and,	  importantly,	  within	  them	  —	  HRW	  conveys	  the	  political	  message	  that	  authoritarian	  governments,	  should,	  and	  will,	  ‘fall’.	  For	  an	  organisation	  with	  a	  distinctly	  Western	  image	  and	  U.S.-­‐based	  management,	  HRW’s	  support	  for	  dissident	  and	  rebellious	  elements	  in	  other	  societies	  is	  never	  far	  from	  criticism	  for	  bias,	  attempting	  to	  undermine	  national	  governments,	  and	  furthering	  Western	  imperialist	  ambition	  (NGO	  Monitor,	  2012;	  The	  Washington	  Post,	  2011).	  Consequently,	  HRW	  regularly	  comes	  under	  attack	  from	  governments,	  including	  	  China,	  Russia,	  Israel,	  Iran,	  Syria,	  Rwanda,	  Sri	  Lanka	  and	  Zimbabwe	  (The	  
Washington	  Post,	  2011).	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As	  with	  Greenpeace,	  HRW	  has	  been	  criticised	  by	  at	  least	  one	  of	  its	  founders	  for	  departing	  from	  its	  original	  principles.	  HRW’s	  founder	  and	  chairman	  emeritus,	  the	  retired	  publisher	  Robert	  L.	  Bernstein618,	  wrote	  in	  an	  op-­‐ed	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  (Bernstein,	  2009)	  that	  he	  felt	  impelled	  to	  publicly	  join	  HRW’s	  critics	  to	  denounce	  what	  he	  termed	  HRW’s	  loss	  of	  ‘critical	  perspective’	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Mr.	  Bernstein	  accused	  HRW	  of	  bias	  and	  of	  casting	  aside	  the	  important	  distinction	  between	  ‘open’	  and	  ‘closed’	  societies	  when	  selecting	  political	  targets.	  HRW	  had,	  he	  said,	  written	  far	  more	  condemnations	  of	  Israel	  for	  violations	  of	  international	  law	  than	  for	  of	  any	  other	  country	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  region619	  (Bernstein,	  2009;	  Foreman,	  2010;	  see	  also	  NGO	  Monitor,	  2012	  and	  The	  Algemeiner,	  2011).	  In	  admonishing	  HRW,	  Bernstein	  wrote:	  	  Only	   by	   returning	   to	   its	   founding	   mission	   and	   the	   spirit	   of	   humility	   that	  animated	   it	  can	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  resurrect	   itself	  as	  a	  moral	   force	   in	   the	  Middle	  East	  and	  throughout	  the	  world.	  If	  it	  fails	  to	  do	  that,	  its	  credibility	  will	  be	   seriously	   undermined	   and	   its	   important	   role	   in	   the	   world	   significantly	  diminished.	  	  	  In	  Bernstein’s	  view	  HRW	  had	  strayed	  too	  far	  from	  the	  values	  of	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  was	  now	  focusing	  its	  efforts	  on	  the	  wrong	  subjects.	  Instead	  of	  targeting	  authoritarian	  governments	  for	  their	  human	  rights	  abuses,	  HRW	  was	  often	  targeting	  open	  governments	  with	  democratic	  systems.	  Moreover,	  human	  rights	  groups	  were	  also	  involving	  themselves	  in	  spillover	  matters	  where	  they	  were	  out	  of	  their	  depth,	  such	  as	  advising	  democratic	  governments	  on	  how	  to	  fight	  wars	  and	  what	  weapons	  to	  use,	  while	  lacking	  the	  expertise	  to	  do	  so	  (Bloomberg,	  2011)620.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
618	  Robert	  Bernstein	  led	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  for	  over	  20	  years	  (1978-­‐98).	  See	  Bernstein	  (2009);	  
Bloomberg	  (2011);	  AHR	  (2013).	  
619	  In	  a	  response,	  published	  five	  days	  later,	  HRW	  strongly	  rejected	  all	  criticisms	  of	  its	  commentaries	  on	  
Israel	  (HRW,	  2009).	  	  
620	  As	  noted	  in	  Section	  9.4.3,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  these	  differences,	  Bernstein	  parted	  company	  with	  HRW	  and	  
established	  the	  breakaway	  human	  rights	  watchdog	  organisation,	  Advancing	  Human	  Rights,	  in	  2010,	  with	  
the	  aim	  of	  getting	  ‘back	  to	  the	  basics	  of	  human	  rights	  promotion,	  especially	  in	  the	  Middle	  East’	  
(Bloomberg,	  2011;	  also	  AHR,	  2013	  and	  N.Y.	  Times,	  2012b).	  The	  declared	  strategy	  of	  the	  new	  
organisation	  was	  to	  focus	  on	  influencing	  closed	  societies	  and	  ‘leveraging	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Internet’	  to	  
promote	  human	  rights	  and	  provide	  a	  platform	  for	  reporting	  rights	  abuses,	  dissident	  opinion	  and	  
discussion.	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9.5	  Outcomes-­‐in-­‐process	  and	  indicative	  macroscopic	  patterns	  
9.5.1	  Assessment	  of	  HRW	  applying	  a	  Complex	  Realism	  analytical	  framework	  A	  complex	  realism	  approach	  aided	  understanding	  of	  the	  contentious	  matters	  of	  human	  rights	  abuse	  in	  HRW’s	  operating	  environment,	  not	  as	  resulting	  from	  increasing	  scales	  of	  human	  immorality	  but	  as	  products	  of	  complex	  systems	  and	  social	  structural	  dynamics621.	  Readily	  apparent	  complexity	  features	  identified	  in	  the	  HRW	  data	  included:	  	  
	  
 Fitness	  landscape	  embeddedness	  HRW	  emerged	  in	  1978	  due	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  advantageous	  assemblage	  of	  enabling	  properties	  in	  its	  fitness	  landscape.	  Arguably,	  the	  most	  salient	  condition	  in	  this	  process	  was	  the	  political	  opportunity	  structure	  provided	  by	  the	  1975	  Helsinki	  Accords	  international	  security	  agreement.	  Coming	  at	  a	  time	  of	  heightened	  Cold	  War	  tensions,	  the	  conditions	  were	  evidently	  ripe	  for	  the	  co-­‐evolution	  of	  a	  human	  rights	  monitoring	  and	  advocacy	  body,	  rooted	  in	  the	  democratic	  West,	  to	  monitor	  the	  USSR’s	  compliance	  with	  the	  Accords.	  The	  Soviet	  crackdowns	  on	  internal	  dissent	  during	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  80’s,	  and	  the	  human	  rights	  abuses	  of	  a	  number	  of	  authoritarian	  regimes,	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  providing	  further	  impetus	  for	  the	  growth	  of	  an	  array	  of	  ‘Watch	  Committees’	  that	  consolidated	  to	  become	  HRW	  in	  1988	  (HRW	  data,	  2014a;	  Encyclopædia	  Britannica,	  2014a).	  	  	  With	  its	  reputation	  for	  scholarly	  research	  and	  exposure	  of	  rights	  abuses	  and	  abusers,	  HRW	  products	  have	  undoubtedly	  been	  of	  considerable	  instrumental	  value	  to	  the	  democracy-­‐promoting	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system	  in	  their	  wars	  of	  words	  with	  pariah	  leaders	  and	  regimes.	  This	  arguably	  reflects	  HRW’s	  competency	  in	  understanding	  its	  operating	  environment.	  This	  evidently	  maximises	  HRW’s	  ability	  to	  ‘scale	  shift’	  issues	  to	  appropriate	  levels	  for	  their	  resolution	  and	  achieve	  its	  preferred	  outcomes	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
621	  See	  Bhaskar	  (2011:2-­‐3)	  for	  insights	  on	  the	  primacy	  of	  social	  structural	  dynamics	  in	  producing	  social	  
phenomena.	  As	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  our	  age	  is	  not	  more	  dangerous	  —	  not	  more	  risky	  —	  than	  those	  
encountered	  by	  earlier	  generations,	  but	  we	  face	  higher	  proportions	  of	  anxieties	  resulting	  from	  hazards	  
created	  by	  ourselves	  (Giddens	  2002:28-­‐29).	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  the	  progressive	  propagation	  of	  laws	  
and	  notions	  of	  human	  rights,	  and	  by	  extension	  the	  worldwide	  citing	  and	  combating	  of	  ever	  increasing	  
abuses	  of	  them,	  appears	  to	  amply	  reflect	  this	  type	  of	  Man-­‐made	  situation.	  A	  contingency	  that	  Giddens	  
refers	  to	  as	  ‘manufactured	  risk’,	  a	  form	  of	  risk	  that	  is	  created	  by	  ‘the	  very	  knowledge	  of	  our	  developing	  
knowledge	  upon	  the	  world’	  and	  which	  we	  have	  very	  little	  historical	  experience	  of	  confronting	  (ibid).	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 Structural	  plurality	  and	  multi-­‐dimensionality	  Evidence	  of	  underlying	  social	  structural	  dimensions	  to	  HRW’s	  operations	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  following	  patterns:	  (i)	  National	  and	  international	  security	  structures	  involving	  military	  power.	  Structural	  restrictions	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  HRW’s	  admitted	  inability	  to	  move	  its	  staff	  freely	  in	  conflict	  zones,	  such	  as	  Syria622,	  and	  instead	  its	  increasing	  reliance	  on	  digital	  communications	  technology	  and	  social	  media	  to	  circumvent	  these	  structural	  barriers.	  (ii)	  Political	  structures,	  generating	  pronounced	  differences	  in	  the	  form	  and	  levels	  of	  HRW’s	  activity	  when	  engaging	  with	  liberal	  democratic,	  nominally	  democratic	  and	  non-­‐democratic	  systems.	  For	  example,	  the	  HRW	  World	  
Report	  2014	  devoted	  less	  space	  to	  documenting	  the	  human	  rights	  situation	  in	  North	  Korea	  than	  to	  reporting	  on	  rights	  abuses	  in	  liberal	  democratic	  Australia	  (World	  Report,	  2014:305,	  292,	  CIA	  data,	  2014).	  (iii)	  Cultural	  dimensions,	  seen	  in	  HRW’s	  projection	  of	  essentially	  Western	  standards	  of	  human	  rights	  norms	  against	  a	  global	  background	  comprising	  a	  diversity	  of	  social	  cultures,	  many	  of	  which	  reject	  these	  norms	  and	  the	  intrusion	  of	  Western	  values	  (Root,	  2013:4-­‐5).	  	  	  (iv)	  Polarity	  patterns	  are	  evident	  in	  HRW’s	  orientation	  to	  the	  advanced	  Western	  liberal	  democratic	  systems	  and	  practices,	  although	  efforts	  are	  being	  made	  to	  adjust	  HRW’s	  traditional	  Northern	  hemispheric	  polarity	  to	  encompass	  the	  global	  South.	  A	  pronounced	  preference	  for	  West-­‐based	  social	  media	  platforms	  is	  currently	  developing.	  	  (v)	  Technological	  structures.	  HRW	  is	  evidently	  being	  shaped	  by	  the	  technological	  tools	  it	  adopts	  and	  their	  availability.	  Indicative	  patterns	  were	  seen	  in	  the	  expansion	  of	  HRW’s	  network	  of	  country	  offices	  whose	  operations	  are	  enabled	  by	  modern	  communications;	  the	  escalating,	  ICT-­‐enabled	  deluge	  in	  rights	  abuse	  claims	  from	  geographically	  diverse	  locations;	  and	  the	  adoption	  of	  advanced	  field	  reporting	  technologies	  that	  are	  shaping	  HRW’s	  advocacy	  function	  in	  ways	  that	  resemble	  those	  of	  an	  international	  news	  agency,	  rather	  than	  those	  typically	  associated	  with	  a	  traditional	  NGO.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
622	  For	  examples,	  see	  HRW	  Annual	  Report	  2013:15,	  31,	  37.	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 Emergence	  HRW’s	  emergence	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  amalgamation	  of	  four	  earlier	  Watch	  Committees,	  which	  in	  turn	  emerged	  from	  the	  monitoring	  NGO	  model	  Helsinki	  Watch.	  Moreover,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  new	  human	  rights	  body,	  AHR,	  demonstrates	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  fitness	  landscapes	  of	  complex	  organisations,	  such	  as	  HRW,	  are	  subjected	  to	  constantly	  evolving	  and	  shifting	  circumstances.	  	  	  	  
 Co-­‐evolution	  The	  emergence	  and	  development	  of	  human	  rights	  monitoring	  NGOs	  in	  various	  regions	  can	  arguably	  be	  viewed	  in	  terms	  of	  co-­‐evolutionary	  responses	  to	  situations	  in	  which	  human	  rights	  were	  perceived	  to	  be	  imperiled.	  
	  
 Sensitivity	  to	  initial	  conditions	  Early	  adopter	  advantages	  can	  be	  identified	  in	  the	  HRW	  model.	  Sensitivity	  to	  the	  original	  international	  system	  fitness	  landscape	  and	  the	  development	  of	  inter-­‐relationships	  characterised	  by	  experiences	  of	  trustworthiness	  and	  mutual	  value	  appear	  to	  be	  present.	  I	  argue	  that	  HRW’s	  research	  capability	  to	  dovetail	  with	  international	  institutional	  conventions	  constitutes	  evidence	  of	  this.	  	  	  	  
 Path	  dependency/Lock-­‐in	  From	  its	  earliest	  days,	  HRW	  has	  declared	  a	  commitment	  to	  championing	  human	  rights	  via	  a	  multi-­‐pronged	  strategy	  that	  exhibits	  signs	  of	  path-­‐dependency.	  Thus,	  HRW	  pursued	  the	  same	  confrontational,	  ‘naming	  and	  shaming’	  advocacy	  activities.	  The	  efficacy	  of	  a	  multi-­‐pronged	  advocacy	  strategy	  accords	  with	  complexity	  theorisation,	  which	  holds	  that	  international	  affairs	  are	  necessarily	  multi-­‐causal	  and	  multiple	  strategies	  on	  different	  levels	  of	  complexity	  are	  therefore	  needed	  to	  effectively	  address	  them.	  HRW’s	  uncompromising	  adversarial	  posture	  in	  regard	  to	  rights	  abuse	  perpetrators	  also	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  locked-­‐in	  strategy	  that	  is	  intrinsically	  linked	  to	  HRW’s	  corporate	  identity,	  and	  is	  therefore	  resistant	  to	  change623.	  	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  adopting	  the	  technological	  tools	  and	  techniques	  of	  contemporary	  communication	  has	  set	  HRW	  on	  a	  path-­‐dependent	  course	  that	  is	  co-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
623	  This	  characteristic	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  comparing	  issues	  of	  HRW’s	  flagship	  publication	  World	  Report	  (e.g.	  
HRW	  World	  Report,	  2014,	  2015).	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evolving	  with	  contingencies	  in	  its	  fitness	  landscapes,	  and	  especially	  with	  the	  capabilities	  of	  rivals	  in	  the	  human	  rights	  advocacy	  sector.	  These	  tendencies	  attest	  to	  McLuhan’s	  theory	  (McLuhan,	  1994:xi)	  that	  ‘we	  shape	  our	  tools	  and,	  thereafter,	  our	  tools	  shape	  us’,	  setting	  in	  train	  a	  systemic	  path	  dependency	  that	  becomes	  difficult	  to	  arrest.	  	  
 Feedback	  mechanisms	  It	  appears	  that	  HRW’s	  function	  as	  a	  feedback	  mechanism	  is	  its	  primary	  and	  most	  valued	  function	  in	  the	  international	  system,	  as	  seen	  in	  its	  awareness-­‐raising,	  service-­‐providing	  and	  legitimising	  features.	  HRW	  has	  been	  acknowledged	  for	  making	  substantial	  contributions	  to	  the	  processes	  of	  informing	  international	  debates	  and	  evidence-­‐based	  international	  policymaking	  	  (UN-­‐OHCHR,	  2008:6;	  Hansard,	  2013;	  Columbia	  U,	  2009;	  HRW	  video,	  2014;	  HRW	  Annual	  Report,	  2013:5)624.	  	  	  
 Attractor	  properties	  Further	  to	  the	  systemic	  attractors	  discussed	  under	  the	  ‘Co-­‐evolution’	  rubric,	  HRW	  exhibits	  core	  principles	  and	  a	  brand	  image	  that	  could	  be	  regarded	  as	  cognitive	  attractors625.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  manifestation	  is	  the	  behavioral	  motivation	  to	  join	  the	  organisation	  and	  engage	  in	  its	  advocacy	  activities.	  	  
	  
 ‘Adjacent	  possible’	  opportunism	  HRW’s	  current	  image	  is,	  arguably,	  that	  of	  an	  iconic	  and	  progressive	  organisation	  that	  is	  stretched	  in	  its	  capacity	  to	  accommodate	  demands	  for	  intervention	  in	  cases	  of	  human	  rights	  abuse.	  Today,	  HRW	  processes	  such	  claims	  in	  over	  70	  thematic	  categories.	  This	  conditioned	  corporate	  response,	  I	  submit,	  is	  an	  example	  of	  systemic	  spillover	  into	  ‘adjacent	  possible	  ’opportunities	  to	  tackle	  human	  rights	  issues	  as	  and	  when	  they	  appear.	  A	  similar	  situation	  was	  arguably	  seen	  in	  the	  Oxfam	  data	  (Black,	  1992:vii),	  which	  showed	  that	  Oxfam	  has	  grown	  into	  a	  globe-­‐spanning	  confederation,	  stretched	  on	  multiple	  fronts.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
624	  See	  also	  HRW	  and	  OHCHR	  official	  Websites	  for	  evidence	  of	  communications	  traffic	  density.	  
625	  See	  Geyer	  and	  Rihani	  (2010:38-­‐39)	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  role	  of	  attractors	  in	  understanding	  
systemic	  behaviours.	  
	   351	  
 Unintended	  consequences	  The	  path	  by	  which	  the	  original	  Helsinki	  Watch	  was	  established	  and	  then	  merged	  with	  the	  parallel	  organisations	  tackling	  other	  areas	  of	  the	  globe,	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  logical	  response	  to	  the	  existing	  legal	  and	  humanitarian	  situations	  at	  the	  time.	  However,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  no	  evidence	  of	  any	  intention	  to	  develop	  further.	  It	  therefore	  appears	  that	  the	  huge	  organisation	  HRW	  has	  grown	  to	  today	  —	  a	  global	  TAN	  icon	  for	  human	  rights	  advocacy,	  employing	  some	  400	  staff	  —	  was	  an	  unintended	  consequence	  of	  complex	  system	  dynamics626.	  
9.5.2	  Assessment	  of	  HRW	  using	  a	  political	  theoretical	  framework	  	  In	  light	  of	  the	  allegations	  against	  HRW	  alleging	  political	  bias,	  its	  professed	  commitment	  to	  eschewing	  political	  causes	  and	  adopting	  non-­‐partisan	  positions	  could	  be	  considered	  debatable	  (HRW	  data,	  2014c;	  Bernstein,	  2009;	  Foreman,	  2010;	  NGO	  Monitor,	  2009,	  2012).	  HRW	  has	  been	  strongly	  criticised	  by	  the	  Jerusalem-­‐based	  organisation	  NGO	  Monitor,	  which	  claims	  that	  HRW	  analyses	  demonstrate	  a	  disproportionate	  anti-­‐Israel	  prejudice.	  The	  monitoring	  body	  also	  claims	  that	  ‘many	  HRW	  officials,	  including	  the	  heads	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  Division,	  have	  a	  history	  of	  ideological	  bias’	  (NGO	  Monitor,	  2012).	  NGO	  Monitor	  documents	  (NGO	  Monitor,	  2009)	  what	  it	  sees	  as	  HRW’s	  descent	  over	  time,	  from	  the	  ‘halo	  effect’	  of	  its	  early	  years,	  when	  it	  established	  a	  reputation	  based	  on	  perceptions	  of	  expertise,	  morality	  and	  objectivity:	  
Our	   investigation	   shows	   a	   consistent	   pattern	   of	   ideological	   bias,	   lack	   of	  professional	  qualifications,	  and	  unsupported	  claims	  based	  on	  faulty	  evidence	  and	  analysis	  on	   the	  part	  of	  HRW.	  These	  are	   then	   replicated	  by	  governments	  and	  international	  organizations,	  including	  the	  United	  Nations,	  that	  adopt	  these	  allegations.	  	  Drawing	  attention	  to	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  troubling	  political	  ideological	  biases	  among	  some	  HRW	  staff	  members	  and	  imbalances	  in	  the	  organisation’s	  selection	  of	  whom	  it	  regards	  as	  victims,	  Foreman	  states	  (2010):	  	  	  Why	  does	  HRW	  seem	  so	  credulous	  of	  civilian	  witnesses	  in	  places	  like	  Gaza	  but	  so	   sceptical	   of	   anyone	   in	   a	   uniform?	   It	  may	   be	   that	   organisations	   like	   HRW	  that	  depend	  on	  the	  media	  for	  their	  profile	  —	  and	  therefore	  their	  donations	  —	  concentrate	  on	  places	  the	  media	  already	  cares	  about.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
626	  There	  are	  obvious	  similarities	  with	  the	  growth	  trajectories	  of	  both	  Greenpeace	  and	  Oxfam.	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In	  what	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  symbolic	  demonstration	  of	  HRW’s	  assertion	  of	  impartiality,	  HRW	  carries	  a	  selection	  of	  opponents’	  criticisms	  against	  itself	  on	  its	  Website,	  under	  the	  tagline	  What	  they	  say	  about	  us627	  (HRW	  data,	  2012a).	  A	  number	  of	  these	  postings	  are	  from	  HRW’s	  long-­‐term	  targets,	  such	  as	  China,	  Somalia	  and	  the	  President	  of	  Zimbabwe,	  Robert	  Mugabe	  —	  all	  with	  records	  as	  human	  rights	  pariahs.	  It	  could	  thus	  be	  concluded	  that	  their	  criticisms	  of	  HRW	  tend	  to	  enhance	  the	  organisation’s	  reputation	  as	  a	  fearless	  rights	  defender,	  rather	  than	  harm	  it628.	  	  Despite	  the	  assumption	  in	  the	  developed	  West	  that	  their	  ethnocentric	  views	  on	  rights	  and	  the	  need	  for	  their	  adoption	  are	  universal,	  they	  sometimes	  clash	  sharply	  with	  other	  deeply	  held	  worldviews	  on	  governance	  and	  rights	  (Root,	  2013:4-­‐5).	  For	  example,	  the	  2013	  Pew	  Survey	  of	  Global	  Attitudes	  showed	  that	  85%	  of	  Chinese	  were	  ‘very	  satisfied’	  with	  their	  country’s	  direction,	  compared	  with	  just	  31%	  of	  Americans	  (Pew,	  2013).	  Thus,	  in	  considering	  the	  political	  implications	  of	  HRW’s	  worldwide	  operations	  and	  effectiveness,	  the	  age-­‐old	  values	  debate629	  concerning	  moral	  universalism	  versus	  moral	  relativism	  cannot	  be	  ignored.	  According	  to	  Brown	  (2008:518-­‐519),	  the	  debate	  pendulum	  has,	  in	  recent	  years,	  possibly	  swung	  more	  towards	  the	  moral	  relativism	  position	  following	  accusations	  —	  particularly	  in	  the	  non-­‐Western	  world	  —	  of	  Western	  political,	  economic	  and	  cultural	  imperialism	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  international	  psychological	  fallout	  associated	  with	  9/11	  (ibid).	  	  	  Aside	  from	  the	  moral	  and	  political	  debates,	  however,	  the	  practical	  challenge	  of	  presenting	  human	  rights	  arguments	  on	  the	  world	  stage	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that,	  despite	  the	  powerful	  rhetorical	  appeal	  of	  the	  liberal	  position	  and	  the	  moving	  voices	  of	  victims	  of	  oppression,	  human	  rights	  are	  essentially	  conflictual630	  	  —	  inter	  alia,	  with	  political	  and	  religious	  ideologies,	  cultures	  and	  nationalities.	  Globalisation	  effects	  notwithstanding,	  Smith	  (1990:188)	  points	  out	  that	  a	  world	  comprising	  competing	  cultures,	  each	  seeking	  to	  improve	  its	  comparative	  status	  rankings	  and	  enlarge	  its	  cultural	  resources,	  affords	  little	  basis	  for	  global	  projects,	  despite	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
627	  At	  URL:	  http://www.hrw.org/what-­‐they-­‐say-­‐about-­‐us.	  
628	  A	  similar	  reverse	  psychology	  communications	  tactic	  was	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Greenpeace.	  
629	  	  See	  Brown,	  2008:516.	  
630	  	  For	  examples	  see	  Ignatieff,	  2001:20	  and	  Brown,	  2008:510-­‐519.	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technical	  and	  linguistic	  infrastructural	  possibilities.	  If	  rights	  conflict	  and	  there	  is	  no	  unarguable	  order	  of	  moral	  priority	  in	  rights	  claims,	  then,	  Ignatieff	  argues,	  we	  cannot	  speak	  of	  rights	  as	  trumps631.	  	  An	  additional	  dilemma	  for	  human	  rights	  activists	  is	  the	  non-­‐negotiability	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  rights.	  Ignatieff	  points	  out	  that	  when	  rights	  are	  introduced	  into	  political	  discussion	  they	  create	  a	  spirit	  of	  non-­‐negotiable	  confrontation,	  running	  a	  risk	  that	  the	  issue	  will	  become	  irreconcilable.	  Compromise	  is	  not	  facilitated	  by	  the	  use	  of	  rights	  language,	  since	  to	  call	  a	  claim	  a	  right	  is,	  essentially,	  to	  declare	  it	  non-­‐negotiable	  (ibid).	  This,	  I	  suggest,	  is	  easier	  for	  the	  advocate	  and	  activist	  to	  do,	  than	  it	  is	  for	  the	  concession-­‐making	  diplomat	  working	  within	  the	  international	  system.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  attracting	  mass	  media	  attention	  the	  inherent	  conflicts	  adhering	  to	  human	  rights	  issues	  are	  highly	  newsworthy,	  particularly	  if	  they	  are	  framed	  dramatically,	  or	  in	  ways	  that	  point	  to	  scandalous	  or	  inhuman	  behaviour	  by	  state	  leaders	  or	  administrations.	  This	  facet	  of	  political	  advocacy	  was	  greatly	  in	  evidence	  in	  the	  case	  study	  on	  Greenpeace	  and,	  this	  thesis	  submits,	  is	  increasingly	  the	  case	  in	  HRW’s	  adoption	  of	  the	  voice-­‐amplifying	  tools	  of	  the	  new	  media632.	  	  Tensions	  and	  conflicts	  might	  be	  usefully	  understood	  as	  intrinsic	  characteristics	  for	  a	  TAN	  such	  as	  HRW,	  which	  asserts	  an	  a	  priori	  basis	  for	  universal	  human	  rights,	  yet	  seeks	  to	  change	  the	  behaviours	  of	  state	  actors	  through	  increased	  information	  supply	  and	  argument	  within	  the	  cultural	  and	  developmental	  diversity	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  However,	  this	  thesis	  argues	  that	  this	  method	  of	  leveraging	  political	  influence	  through	  increased	  communications	  is	  risky	  and	  has	  a	  significant	  counter-­‐intuitive	  aspect,	  according	  to	  Ackoff	  633	  (1999:	  36-­‐37):	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
631	  Dworkin	  (1977),	  cited	  in	  Ignatieff,	  2001:20;	  50.	  Ignatieff	  argues	  that	  the	  realisation	  of	  liberty	  and	  
equality,	  freedom	  and	  security,	  property	  and	  distributive	  justice,	  conflict,	  and,	  because	  they	  do,	  the	  
rights	  that	  define	  them	  as	  entitlements	  are	  also	  in	  conflict.	  
632	  An	  example	  of	  this	  type	  of	  news	  sensationalism	  is,	  arguably,	  the	  full	  page	  publication	  of	  an	  old	  (2005)	  
photograph	  featuring	  political	  leaders	  who	  are	  currently	  unpopular	  in	  the	  West,	  in	  HRW’s	  latest	  Annual	  
Report	  (HRW	  Annual	  Report,	  2013:37).	  The	  photograph	  has	  little	  relevance	  to	  the	  accompanying	  report	  
and	  bears	  the	  arguably	  gratuitous	  caption:	  ‘Russian	  President	  Vladimir	  Putin	  and	  then-­‐wife,	  Lyudmila,	  
welcome	  Syrian	  President	  Bashar	  al-­‐Assad	  and	  his	  wife,	  Asma,	  in	  Moscow	  on	  January	  23,	  2005’.	  	  
633	  The	  U.S.	  organisational	  and	  systems	  theorist,	  the	  late	  Russell	  L.	  Ackoff.	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Unfortunately,	   when	   conflict	   is	   based	   on	   differing	   values	   or	   scarcity	   of	  resources,	  an	  increased	  flow	  of	  information,	  contrary	  to	  conventional	  wisdom,	  does	  not	  improve	  but	  aggravates	  the	  conflict.634	  	  	  Reminiscent	  of	  Keohane	  and	  Nye’s	  observations	  of	  information	  overload,	  ‘white	  noise’	  and	  ‘gridlock’	  that	  were	  already	  being	  experienced	  by	  international	  institutions	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  in	  their	  interactions	  with	  transnational	  civil	  society	  groups	  (1988:89),	  Ackoff	  asserts	  (ibid:36):	  	  [A]s	  the	  amount	  of	  information	  received	  increases	  beyond	  the	  amount	  receivers	  can	  handle	  effectively,	  they	  use	  less	  and	  less	  of	  it.	  Not	  only	  do	  receivers	  become	  saturated	  with	  information	  —	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  receive	  any	  more	  —	  but	  they	  can	  and	  do	  become	  supersaturated	  and	  discard	  some	  of	  the	  information	  they	  already	  have.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  nexus	  between	  political	  intention	  and	  political	  advocacy	  and	  influence	  is	  an	  intricate	  one.	  In	  order	  to	  influence	  or	  persuade	  others,	  political	  information	  and	  ideas	  must	  be	  conveyed	  to	  them	  in	  acceptable	  ways	  (Broom	  and	  Sha,	  2013:323).	  	  There	  are	  two	  further	  interrelated	  factors	  that	  I	  consider	  play	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  type	  of	  NGO	  model	  that	  HRW	  has	  evolved	  into	  and	  the	  type	  of	  strategies	  it	  chooses	  to	  pursue	  its	  aims.	  These	  are:	  1.	  How	  independent	  and	  autonomous	  is	  HRW?	  And	  2.	  Does	  HRW’s	  funding	  model	  have	  a	  determinative	  effect	  on	  the	  political	  strategies	  it	  chooses?635	  In	  this	  context	  HRW	  declares	  (HRW	  data,	  2014d):	  	  Human	   Rights	   Watch	   is	   an	   independent,	   nongovernmental	   organization,	  supported	   by	   contributions	   from	   private	   individuals	   and	   foundations	  worldwide.	  It	  accepts	  no	  government	  funds,	  directly	  or	  indirectly.	  	  	  And	  (HRW	  data,	  2014c): 	  To	  ensure	  our	  independence,	  we	  do	  not	  accept	  government	  funds,	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	   or	   support	   from	   any	   private	   funder	   that	   could	   compromise	   our	  objectivity	  and	  independence.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
634	  Ackoff	  gives	  as	  an	  example	  ‘the	  more	  information	  enemies	  at	  war	  have	  about	  each	  other,	  the	  more	  
harm	  each	  can	  inflict	  on	  the	  other’	  (ibid:36).	  	  
	  
635	  These	  two	  factors	  have	  particular	  relevance	  to	  the	  PRQ	  and	  H5:	  The	  funding	  models	  TANs	  adopt	  have	  
a	  determinative	  effect	  on	  their	  advocacy	  strategies.	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According	  to	  its	  statements	  (HRW	  Financial	  Statement,	  2013),	  HRW	  obtains	  its	  financial	  support	  primarily	  from	  foundation	  grants	  and	  contributions	  from	  private	  individuals,	  but	  also	  from	  estates,	  trusts	  and	  businesses.	  This	  funding	  model	  may	  need	  to	  change	  as	  HRW’s	  financial	  resources	  appear	  to	  be	  under	  pressure636.	  It	  could	  not	  be	  established,	  by	  way	  of	  this	  external	  audit,	  whether	  HRW’s	  funding	  situation	  was	  causally	  related	  to	  its	  advocacy	  patterns	  of	  change.	  However,	  it	  is	  clearly	  evident	  that	  HRW’s	  advocacy	  patterns	  are	  changing	  (Section	  9.5.3).	  	  This	  sense	  of	  a	  stretched	  organisation	  feeling	  the	  strains	  of	  the	  tasks	  it	  has	  undertaken	  is	  evident	  in	  HRW’s	  Annual	  Reports.	  In	  2011,	  the	  Executive	  Director’s	  overview	  of	  the	  year	  spoke	  of	  ‘staffing	  inadequacies’	  and	  the	  ‘extreme	  burden’	  faced	  by	  researchers	  in	  trying	  to	  carry	  out	  assignments	  in	  a	  number	  of	  countries	  simultaneously,	  across	  the	  turbulent	  Middle	  East	  region	  (HRW	  Annual	  Report,	  2011:1;	  2012:43;	  2013:1).	  	  HRW’s	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  independent	  financially	  relates	  to	  the	  non-­‐acceptance	  of	  	  	  financial	  support	  from	  any	  government	  or	  government-­‐funded	  agency.	  Nevertheless,	  this	  asserted	  independence	  does	  not	  necessarily	  equate	  to	  an	  organisation	  that	  is	  independent	  of	  non-­‐financial	  drivers,	  such	  as	  ideologies,	  dispositions	  or	  influences.	  HRW’s	  boilerplate	  claim	  to	  be	  ‘independent	  and	  autonomous’,	  therefore,	  seems	  somewhat	  ambiguous.	  In	  2010,	  HRW	  accepted	  a	  grant	  from	  George	  Soros’s637	  Open	  Society	  Foundations	  of	  US$100	  million	  (ibid:16;	  OSF	  data,	  2012),	  to	  be	  donated	  in	  $10	  million	  installments	  over	  10	  years,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  extending	  HRW’s	  global	  presence,	  particularly	  in	  the	  global	  South.	  Over	  this	  period,	  HRW	  is	  expected	  to	  find	  funding	  to	  match	  the	  grant	  (HRW	  audio,	  2010).	  According	  to	  The	  Washington	  Post	  (The	  Washington	  Post,	  2010),	  HRW	  is	  also	  seeking	  to	  cultivate	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  foreign	  donors,	  to	  raise	  its	  30%	  funding	  from	  outside	  the	  U.S.	  (which	  in	  2010	  came	  mostly	  from	  Europe,	  with	  some	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
636	  For	  example,	  in	  2011	  HRW	  raised	  US$151.6	  million	  from	  its	  revenue	  sources	  and	  recorded	  
expenditure	  of	  US$50.6	  million;	  in	  2012	  it	  raised	  only	  $70.5	  million	  and	  had	  expenditure	  of	  $58.7	  
million.	  In	  2013,	  $64.6	  million	  was	  raised	  and	  expenditure	  was	  $65.3	  million	  (HRW	  Annual	  Report,	  2012;	  
2013).	  	  	  
637	  Investor	  and	  philanthropist	  George	  Soros	  is	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Open	  Society	  Foundations,	  a	  body	  he	  
established	  in	  1979	  to	  help	  countries	  make	  the	  transition	  out	  of	  communism.	  URL	  
http://www.soros.org/about.	  The	  link	  between	  HRW	  and	  the	  OSF	  is	  not	  tenuous:	  one	  of	  the	  founders	  of	  
Human	  Rights	  Watch	  and	  its	  Executive	  Director	  for	  12	  years,	  Aryeh	  Neier,	  is	  President	  Emeritus	  of	  the	  
Open	  Society	  Foundations	  (http://www.soros.org/people/aryeh-­‐neier).	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input	  from	  Japan)	  to	  50%	  within	  a	  decade.	  Clearly,	  this	  gearing	  up	  in	  HRW’s	  fundraising	  overtures	  to	  attract	  a	  qualitatively	  new	  category	  of	  non-­‐U.S.	  donor	  will	  predicate	  changes	  in	  advocacy	  strategies.	  The	  Post	  reported	  (ibid)	  that	  the	  Soros	  grant	  would	  ensure	  the	  financial	  health	  of	  HRW	  for	  years	  to	  come	  and	  enable	  it	  to	  increase	  its	  staff	  by	  one	  third.	  It	  commented:	  	  The	   group	   [HRW]	   will	   also	   set	   up	   regional	   headquarters	   in	   the	   capitals	   of	  emerging	   political	   and	   economic	   powers,	   where	   leaders	   have	   frequently	  criticized	   human	   rights	   advocacy	   as	   a	  Western	   tool	   to	   impose	   their	   will	   on	  small	  countries.	  	  The	  report	  quoted	  HRW’s	  Executive	  Director,	  Kenneth	  Roth:	  ‘We	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  shape	  the	  foreign	  policies	  of	  these	  emerging	  powers,	  much	  as	  we	  have	  traditionally	  done	  with	  Western	  powers’.	  I	  argue	  that	  at	  least	  three	  pressures	  on	  strategy	  directions	  are	  evident	  in	  the	  acceptance	  of	  this	  grant:	  (a)	  the	  obligation	  to	  apply	  it	  specifically	  to	  global	  expansion,	  especially	  in	  the	  South;	  (b),	  the	  use	  of	  strategies	  intended	  to	  ‘shape	  the	  foreign	  policies	  of	  these	  emerging	  powers’	  in	  accordance	  with	  those	  used	  in	  the	  West;	  and	  (c),	  the	  imperative	  to	  match	  the	  grant	  with	  a	  vastly	  expanded	  programme	  to	  attract	  donor	  funds.	  This	  thesis	  further	  suggests	  that	  whether	  one	  agrees	  with	  the	  open	  society/pro-­‐democracy	  political	  stance	  of	  the	  Soros	  organisation,	  its	  aims	  and	  operations	  are	  overtly	  ideological	  and	  distinctively	  political	  (OSF	  data,	  2012;	  The	  Washington	  Post,	  ibid).	  Signs	  that	  HRW’s	  funding	  model	  and	  funding	  imperatives	  have	  a	  determinative	  effect	  on	  the	  strategies	  it	  chooses	  are	  thus	  clearly	  evident.	  	  	  Some	  scholars,	  who	  challenge	  assumptions	  about	  the	  principled,	  normative	  motivation	  of	  INGOs,	  suggest	  that	  market	  forces	  and	  instrumental	  concerns,	  such	  as	  the	  ‘desire	  to	  please	  multiple	  donors	  who	  control	  the	  purse	  strings’,	  should	  have	  a	  higher	  priority	  in	  analysing	  the	  strategies	  and	  behaviour	  of	  INGOs	  (Cooley	  and	  Ron,	  2010:205;	  Lecy,	  Mitchell	  and	  Schmitz,	  2010:235).	  Lecy	  et	  al	  point	  out:	  	  Advocacy	   organizations	   such	   as	   Amnesty	   International	   and	   Human	   Rights	  Watch	  do	  not	  pick	  their	  targets	  primarily	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  greatest	  violation	  of	  human	  rights	  principles,	  but	   instead	  are	  driven	  by	  a	  need	   for	  mass	  media	  exposure	  and	  for	  securing	  increased	  funding638.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
638	  See	  also	  Ron,	  Ramos	  and	  Rodgers,	  2005,	  for	  a	  comparative	  study	  on	  the	  factors	  shaping	  transnational	  
human	  rights	  NGO	  agendas.	  Support	  for	  this	  assessment	  is	  also	  provided	  by	  Foreman	  (2010).	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9.5.3	  Assessment	  of	  HRW	  using	  an	  advocacy	  theoretical	  framework	  	  HRW	  projects	  an	  assertive	  global	  brand	  identity	  as	  a	  champion	  of	  human	  rights.	  How	  has	  it	  achieved	  this?	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  a	  critical	  determinator	  is	  that	  HRW’s	  communications	  aims	  are	  tied	  to	  communications	  strategies.	  This	  ensures	  that	  the	  strategic	  target	  is	  achievable	  with	  the	  actions	  proposed;	  that	  the	  action	  is	  being	  taken	  towards	  a	  real	  and	  logical	  target,	  rather	  than	  an	  arbitrary	  one,	  using	  a	  real	  lever	  to	  produce	  the	  desired	  effect.	  In	  this	  light,	  an	  organisation	  is	  able	  to	  connect	  its	  publicity	  to	  actual	  performance	  and	  claim	  credit	  where	  it	  asserts	  it	  is	  due.	  The	  principle	  of	  cumulative	  advantage,	  whereby	  HRW’s	  prominent,	  publicity-­‐generating	  outputs	  have	  been	  amplified	  in	  mass	  media	  discourses,	  appears	  to	  have	  played	  a	  prime	  role	  in	  establishing	  HRW’s	  global	  reputation	  (vide	  Arthur,	  1989;	  Watts,	  72-­‐75;	  Adler,	  1985).	  	  	  Unlike	  both	  Greenpeace	  and	  Oxfam,	  HRW	  does	  not	  commit	  to	  an	  overall	  ideal	  that	  leaves	  much	  to	  subjective	  interpretation	  about	  what	  is	  meant.	  In	  this	  respect,	  HRW’s	  operations	  are	  guided	  by	  the	  relatively	  more	  practical	  mission	  statement:	  	  	  	  	   Human	   Rights	  Watch	   is	   dedicated	   to	   protecting	   the	   human	   rights	   of	   people	  around	   the	   world.	   We	   stand	   with	   victims	   and	   activists	   to	   prevent	  discrimination,	  to	  uphold	  political	  freedom,	  to	  protect	  people	  from	  inhumane	  conduct	   in	   wartime,	   and	   to	   bring	   offenders	   to	   justice.	   We	   investigate	   and	  expose	  human	   rights	   violations	   and	  hold	   abusers	   accountable.	  We	   challenge	  governments	  and	  those	  who	  hold	  power	  to	  end	  abusive	  practices	  and	  respect	  international	   human	   rights	   law.	   We	   enlist	   the	   public	   and	   the	   international	  community	  to	  support	  the	  cause	  of	  human	  rights	  for	  all.	  	  This	  gives	  HRW	  a	  potential	  advantage	  in	  demonstrating	  its	  effectiveness	  by	  being	  factually	  specific	  about	  its	  goals,	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  nebulous	  goals	  set	  by	  both	  Greenpeace	  and	  Oxfam639.	  Importantly,	  HRW’s	  work	  is	  underpinned	  and	  guided	  by	  international	  human	  rights	  and	  humanitarian	  law	  (HRW	  data,	  2014c).	  Thus,	  when	  HRW	  commits	  to	  ‘protect	  people	  from	  inhumane	  conduct	  in	  wartime’,	  the	  internationally	  acknowledged	  referent	  for	  ‘inhumane	  conduct’	  is	  unambiguous	  and	  breaches	  of	  its	  stipulations	  are	  measurable.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
639	  Greenpeace’s	  goal	  is	  ‘to	  ensure	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  earth	  to	  nurture	  life	  in	  all	  its	  diversity’	  (GI	  data,	  
2012d);	  Oxfam’s	  goal	  is	  ‘finding	  lasting	  solutions	  to	  poverty	  and	  injustice’	  (OI	  data,	  2012a).	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According	  to	  Lombord	  there	  is	  sound	  logic	  in	  promoting	  and	  upholding	  a	  material	  object,	  such	  as	  international	  human	  rights	  law,	  rather	  than	  ideals	  (2001:5-­‐6).	  He	  points	  out	  that	  in	  comparing	  the	  state	  of	  the	  world	  with	  an	  ideal	  situation	  we	  are	  implicitly	  making	  a	  political	  judgment.	  He	  adds:	  ‘If	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  the	  real	  state	  of	  the	  world,	  we	  need	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  fundamentals640	  and	  we	  need	  to	  look	  at	  
realities,	  not	  myths’.	  And	  for	  this	  we	  need	  statistics641	  (ibid:	  xx).	  Therefore,	  Lombord	  asserts,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  distinguish	  between	  what	  the	  world	  is	  like	  and	  what	  we	  think	  it	  ought	  to	  look	  like,	  if	  the	  best	  possible,	  sound	  information	  is	  to	  be	  used	  to	  prioritise	  projects	  and	  resources	  and	  formulate	  policy	  (ibid:4).	  Given	  HRW’s	  background	  in	  scrutinising	  legal	  compliance	  and	  mounting	  legal	  arguments,	  this	  logic	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  persuasive	  for	  HRW	  staff	  and	  supporters.	  	  	  A	  further	  advantage	  in	  demonstrating	  efficacy	  lies	  in	  the	  selection	  of	  performance	  indicators	  for	  HRW’s	  mission-­‐related	  activities	  that	  are	  relatively	  easy	  to	  set,	  and	  to	  varying	  degrees	  fulfill	  —	  and,	  moreover,	  to	  quantify	  and	  publicise	  in	  a	  positive	  light.	  Although	  this	  theory	  requires	  further	  substantiation	  by	  way	  of	  an	  internal	  audit	  of	  HRW	  it	  is	  inconceivable	  that	  HRW	  does	  not	  evaluate	  its	  performance	  against	  its	  mission	  commitments642.	  Such	  a	  process	  is	  obviously	  superior	  to	  unsubstantiated	  claim-­‐making	  of	  effectiveness,	  credit	  assignment	  and	  victories.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  HRW,	  this	  type	  of	  performance	  efficacy	  assessment	  would	  appear	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  levels	  of	  credible	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  data	  available	  regarding	  HRW’s	  activities	  and	  effectiveness,	  as	  well	  as	  enabling	  comparison	  and	  trend	  monitoring.	  	  	  Until	  recently,	  HRW	  typically	  adopted	  the	  role	  of	  narrator,	  or	  conduit,	  in	  exposing	  human	  rights	  news	  —	  unlike	  Greenpeace	  and	  Oxfam,	  which	  to	  varying	  degrees	  position	  themselves	  prominently	  within	  the	  news	  stories	  they	  frame.	  Recently,	  however,	  HRW	  has	  increasing	  used	  modern	  communications	  tools	  to	  showcase	  the	  lives	  and	  activities	  of	  its	  field	  reporters	  and	  executives	  in	  surmounting	  danger	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
640	  Emphasis	  as	  in	  original.	  
641	  Bjørn	  Lombord	  asserts	  that,	  in	  many	  areas,	  statistics	  are	  the	  only	  means	  by	  which	  we	  can	  make	  a	  
scientifically	  sound	  description	  of	  the	  world	  (2001:	  xx)	  
642	  For	  example,	  a	  thematic	  performance	  survey	  within	  HRW	  might	  conceivably	  enquire:	  Did	  we	  ‘stand	  
with	  victims	  and	  activists	  to	  prevent	  discrimination’,	  etc?	  Answer:	  Yes,	  we	  did.	  We	  did	  the	  following	  …	  
(outputs	  or	  interventions	  x,	  y	  z,	  and	  outcomes,	  can	  then	  be	  listed).	  Question:	  	  Did	  we	  ‘investigate	  and	  
expose	  human	  rights	  violations	  and	  hold	  abusers	  accountable’?	  Answer:	  Yes,	  we	  did.	  We	  did	  …	  
(outputs/interventions	  and	  outcomes	  can	  then	  be	  listed).	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to	  bring	  rights	  abuse	  cases	  to	  light	  (e.g.	  HRW	  Annual	  Report	  2013;	  2012;	  2011;	  HRW	  video	  2012;	  2014a;	  2014c).	  In	  this	  analysis,	  HRW	  demonstrates	  both	  its	  transition	  from	  operating	  on	  the	  lines	  of	  a	  traditional	  NGO	  model	  to	  those	  of	  a	  contemporary	  media-­‐savvy	  TAN	  and	  its	  metamorphosis	  into	  a	  type	  of	  international	  news	  agency.	  	  The	  question	  arises:	  just	  how	  significant	  is	  this	  transformation	  of	  HRW’s	  advocacy	  function	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  other	  functional	  components?	  A	  review	  of	  HRW’s	  dissemination	  of	  information,	  via	  press	  releases	  and	  publications	  determined	  what	  changes	  had	  been	  made	  in	  these	  communications	  outputs	  over	  time.	  I	  found	  that	  the	  advent	  of	  affordable	  global	  communications	  technology	  has	  rapidly	  revolutionised	  HRW’s	  messaging	  content	  and	  volume.	  To	  illustrate	  this,	  the	  earliest	  edition	  of	  HRW’s	  flagship	  annual	  publication	  World	  Report	  that	  can	  now	  be	  found	  on	  the	  HRW	  Website	  is	  for	  the	  year	  1989.	  Although	  this	  Report	  declares	  that	  1989	  was	  ‘a	  momentous	  year	  for	  human	  rights’	  (Introduction	  to	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  
World	  Report	  1989),	  with	  demands	  for	  human	  rights	  being	  credited	  with	  bringing	  down	  the	  Berlin	  Wall,	  overturning	  dictatorships,	  helping	  to	  bring	  the	  Cold	  War	  to	  an	  end,	  arousing	  hopes	  for	  peaceful	  change	  in	  southern	  Africa	  and	  eliciting	  the	  Tiananmen	  Square	  crackdown	  in	  China,	  it	  is	  surprising	  to	  realise	  that	  the	  means	  HRW	  had	  to	  disseminate	  its	  views	  on	  these	  historical	  events,	  and	  the	  audiences	  it	  could	  reach,	  were	  then	  relatively	  restricted643:	  the	  year	  1989	  was	  pre-­‐World	  Wide	  Web	  so	  the	  report	  was	  not	  available	  online	  —	  instead,	  this	  flagship	  publication	  was	  printed,	  using	  an	  outdated	  typewriter	  typeface	  and	  presented	  in	  a	  dense	  uniform	  format	  that	  would	  have	  arguably	  challenged	  the	  perseverance	  of	  even	  the	  most	  dedicated	  human	  rights	  researcher	  or	  news	  reporter.	  	  	  As	  recently	  as	  2006,	  the	  World	  Report	  was	  still	  presented	  in	  a	  very	  basic	  format.	  Then	  in	  2007,	  it	  sprang	  to	  life	  with	  colour	  photographs	  throughout,	  and	  in	  2008	  its	  presentation	  leaped	  forward	  again	  with	  the	  online	  version	  innovatively	  carrying	  an	  embedded	  podcast,	  amidst	  a	  more	  easily	  readable	  text.	  Naming	  and	  shaming	  in	  human	  rights	  advocacy	  had	  taken	  on	  new	  dimensions	  and	  become	  widely	  accessible.	  Today,	  HRW	  maintains	  a	  vibrant,	  reader-­‐oriented,	  Website	  providing	  rapid	  news	  and	  information,	  photographs,	  videos,	  podcasts	  and	  RSS	  feeds;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
643	  Ulrich	  Beck	  describes	  1989	  as	  the	  symbolic	  date	  that	  ‘will	  go	  down	  in	  history	  as	  the	  end	  of	  an	  epoch’	  
(Beck,	  1994:1).	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maintaining	  a	  presence	  on	  leading	  social	  media	  networks;	  distributing	  images	  captured	  on	  cell	  phones	  and	  video	  cameras	  by	  human	  rights	  victims	  and	  advocates	  (BBC	  news,	  2012);	  and	  facilitating	  low-­‐cost	  networking	  with	  its	  stakeholders	  and	  audiences.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  a	  senior	  HRW	  staff	  member644,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  compelling	  information	  that	  will	  help	  its	  causes,	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  ‘is	  going	  to	  get	  it,	  get	  it	  out	  there,	  and	  we’re	  going	  to	  let	  the	  whole	  world	  know’	  (HRW	  video,	  2012).	  	  Replicating	  the	  distinctive	  operational	  model	  of	  a	  24/7	  news	  agency,	  this	  side	  of	  HRW’s	  work	  includes:	  directing	  its	  field	  staff	  on	  extensive,	  covert,	  fact-­‐finding	  operations;	  interviewing	  victims	  and	  eye-­‐witnesses	  to	  abuses;	  researching,	  reporting,	  photographing	  and	  filming;	  whistle-­‐blowing;	  monitoring	  compliance	  with	  regulations	  and	  laws;	  bearing	  witness	  in	  often	  dangerous	  situations;	  attending	  international	  forums;	  and	  presenting	  its	  spokespersons	  on-­‐camera	  (e.g.	  
N.Y.	  Times,	  2012a	  and	  BBC	  news,	  2012).	  	  Instead	  of	  relying	  on	  the	  traditional	  media	  organisations	  to	  transmit	  its	  messages	  to	  their	  audiences,	  HRW	  is	  increasingly	  connecting	  directly	  with	  its	  own	  target	  audiences	  (Ellis,	  2012).	  This	  not	  only	  bypasses	  the	  traditional	  media645,	  or	  gatekeeper,	  but	  enables	  HRW	  to	  customise	  its	  messages,	  take	  advantage	  of	  cheaper	  delivery	  platforms,	  and	  guarantee	  dissemination	  of	  its	  releases.	  Acknowledging	  the	  move	  into	  the	  media	  business,	  HRW’s	  Bogert646,	  commented	  (Ellis,	  ibid):	  	  	  We	   consciously	   ape	   the	   style	   of	   media	   in	   our	   communication	   in	   order	   that	  what	   we	   produce	   looks	   more	   like	   journalism.	   We’re	   a	   nonprofit	   and	   we’re	  moving	  into	  the	  media	  business.	  	  However,	  although	  HRW’	  s	  media	  mentions	  have	  risen	  steadily	  in	  recent	  years,	  Bogert	  emphasises	  that	  a	  scattergun	  approach	  to	  a	  mass	  audience	  is	  not	  where	  HRW	  is	  aiming.	  Its	  targets	  are	  presidents,	  prime	  ministers	  and	  other	  powerbrokers	  in	  a	  position	  to	  effect	  change	  (ibid):	  	  	   We	  want	   to	  make	  sure	  we’re	  occupying	  all	   the	   information	  channels	   flowing	  into	  the	  brain	  of	  a	  decision	  maker.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
644	  This	  comment	  is	  by	  the	  HRW	  Executive	  Director,	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa	  Division,	  New	  York	  
Office,	  Sarah	  Leah	  Whitson,	  speaking	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  uprising	  in	  Syria	  and	  the	  difficulties	  faced	  in	  
gaining	  access	  to	  the	  country	  (HRW	  video,	  2012).	  
645	  Sometimes	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘legacy’	  media.	  
646	  Deputy	  Executive	  Director	  for	  External	  Relations,	  Carroll	  Bogert.	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  But,	  Bogert	  admits,	  HRW	  faces	  various	  dilemmas	  in	  navigating	  in	  these	  channels.	  For	  one	  thing,	  she	  wants	  HRW	  to	  shun	  the	  sensationalist	  methods	  of	  mainstream	  journalism.	  And	  she	  finds	  that	  balancing	  content	  for	  disparate	  audiences	  is	  challenging:	  	  I	  think	  the	  question	  for	  us	  is	  what	  is	  the	  right	  balance	  between	  the	  short-­‐form	  content	  that	  social	  media	  requires	  and	  the	  long-­‐form	  content	  by	  which	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  has	  made	  its	  name.	  	  	  Reinforcing	  the	  depiction	  of	  HRW	  as	  a	  quasi-­‐news	  agency,	  one	  New	  York	  newspaper	  observed	  (The	  Village	  Voice,	  2006):	  ‘There's	  more	  hard-­‐hitting	  journalism	  going	  on	  in	  its	  offices	  than	  in	  most	  of	  the	  bigger	  newsrooms	  in	  this	  country.’	  	  	  In	  HRW	  advocacy,	  it	  is	  the	  events	  and	  revelations	  themselves	  that	  are	  often	  dramatic	  and	  fiercely	  contested	  and,	  therefore,	  irresistibly	  newsworthy.	  In	  further	  contrast	  to	  Greenpeace	  and	  Oxfam,	  HRW’s	  issues	  are	  represented	  in	  terms	  that	  are	  gritty	  and	  dark,	  especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  torture.	  Its	  victims	  of	  abuse	  appear	  to	  be	  authentic:	  often	  presented	  before	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  world	  still	  battered	  and	  bleeding	  from	  instances	  of	  alleged	  abuse.	  In	  terms	  of	  assessing	  the	  ‘dependent	  affectedness’647	  of	  these	  human	  voices,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  HRW	  advocacy	  arguably	  trumps	  all	  others648.	  	  	  HRW	  may	  be	  increasingly	  challenged	  in	  the	  future	  not	  only	  in	  its	  audience	  targeting	  but	  also	  in	  its	  selection	  of	  cases	  to	  pursue.	  This	  challenge	  will	  come	  from	  the	  inherent	  tensions	  in	  choosing	  between	  illuminating	  deserving	  rights	  abuse	  causes	  and	  the	  need	  to	  compete	  with	  other	  information-­‐disseminating	  organisations	  to	  attract	  audiences	  by	  telling	  compelling	  narratives.	  A	  question	  that	  might	  be	  asked	  is:	  Does	  HRW	  increase	  the	  steady	  tally	  of	  success	  stories	  on	  its	  Website	  —	  where	  every	  story	  requires	  a	  photo,	  a	  video,	  a	  podcast,	  or	  a	  link	  to	  something	  visual	  —	  or	  does	  it	  fight	  the	  quiet,	  low-­‐profile,	  unphotogenic	  battles,	  where	  the	  human	  rights	  abuses	  may	  be	  insidious	  but	  equally	  brutal?	  (Weiss,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
647	  See	  earlier	  reference	  to	  ‘validity	  of	  voice’	  assessment	  criteria	  in	  Section	  6.6.2	  and	  Bendell,	  2006.	  
648	  Examples	  of	  these	  dramatic	  images	  are	  readily	  available	  in	  the	  press	  release,	  publications	  and	  
multimedia	  sections	  of	  the	  HRW	  Website	  at	  www.hrw.org	  and	  the	  HRW	  Annual	  Reports	  for	  2011,2012	  
and	  2013.	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2013:49-­‐52).	  In	  the	  same	  way	  that	  Greenpeace	  has	  been	  criticised	  for	  increasingly	  selecting	  global	  brands	  to	  target	  in	  its	  recent	  campaigns,	  HRW	  may	  need	  to	  avoid	  a	  similarly	  sensationalist	  image	  as	  a	  quasi-­‐news	  agency,	  particularly	  one	  that,	  I	  argue,	  is	  increasingly	  adopting	  the	  familiar	  media	  principle:	  ‘If	  it	  bleeds,	  it	  leads’.	  	  
	  Framing	  instances	  of	  political	  dissent	  in	  terms	  of	  human	  rights	  abuse	  keeps	  HRW	  in	  the	  forefront	  of	  news	  coverage	  of	  significant	  political	  events.	  The	  Arab	  Spring	  presents	  an	  exceptional	  and	  timely	  backdrop	  against	  which	  to	  analyse	  HRW’s	  current	  positioning	  in	  the	  field	  of	  political	  advocacy.	  Framing	  these	  events	  as	  ‘essentially	  human	  rights	  uprisings’,	  a	  HRW	  official	  in	  Washington	  (Porteous)649	  provides	  a	  vivid	  account	  of	  HRW’s	  distinctive	  modus	  operandi	  by	  explaining	  its	  activities	  during	  the	  turmoil	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  (HRW	  video,	  2012).	  He	  relates	  how	  HRW	  had	  been	  reporting	  on	  human	  rights	  abuses	  in	  affected	  Arab	  countries	  for	  years	  and	  had	  an	  intimate	  knowledge	  and	  understanding	  of	  their	  background	  and	  problems.	  When	  violence	  broke	  out	  in	  Egypt,	  he	  explains,	  no	  other	  human	  rights	  monitor	  had	  been	  as	  well	  placed	  to	  supply	  the	  global	  media	  with	  credible,	  in-­‐country,	  data	  —	  particularly	  in	  regard	  to	  atrocities	  and	  numbers	  of	  casualties	  with	  which	  to	  challenge	  government	  accounts.	  This	  thesis	  suggests	  there	  are	  obvious	  comparisons	  and	  theorising	  that	  can	  be	  made	  here	  between	  the	  traditional	  media	  news	  supplier	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  now-­‐vanishing	  foreign	  correspondent,	  who	  was	  usually	  a	  country	  expert,	  and	  the	  replacement	  of	  these	  news	  sources	  by	  activists	  with	  cell	  phones.	  	  	  HRW	  had	  also	  channeled	  its	  field	  information	  to	  the	  U.S.	  authorities	  ‘to	  enable	  them	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  the	  Egyptian	  army,	  with	  whom	  they	  had	  close	  contacts,	  to	  convince	  President	  Mubarak	  to	  step	  aside’.	  Which	  ‘is	  essentially	  what	  they	  did’,	  Porteous	  adds.	  	  In	  describing	  HRW’s	  frontline,	  albeit	  self-­‐appointed,	  non-­‐official	  role	  in	  the	  conflict	  zone,	  Porteous	  claims	  (ibid):	  	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  has	  never	  before	  faced	  a	  multitude	  of	  crises	  across	  such	  a	  wide	  region.	  But	  our	  methodology	  is	  the	  same	  as	  our	  methodology	  anywhere	  else:	  we	  get	  as	  close	  as	  possible	  to	  the	  abuses	  that	  are	  taking	  place.	  Our	  work	  involves	   speaking	   to	  witnesses	  —	  and	  also	   to	   the	  perpetrators;	   gathering	  as	  much	  evidence	  —	  photographic	  evidence,	  or	  video	  evidence	  —	  and	   then	  we	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
649	  Tom	  Porteous	  is	  the	  Deputy	  Programme	  Director	  of	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  Washington	  Office.	  His	  
comments	  are	  featured	  in	  the	  video	  Defending	  Human	  Rights	  Worldwide,	  (HRW	  video,	  2012).	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put	  it	  all	  together	  and	  we	  get	  the	  information	  out	  there,	  to	  change	  the	  situation	  on	  the	  ground.	  	  In	  view	  of	  the	  new	  communications	  technologies	  that	  HRW	  has	  recently	  adopted	  (HRW	  data,	  2012a),	  it	  was	  not	  surprising	  that	  HRW	  has	  ‘never	  before	  faced	  a	  multitude	  of	  crises	  across	  such	  a	  wide	  region’.	  HRW’s	  most	  senior	  executives	  recently	  declared	  (HRW	  Annual	  Report,	  2013:1):	  	  	   Human	  Rights	  Watch’s	  increasingly	  global	  reach	  has	  bolstered	  our	  impact,	  but	  the	  challenges	  before	  us	  are	  immense	  and	  increasing.	  	  
9.5.4	  Assessment	  of	  HRW’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  United	  Nations	  	  The	  international	  system	  has	  a	  statutory	  commitment	  to	  close	  collaboration	  with	  NGOs	  involved	  in	  championing	  human	  rights	  (see	  Chapters	  4	  and	  5).	  In	  its	  guide	  to	  CSOs	  on	  engagement	  with	  the	  various	  UN	  civil	  rights	  bodies	  and	  mechanisms,	  the	  UN	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights650	  (OHCHR)	  stated:	  ‘one	  cannot	  overestimate	  the	  contribution	  that	  civil	  society	  has	  made	  towards	  the	  development	  of	  international	  human	  rights	  standards’,	  their	  views,	  practical	  knowledge	  and	  scholarship	  being	  consequently	  regarded	  as	  ‘crucial’	  to	  the	  advancement	  of	  the	  human	  rights	  movement	  (UN-­‐OHCHR,	  2008).	  This	  work,	  the	  Commissioner	  added,	  includes:	  sharing	  information,	  advocating	  and	  scrutinising	  the	  implementation	  of	  human	  rights,	  reporting	  violations,	  assisting	  victims	  of	  abuses,	  and	  campaigning	  for	  the	  development	  of	  new	  human	  rights.	  Furthermore:	  	  They	  give	  voice	  to	  the	  powerless	  in	  venues	  that	  may,	  otherwise,	  be	  out	  of	  the	  victims’	  reach,	  including	  international	  human	  rights	  forums	  and	  mechanisms.	  	  	  Therefore,	  the	  Commissioner	  pointed	  out:	  	  Clearly,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  on	  the	  part	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  to	  deeply	  understand	  and	  master	  the	  modus	  operandi	  of	  national,	  regional	  and	  international	  human	  rights	  institutions.	  	  	  HRW’s	  interface	  with	  the	  UN	  could	  be	  summed	  up	  as:	  accreditation,	  collaboration	  and	  heavy	  traffic.	  HRW	  has	  a	  collaborative	  and	  assertive	  interface	  with	  the	  international	  system,	  as	  may	  be	  gauged	  by	  its	  communications	  traffic	  with	  its	  primary	  international	  institutional	  target,	  the	  OHCHR.	  Evidently,	  the	  OHCHR	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
650	  Ms.	  Navanethem	  Pillay.	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encourages	  this	  level	  of	  engagement,	  stating	  that	  it	  is	  committed	  to	  strengthening	  civil	  society’s	  capacity	  to	  use	  the	  UN	  human	  rights	  programme	  effectively	  	  (UN-­‐OHCHR,	  2008:7).	  The	  OHCHR	  declares	  (ibid,	  3):	  	  	  Local,	   national	   and	   international	   human	   rights	   NGOs	   are	   a	   vital	   part	   of	   the	  international	   human	   rights	   movement	   and	   an	   essential	   partner	   for	   OHCHR.	  They	  alert	  the	  world	  to	  human	  rights	  violations.	  They	  defend	  victims,	  promote	  rights	  through	  education,	  and	  campaign	  for	  improvements	  and	  advancements.	  The	   relationship	   between	   OHCHR	   and	   civil	   society	   is	   a	   dynamic	   and	  collaborative	  one,	  which	  infuses	  all	  parts	  of	  OHCHR.	  	  By	  assessing	  HRW’s	  heavy	  usage	  of	  this	  interface	  mechanism	  it	  may	  be	  deduced	  that	  the	  arrangement	  has	  value	  for	  all	  parties.	  For	  example,	  the	  OHCHR	  Website651	  currently	  contains	  over	  2,500	  items	  relating	  to	  mutually	  relevant	  issues	  with	  HRW.	  For	  its	  part,	  HRW’s	  Website652	  posts	  over	  17,000	  items	  —	  reports,	  submissions,	  press	  releases,	  etc.	  —	  relating	  to	  its	  interface	  with	  the	  UN.	  The	  institutional	  mechanism,	  therefore,	  appears	  to	  be	  maintained	  by	  mutual	  commitment,	  engagement	  and,	  presumably,	  mutual	  rewards.	  	  	  To	  a	  large	  extent,	  HRW’s	  work	  within	  the	  UN	  system	  involves	  assisting	  the	  UN’s	  human	  rights	  treaty	  bodies	  (which	  are	  committees	  of	  independent	  experts),	  to	  monitor	  the	  implementation	  by	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  UN’s	  10	  human	  rights	  treaties653	  (UN-­‐OHCHR,	  2012).	  In	  addition	  to	  their	  obligations	  to	  implement	  the	  treaties	  to	  which	  they	  are	  signatories,	  States	  are	  required	  to	  submit	  regular	  progress	  reports	  for	  consideration	  by	  these	  committees.	  The	  committees	  also	  receive	  information	  from	  UN	  agencies,	  national	  human	  rights	  institutions	  and	  civil	  society	  actors,	  in	  particular	  NGOs,	  professional	  associations	  and	  academic	  institutions	  (UN-­‐OHCHR,	  2008:31-­‐35).	  It	  is	  here	  that	  HRW	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  have	  a	  high	  level	  of	  input,	  submitting	  detailed	  reports,	  frequently	  taking	  issue	  with	  the	  assertions	  of	  individual	  States,	  and	  providing	  counterclaims	  and	  information	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





652HRW	  Website	  at	  
http://www.hrw.org/search/apachesolr_search/United%20Nations?filters=tid%3A680	  	  	  
653	  These	  treaty	  bodies	  are	  the	  committees	  on:	  Human	  Rights,	  Against	  Torture,	  Elimination	  of	  
Discrimination	  Against	  Women,	  Rights	  of	  the	  Child,	  Rights	  of	  Persons	  with	  Disabilities,	  Elimination	  of	  
Racial	  Discrimination,	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights,	  Migrant	  Workers,	  Enforced	  Disappearances,	  
and	  the	  Sub-­‐committee	  on	  Prevention	  of	  Torture.	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concerning	  serious	  or	  systematic	  violations	  of	  treaties.	  	  A	  typical	  example	  of	  the	  type	  of	  correspondence	  between	  UN	  bodies	  and	  HRW	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  HRW’s	  Report	  on	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Yemen,	  which	  was	  submitted	  to	  the	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  Committee	  in	  advance	  of	  its	  Review	  of	  Yemen	  in	  March	  2012,	  and	  which	  I	  have	  selected	  from	  among	  the	  thousands	  of	  instances	  of	  HRW’s	  engagements	  with	  the	  UN	  (HRW	  Report,	  2012).	  Written	  in	  plain,	  unambiguous	  language,	  without	  the	  use	  of	  rhetorical	  flourishes	  so	  often	  favoured	  by	  some	  TANs654,	  the	  18-­‐page	  report	  points	  out	  	  ‘systematic	  violations’	  of	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights.	  Having	  argued	  its	  points	  with	  characteristic	  concision,	  the	  Report	  provides	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Committee	  with	  a	  footnote	  URL	  to	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  the	  interviews	  with	  child	  soldiers	  (HRW	  data,	  2011).	  To	  assist	  these	  processes,	  HRW	  has	  a	  dedicated	  office	  to	  handle	  UN-­‐related	  issues,	  supervised	  by	  an	  international	  communications	  professional655.	  	  
9.6	  Summary	  	  	  HRW	  exhibits	  all	  of	  the	  essential	  properties	  this	  thesis	  associates	  with	  TANs.	  However,	  HRW	  is	  also	  a	  TAN	  hybrid:	  while	  its	  traditional	  service-­‐providing	  functions	  were	  shown	  to	  be	  maintained	  at	  a	  high	  level	  of	  operational	  efficiency,	  a	  vigorous	  advocacy	  function	  has	  developed	  to	  the	  point	  where	  it	  resembles	  an	  international	  news	  agency.	  Its	  traditional	  NGO	  function	  includes	  the	  provision	  of	  legal	  expertise,	  treaty	  monitoring	  services,	  academic	  research	  and	  analysis.	  Capabilities	  include	  evidence-­‐based	  argumentation	  and	  navigation	  of	  the	  international	  institutional	  landscape,	  bridging	  varying	  levels	  of	  complexity	  —	  from	  empowering	  the	  voices	  of	  individual	  rights	  abuse	  victims	  to	  complex	  international	  deliberations,	  diplomatic	  liaison	  and	  lobbying.	  These	  distinctive	  differentiating	  properties	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  replicated	  by	  other	  TANs	  and	  were	  seen	  as	  lending	  value	  to	  HRW’s	  international	  relationships	  and	  the	  UN	  system.	  Evidence	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
654	  For	  example,	  describing	  the	  UN’s	  Earth	  Summit	  as	  a	  ‘failure	  of	  epic	  proportions’	  (GI	  news,	  2012b)	  and	  
accusing	  world	  leaders	  of	  ‘dithering	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  will’	  (GI	  Naidoo,	  2014).	  
655	  HRW’s	  United	  Nations	  Director,	  Philippe	  Bolopion,	  a	  former	  international	  journalist	  and	  UN	  
correspondent	  for	  the	  French	  news	  organisation,	  Le	  Monde	  (HRW	  data,	  2012b).	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presented	  that	  HRW	  has	  established	  an	  influential	  voice	  in	  international	  politics,	  supporting	  H1,	  H2,	  and	  H3656.	  	  	  The	  increasing	  adoption	  of	  advanced	  ICTs	  and	  communications	  techniques,	  since	  around	  2007,	  has	  dramatically	  changed	  the	  advocacy	  face	  HRW	  presents	  to	  the	  world.	  This	  corporate	  brand	  identity	  promotion	  ensures	  that	  HRW	  is	  globally	  recognised	  as	  an	  important	  and	  effective	  voice	  in	  championing	  human	  rights	  issues	  in	  national	  and	  international	  contexts	  (H1).	  	  Today,	  HRW	  operates	  concurrently	  as	  both	  ‘insider’	  and	  ‘outsider’	  in	  the	  international	  institutional	  system.	  However,	  HRW’s	  ‘outsider’	  role	  is	  developing	  conspicuously.	  A	  cycle	  of	  shaping	  the	  tools	  of	  advocacy	  and	  being	  shaped	  by	  them	  is	  evident.	  By	  adopting	  the	  latest	  ICTs	  and	  tools,	  HRW’s	  upscaled	  communications	  function	  is	  enabling	  unprecedented	  numbers	  of	  rights	  abuse	  claimants	  to	  raise	  their	  protests	  from	  micro-­‐level	  social	  situations,	  to	  the	  uniquely	  complex	  macro-­‐level	  of	  international	  discourse	  and	  decision-­‐making.	  There	  were	  indications-­‐in-­‐process	  that	  this	  enhanced	  use	  of	  advocacy	  tools	  in	  various	  regions,	  particularly	  in	  the	  global	  South,	  may	  have	  been	  necessitated	  by	  HRW’s	  imperative	  to	  raise	  its	  non-­‐U.S.	  profile,	  in	  order	  to	  attract	  substantially	  increased	  donor	  funding.	  Internal	  tensions	  between	  the	  insider/outsider	  roles	  were	  evident	  in	  Bernstein’s	  breakaway	  to	  form	  a	  more	  ICT–focused	  TAN,	  and	  the	  comments	  by	  Bogert,	  that	  it	  is	  HRW’s	  policy	  to	  retain	  its	  traditional,	  service-­‐providing	  fundamentals	  and	  ‘shun	  the	  sensationalist	  methods	  of	  mainstream	  journalism’	  (which,	  I	  argue,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  suggest	  HRW	  currently	  is	  not	  doing)	  (H2,	  H5)657.	  	  	  HRW’s	  traditional	  information-­‐sharing	  function	  appears	  to	  determine	  that	  it	  has	  a	  mutually	  rewarding	  and	  satisfactory	  relationship	  with	  the	  international	  system,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  some	  currently	  notable,	  ‘pariah’	  states.	  HRW’s	  traditional	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
656	  H1:	  Contemporary	  TANs	  are	  an	  important	  NGO	  variant	  in	  international	  politics	  that	  have	  
unprecedented	  properties	  and	  powers	  emerging	  from	  their	  advocacy	  communications,	  which	  are	  
typically	  neglected	  in	  politics	  theorising.	  
H2:	  The	  international	  system	  is	  struggling	  to	  accommodate	  TANs	  and	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  
institutions	  have	  a	  distinctively	  troubled	  interface	  with	  modern	  TAN-­‐type	  NGOs.	  
H3:	  The	  adversarial	  advocacy	  strategies	  typically	  adopted	  by	  TANs	  constitute	  a	  barrier	  to	  them	  achieving	  
their	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  policy-­‐making	  environment.	  	  
657	  H2	  (As	  per	  previous	  footnote).	  
H5:	  The	  funding	  models	  TANs	  adopt	  have	  a	  determinative	  effect	  on	  their	  advocacy	  strategies.	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‘long-­‐form’	  research	  outputs	  remain	  a	  trusted	  resource	  within	  international	  society,	  despite	  some	  specific	  criticisms	  (notably,	  of	  an	  anti-­‐Israel	  bias).	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  HRW	  increasingly	  tries	  to	  embody	  the	  contrasting	  needs	  of	  public	  advocacy	  and	  international	  diplomacy.	  Internal	  and	  external	  tensions	  are	  thus	  unavoidable,	  as	  those	  involved	  in	  high-­‐stakes	  confidential	  negotiations,	  such	  as	  Member	  State	  representatives,	  might	  be	  mistrustful	  of	  them	  disclosing	  details	  of	  confidential	  deliberations	  (UN	  Report	  2004c).	  	  The	  evidence	  points	  to	  a	  striking	  difference	  between	  the	  adversarial	  stance	  of	  HRW	  and	  some	  other	  TANs,	  such	  as	  Greenpeace,	  in	  that	  HRW’s	  adversarial	  strategies	  are	  directed	  at	  specific	  targets,	  typically	  controversial	  national	  leaders	  and	  their	  governments,	  rather	  than	  at	  the	  international	  order	  per	  se.	  HRW	  makes	  conspicuous	  efforts	  to	  understand	  and	  work	  within	  the	  international	  system	  to	  lobby	  support,	  surmount	  barriers	  and	  leverage	  change	  (H3.).	  However,	  comments	  by	  HRW’s	  Roth	  that	  ‘we	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  shape	  the	  foreign	  policies	  of	  these	  emerging	  powers’	  (The	  Washington	  Post,	  2010),	  appear	  to	  be	  at	  variance	  with	  HRW’s	  undertakings	  to	  the	  UN	  to	  ‘not	  engage	  in	  a	  politically	  motivated	  act	  against	  a	  Member	  State	  […]’	  and	  to	  ‘Respect	  the	  norm	  of	  non-­‐interference	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  states’	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2011c).	  	  	  Complex	  realism	  was	  a	  useful	  analytical	  framework	  for	  explaining	  the	  development	  of	  HRW.	  There	  were	  signs	  of	  the	  systemic	  influences	  that	  led	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  Helsinki	  Watch,	  in	  a	  particular	  fitness	  landscape,	  followed	  by	  adaptation	  of	  the	  model	  into	  other	  ‘Watch	  Committees’	  and	  then	  HRW.	  HRW’s	  spillover	  into	  adjacent	  possible	  opportunities	  is	  accommodated	  in	  this	  conceptualisation.	  Moreover,	  an	  important	  driver	  of	  HRW’s	  growth	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  systemic	  properties	  of	  the	  advocacy	  communications	  function,	  which,	  having	  adopted	  new	  ICTs	  and	  tools,	  is	  increasingly	  disposed	  to	  adapt	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  myriad	  of	  fitness	  landscapes	  that	  attract	  HRW’s	  interventions.	  HRW	  was	  also	  seen	  as	  (a)	  providing	  a	  valued	  feedback	  mechanism	  in	  the	  international	  system;	  and	  (b)	  developing	  capacities	  to	  enable	  grassroots	  voices	  to	  ‘scale-­‐shift’	  their	  concerns	  to	  national	  and	  international	  sociological	  levels	  at	  which	  they	  might	  be	  addressed.	  This	  capability	  to	  evolve	  fitness	  properties	  suited	  to	  its	  environments	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  indicator	  that	  HRW	  is	  effective	  in	  achieving	  its	  aims.	  Moreover,	  HRW’s	  setting	  of	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practical	  goals	  and	  measurable,	  multi-­‐pronged,	  strategies	  was	  seen	  as	  beneficial	  in	  establishing	  the	  validity	  of	  credit	  claims	  (H4)658.	  	  	  HRW’s	  funding	  model	  appears	  to	  have	  a	  clear	  determinative	  influence	  on	  its	  advocacy	  strategies.	  This	  could	  present	  a	  dilemma	  because	  of	  evolving	  changes	  in	  its	  funding	  needs	  and	  present	  financial	  sources,	  in	  view	  of	  its	  declared	  independence.	  The	  undoubtedly	  timely	  award	  of	  US$100	  million	  from	  the	  pro-­‐democracy	  Open	  Society	  Foundations	  in	  2012,	  might	  be	  usefully	  regarded	  as	  a	  bailout,	  albeit	  with	  obligations	  regarding	  HRW’s	  future	  strategic	  direction.	  	  	  	  It	  appears	  that	  the	  present	  challenges	  for	  HRW	  are	  how	  to:	  (i)	  cope	  with	  the	  pressures	  of	  supply	  and	  demand	  in	  its	  chosen	  field;	  (ii)	  manage	  resources;	  and	  (iii)	  set	  priorities	  amid	  the	  increasing	  cacophony	  of	  newly-­‐enabled	  voices	  around	  the	  world	  that	  are	  pleading	  for	  a	  global	  champion	  to	  listen	  to	  them	  and	  protect	  their	  human	  rights.	  	  	  This	  thesis	  posits	  that	  only	  time	  will	  tell	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  contemporary	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  model	  will	  be	  able	  to	  effectively	  contain	  the	  contradictory	  elements	  of	  its	  hybrid	  corporate	  body	  as	  a	  coherent,	  trusted,	  international	  intelligence	  source	  and	  reliable	  consultation	  partner,	  as	  the	  tensions	  between	  modern	  advocacy’s	  need	  to	  spin	  dramatic	  and	  compelling	  narratives,	  and	  the	  needs	  of	  diplomacy	  for	  the	  discipline	  of	  considered	  verification,	  grow	  ever	  stronger659.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
658	  H4:	  A	  complex	  realist	  approach	  has	  exemplary	  merit	  in	  approaching	  the	  subject	  area	  and	  primary	  
research	  question	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  
659	  For	  additional,	  contemporary,	  insights	  on	  such	  tensions,	  see	  Zuckerman	  (2012).	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10.	  Conclusion	  	  	  	  
Don’t	  raise	  your	  voice;	  
improve	  your	  argument.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Archbishop	  Desmond	  Tutu	  (2012)	  	  
	  	  	  	  
10.1	  Introduction	  	  This	  thesis	  investigated	  a	  practical	  conundrum	  emerging	  in	  international	  politics:	  	  What	  is	  the	  place	  and	  function	  of	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system	  and	  how	  effective	  are	  they	  in	  achieving	  their	  aims?	  The	  primary	  reason	  for	  framing	  this	  interface	  zone	  as	  a	  research	  problem	  was	  due	  to	  evidence	  of	  a	  paradox:	  while	  TANs	  are	  a	  rapidly	  proliferating	  phenomenon	  in	  international	  contentious	  politics	  and	  are	  widely	  known	  for	  waging	  headline-­‐grabbing	  wars	  of	  words,	  TANs,	  both	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  and	  individually,	  remain	  on	  the	  whole	  opaque	  to	  outside	  scrutiny	  and	  are	  under-­‐theorised	  on	  important	  levels	  of	  analysis.	  Unsurprisingly,	  they	  have	  been	  termed	  ‘elusive’	  in	  the	  political	  literature.	  Typically	  portrayed	  as	  vital	  service-­‐providing	  agencies	  that	  by-­‐pass	  official	  controls	  to	  relay	  civil	  society	  concerns	  to	  the	  world’s	  media	  and	  international	  policy-­‐makers,	  TANs	  are	  commonly	  assumed	  to	  be	  the	  vociferous,	  Internet-­‐enabled,	  offspring	  of	  traditional	  NGOs	  and,	  thus,	  heirs	  to	  the	  reputational	  capital	  of	  NGOs.	  However,	  despite	  this	  respected	  provenance,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  TANs	  frequently	  fail	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals.	  	  	  The	  rationale	  for	  this	  thesis	  was	  thus	  found	  in	  lacunae	  and	  areas	  of	  apparent	  oversight	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  contentious	  international	  politics,	  a	  relatively	  recent	  political	  paradigm	  that	  appears	  to	  have	  emerged	  from	  a	  need	  to	  accommodate	  the	  multitudes	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  now	  present	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  	  This	  literature	  focuses	  mainly	  on	  conflict	  and	  competing	  ontologies	  over	  the	  way	  the	  world	  is,	  or	  should	  be,	  and	  are	  typically	  waged	  as	  wars	  of	  words	  between	  civil	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society	  activist	  organisations	  and	  the	  nation-­‐state	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  By	  engaging	  with	  this	  problem	  space,	  the	  thesis	  sought	  to	  build	  on	  this	  literature	  by	  showing	  why	  the	  emerging	  NGO	  typology	  of	  TANs	  cannot	  be	  explained	  without	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  systemic	  complexity	  of	  their	  environment	  and	  their	  essentially	  communicative	  functioning.	  Indeed,	  this	  thesis	  argues	  that	  advocacy	  is	  best	  understood	  when	  it	  is	  regarded	  as	  a	  communications	  function,	  not	  a	  political	  role.	  Furthermore,	  by	  adopting	  a	  pluralist	  approach	  that	  assumed	  contingency,	  temporality	  and	  multi-­‐causality	  —	  while	  rejecting	  reductionism	  absolutely	  —	  the	  thesis	  aimed	  also	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  analytical	  value	  of	  applying	  complex	  realism	  to	  conceptualise	  and	  empirically	  examine	  interacting	  IR	  subject	  matter	  of	  this	  nature.	  	  This	  course	  was	  indicated	  by	  my	  development	  of	  the	  following	  two	  theories	  concerning	  the	  functioning,	  relationships	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs,	  namely:	  (i)	  that	  the	  advocacy	  characteristics	  of	  recently	  emerging	  transnational	  'advocacy'	  networks	  differentiate	  them	  markedly	  from	  other	  typologies	  of	  NGO	  operating	  in	  the	  international	  arena	  —	  raising	  questions	  regarding	  widespread	  assumptions	  that	  contemporary	  TANs	  are	  due	  inheritors	  of	  the	  reputational	  capital	  of	  traditional	  NGOs;	  and	  (ii)	  these	  important,	  differentiating,	  properties	  of	  contemporary	  TANs	  notably	  arise	  from	  the	  advocacy	  function	  of	  their	  organisations,	  are	  typically	  overlooked	  by	  political	  theorists	  and,	  therefore,	  are	  not	  problematised	  in	  Politics	  thinking	  and	  debates.	  This	  thesis	  aims	  to	  contribute	  towards	  further	  shaping	  this	  thinking	  and	  these	  debates.	  	  In	  accordance	  with	  opinion	  that	  outcomes	  in	  complex	  systems	  are	  always	  outcomes-­‐in-­‐process660,	  I	  emphasise	  that	  the	  results	  presented	  in	  this	  chapter	  summarise	  my	  analysis	  of	  patterns,	  tendencies	  and	  trends,	  which	  are	  not	  asserted	  to	  be	  conclusive,	  or	  concluded,	  at	  this	  point	  in	  time	  but	  are	  suggestive	  of	  underlying	  structures	  and	  generative	  mechanisms	  conditioning	  the	  manifest	  events	  and	  relational	  behaviours	  of	  agents.	  Despite	  the	  deluge	  of	  information	  that	  characterises	  the	  modern	  Information	  Age,	  with	  issues	  framed	  as	  important	  for	  targeted	  audiences,	  and	  the	  unremitting	  publicity	  on	  ‘micro	  events	  that	  fascinate	  the	  media’	  (Wight,	  2013:91),	  on-­‐going	  monitoring	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  determine	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
660	  See	  Section	  3.2.1.	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which	  of	  the	  events,	  tendencies	  or	  trends,	  could	  prove	  significant	  in	  shaping	  change	  at	  the	  macro-­‐sociological	  level.661	  	  I	  turn	  now	  to	  summarising	  the	  results	  of	  the	  research	  and	  showing	  how	  exploring	  the	  PRQ	  and	  five	  hypotheses	  helped	  to	  focus	  the	  research	  and	  shed	  light	  on	  neglected	  but	  important	  areas	  of	  TAN	  activity,	  particularly	  those	  that	  have	  an	  interface	  with	  the	  international	  system.	  The	  first	  part	  deals	  with	  the	  results	  of	  the	  research.	  This	  is	  structured	  under	  four	  rubrics:	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  each	  chapter	  and	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  findings;	  the	  place	  and	  function	  of	  TANs	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system;	  the	  contribution	  of	  the	  five	  hypotheses	  to	  supporting	  the	  thesis;	  and	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs	  in	  achieving	  their	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  The	  second	  part	  discusses	  the	  wider	  debates	  involving	  NGO	  and	  TAN	  activity	  in	  international	  politics	  and	  sums	  up	  the	  contributions	  of	  this	  thesis.	  It	  concludes	  by	  indicating	  a	  number	  of	  pathways	  into	  promising	  areas	  for	  further	  research.	  
10.2	  Overview	  and	  chapter	  summaries	  	  While	  some	  scholars	  have	  observed	  that	  research	  in	  this	  subject	  area	  has	  been	  mainly	  driven	  by	  a	  normative	  desire	  to	  support	  the	  ‘principled-­‐issues’	  TANs	  champion,	  this	  thesis	  held	  normativity	  to	  be	  an	  unstable,	  relatively	  conditioned,	  platform	  from	  which	  to	  obtain	  scientific	  knowledge	  of	  either	  a	  globalised	  social	  phenomenon,	  or	  international	  affairs.	  	  Instead,	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘normative	  turn’	  in	  IR	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  might	  help	  to	  explain	  why	  political	  understandings	  of	  TANs	  have	  tended	  to	  approach	  TANs,	  uncritically,	  on	  their	  own	  terms,	  and	  are	  characteristically	  ethnocentric,	  partial	  and	  fragmented.	  Moreover,	  initial	  research	  showed	  that	  contemporaneous	  developments	  in	  both	  globalisation	  and	  technologically-­‐enhanced	  communications	  are	  widely	  recognised	  as	  two	  of	  the	  principal	  catalysts	  for	  TAN	  emergence:	  enabling	  multitudes	  of	  situated	  individuals	  with	  genuine	  concerns	  for	  their	  welfare	  and	  that	  of	  distant	  others,	  to	  seek	  collective	  empowerment	  by	  aligning	  with	  the	  projected	  aims	  and	  values	  of	  civil	  society	  norm-­‐entrepreneurs,	  such	  as	  TANs,	  in	  order	  to	  take	  open	  issue	  with	  the	  management,	  by	  states	  and	  the	  international	  institutions,	  of	  complex,	  macro-­‐structural	  problems	  and	  global	  challenges.	  These	  initial	  findings	  highlighted	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
661	  This	  understanding	  is	  guided	  by	  Wight	  (2013:91-­‐93).	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unprecedented	  scale	  of	  collision	  between	  representative	  agents	  at	  disparate	  and	  incompatible	  levels	  of	  social	  complexity	  in	  the	  international	  environment	  and	  the	  contrasting	  weights	  of	  their	  argumentation.	  This	  was	  shown	  in	  the	  thesis	  to	  be	  problematical,	  since	  complexity	  theory	  posits	  that	  the	  reality	  of	  higher	  orders	  in	  complex	  systems	  cannot	  be	  predicted,	  or	  explained,	  by	  using	  only	  understandings	  of	  lower	  order	  complexity.	  	  	  From	  the	  outset,	  this	  thesis	  has	  tried	  to	  avoid	  entering	  the	  morality-­‐based	  melees	  involving	  TAN	  ideological	  choices,	  by	  focusing	  instead	  on	  the	  advocacy	  strategies	  they	  choose	  in	  order	  to	  champion	  their	  political	  causes.	  However,	  personal	  experience	  of	  international	  communications	  praxis	  raised	  many	  questions	  regarding	  the	  ethical	  use	  of	  affordable,	  globe-­‐spanning	  communications	  tools	  and	  techniques:	  tools	  that	  can	  alert	  us	  to	  important	  risks	  to	  humanity	  and	  struggles	  for	  social	  justice	  but	  which	  also	  enable	  complex	  international	  political	  issues	  to	  be	  routinely	  misdiagnosed	  as	  to	  causality	  and	  key	  actors	  to	  be	  routinely	  misrepresented	  and/or	  disparaged,	  in	  simplified	  rhetoric	  by	  pressure	  groups	  vying	  globally	  for	  media	  attention	  and	  financial	  support.	  	  	  Additionally,	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  I	  discussed	  insights	  by	  Giddens,	  Beck	  and	  Lash,	  et	  al,	  on	  the	  manufacture	  of	  aggressive	  publicity	  by	  competing	  protest	  groups,	  relayed	  by	  the	  mass	  media,	  which	  promotes	  not	  only	  awareness	  of	  their	  selected	  issues	  but	  also	  generates	  alarm,	  distrust	  of	  public	  officials	  and	  political	  institutions,	  and	  mounting	  anxieties	  over	  our	  ‘risk	  society’	  and	  ‘runaway	  world’.	  Moreover,	  the	  frustrations	  commonly	  expressed	  by	  TANs	  revealed	  high	  levels	  of	  failure	  and	  consequent	  condemnation	  of	  officials	  and	  official	  institutions	  whose	  persuasion,	  paradoxically,	  is	  necessary	  for	  policy	  change.	  	  Since	  there	  is	  considerable	  evidence	  and	  patterning	  at	  the	  macroscopic	  level	  that	  these	  assessments	  are	  often	  faulty,	  the	  line	  argued	  in	  this	  thesis	  was	  that	  these	  failures	  should	  be	  analysed	  in	  alternative	  ways:	  (1)	  as	  communications	  strategy	  inadequacies	  (i.e.	  non-­‐alignment	  of	  aims	  and	  strategies;	  misjudgements	  in	  targeting	  strategies	  that	  might	  ‘scale	  shift’	  issues	  to	  appropriate	  levels	  for	  their	  resolution;	  and	  inadequacy	  of	  resources	  required	  to	  achieve	  the	  preferred	  strategies);	  (2)	  as	  misunderstandings	  of	  the	  differing	  scales	  of	  complexity	  conditioning	  the	  micro-­‐macro	  landscapes	  of	  international	  politics;	  and	  (3)	  as	  misunderstandings	  of	  the	  time-­‐space	  distanciation	  effects	  caused	  by	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disparate	  social	  structures	  effecting	  individuals	  in	  their	  relations	  with	  institutions	  and	  social	  systems.	  	  	  These	  concerns	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  PRQ	  and	  the	  first	  hypothesis	  of	  the	  thesis	  (H1)662:	  viz.	  that	  the	  ‘advocacy’	  communications	  functions	  of	  advocacy	  NGOs	  are	  typically	  neglected	  in	  politics	  theorising	  but	  are	  analytically	  crucial	  to	  explaining	  their	  functioning	  and	  place	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system.	  Thus,	  the	  underlying	  research	  design	  approached	  the	  subject	  of	  TAN	  relationships	  in	  the	  international	  arena	  from	  a	  radically	  different,	  cross-­‐disciplinary,	  perspective:	  exploring,	  inter	  alia,	  the	  structural	  predestination	  of	  their	  behaviours	  and	  functional	  attributes;	  adopting	  recent	  complexity	  scholarship	  to	  conceptualise	  TANs	  as	  complex	  systems,	  embedded	  in	  a	  myriad	  of	  complex	  systems	  —	  including	  the	  international	  system	  —	  intersecting,	  interdependent,	  challenged	  by	  and	  competing	  with	  other	  agents	  (seen	  as	  systemic	  elements),	  and	  co-­‐evolving	  in	  structurally-­‐conditioned,	  multi-­‐dimensional	  fitness	  landscapes.	  Furthermore,	  complexity	  insights	  were	  employed	  to	  analyse	  the	  ‘fitness’	  of	  TANs	  to	  interact,	  form	  international	  relationships,	  survive	  and	  be	  effective	  on	  multiple	  levels	  of	  social	  complexity.	  The	  dominant	  communicative	  functioning	  of	  TANs	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  their	  relationships,	  commonly	  taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  or	  assumed	  in	  political	  theory,	  were	  then	  tested	  by	  introducing	  substantive	  theoretical	  lenses	  from	  communications	  science,	  with	  heartening	  results.	  	  	  Firstly,	  the	  research	  approach	  understood	  the	  primary	  research	  question	  to	  be	  (a)	  chiefly	  concerned	  with	  relationships	  and	  (b)	  complex	  and	  multidimensional	  —	  implying	  the	  need	  to	  investigate	  different	  strata	  of	  complex	  social	  reality,	  occurring	  on	  different	  timescales	  and	  suffused	  with	  political	  power	  inequalities.	  The	  linking	  of	  TANs	  to	  the	  international	  institutional	  system	  —	  both	  as	  individual	  organisations	  and	  as	  a	  cluster	  —	  had	  implications	  for	  at	  least	  two	  thorny	  challenges	  in	  sociological	  analysis:	  the	  micro-­‐macro	  (levels	  of	  analysis)	  problem	  and	  questions	  of	  time-­‐space	  distanciation.	  The	  latter	  relating	  to	  the	  entrenched	  structural	  properties	  of	  on-­‐going,	  complex,	  social	  systems	  that	  stretch	  over	  time	  and	  space	  and	  their	  intrinsic	  resistances	  to	  manipulation	  and	  change	  by	  any	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
662	  H1:	  Contemporary	  TANs	  are	  an	  important	  NGO	  variant	  in	  international	  politics	  that	  have	  
unprecedented	  properties	  and	  powers	  emerging	  from	  their	  advocacy	  communications,	  which	  are	  
typically	  neglected	  in	  politics	  theorising.	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individual	  agent.	  These	  challenges	  were	  addressed	  by	  applying	  complex	  realism	  to	  conceptualise	  the	  ontology	  of	  these	  relationships	  as	  intersections	  between	  systemic	  elements	  embedded	  in	  fitness	  landscapes	  and	  constituted	  on	  different	  social	  levels	  and	  scales	  of	  complexity.	  This	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  research	  design	  involving	  both	  ‘top-­‐down’	  macroscopic	  analysis	  of	  the	  macro-­‐sociological	  features	  of	  the	  international	  system	  interface	  with	  TANs	  (observed	  mainly	  in	  behavioural	  patterns	  that	  reflected	  the	  underlying	  and	  enduring	  social	  structures	  of	  institutions,	  including	  powers,	  tendencies,	  trends	  and	  relationship	  qualities,	  such	  as	  trust	  and	  mutual	  understanding);	  and	  ‘bottom-­‐up’	  case	  study	  analysis	  of	  three	  iconic	  TANs:	  Greenpeace	  International,	  Oxfam	  International	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Watch.	  This	  scalable	  methodology	  enabled	  the	  study	  to	  transcend	  the	  micro-­‐macro	  problems	  inherent	  in	  the	  primary	  research	  question.	  	  
	  
The	  Literature	  The	  research	  commenced	  by	  undertaking	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  literature	  review.	  This	  enabled	  identification	  of	  the	  key	  actors,	  issues	  and	  debates,	  and	  led	  to	  the	  refinement	  of	  the	  primary	  research	  question	  and	  development	  of	  five	  grounded	  hypotheses.	  However,	  it	  was	  clear	  from	  the	  outset	  that	  writers	  dealing	  with	  NGOs,	  in	  general,	  and	  the	  relatively	  recent,	  ICT-­‐enabled,	  TAN	  phenomenon	  in	  particular,	  lacked	  a	  common	  terminology	  for	  identifying	  TANs	  and	  their	  essential	  characteristics.	  This	  led	  me	  to	  develop	  an	  original	  referent	  model	  for	  the	  TAN	  typology	  that	  I	  had	  identified	  from	  the	  literature	  and	  discourses	  as	  being	  distinctively	  different	  and	  analytically	  important	  from	  the	  traditional	  NGO	  model.	  From	  these	  early	  results,	  I	  formed	  a	  premise	  that	  political	  theory	  alone	  was	  insufficient	  to	  unlock	  the	  research	  problem	  and	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  emerging	  hypotheses,	  owing	  to	  fundamental	  idiosyncrasies	  in	  the	  way	  politics	  theorisation	  looks	  at	  TANs	  —	  unable	  to	  adequately	  explain	  relationships,	  other	  than	  in	  terms	  of	  competing	  ontologies;	  lacking	  the	  tools	  to	  examine	  fundamental	  changes	  in	  the	  media	  ecology	  and	  contemporary	  communications	  praxis,	  as	  adopted	  by	  TANs;	  and	  customarily	  conflating	  micro-­‐	  and	  macro-­‐	  levels	  of	  social	  systemic	  complexity,	  which	  tends	  to	  confound	  efforts	  to	  interpret	  international	  relations.	  	  
	  Hence,	  the	  thesis	  is	  situated	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  three	  principal	  literatures:	  	  (1)	  contentious	  international	  politics	  (reflecting	  a	  zone	  of	  clashing	  worldviews	  involving	  TANs)	  ;	  (2)	  international	  relations	  and	  policy	  studies	  (particularly	  the	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‘globalisation’	  debates	  concerning	  the	  role	  and	  power	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  in	  international	  institutional	  processes	  and	  political	  transformations);	  and	  (3)	  political	  advocacy	  communications	  in	  the	  Information	  Age.	  This	  cross-­‐disciplinary	  combination	  was	  necessary	  to	  investigate	  the	  complex,	  multi-­‐dimensional,	  nature	  of	  the	  research	  question;	  the	  plurality	  of	  academic	  disciplines	  interested	  in	  TANs	  and	  their	  diverse	  approaches	  and	  perspectives;	  and	  the	  politics/communication/media/technology	  genre,	  which	  views	  TANs,	  collectively,	  as	  a	  relatively	  recent,	  technology-­‐enabled	  and	  significant	  political	  force	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  Importantly,	  this	  review	  led	  to	  the	  discovery	  that,	  despite	  their	  increasing	  numbers	  and	  prominence	  in	  mass	  media	  accounts	  of	  their	  activities,	  not	  least	  via	  their	  own	  publicity	  efforts,	  throughout	  the	  academic	  political	  literature	  transnational,	  advocacy-­‐prioritising,	  NGOs	  are	  invariably	  considered	  to	  be	  an	  ill-­‐defined,	  perplexing	  and	  inadequately-­‐theorised	  social	  phenomenon.	  	  The	  ‘contentious	  international	  politics’	  literature,	  typically	  associated	  with	  the	  work	  of	  Tarrow,	  Tilly,	  McAdam,	  della	  Porta,	  Diani,	  Melucci,	  Sikkink,	  Keck,	  Finnemore,	  et	  al,	  provided	  the	  core	  of	  academic	  thinking	  in	  the	  subject	  area	  relating	  to	  the	  PRQ.	  However,	  owing	  to	  what	  I	  considered	  to	  be	  its	  distinctive	  fragmentation	  and	  imprecision,	  not	  least	  in	  the	  terminology	  commonly	  used	  to	  examine	  non-­‐state	  elements	  engaged	  in	  the	  international	  political	  domain,	  this	  literature	  was	  unable	  to	  provide	  a	  clear	  definition	  of	  the	  TAN	  phenomenon.	  Therefore,	  its	  chief	  value	  was	  in	  understanding	  how	  research	  in	  the	  long-­‐established	  field	  of	  ‘social	  movements’	  has	  evolved,	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  to	  accommodate	  unprecedented	  forms	  of	  transnational	  and	  deterritorialised	  civil	  society	  activism,	  including	  TANs.	  	  	  Overall,	  this	  body	  of	  opinion	  reflected	  a	  sociological	  paradigm	  that	  is	  keenly	  aware	  it	  faces	  methodological	  challenges	  in	  dealing	  with	  the	  unfamiliar	  forces	  driving	  transnationalism	  and	  shifting	  analytical	  focal	  points.	  In	  this	  regard,	  ‘scale	  shift’	  theory,	  posited	  by	  McAdam,	  Tarrow	  and	  Tilly,	  provided	  a	  useful	  basis	  for	  thinking	  about	  how	  this	  literature	  was	  trying	  to	  cope	  with	  these	  new	  tensions.	  Scale-­‐shift	  theory,	  which	  holds	  that	  contentious	  political	  environments	  are	  constituted	  by	  multiple	  levels	  of	  social	  interaction,	  thus	  usefully	  informed	  this	  thesis.	  However,	  it	  did	  not	  go	  far	  enough	  explain	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  social	  ‘levels’,	  or	  to	  transcend	  the	  micro-­‐macro	  and	  time	  distanciation	  problems	  inherent	  in	  the	  research	  question.	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Nevertheless,	  it	  was	  apparent	  that	  the	  literature	  on	  pre-­‐90s	  social	  movements	  while	  necessary	  for	  tracing	  the	  emergence	  of	  TANs	  and	  their	  issues,	  was	  largely	  outdated	  in	  regard	  to	  addressing	  the	  key	  questions	  and	  hypotheses	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Significantly,	  this	  literature	  typically	  revealed	  a	  rigid	  focus	  on	  the	  contentious	  political	  and	  historical	  underpinnings	  of	  TAN	  activism	  but	  suffered	  from	  a	  critical	  analytical	  blind	  spot	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  TANs	  —	  whom	  I	  identify	  as	  a	  new	  social	  phenomenon	  that	  is	  constituted	  and	  defined	  by	  its	  communications	  function	  —	  use	  advanced	  communications	  tools	  and	  techniques	  to	  express	  their	  causes	  and	  ideologies	  to	  the	  wider	  world.	  	  Bearing	  in	  mind	  Castell’s	  assertion	  that	  ‘the	  networked	  social	  movements	  of	  the	  digital	  age	  represent	  a	  new	  species	  of	  social	  movement’,	  this	  TAN	  communications	  oversight	  leaves	  this	  sector	  of	  the	  political	  literature	  with	  a	  significant	  lacuna,	  due	  to	  its	  inability	  to	  provide	  us	  with	  sophisticated,	  qualitative	  and	  scientifically	  sound	  understandings	  of	  (a)	  the	  relationships	  between	  the	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  elements	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system;	  and	  (b),	  the	  international	  political	  impacts	  of	  unprecedented	  levels	  of	  human	  interconnectivity	  afforded	  by	  digital	  communications	  technologies	  and	  tools,	  as	  utilised	  by	  TANs.	  In	  order	  to	  connect	  TANs	  to	  the	  international	  system	  and	  unlock	  the	  interface	  landscape	  between	  TANs	  and	  the	  UN,	  I	  accessed	  the	  literatures	  taking	  a	  largely	  macroscopic	  perspective	  on	  international	  politics	  and	  relations,	  governance	  and	  globalisation.	  Despite	  the	  comparatively	  more	  generalised	  nature	  of	  these	  perspectives	  and	  the	  contested	  topic	  of	  ‘global	  civil	  society’	  these	  texts	  tended	  to	  take	  a	  more	  detached,	  objective	  approach,	  concentrating	  largely	  on	  comparative	  socio-­‐economic	  matters,	  political	  and	  historical	  contexts,	  institutional	  processes	  and	  collective	  experiences.	  Most	  importantly,	  they	  enabled	  the	  investigation	  of	  macroscopic	  perspectives	  and	  patterns	  in	  the	  relationships.	  	  A	  third	  literature	  was	  required	  to	  cover	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  ‘Information	  Age’	  to	  the	  development	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs.	  This	  literature	  was	  necessary	  for	  understanding	  the	  part	  of	  the	  PRQ	  relating	  to	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs	  in	  achieving	  their	  aims,	  which	  I	  hypothesised	  was	  significantly	  influenced	  by	  their	  communications	  strategies	  and	  performance.	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But	  there	  were	  shortcomings	  in	  the	  available	  literature,	  due	  mainly	  to:	  (i)	  the	  limited	  ability	  of	  discipline-­‐oriented	  studies	  to	  reveal	  more	  of	  the	  ontological	  ‘big	  picture’	  on	  questions	  involving	  complex	  relationships	  on	  varying	  planes	  of	  analysis,	  and/or	  crossed	  paradigm	  boundaries;	  and	  (ii)	  the	  serious,	  but	  inevitable,	  delays	  between	  academic	  research	  into	  dynamic,	  contemporary,	  social	  phenomena	  and	  the	  availability	  of	  published	  analyses663.	  	  	  Consequently,	  the	  existing	  literature	  had	  little	  to	  say	  about	  recent	  patterns	  and	  trends	  in	  TAN	  relationships.	  This	  struggle	  to	  capture	  what	  is	  important	  and	  different	  in	  these	  new	  forms	  of	  social	  activism	  permeates	  the	  literature,	  prompting	  Klandermans,	  Staggenborg	  and	  Tarrow	  to	  remind	  us	  that	  until	  very	  recently	  the	  entire	  focus	  of	  social	  movement	  research	  was	  the	  nation	  state.	  In	  some	  cases	  this	  domestic	  focus	  works	  adequately,	  since	  many	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  TANs	  are	  carried	  out	  at	  local	  and	  domestic	  levels	  where	  the	  enablements	  and	  resistances	  they	  encounter	  are	  familiar;	  but	  some	  activities,	  particularly	  the	  ones	  of	  interest	  to	  this	  thesis,	  are	  not.	  Moreover,	  while	  writers	  in	  the	  contentious	  international	  politics	  paradigm	  frequently	  mention	  the	  work	  of	  others,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  they	  tend	  to	  be	  engaged	  in	  separate	  conversations.	  The	  body	  of	  literature	  itself	  is	  essentially	  fragmented	  due,	  perhaps,	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  research	  projects	  involving	  social	  movements	  and	  activism	  are	  based	  on	  fragmented	  case	  studies	  of	  specific	  local,	  regional,	  or	  national	  groups.	  The	  varied	  terminology	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  TANs	  and	  TAN-­‐type	  organisations	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  reflection	  of	  this	  heterogeneity.	  Chandler’s	  observation	  (2005:166),	  that	  constructivist	  (i.e.	  mainstream)	  approaches	  to	  global	  civil	  society	  seem	  to	  be	  driven	  mainly	  by	  a	  normative	  desire	  to	  support	  the	  ‘principled-­‐issues’	  advocated	  by	  non-­‐state	  actors,	  was	  also	  evident	  in	  the	  body	  of	  work	  reviewed.	  	  The	  implications	  of	  this	  challenging	  literature	  landscape	  for	  this	  thesis	  was	  that	  although	  it	  was	  useful	  for	  factually	  and	  theoretically	  underpinning	  some	  sections	  of	  the	  thesis,	  particularly	  those	  relating	  to	  the	  international	  system	  and	  socio-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
663	  In	  a	  recent	  example,	  political	  magazine	  commentaries	  on	  the	  Occupy	  movement	  in	  the	  U.S.	  were	  
collated	  to	  create	  an	  ‘instant	  book’	  that	  was	  published	  in	  under	  three	  months,	  while	  a	  text	  on	  the	  same	  
subject	  by	  the	  noted	  writer	  on	  political	  activism,	  Noam	  Chomsky,	  was	  not	  published	  until	  some	  seven	  
months	  after	  the	  Zuccotti	  Park	  events	  (van	  Gelder,	  2011:	  vii;	  Chomsky,	  2012).	  In	  such	  cases,	  I	  suggest,	  
the	  value	  of	  high	  quality	  mainstream	  media	  accounts	  cannot	  be	  ignored.	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historical	  and	  political	  contexts,	  it	  was	  largely	  unsuited	  to	  the	  task	  of	  closely	  examining	  the	  contemporary	  international	  relations	  of	  the	  case	  study	  organisations	  and	  providing	  substantive	  evidence	  about	  them.	  As	  may	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  bibliography,	  large	  volumes	  of	  additional	  primary	  and	  secondary	  data	  needed	  to	  be	  accessed	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  media	  and	  website	  sources.	  It	  was	  therefore	  a	  valuable	  aspect	  of	  this	  study	  that	  TANs	  typically	  release	  large	  volumes	  of	  publicity	  outputs	  about	  themselves	  that	  can	  be	  readily	  accessed.	  In	  fact,	  the	  demonstration	  of	  this	  methodologically	  pluralist,	  multi-­‐focused,	  approach	  to	  the	  subject	  matter	  is	  offered	  as	  a	  key	  contribution	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  Although	  there	  is	  abundant	  literature	  on	  the	  readily	  perceived	  aspects	  of	  NGOs/TANs,	  scholars	  had	  little	  to	  say	  on	  the	  rationality	  of	  the	  emerging	  TAN	  model	  as	  an	  all-­‐purpose	  communications	  vehicle	  for	  deployment	  across	  the	  multi-­‐level,	  multi-­‐dimensional	  social	  landscape	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  fact	  that	  TANs	  have	  emerged	  can	  be	  explained	  with	  reference	  to	  a	  rich	  mixture	  of	  historical	  and	  contemporary	  circumstances,	  which	  is	  adequately	  reflected	  in	  the	  literature.	  Whether	  transnational	  advocacy	  collectives	  are	  best	  suited	  to	  accomplish	  the	  goals	  they	  set	  for	  themselves,	  using	  the	  tools	  they	  select,	  appears	  open	  to	  question	  in	  light	  of	  uncertainties	  in	  the	  literature	  regarding	  their	  definition,	  common	  characteristics,	  and	  about	  their	  roles	  and	  performance	  in	  their	  interactions	  with	  the	  international	  system.	  Thus,	  the	  exploration	  of	  TANs	  and	  their	  emergence	  and	  relationships,	  as	  assertive	  contenders	  in	  the	  international	  system,	  became	  the	  principal	  line	  of	  investigation	  in	  this	  dissertation.	  Constructivist	  narratives	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  social	  movements	  may	  adequately	  explain	  the	  motivations	  and	  rationality	  of	  contemporary	  TANs	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  interact	  with	  communications	  technologies	  in	  pursuit	  of	  their	  goals,	  but	  the	  compilation	  of	  large	  numbers	  of	  individual	  narratives	  do	  not,	  I	  submit,	  adequately	  explain	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  TANs	  interact	  with	  international	  institutions,	  and	  the	  reasons	  why	  they	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  conceptually	  ‘elusive’	  and	  ‘frequently	  fail	  to	  achieve	  their	  goals’.	  	  The	  gaps	  in	  the	  literature	  uncovered	  by	  this	  review	  made	  it	  impossible	  to	  answer	  the	  PRQ	  and	  hypotheses	  without	  conducting	  further,	  original,	  research.	  These	  gaps	  were	  most	  apparent	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  (a)	  bringing	  into	  the	  contentious	  international	  politics	  paradigm	  more	  scientific	  and	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  understandings	  of	  the	  role	  of	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  communications	  in	  interpreting	  the	  interface	  between	  TANs	  and	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the	  international	  system;	  (b)	  explaining	  the	  barriers	  to	  international-­‐level	  relationships,	  roles	  and	  effectiveness	  that	  some	  TANs	  encounter;	  and	  (c)	  explaining	  the	  different	  environments	  and	  effectiveness	  conditions	  that	  TANs	  encounter	  at	  various	  levels	  of	  complex	  interaction,	  beyond	  the	  basic	  mechanism	  identified	  by	  scale-­‐shift	  theory.	  Moreover,	  these	  lacunae	  highlighted	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  unifying	  analytical	  framework	  in	  which	  micro-­‐	  and	  macro-­‐sociological	  phenomena	  could	  be	  accommodated	  and	  their	  inter-­‐relationships	  explained.	  Through	  an	  iterative	  process,	  the	  literature	  enabled	  me	  to	  refine	  the	  primary	  research	  question	  and	  develop	  five	  hypotheses	  that	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  shed	  greater	  light	  on	  TAN	  relationships	  with	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  
	  
The	  United	  Nations	  As	  the	  principal	  organ	  of	  the	  international	  system,	  consisting	  of	  the	  sui	  generis	  systemic	  linking	  of	  the	  greatest	  number	  of	  nation	  states,	  the	  UN’s	  suitability	  to	  represent	  the	  ‘system’	  in	  this	  thesis	  was	  asserted.	  Moreover,	  the	  UN	  was	  identified	  also	  as	  the	  epitome	  of	  a	  complex	  system	  that	  is	  embedded	  in,	  and	  intersected	  by,	  countless	  other	  complex	  systems.	  It	  was	  argued	  that	  many	  of	  the	  institutional	  characteristics	  widely	  associated	  with	  the	  UN	  could	  be	  usefully	  regarded	  as	  manifestations	  of	  complex	  systemic	  ‘path-­‐dependent’	  behaviours	  set	  up	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  UN’s	  history.	  These	  included	  the	  enduring	  primacy	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter	  of	  1945	  and	  the	  perturbations	  introduced	  by	  large	  scale	  decolonisation	  after	  World	  War	  II.	  The	  UN	  was	  presented	  as	  an	  association	  of	  193	  of	  the	  world’s	  sovereign	  states,	  founded	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  World	  War	  II	  and	  representing	  the	  best	  Man	  has	  been	  able	  to	  do	  to	  live	  in	  harmony	  with	  his	  fellow	  man.	  It	  was	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  UN	  is	  not	  a	  world	  governance	  body	  and	  it	  lacks	  coercive	  powers	  to	  compel	  Member	  States	  to	  comply	  with	  its	  recommendations.	  Furthermore,	  the	  UN	  and	  its	  systems	  of	  interconnected	  and	  ancillary	  systems	  was	  seen	  as	  deeply	  flawed	  and	  mired	  in	  perpetual	  crisis,	  still	  served	  by	  yesteryear’s	  institutional	  arrangements	  and	  urgently	  in	  need	  of	  reform,	  yet	  notoriously	  resistant	  to	  instituting	  the	  scale	  of	  adaptation	  needed	  to	  tackle	  the	  present	  generation	  of	  global	  problems.	  This	  opinion	  testified	  to	  Durkheim’s	  conviction	  that	  institutions	  are	  intrinsically	  limited	  and	  necessarily	  slow	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  undertake	  major	  transformations	  (as	  opposed	  to	  evolutionary	  ones),	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  political	  agitation	  for	  change	  that	  is	  intrinsically	  tied	  to	  the	  life-­‐span	  and	  other	  constraints	  of	  individual	  agents.	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  Thus,	  despite	  the	  many	  criticisms	  of	  the	  UN’s	  performance	  record,	  there	  seems	  little	  likelihood	  that,	  without	  the	  UN,	  the	  world	  would	  have	  seen	  a	  more	  stable	  world	  order	  during	  the	  past	  six	  decades.	  Notwithstanding	  the	  deterritorialising	  effects	  of	  globalisation	  and	  increasingly	  complex	  interdependencies	  between	  nations,	  grounds	  were	  seen	  for	  the	  Westphalian	  order	  of	  states,	  underpinned	  by	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter,	  remaining	  the	  most	  intellectually	  coherent	  basis	  for	  conducting	  international	  affairs	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future.	  	  That	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  the	  dynamic	  and	  emergent	  properties	  of	  the	  UN	  system,	  nor	  the	  imperative	  for	  new	  knowledge,	  fresh	  ideas	  and	  outspoken	  voices	  in	  the	  system	  that	  are	  non-­‐aligned	  with	  domestic	  governments,	  not	  obligated	  to	  protect	  national	  sovereignty	  at	  any	  cost,	  and	  willing	  to	  propose	  solutions	  that	  transcend	  ideologies.	  The	  chapter	  concluded	  with	  a	  reminder	  that	  the	  UN	  can	  do	  little	  more	  than	  promote	  priorities	  for	  action,	  help	  monitor,	  and	  provide	  modest	  levels	  of	  technical	  and	  financial	  support.	  	  
The	  U.N.	  Interface	  with	  Civil	  Society	  The	  interface	  between	  the	  UN	  and	  NGOs	  is	  a	  densely	  crowded	  landscape.	  Over	  13,000	  civil	  society	  organisations	  have	  established	  a	  formal	  relationship	  with	  the	  UN	  —	  over	  4,000	  of	  them	  in	  accredited	  consultancy	  relationships	  at	  various	  levels	  of	  participation	  and	  influence	  in	  international	  affairs	  and	  policy-­‐making.	  Meanwhile,	  some	  31,000	  NGOs	  have	  an	  interface	  with	  the	  system	  in	  various	  other	  roles.	  However,	  gauging	  an	  accurate	  picture	  of	  the	  place	  and	  function	  of	  civil	  society	  organisations	  in	  their	  relationships	  within	  the	  international	  system	  is	  problematical:	  UN	  official	  statements	  concerning	  NGOs	  were	  assessed	  as	  largely	  appreciative,	  if	  measured,	  regarding	  the	  overall	  contributions	  of	  civil	  society	  actors	  to	  the	  UN	  system;	  while	  NGOs	  in	  consultative	  roles,	  although	  very	  numerous,	  make	  few	  public	  comments	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  their	  relationships	  with	  the	  UN	  —	  with	  some	  notable	  exceptions,	  such	  as	  Greenpeace,	  which	  has	  a	  long	  record	  of	  outspoken	  criticisms	  of	  the	  world	  body.	  	  Nevertheless,	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  content	  and	  discourse	  analysis,	  aided	  by	  diachronic	  process	  tracing,	  definite	  patterns	  and	  tendencies	  in	  these	  relationships	  could	  be	  discerned.	  It	  was	  emphasised	  that	  taxonomy	  and	  ambiguous	  terminology	  are	  major	  challenges	  in	  differentiating	  between	  civil	  society	  actors	  operating	  in	  the	  UN	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system,	  since	  the	  UN	  makes	  no	  formal	  distinction	  between	  NGOs	  functionally,	  or	  philosophically,	  whether	  service-­‐providing	  or	  lobbyist,	  radical	  or	  reformist,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  meet	  the	  UN’s	  accreditation	  criteria	  for	  consultancy	  status.	  It	  could	  be	  deduced	  that	  owing	  to	  the	  large	  and	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  NGOs	  either	  in,	  or	  seeking,	  relationships	  with	  elements	  of	  the	  UN	  system,	  that	  consultancy	  status	  is	  generally	  considered	  to	  be	  worthwhile.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  UN	  has	  officially	  encouraged	  dialogue	  between	  Member	  States	  and	  NGOs	  since	  its	  beginnings,	  and	  has	  a	  long,	  albeit	  inconsistent,	  record	  of	  creating	  opportunity	  frames	  for	  these	  engagements,	  such	  as	  World	  conferences	  on	  topics	  of	  mutual	  importance.	  	  There	  were	  signs,	  however,	  that	  the	  UN’s	  contemporary	  relationship	  with	  NGOs	  is	  greatly	  encumbered	  by	  historical	  baggage,	  which	  can	  be	  usefully	  understood	  as	  resulting	  from	  the	  complex	  system	  effects	  of	  sensitivity	  to	  initial	  conditions,	  path	  dependency	  and	  lock-­‐in.	  The	  Cardoso	  Report	  (2004),	  which	  sought	  to	  reform	  the	  UN’s	  arrangements	  for	  engaging	  with	  NGOs,	  and	  the	  UN	  Secretary-­‐General’s	  response	  to	  the	  Report,	  were	  particularly	  valuable	  sources	  of	  primary	  data	  and	  surprising	  candour	  on	  the	  state	  of	  the	  these	  relationships.	  	  	  It	  was	  emphasised	  that	  the	  UN	  Charter,	  so	  visionary	  in	  its	  conceptualisations	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1940s,	  did	  not	  envisage	  a	  world	  facing	  today’s	  global	  challenges,	  developmental	  disparities	  and	  shifting	  power	  relationships;	  nor	  one	  endowed	  with	  such	  a	  wealth	  of	  scientific	  and	  technological	  advances.	  It	  did	  not	  foresee	  the	  evolution	  of	  powerful,	  supranational	  actors	  on	  the	  world	  stage	  that	  were	  not	  states	  or	  inter-­‐governmental	  organisations.	  And	  yet,	  the	  UN	  provides	  the	  institutional	  structures	  for	  civil	  society	  actors	  to	  achieve	  their	  aims,	  allowing	  them,	  as	  necessary,	  to	  by-­‐pass	  domestic	  structures.	  	  	  However,	  significant	  downsides	  were	  seen	  for	  NGOs	  in	  seeking	  relationships	  with	  international	  institutions:	  many	  fearing	  that,	  inter	  alia,	  they	  could	  lose	  their	  independence,	  funding	  or	  ability	  to	  react	  quickly	  to	  situations	  if	  they	  were	  encumbered	  by	  international	  institutional	  bureaucracy	  and	  processes.	  In	  addition,	  significant	  sectors	  among	  NGOs/TANs	  evidently	  find	  the	  statutory	  obligations	  required	  for	  UN	  consultant	  accreditation	  —	  such	  as	  supporting	  the	  Charter	  and	  work	  of	  the	  UN	  and	  not	  engaging	  in	  ‘politically	  motivated’	  acts	  against	  Member	  States	  —	  incompatible	  with	  their	  ideological	  principles	  and	  posing	  insurmountable	  
	   382	  
barriers	  to	  their	  participation	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system	  via	  the	  UN	  (see	  Annex	  4	  for	  further	  examples	  of	  the	  difficulties	  faced	  by	  NGOs	  in	  measuring	  up	  to	  the	  UN’s	  affiliation	  criteria	  for	  consultancy	  status).	  There	  were,	  however,	  signs	  of	  a	  turning	  point	  and	  a	  new	  trend	  in	  relations	  with	  NGOs,	  stemming	  from	  the	  UN’s	  recent	  introduction	  of	  outreach	  initiatives	  to	  include	  a	  greater	  component	  of	  business	  and	  commercial	  interests	  in	  the	  consultation	  framework	  with	  civil	  society.	  This	  apparent	  trend	  was	  also	  reflected	  in	  the	  new	  ‘coalitions	  and	  partnerships’	  terminology	  in	  UN	  publications.	  Certainly,	  some	  NGOs	  represented	  at	  the	  UN	  have	  expressed	  their	  dismay	  at	  the	  perceived	  ‘elevation	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  over	  and	  above	  NGOs’.	  To	  what	  extent	  this	  apparent	  change	  of	  policy	  reflects	  the	  differences	  in	  leadership	  culture	  between	  Kofi	  Annan	  and	  Ban	  Ki-­‐moon,	  is	  not	  yet	  reflected	  in	  current	  commentaries	  but	  may	  become	  more	  evident	  in	  time.	  	  	  Therefore,	  the	  capacity	  to	  include	  TANs	  in	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  exists,	  affording	  some	  of	  them	  a	  formal	  place	  and	  a	  function	  in	  the	  international	  system,	  although	  the	  ECOSOC	  mechanism	  appears	  to	  operate	  in	  an	  inconsistent	  manner:	  in	  theory	  open	  to	  all	  issues	  and	  all	  applicants,	  apart	  from	  paedophile	  groups,	  Nazis,	  and	  organisations	  that	  propagate	  racial	  and/or	  religious	  discrimination	  	  —	  in	  practice,	  the	  accreditation	  criteria	  appears	  to	  be	  applied	  flexibly.	  Overall,	  NGOs,	  including	  TANs,	  appear	  to	  function	  in	  the	  UN	  system	  in	  an	  irregular,	  unpredictable,	  manner	  that	  is	  not	  easily	  comprehensible	  without	  taking	  into	  account	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  distinctive	  nature	  of	  TANs	  (Chapter	  6)	  and	  empirical	  case	  studies	  of	  individual	  TANs	  in	  relationships	  with	  the	  UN	  (as	  presented	  in	  Chapters	  7	  to	  9).	  The	  place	  and	  function	  of	  NGOs	  is	  formally	  established	  by	  the	  UN	  Charter,	  but	  in	  practice,	  NGOs	  appear	  to	  contribute	  to	  policy-­‐making	  at	  arm’s	  length,	  if	  at	  all,	  and	  Member	  States,	  on	  the	  whole,	  prefer	  to	  keep	  things	  that	  way.	  
	  
Transnational	  Advocacy	  Networks	  This	  chapter	  pointed	  out	  that	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  political	  sociologists	  consider	  TANs	  to	  be	  politically	  important	  (thereby	  supporting	  my	  H1),	  increasing	  rapidly	  in	  number,	  distinctively	  different	  and	  characteristically	  rejecting	  of	  the	  international	  governance	  order	  (H2,	  H3).	  But,	  there	  remains	  much	  confusion	  and	  significant	  gaps	  in	  the	  literature	  regarding	  the	  essential	  nature	  of	  these	  differences	  and	  how	  to	  approach	  and	  analyse	  them.	  An	  advocacy-­‐oriented	  referent	  model	  was	  presented	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as	  a	  practical	  step	  towards	  addressing	  this	  lacuna	  (H1).	  A	  set	  of	  substantive	  communications	  theoretical	  lenses	  was	  also	  presented	  to	  both	  confront	  some	  of	  the	  conventional	  wisdoms	  with	  a	  range	  of	  phronetic	  wisdoms	  regarding	  TAN	  activity;	  and,	  thus,	  aid	  understanding	  of	  the	  advocacy	  strategies	  that	  contemporary,	  ICT-­‐enabled,	  TANs	  are	  increasingly	  employing	  in	  pursuit	  of	  their	  goals	  (H2,	  H3).	  A	  discussion	  was	  opened	  regarding	  the	  competencies	  and	  consequences	  of	  the	  strategic	  communications	  choices	  now	  being	  commonly	  employed	  by	  TANs,	  on	  both	  international	  stakeholders	  and	  heterogeneous	  worldwide	  audiences.	  The	  complex,	  multi-­‐dimensional	  and	  analytically	  multi-­‐level	  international	  landscape,	  in	  which	  UN	  consultant	  TANs	  operate,	  was	  described	  (H4).	  Support	  was	  presented	  for	  H5,	  which	  proposes	  that	  the	  funding	  models	  TANs	  adopt	  have	  a	  determinative	  effect	  on	  their	  advocacy	  strategies.	  The	  argument	  then	  proceeded	  to	  analyse	  three	  iconic	  TANs	  that	  exhibit	  the	  TAN-­‐model	  characteristics	  to	  varying	  degrees.	  
	  
Greenpeace	  International	  Greenpeace	  was	  presented	  as	  an	  archetypal	  TAN,	  embodying	  all	  eight	  referent	  criteria	  to	  a	  high	  degree.	  Indeed	  GI	  was	  the	  most	  TAN-­‐like	  of	  the	  three	  cases.	  Greenpeace	  was	  therefore	  examined	  in	  the	  light	  of	  patterns	  seen	  in	  the	  macroscopic	  analysis	  of	  the	  international	  system	  and	  UN	  relationships	  to	  find	  support	  for	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  most	  TAN-­‐like	  organisations	  were	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  experience	  the	  most	  difficulty	  in	  their	  relationships	  with	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system	  and	  achieving	  their	  aims	  in	  that	  environment.	  GI’s	  UN	  consultancy	  role,	  or	  function,	  thus	  possessed	  considerable	  analytical	  value,	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  GI’s	  frequent	  negative	  statements	  regarding	  its	  inter-­‐relationships	  and	  perceived	  lack	  of	  influence	  in	  the	  international	  fora.	  The	  conclusion	  arising	  from	  this	  pattern	  was	  that	  GI’s	  place	  in	  the	  international	  system	  is	  in	  a	  constant	  state	  of	  flux	  and	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  fluctuate	  in	  relation	  to	  GI’s	  adaptations	  to:	  (i)	  its	  role	  and	  value	  to	  other	  sub-­‐elements	  of	  the	  system	  (such	  as	  allies	  who	  facilitate	  its	  activity	  and	  opponents	  who	  restrict	  it);	  (ii)	  perceptions	  of	  its	  role,	  reputation,	  and	  the	  value	  it	  derives	  from	  the	  system;	  and	  (iii)	  its	  contribution	  to	  the	  collectively-­‐determined	  purposes,	  joint	  agreements	  and	  continuing	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  overall	  system	  (H1,H2	  ,H3	  ).	  Consequently,	  GI’s	  function	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in	  the	  international	  system	  is	  constantly	  shaped	  by	  its	  interactions	  with	  other	  sub-­‐elements	  in	  the	  system	  (H4).	  	  	  Greenpeace	  exhibited	  an	  apparently	  locked-­‐in	  commitment	  to	  its	  founding	  ethos	  of	  ‘creative	  confrontation’,	  strategically	  developing	  ‘media	  mindbombs’	  and	  bearing	  non-­‐violent	  witness	  to	  issues	  it	  believes	  transgress	  its	  ideological	  positions.	  The	  study	  found	  that	  Greenpeace	  has	  developed	  a	  distinctive	  style	  of	  interpreting	  and	  framing	  complex	  global	  environmental	  and	  political	  issues	  according	  to	  a	  narrow	  set	  of	  campaign	  issue	  areas,	  which	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  developed	  to	  suit	  its	  organisational	  capabilities.	  It	  has	  a	  distinctive	  style	  of	  framing	  complex	  issues	  by	  focusing	  on	  its	  own	  roles	  and	  the	  news-­‐making	  responses	  it	  provokes.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  complex	  issues	  are	  characteristically	  presented	  as	  a	  backdrop	  to	  these	  activities	  and	  are	  communicated	  in	  simple	  campaign	  frames	  containing	  rhetorical	  techniques,	  repetition	  and	  emotional	  cues	  and	  stereotypes.	  Publicity	  outputs	  also	  contained	  simplified	  personal	  viewpoints;	  linear	  snapshots	  of	  complex	  problems;	  and	  popular	  assumptions,	  often	  employing	  stereotypes	  and	  humour.	  There	  was	  a	  high	  incidence	  of	  human-­‐interest	  detail,	  often	  involving	  anthropomorphised	  wild	  animals.	  However,	  a	  fundamental	  consideration	  in	  communication	  praxis	  is	  that	  intended	  audiences	  need	  to	  be	  accurately	  identified	  and	  the	  issues	  framed	  for	  those	  audiences	  in	  ways	  that	  resonate	  with	  different	  degrees	  of	  expertise,	  information	  needs,	  and	  resistance.	  For	  over	  40	  years,	  Greenpeace	  has	  developed	  and	  maintained	  a	  sector-­‐leading	  brand	  presence	  in	  the	  TAN	  sector,	  using	  the	  newest	  ideas	  and	  most	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  communications	  and	  brand	  marketing	  techniques	  and	  technologies.	  Today,	  we	  see	  a	  large-­‐scale	  decentralisation	  of	  resources	  and,	  arguably,	  degrees	  of	  strategy	  incoherence	  and	  decreasing	  effectiveness	  in	  which	  the	  numerous	  Greenpeace	  branded	  campaigns	  appear	  to	  compete	  with	  each	  other,	  and	  with	  other	  environmental	  TANs,	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  capacity	  to	  mount	  attention-­‐grabbing	  spectacles	  and	  secure	  resources.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  crowded,	  competitive,	  world	  of	  environmental	  politics,	  Greenpeace	  claims	  of	  effectiveness	  and	  conclusive	  victories	  for	  its	  confrontational	  activism	  model	  cannot	  be	  validated	  (H4).	  	  The	  study	  found	  no	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  Greenpeace	  key	  claim	  that	  world	  leaders	  and	  the	  international	  world	  are	  ‘sleepwalking’	  into	  global	  catastrophe	  and	  
	   385	  
doing	  little	  to	  find	  answers	  to	  the	  world’s	  intractable	  ecological	  challenges.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  evidence	  of	  intensive	  efforts	  and	  concerns,	  the	  contradictory	  Greenpeace	  message	  framing	  appears	  likely	  to	  strengthen	  barriers	  to	  the	  TAN’s	  international	  influence-­‐brokering	  and	  goal	  attainment	  (H1,	  H2,	  H3).	  	  Furthermore,	  there	  was	  no	  clear	  evidence	  that	  the	  trademark	  ‘Greenpeace	  action’	  of	  creative	  confrontation	  is	  effective	  in	  matters	  impinging	  on	  any	  nation	  state’s	  security	  and	  macro-­‐economic	  issues	  (H3).	  	  Greenpeace’s	  ongoing	  condemnations	  of	  state	  actors	  and	  international	  fora,	  and	  calls	  for	  mass	  civil	  disobedience,	  are	  arguably	  at	  variance	  with	  at	  least	  four	  of	  the	  undertakings	  it	  made	  to	  secure	  NGO	  consultancy	  accreditation	  to	  the	  UN	  in	  1998	  (H2,	  H3).	  In	  its	  recent	  announcement	  to	  prioritise	  the	  fostering	  of	  Internet-­‐enabled	  activism	  and	  ‘people	  power’,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  Greenpeace	  elides	  the	  notions	  of	  ‘collectivity’	  and	  ‘connectivity’	  in	  estimating	  the	  potential	  of	  Internet-­‐enabled	  activism	  and	  the	  possible	  mobilisation	  of	  ‘people	  power’	  (H1,	  H3).	  	  A	  growing	  body	  of	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  the	  formulaic	  ‘Greenpeace	  action’	  model	  of	  protest	  has	  become	  less	  effective	  as	  a	  news-­‐making	  strategy	  —	  a	  casualty	  of	  its	  own	  renowned	  success	  —	  and	  lacks	  novelty	  and	  impact.	  The	  political	  protest	  landscape,	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  complex	  interaction,	  is	  now	  crowded	  with	  later	  models	  of	  activism	  based	  on	  the	  Greenpeace	  prototype	  (H4).	  Yet	  Greenpeace	  continues	  to	  apply	  this	  locked-­‐in	  strategy,	  developed	  for	  a	  different	  media	  environment	  over	  40	  years	  ago,	  which	  arguably	  failed	  to	  achieved	  the	  intended	  aims	  then	  and,	  the	  organisation’s	  CEO	  admits,	  is	  not	  forcing	  the	  desired	  responses	  from	  the	  international	  system	  now.	  	  The	  three	  most	  publicised	  events	  in	  Greenpeace	  history	  —	  the	  original	  Amchitka	  voyage,	  the	  sinking	  of	  the	  Rainbow	  Warrior	  and	  the	  Brent	  Spar	  campaign	  —	  were	  shown	  to	  be	  unintended	  outcomes,	  not	  strategic	  achievements.	  	  Support	  was	  found	  for	  Wittner’s	  theory	  that	  when	  faced	  with	  an	  impenetrable	  barrier	  to	  aim-­‐achievement	  in	  the	  international	  arena,	  some	  activists	  have	  shown	  a	  pattern	  of	  developing	  systemic	  analyses	  and	  fighting	  side	  battles	  instead	  (H4).	  Similar	  outcomes	  were	  seen	  in	  GI’s	  gravitation	  towards	  ‘adjacent	  possible’	  opportunities	  to	  campaign	  against	  nuclear	  energy	  producers	  and,	  additionally,	  to	  battling	  climate	  change	  via	  vigorous	  campaigns	  aimed	  at	  shaming	  leading	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commercial	  brands	  for	  allegedly	  harming	  the	  environment.	  	  It	  was	  observed	  that	  all	  of	  the	  campaigns	  against	  prominent	  corporations	  —	  negatively	  framed	  as	  ‘Goliaths’	  and	  ‘business	  elites’	  —	  showed	  the	  discursive	  emblems	  of	  an	  underlying	  anti-­‐capitalist	  agenda:	  the	  populist	  rhetoric,	  arguably,	  indicative	  of	  a	  NIEO	  revivalist	  vision.	  	  Corroboration	  was	  found	  for	  the	  hypothesis	  (H5)	  that	  the	  funding	  model	  Greenpeace	  has	  adopted	  to	  finance	  its	  operations	  has	  a	  deterministic	  influence	  on	  the	  communications	  strategies	  it	  selects;	  and	  that	  this,	  in	  turn,	  has	  a	  critical	  bearing	  on	  this	  TAN’s	  place	  and	  function	  in	  the	  international	  system	  and	  on	  its	  effectiveness	  in	  achieving	  its	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  In	  stark	  terms,	  the	  high	  visibility	  self-­‐promotion	  and	  adversarial	  rhetoric	  that	  Greenpeace	  invariably	  adopts	  in	  its	  public	  advocacy	  regarding	  the	  UN,	  and	  other	  international	  actors,	  is	  undoubtedly	  effective	  in	  resonating	  with	  diverse	  audiences	  in	  the	  news	  media,	  donors	  and	  supporters	  (H1,	  H2,	  H3).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  clearly	  indicative	  of	  poor	  relationship	  quality	  with	  international	  system	  counterparts.	  In	  probing	  why	  this	  might	  be	  so,	  the	  study	  found	  wide	  contrasts	  between	  the	  relative	  unaccountability	  of	  Greenpeace	  in	  its	  trademark	  framing	  of	  global	  challenges,	  repetitive	  argumentation	  and	  pressure	  tactics,	  and	  the	  mature,	  ordered	  and	  institutionalised	  deliberative	  processes	  of	  contemporary	  international	  engagement	  (H1,	  H2,	  H3).	  	  	  There	  is	  clear	  evidence	  in	  numerous	  statements	  by	  the	  CEO	  that	  Greenpeace	  does	  not	  consider	  itself	  to	  be	  effective	  in	  achieving	  its	  aims	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system.	  Naidoo’s	  ‘Message’	  that	  ‘We	  are	  winning	  battles,	  but	  losing	  the	  planet’,	  is	  apposite,	  given	  that	  Greenpeace	  declares	  its	  main	  purpose	  is	  ‘to	  ensure	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  earth	  to	  nurture	  life	  […]’.	  	  Greenpeace	  aims	  and	  its	  communications	  strategies	  are	  clearly	  not	  aligned.	  I	  argue,	  therefore,	  that	  Greenpeace	  is	  largely	  not	  effective	  in	  achieving	  its	  aims	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system	  but	  confuses	  the	  picture	  by	  claiming	  sequential	  victories	  on	  a	  micro-­‐sociological	  agenda.	  	  	  
Oxfam	  Oxfam	  International	  embodies	  all	  eight	  referent	  criteria	  for	  an	  archetypal	  TAN.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  distinction	  because	  Oxfam	  is	  recognised	  primarily	  for	  its	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traditional	  service-­‐providing	  NGO	  function,	  which	  has	  evolved	  in	  a	  complementary	  relationship	  with	  its	  advocacy	  function.	  However,	  the	  increasing,	  ICT-­‐enabled	  assertiveness	  of	  OI’s	  political	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  ideological	  advocacy	  on	  matters	  that	  are	  not	  tied	  to	  specific	  humanitarian	  projects	  (as	  evidenced	  in	  OI’s	  current	  five-­‐year	  Strategic	  Plan	  2013),	  does	  not	  yet	  appear	  to	  be	  widely	  recognised	  as	  an	  OI	  policy	  change	  (H1,	  H2,	  H3).	  This	  strategic	  redirection	  shifts	  OI’s	  focus	  away	  from	  service	  delivery	  in	  favour	  of	  ideological	  political	  advocacy,	  including	  a	  range	  of	  activities	  supporting	  a	  new	  world	  economic	  order.	  This	  rhetoric	  is	  suggestive	  of	  a	  NIEO	  revivalist	  campaign	  (H1,	  H2,	  H3).	  
	  Oxfam	  has	  maintained	  a	  ‘place’	  in	  the	  international	  system	  since	  1945.	  This	  stems	  from	  its	  adaptation	  to	  a	  new	  fitness	  landscape	  at	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II	  and	  its	  redrafted	  strategic	  aim	  (viz.	  to	  provide	  ‘relief	  of	  suffering	  caused	  by	  any	  wars’),	  which	  necessitated	  the	  establishment	  of	  inter-­‐relationships	  with	  international	  actors.	  OI	  also	  has	  a	  recognised	  place	  in	  the	  UN	  system	  by	  way	  of	  its	  accredited	  NGO	  consultant	  status.	  This	  status	  provides	  a	  mutually	  beneficial	  mechanism:	  it	  gives	  Oxfam	  direct	  access	  to	  international	  audiences,	  whilst	  also	  providing	  for	  the	  TAN	  to	  function	  as	  part	  of	  the	  international	  system’s	  feedback	  mechanism	  and	  legitimising	  substructure.	  Oxfam’s	  ‘place’	  and	  ‘function’	  in	  the	  international	  system	  are	  further	  indicated	  by	  its	  strategic	  involvement	  in	  a	  complex	  array	  of	  institutional	  relationships,	  especially	  as	  a	  prominent	  advocate	  of	  human	  welfare,	  rights	  and	  social	  justice	  issues	  and	  as	  a	  long-­‐established	  provider	  of	  international	  crisis	  and	  development	  aid	  services	  (H1).	  	  	  Considering	  the	  huge	  proportion	  of	  Oxfam’s	  funding	  that	  comes	  from	  international	  institutional	  sources	  the	  strategic	  maintenance	  of	  an	  embedded	  position	  in	  the	  international	  system	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  shrewd	  policy	  (H2).	  There	  are	  indications	  that	  Oxfam’s	  funding	  model	  has	  had	  a	  determinative	  effect	  on	  its	  advocacy	  strategy	  of	  avoiding	  ‘naming	  and	  shaming’	  governments	  (H5).	  	  	  Oxfam	  has	  traditionally	  founded	  its	  reputation	  on	  a	  platform	  of	  apolitical	  and	  areligious	  aims	  and	  practices.	  It	  cannot	  be	  predicted	  where	  the	  observed	  tendencies	  towards	  more	  overt	  political	  advocacy	  will	  lead	  OI	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  influence	  and	  instrumentality	  of	  public	  relations	  and	  communications	  strategies	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are	  notoriously	  difficult	  to	  measure;	  can	  have	  unpredictable	  and	  unintended	  consequences;	  generally	  need	  to	  be	  administered	  over	  time;	  and	  are	  difficult	  to	  interpret	  in	  value-­‐for-­‐money	  terms	  —	  none	  of	  which	  are	  likely	  to	  prove	  appealing	  in	  the	  donor-­‐funding	  market	  (H5).	  	  	  Using	  complex	  realism	  to	  trace	  and	  interpret	  its	  historical	  path,	  Oxfam	  revealed	  an	  array	  of	  key	  features	  associated	  with	  complex	  systems.	  There	  were	  strong	  indications	  that	  Oxfam’s	  functional	  hybridity	  emerged	  from	  its	  original	  mixture	  of	  core	  attractor	  properties.	  Furthermore,	  it	  was	  noted	  that	  while	  it	  has	  undergone	  significant	  changes	  during	  its	  evolution,	  the	  organisation	  has	  continued	  to	  sustain,	  and	  be	  sustained	  by,	  these	  locked-­‐in	  primary	  drivers	  and	  the	  corporate	  capital	  they	  amassed.	  This	  approach	  provided	  analytical	  tools	  to	  extend	  understanding	  of	  Oxfam	  and	  its	  relationships,	  and	  was	  far	  from	  exhausted	  by	  this	  study	  (H4).	  	  In	  its	  extrapolation	  of	  the	  issues	  and	  understandings	  of	  	  ‘dependent	  affected’	  individuals	  to	  explain	  complex	  macro-­‐sociological	  challenges,	  Oxfam	  demonstrates	  a	  particular	  TAN	  characteristic:	  the	  conflation	  of	  scales	  of	  complex	  social	  reality	  to	  emphasise	  particular	  rhetorical	  arguments	  (H1,	  H2,	  H3).	  	  	  Of	  the	  three	  case	  studies,	  OI	  was	  distinctive	  in	  one	  particular	  aspect:	  it	  exhibited	  the	  most	  striking	  historical	  pattern	  of	  restructuring	  its	  strategic	  approaches	  to	  fit	  the	  changing	  circumstances	  in	  its	  worldwide	  bailiwick.	  When	  faced	  with	  changes	  in	  its	  operating	  environment,	  Oxfam	  has	  characteristically	  readjusted	  its	  strategic	  goals	  and	  forged	  new	  paths	  to	  achieve	  them.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  other	  two	  TANs	  showed	  strong,	  complex	  systems	  path-­‐dependency	  attributes	  by	  strict	  adherence	  to	  their	  foundational	  aims	  and	  imperatives,	  irrespective	  of	  altered	  socio-­‐political	  and	  power	  contexts.	  However,	  there	  are	  signs	  emerging	  that	  OI	  is	  placing	  increasing	  emphasis	  on	  tackling	  its	  primary	  goal	  of	  ending	  poverty	  and	  injustice	  via	  advocacy	  strategies.	  	  	  Until	  recently,	  Oxfam’s	  strategic	  communications	  had	  not	  adopted	  an	  adversarial	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other	  international	  actors	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  overall	  linguistic	  tone	  of	  its	  public	  communications	  has	  apparently	  not	  constituted	  a	  significant	  barrier	  to	  its	  place,	  function	  and	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  However,	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there	  are	  indications	  that	  its	  impartiality,	  as	  laid	  down	  in	  its	  constitution,	  may	  be	  compromised.	  Parallels	  are	  now	  appearing	  between	  Oxfam	  and	  Greenpeace	  in	  their	  use	  of	  the	  same	  social	  stereotypes	  and	  political	  ideological	  cues.	  Oxfam’s	  drift	  into	  more	  outspoken	  advocacy	  in	  human	  rights	  and	  social	  justice	  is	  undoubtedly	  more	  controversial	  than	  its	  humanitarian	  aid-­‐delivery	  work	  has	  been.	  Oxfam’s	  commitment	  to	  assisting	  grassroots	  political	  organising	  and	  fostering	  Internet-­‐enabled	  activism	  and	  ‘people	  power’	  is,	  arguably,	  at	  variance	  with	  its	  UN	  consultancy	  undertakings	  to	  refrain	  from	  engaging	  in	  any	  ‘politically	  motivated	  act	  against	  a	  Member	  State’	  and	  respecting	  ‘the	  norm	  of	  non-­‐interference	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  states’	  (H2,	  H3).	  	  	  Arguably,	  OI’s	  advocacy	  messages	  now	  echo	  the	  alter-­‐globalisation	  and	  anti-­‐capitalist	  political	  lobbies	  of	  the	  developed	  West.	  Income	  inequality	  and	  redistribution	  has	  recently	  become	  a	  political	  theme	  and	  there	  is	  strong	  evidence	  of	  social-­‐boundary	  construction	  in	  Oxfam’s	  portrayals	  of	  implied	  wrong-­‐doing	  by	  those	  perceived	  as	  the	  ‘rich’	  and	  powerful	  in	  societies,	  against	  the	  interests	  of	  ‘ordinary	  people’,	  and	  ‘everyone	  else’.	  Oxfam	  appears	  to	  be	  reviving	  the	  grievances	  and	  power	  struggles	  that	  characterised	  the	  NIEO	  campaign	  in	  the1970s	  and	  80s.	  Right	  to	  Communicate	  and	  New	  World	  Information	  and	  Communication	  Order	  (NWICO)	  themes	  are	  also	  in	  evidence	  in	  Oxfam’s	  more	  recent	  communications	  outputs.	  	  Oxfam	  has	  carried	  out	  policy	  changes	  in	  line	  with	  assumptions	  regarding	  predictions	  of	  favourable	  socio-­‐political	  conditions	  in	  the	  emerging	  BRICSAM	  economies.	  However	  recent	  economic	  analysis	  has	  shown	  that	  this	  interpretation	  of	  shifting	  polarity	  in	  the	  world	  economic	  order	  has	  been	  overestimated.	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  OI’s	  recent	  strategic	  repositioning	  in	  solidarity	  with	  social	  mobilisation	  in	  the	  BRICSAMs	  and	  more	  adversarial	  rhetoric	  directed	  at	  the	  ‘rich	  countries’,	  will	  have	  a	  bearing	  on	  OI’s	  international	  institutional	  funding,	  its	  place	  and	  function	  in	  the	  international	  arena,	  and	  its	  effectiveness	  in	  achieving	  its	  globe-­‐spanning	  aims.	  	  
HRW	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  exhibits	  all	  of	  the	  essential	  properties	  this	  thesis	  associates	  with	  TANs.	  However,	  HRW	  is	  also	  a	  TAN	  hybrid:	  while	  its	  traditional	  service-­‐
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providing	  functions	  were	  shown	  to	  be	  maintained	  at	  a	  high	  level	  of	  operational	  efficiency,	  a	  vigorous	  advocacy	  function	  has	  developed	  to	  the	  point	  where	  the	  outward	  face	  of	  the	  organisation	  resembles	  that	  of	  an	  international	  news	  agency.	  Its	  traditional	  NGO	  function	  includes	  the	  provision	  of	  legal	  expertise,	  treaty	  monitoring	  services,	  academic	  research	  and	  analysis.	  Capabilities	  include	  evidence-­‐based	  argumentation	  and	  navigation	  of	  the	  international	  institutional	  landscape,	  bridging	  varying	  levels	  of	  complexity	  —	  from	  empowering	  the	  voices	  of	  individual	  rights	  abuse	  victims	  to	  complex	  international	  deliberations,	  diplomatic	  liaison	  and	  lobbying.	  These	  distinctive	  differentiating	  properties	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  replicated	  by	  other	  TANs	  and	  were	  seen	  as	  lending	  value	  to	  HRW’s	  international	  relationships	  and	  the	  UN	  system.	  Evidence	  was	  presented	  that	  HRW	  has	  established	  an	  influential	  voice	  in	  international	  politics,	  supporting	  the	  hypotheses	  H1,	  H2,	  and	  H3.	  	  	  The	  increasing	  adoption	  of	  advanced	  ICTs	  and	  communications	  techniques,	  since	  around	  2007,	  has	  dramatically	  changed	  the	  advocacy	  face	  HRW	  presents	  to	  the	  world.	  This	  corporate	  brand	  identity	  promotion	  ensures	  that	  HRW	  is	  globally	  recognised	  as	  an	  important	  and	  effective	  voice	  in	  championing	  human	  rights	  issues	  in	  national	  and	  international	  contexts	  (H1).	  	  HRW	  operates	  concurrently	  as	  both	  ‘insider’	  and	  ‘outsider’	  in	  the	  international	  institutional	  system.	  However,	  HRW’s	  ‘outsider’	  role	  is	  developing	  conspicuously.	  A	  cycle	  of	  shaping	  the	  tools	  of	  advocacy	  and	  being	  shaped	  by	  them	  is	  evident.	  By	  adopting	  the	  latest	  ICTs	  and	  tools,	  HRW’s	  upscaled	  communications	  function	  is	  enabling	  unprecedented	  numbers	  of	  rights	  abuse	  claimants	  to	  raise	  their	  protests	  from	  micro-­‐level	  social	  situations,	  to	  the	  uniquely	  complex	  macro-­‐level	  of	  international	  discourse	  and	  decision-­‐making.	  There	  were	  indications-­‐in-­‐process	  that	  this	  enhanced	  use	  of	  advocacy	  tools	  in	  various	  regions,	  particularly	  in	  the	  global	  South,	  may	  have	  been	  necessitated	  by	  HRW’s	  imperative	  to	  raise	  its	  non-­‐U.S.	  profile,	  in	  order	  to	  attract	  substantially	  increased	  donor	  funding.	  Internal	  tensions	  between	  the	  insider/outsider	  roles	  were	  evident	  in	  Robert	  Bernstein’s	  breakaway	  to	  form	  a	  more	  ICT–focused	  TAN,	  and	  the	  comments	  by	  Bogert,	  that	  it	  is	  HRW’s	  policy	  to	  retain	  its	  traditional,	  service-­‐providing	  fundamentals	  and	  ‘shun	  the	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sensationalist	  methods	  of	  mainstream	  journalism’	  (which,	  I	  argue,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  suggest	  HRW	  is	  currently	  not	  doing)	  (H2,	  H5).	  	  	  HRW’s	  traditional	  information-­‐sharing	  function	  appears	  to	  determine	  that	  it	  has	  a	  mutually	  rewarding	  and	  satisfactory	  relationship	  with	  the	  international	  system,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  some	  currently	  notable,	  ‘pariah’	  states.	  HRW’s	  traditional	  ‘long-­‐form’	  research	  outputs	  remain	  a	  trusted	  resource	  within	  international	  society,	  despite	  some	  specific	  criticisms	  (notably,	  of	  an	  anti-­‐Israel	  bias).	  This	  thesis	  has	  argued	  that	  HRW	  increasingly	  tries	  to	  embody	  the	  contrasting	  needs	  of	  public	  advocacy	  and	  international	  diplomacy.	  Internal	  and	  external	  tensions	  are	  thus	  unavoidable,	  as	  those	  involved	  in	  high-­‐stakes	  confidential	  negotiations,	  such	  as	  Member	  State	  representatives,	  could	  be	  reasonably	  assumed	  to	  be	  mistrustful	  of	  non-­‐state	  participants	  disclosing	  details	  of	  confidential	  deliberations.	  Such	  fears	  were	  highlighted	  in	  the	  UN	  Secretary-­‐General’s	  response	  document	  to	  the	  2004	  Cardoso	  Report.	  	  A	  striking	  difference	  was	  evident	  between	  the	  adversarial	  stance	  of	  HRW	  and	  some	  other	  TANs,	  such	  as	  Greenpeace,	  in	  that	  HRW’s	  adversarial	  strategies	  are	  directed	  at	  specific	  targets,	  typically	  controversial	  national	  leaders	  and	  their	  governments,	  rather	  than	  at	  the	  international	  order	  per	  se.	  HRW	  makes	  conspicuous	  efforts	  to	  understand	  and	  work	  within	  the	  international	  system	  to	  lobby	  support,	  surmount	  barriers	  and	  leverage	  change	  (H3.).	  However,	  comments	  by	  HRW’s	  Roth	  that	  ‘we	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  shape	  the	  foreign	  policies	  of	  […]	  emerging	  powers’	  appear	  to	  be	  at	  variance	  with	  HRW’s	  undertakings	  to	  the	  UN	  to	  ‘not	  engage	  in	  a	  politically	  motivated	  act	  against	  a	  Member	  State	  […]’	  and	  to	  ‘Respect	  the	  norm	  of	  non-­‐interference	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  states’.	  	  	  Complex	  realism	  was	  a	  useful	  analytical	  framework	  for	  explaining	  the	  development	  of	  HRW.	  There	  were	  signs	  of	  the	  systemic	  influences	  that	  led	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  Helsinki	  Watch,	  in	  a	  particular	  fitness	  landscape,	  followed	  by	  adaptation	  of	  the	  model	  into	  other	  ‘Watch	  Committees’	  and	  then	  HRW.	  HRW’s	  spillover	  into	  adjacent	  possible	  opportunities	  is	  accommodated	  in	  this	  conceptualisation.	  Moreover,	  an	  important	  driver	  of	  HRW’s	  growth	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  systemic	  properties	  of	  the	  advocacy	  communications	  function,	  which,	  having	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adopted	  new	  ICTs	  and	  tools,	  is	  increasingly	  disposed	  to	  adapt	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  myriad	  of	  fitness	  landscapes	  that	  attract	  HRW’s	  interventions.	  HRW	  was	  also	  seen	  as	  (a)	  providing	  a	  valued	  feedback	  mechanism	  in	  the	  international	  system;	  and	  (b)	  developing	  capacities	  to	  enable	  grassroots	  voices	  to	  ‘scale-­‐shift’	  their	  concerns	  to	  national	  and	  international	  sociological	  levels	  at	  which	  they	  might	  be	  addressed.	  This	  capability	  to	  evolve	  fitness	  properties	  suited	  to	  its	  environments	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  indicator	  that	  HRW	  is	  effective	  in	  achieving	  its	  aims.	  Moreover,	  HRW’s	  setting	  of	  practical	  goals	  and	  measurable,	  multi-­‐pronged,	  strategies	  was	  seen	  as	  beneficial	  in	  establishing	  the	  validity	  of	  its	  credit	  claims	  (H4).	  	  	  HRW’s	  funding	  model	  appears	  to	  have	  a	  clear	  determinative	  influence	  on	  its	  advocacy	  strategies.	  This	  could	  present	  a	  dilemma	  because	  of	  evolving	  changes	  in	  its	  funding	  needs	  and	  present	  financial	  sources,	  in	  view	  of	  its	  declared	  independence.	  The	  undoubtedly	  timely	  award	  of	  US$100	  million	  from	  the	  pro-­‐democracy	  Open	  Society	  Foundations	  in	  2012	  might	  be	  usefully	  regarded	  as	  a	  bailout,	  albeit	  with	  obligations	  regarding	  HRW’s	  future	  strategic	  direction.	  	  	  	  It	  appears	  that	  the	  present	  challenges	  for	  HRW	  are	  how	  to:	  (i)	  cope	  with	  the	  pressures	  of	  supply	  and	  demand	  in	  its	  chosen	  field;	  (ii)	  manage	  resources;	  and	  (iii)	  set	  priorities	  amid	  the	  increasing	  cacophony	  of	  newly-­‐enabled	  voices	  around	  the	  world	  that	  are	  pleading	  for	  a	  global	  champion	  to	  listen	  to	  them	  and	  protect	  their	  human	  rights.	  This	  thesis	  posits	  that	  only	  time	  will	  tell	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  contemporary	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  model	  will	  be	  able	  to	  effectively	  contain	  the	  contradictory	  elements	  of	  its	  hybrid	  corporate	  body	  as	  a	  coherent,	  trusted,	  international	  intelligence	  source	  and	  reliable	  consultation	  partner.	  
10.3	  Contribution	  of	  the	  five	  hypotheses	  to	  supporting	  the	  thesis	  
	  Each	  of	  the	  five	  hypotheses	  proved	  helpful	  in	  exploring	  the	  PRQ	  and	  broad	  subject	  matter	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  	  
H1:	  Contemporary	  TANs	  are	  an	  important	  NGO	  variant	  in	  international	  politics	  
that	  have	  unprecedented	  properties	  and	  powers	  emerging	  from	  their	  advocacy	  
communications,	  which	  are	  typically	  neglected	  in	  politics	  theorising.	  
	  The	  study	  found	  that	  both	  government	  officials	  and	  NGOs/TANs	  struggle	  to	  accommodate	  each	  other	  in	  their	  relationships	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	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international	  system,	  exhibiting	  patterns	  that	  show	  significant	  deficiencies	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  relationship	  qualities	  of	  trust,	  respect,	  mutual	  understanding,	  etc.	  The	  politics	  literature	  contains	  subjective	  comments	  on	  relationships,	  particularly	  based	  on	  interview	  data	  gathered	  from	  individuals,	  but	  possesses	  no	  qualitative	  theoretical	  framework	  for	  analysing	  them.	  The	  literature	  generally	  assessed	  TANs	  as	  ‘important’	  and	  containing	  qualitatively	  different	  characteristics	  to	  traditional,	  service-­‐providing	  NGOs,	  but	  political	  scholars	  were	  generally	  unable	  to	  identify	  many	  characteristics	  that	  TANs	  commonly	  shared,	  beyond	  the	  adoption	  of	  modern	  communications	  technologies	  and	  the	  definition	  provided	  by	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  in	  1998,	  and	  thus	  were	  unable	  to	  provide	  a	  stable	  analytical	  unit	  for	  investigating	  the	  TAN	  phenomenon.	  	  
	  
H2:	  The	  international	  system	  is	  struggling	  to	  accommodate	  TANs	  and	  the	  
elements	  of	  the	  international	  institutions	  have	  a	  distinctively	  troubled	  
interface	  with	  modern	  TAN-­type	  NGOs.	  
	  All	  three	  case	  study	  TANs	  appear	  to	  be	  in	  breach	  of	  their	  undertakings	  to	  the	  UN	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  accredited	  consultant	  status,	  however,	  no	  publicly-­‐available	  reaction	  from	  the	  UN	  was	  found.	  Research	  into	  the	  UN’s	  archives,	  especially	  statutory	  documents	  relating	  to	  the	  relationship	  with	  NGOs	  overall,	  reveal	  that	  UN	  officials	  tend	  to	  be	  guarded	  in	  their	  willingness	  to	  countenance	  a	  wider	  role	  for	  civil	  society	  in	  international	  policymaking	  processes.	  The	  Cardoso	  Report	  and	  the	  UN	  Secretary-­‐General’s	  official	  response	  to	  it	  provide	  clear	  indications	  of	  tensions	  and	  mistrust	  in	  the	  UN’s	  interface	  with	  TANs.	  
H3:	  The	  adversarial	  advocacy	  strategies	  typically	  adopted	  by	  TANs	  constitute	  a	  
barrier	  to	  them	  achieving	  their	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  policy-­making	  
environment.	  	  	  The	  case	  studies	  presented	  evidence	  that,	  overall,	  Greenpeace	  disseminates	  a	  key	  message	  that	  is	  highly	  critical	  of	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system	  and	  world	  leaders	  and	  has	  a	  dysfunctional	  relationship	  with	  the	  UN.	  Its	  evident	  path-­‐dependent	  features	  signal	  that	  this	  situation	  is	  unlikely	  to	  change.	  Oxfam,	  until	  very	  recently,	  appeared	  to	  be	  comparatively	  restrained	  in	  condemning	  other	  international	  actors	  and	  the	  international	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  Over	  many	  decades	  Oxfam	  has	  also	  received	  large	  amounts	  of	  international	  institutional	  funding	  and	  has	  worked	  closely	  with	  many	  UN	  agencies	  on	  crisis	  and	  development	  aid	  projects	  and	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  faced	  significant	  barriers	  to	  this	  collaboration.	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Recently,	  however,	  Oxfam	  has	  shown	  signs	  of	  a	  strategic	  reversal	  in	  this	  policy,	  which	  could	  result	  in	  barriers	  to	  this	  level	  of	  access.	  Oxfam’s	  capacity	  to	  change	  its	  aims	  and	  strategies	  reveal	  a	  tendency	  to	  avoid	  path-­‐dependent	  policies,	  which	  could	  indicate	  that	  any	  barriers	  it	  faces	  could	  be	  temporary.	  Meanwhile,	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  is	  noted	  for	  sharply	  rebuking	  individual	  ‘pariah’	  governments,	  but	  appears	  to	  have	  established	  a	  durable	  symbiotic	  role	  in	  the	  international	  institutional	  system	  and	  conducts	  much	  of	  its	  work	  through	  contacts	  between	  its	  professional	  staff	  and	  public	  officials.	  The	  heavy	  traffic	  in	  HRW’s	  patterns	  of	  interaction	  with	  the	  UN	  agencies	  and	  officials	  of	  states	  speaks	  for	  itself	  about	  the	  apparently	  robust	  quality	  of	  HRW’s	  current	  relationships	  with	  international	  system	  agencies.	  Although	  HRW	  is	  firmly	  path-­‐dependent	  in	  its	  assertion	  of	  human	  rights,	  it	  appears	  to	  maintain	  a	  mutually-­‐valued,	  symbiotic,	  relationship	  with	  the	  liberal	  democratic	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system,	  in	  general.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
H4:	  A	  complex	  realist	  approach	  has	  exemplary	  merit	  in	  approaching	  the	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H5:	  The	  funding	  models	  TANs	  adopt	  have	  a	  determinative	  effect	  on	  their	  
advocacy	  strategies.	  
	  The	  funding	  imperatives	  of	  TANs	  were	  shown	  to	  be	  a	  source	  of	  concern	  for	  the	  case	  study	  TANs,	  impacting	  on	  the	  sense	  of	  financial	  pressures	  conveyed	  in	  their	  publicity	  messages	  and	  their	  survival.	  The	  thesis	  showed	  that	  the	  scale	  of	  funding	  required	  by	  today’s	  TANs	  can	  be	  enormous.	  In	  the	  2012	  financial	  year	  alone,	  the	  three	  case	  study	  organisations	  reported	  expenditures	  of	  €274	  million	  (Greenpeace);	  €920	  million	  (Oxfam);	  and	  US$58.7	  million	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch).	  All	  three	  TANs	  exhibited	  patterns	  of	  strategy	  selection	  influenced	  by	  funding	  imperatives.	  
10.4	  The	  place	  and	  function	  of	  TANs	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  
system	  
	  
General	  conclusions	  regarding	  the	  ‘place’	  and	  ‘function’	  of	  TANs,	  as	  a	  cluster	  When	  TANs	  are	  viewed	  as	  elements	  in	  a	  complex	  international	  ecosystem,	  co-­‐evolving	  with	  other	  elements	  in	  a	  constantly	  shifting	  landscape,	  and	  sensitive	  to	  considerations	  of	  value	  mutuality,	  it	  was	  apparent	  that	  their	  place	  and	  function	  are	  never	  static	  but	  constantly	  adapting	  to	  internal	  and	  external	  conditions.	  In	  examining	  questions	  regarding	  the	  place	  and	  function	  of	  a	  TAN	  that	  has	  verifiable	  relationships	  with	  the	  international	  system,	  it	  was	  thus	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  view	  that	  the	  research	  was	  not	  focusing	  on	  a	  stable	  set	  of	  relationships	  or	  a	  static	  entity,	  but	  one	  that	  comprised	  a	  heterogeneous	  multitude	  of	  TANs,	  each	  co-­‐evolving	  and	  charting	  its	  own	  course	  from	  moment	  to	  moment	  in	  a	  dynamic	  environment.	  	  	  	  Support	  was	  seen	  for	  arguments	  by	  Waltz	  and	  Donnelly	  that	  NGOs,	  as	  an	  analytical	  unit,	  do	  not	  participate	  in	  international	  relationships	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  sovereign	  states	  do.	  Hence,	  TANS,	  like	  all	  NGOs,	  are	  subordinate	  to	  states.	  Supporting	  this	  contention,	  the	  Cardoso	  Report	  revealed	  that	  states	  ‘call	  the	  shots’	  in	  the	  international	  realm:	  displaying	  Thucydidean-­‐type	  suspicions	  regarding	  their	  perceived	  adversaries,	  they	  control	  the	  fluctuating	  fortunes	  and	  scale	  of	  involvement	  by	  civil	  society	  representatives	  in	  global	  governance,	  enabling	  NGOs	  to	  contribute	  to	  international	  policy-­‐making	  at	  arm’s	  length,	  if	  at	  all.	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In	  Chapter	  5,	  it	  was	  shown	  that	  the	  ‘place’	  of	  thousands	  of	  NGOs	  in	  the	  international	  system	  has	  been	  acquired	  by	  a	  negotiated	  structural	  adjustment	  of	  the	  system	  to	  accommodate	  them,	  formally,	  in	  a	  long-­‐established	  NGO	  consultancy	  programme	  at	  the	  UN.	  In	  complexity	  thinking	  this	  establishes	  all	  UN-­‐accredited	  civil	  society	  agents	  as	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system	  and	  accords	  them	  two	  obvious	  potential	  functions:	  (a)	  providing	  value	  to	  the	  system	  in	  terms	  of	  support	  and	  services,	  as	  specified	  in	  their	  accreditation	  agreements;	  and	  (b)	  providing	  a	  feedback	  mechanism	  to	  the	  system.	  Since	  the	  international	  system	  does	  not	  formally	  differentiate	  between	  typologies	  of	  NGO—	  and	  it	  was	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  project	  to	  comprehensively	  TAN-­‐test	  more	  than	  three	  case	  study	  organisations	  —	  the	  ‘place’	  of	  TANs,	  as	  a	  distinct	  typology	  of	  NGO,	  could	  not	  be	  established	  by	  a	  small	  n	  study.	  However,	  it	  was	  evident	  that	  by	  using	  diachronic	  process	  tracing	  methods	  to	  investigate	  the	  case	  study	  TANs,	  snapshots	  could	  be	  taken	  of	  the	  ‘place’	  of	  individual	  TANs	  in	  the	  international	  system,	  at	  particular	  points	  of	  time,	  and	  useful	  patterns	  in	  their	  relationships	  could	  be	  traced.	  	  	  Similarly,	  the	  ‘function’	  of	  TANs	  in	  the	  international	  system	  also	  could	  not	  be	  conclusively	  established	  at	  cluster	  level	  for	  UN-­‐accredited	  TANs.	  However,	  patterns	  were	  seen	  in	  the	  data	  —	  again,	  particularly	  in	  the	  Cardoso	  Report,	  case	  studies,	  and	  in	  UN	  documents	  and	  statements	  by	  a	  succession	  of	  UN	  Secretary-­‐Generals	  —	  indicating	  that	  the	  functioning	  of	  NGOs	  in	  the	  international	  system	  is	  in	  a	  state	  of	  constant,	  co-­‐evolutionary,	  flux	  and	  participation	  levels	  appear	  to	  be	  contingent	  on	  the	  perceived	  value	  of	  individual	  NGOs	  to	  the	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  system	  and	  vice	  versa.	  By	  extension,	  this	  state	  of	  affairs	  covered	  TAN-­‐type	  NGOs,	  which,	  it	  was	  shown	  in	  the	  three	  case	  studies,	  face	  individual	  challenges	  in	  securing	  perceptions	  of	  value	  to	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  system	  —	  and	  vice	  versa.	  The	  question	  of	  value	  mutuality	  to	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system	  was	  therefore	  considered	  separately	  in	  assessing	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  each	  case	  study	  organisation.	  	  
The	  ‘place	  and	  ‘function’	  of	  individual	  TANs:	  Contribution	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  
	  The	  three	  case	  study	  organisations	  were	  selected	  for	  examination	  primarily	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  following	  criteria:	  firstly,	  their	  official	  listing	  as	  being	  in	  formal	  consultancy	  status	  with	  the	  UN	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  2011:4,	  6,	  39),	  which	  establishes	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their	  suitability	  to	  be	  examined	  as	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  institutional	  system;	  secondly,	  their	  identification	  as	  TANs;	  and	  thirdly,	  their	  established	  status	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  been	  interacting	  with	  the	  international	  system	  over	  a	  period	  of	  time	  that	  was	  assumed	  to	  be	  sufficient	  to	  afford	  them,	  and	  external	  observers,	  a	  well	  documented	  perspective	  on	  their	  relationships	  within	  the	  international	  system.	  	  In	  light	  of	  the	  rich	  data	  generated	  by	  analysing	  these	  organisations,	  their	  selection	  was	  fully	  justified.	  	  	  The	  exploration	  of	  the	  three	  case	  studies	  was	  undertaken	  as	  a	  second	  stage,	  ‘bottom	  up’	  investigation	  to	  test	  whether	  the	  findings	  and	  patterns	  observed	  in	  the	  macroscopic	  analysis	  of	  the	  UN’s	  interface	  with	  NGOs/TANs	  were	  borne	  out	  in	  the	  context	  of	  relevant	  cases	  of	  micro-­‐situational	  reality.	  This	  step	  was	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  the	  consistent	  validity	  of	  the	  developing	  ‘big’	  picture	  of	  the	  ‘place’,	  ‘function’	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  Thus,	  it	  was	  crucial	  to	  be	  precise	  in	  identifying	  NGOs	  that	  exhibited	  the	  characteristics	  associated	  with	  TANs,	  that	  the	  thesis	  held	  to	  be	  both	  relevant	  to	  the	  hypotheses	  and	  determinative	  of	  their	  relationships	  within	  the	  international	  system.	  In	  this	  distillation	  task,	  I	  applied	  three	  criteria:	  (a)	  a	  demonstrable	  relationship	  with	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system,	  in	  order	  to	  apply	  a	  coherent	  analytical	  framework	  and	  substantive	  theoretical	  lenses	  relating	  to	  the	  international	  system	  and	  international	  politics,	  relationships,	  and	  complex	  systems	  behaviours;	  (b),	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  1998	  criteria	  for	  describing	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks;	  and	  (c),	  my	  original,	  eight-­‐point,	  referent	  template	  for	  identifying	  contemporary	  TANs	  as	  an	  emergent,	  communications-­‐oriented,	  typology	  of	  NGO	  (Figure	  6.2).	  	  In	  Chapters	  7,	  8	  and	  9,	  I	  provided	  details	  of	  the	  evidence	  produced	  by	  mapping	  the	  TAN	  identification	  matrix	  onto	  the	  data	  for	  each	  organisation.	  These	  analyses	  revealed	  that	  each	  of	  the	  selected	  cases	  fitted	  the	  TAN	  referent	  template	  and	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  TAN	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Hence,	  the	  findings	  are	  relevant	  to	  them.	  Figure	  10.1,	  following,	  is	  a	  tabulation	  of	  collated	  results.	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TAN	  Identification	  Matrix	  including	  case	  study	  analysis	  
	  






1.	  Distinctive,	  highly-­‐visual,	  transnational,	  
corporate	  identity	   	   	   	  
2.	  Demonstrable	  prioritising	  of	  self-­‐
promotion	   	   	   	  
3.	  Demonstrable	  prioritising	  of	  voice-­‐
amplification	  strategies	  in	  advocacy	   	   	   	  
4.	  Highly	  media-­‐savvy	  with	  unremitting	  
media	  relations	  activity	  	   	   	   	  
5.	  Demonstrable	  high	  degree	  of	  adoption	  
of	  sophisticated	  public/political	  
communications	  style	  and	  strategies	  
	   	   	  
6.	  Demonstrable	  high-­‐degree	  of	  adoption	  
of	  advanced	  information	  and	  
communications	  technologies	  
	   	   	  
7.	  Demonstrable	  high	  degree	  of	  strategic	  
social	  boundary	  mechanism	  construction	  	   	   	   To	  some	  extent	  
8.	  Demonstrable	  differentiation	  strategies	  
within	  the	  NGO	  sector	  and	  within	  the	  
typology	  of	  TANs	  
	   	   	  	  
Figure	  10.1	  	  This	  thesis	  has	  no	  criticism	  of	  any	  of	  the	  characteristics	  shown	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  contemporary	  TANs	  —	  indeed,	  these	  attributes	  are	  highly	  desirable	  and	  should	  be	  expected	  of	  determined,	  transnational	  and	  progressive	  organisations	  that	  have	  adopted	  ICTs	  and	  communications	  strategies	  to	  enable	  them	  to	  gain	  a	  competitive	  advantage	  in	  the	  saturated	  NGO	  protest	  market,	  bypass	  media	  gatekeepers	  and	  increasingly	  emulate	  global	  news	  media	  agencies,	  in	  order	  to	  drive	  their	  visions	  for	  significant	  political	  change	  and	  a	  better	  world.	  	  	  However,	  this	  thesis	  offered	  an	  alternative	  perspective	  on	  how	  we	  might	  interpret	  these	  essential	  TAN	  attributes,	  which	  TANs	  share	  with	  today’s	  commercial	  multi-­‐national	  corporations,	  and	  none	  of	  which	  were	  seen	  to	  be	  valued	  by	  the	  nation	  states	  of	  the	  international	  system,	  nor	  generally	  regarded	  by	  them	  as	  contributing	  towards	  system	  welfare	  or	  equilibrium.	  Indeed,	  most	  of	  these	  overt	  brand-­‐promoting	  activities,	  predominantly	  aimed	  at	  achieving	  frequent,	  maximum	  publicity	  impact	  in	  the	  voracious	  news-­‐making	  sphere	  of	  mass	  media,	  appear	  to	  be	  out	  of	  step	  with	  the	  deliberative	  procedures	  of	  international,	  evidence-­‐based,	  decision-­‐making.	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  consider	  that	  the	  distrust	  of	  NGOs	  (expressed	  by	  state	  representatives	  in	  the	  Cardoso	  Report)	  on	  account	  of	  their	  potential	  to	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undermine	  the	  confidentiality	  of	  deliberations	  between	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  UN,	  is	  magnified	  greatly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  archetypal	  TANs,	  whose	  raison	  d’être	  is	  changing	  the	  behavior	  of	  states	  and	  international	  organisations	  through	  the	  ‘creative	  use	  of	  information’	  to	  strengthen	  their	  advocacy	  outputs.	  	  Similar	  tendencies	  were	  pointed	  out	  to	  show	  that	  the	  globalised	  popular	  news	  media	  and	  the	  emerging	  communications-­‐oriented	  advocacy	  model	  adopted	  by	  some	  TANs	  function	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  shaped	  by	  the	  information	  tastes	  and	  habits	  of	  their	  target	  markets.	  It	  was	  shown	  that	  all	  three	  case	  study	  TANs	  are	  evolving	  to	  better	  serve	  this	  24/7,	  breaking	  news	  market.	  The	  mass	  media	  —	  focused	  on	  popular,	  micro-­‐sociological	  practices,	  events	  and	  interests,	  which	  individuals	  experience	  as	  undergoing	  rapid,	  constant	  change	  —	  have	  developed	  a	  symbiotic	  relationship	  with	  some	  TANs.	  Moreover,	  modern	  communications	  increasingly	  enables	  these	  relationships	  to	  operate	  within	  the	  same	  timeframes.	  
	  Nevertheless,	  the	  media,	  having	  its	  own	  agendas	  	  —	  and	  attuned	  to	  newsworthy	  issue	  framings	  that	  feature	  threats	  and	  scandal	  —	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  an	  uncertain	  and	  uncontrollable	  instrument	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  publicising	  civil	  society	  messages	  to	  international	  system	  officials.	  But	  when	  TANs	  emulate	  international	  news	  agencies	  themselves	  they	  need	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  drive	  new	  stakeholder	  audiences	  to	  their	  Websites,	  otherwise	  they	  are	  mostly	  ‘preaching	  to	  the	  converted’.	  This	  may	  have	  advantages	  in	  stimulating	  donor	  funding,	  for	  example,	  but	  the	  current	  Website	  content	  of	  the	  case	  study	  TANs	  appeared	  to	  be	  even	  less	  reliable	  than	  the	  media	  as	  a	  means	  of	  influencing	  multiple	  levels	  of	  complexity	  in	  the	  international	  institutions.	  The	  strategic	  deployment	  of	  celebrity	  influencers,	  or	  ‘ambassadors’,	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  way	  of	  creating	  intersections	  to	  different	  and	  desirable	  audiences	  for	  TAN	  communications	  and,	  therefore,	  may	  assist	  this	  process.	  Ranging	  from	  pop	  stars	  to	  influential	  community	  leaders,	  their	  selection	  as	  strategic	  tools	  for	  TANs	  obviously	  depends	  on	  the	  type	  of	  audience	  the	  TAN	  wishes	  to	  reach	  and	  the	  action	  it	  wants	  those	  audiences	  to	  take	  to	  assist	  its	  strategic	  aim	  achievement.	  	  As	  NGOs	  evolve,	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  surmise	  that	  many	  more	  will	  adopt	  the	  attractive,	  affordable,	  tools	  and	  techniques	  of	  modern	  communications	  and	  become	  more	  TAN-­‐like.	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10.5	  Effectiveness	  of	  TANs	  in	  achieving	  their	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  
system	  	  While	  on-­‐going	  research	  is	  needed	  to	  monitor	  the	  ebb	  and	  flow	  of	  TAN	  effectiveness	  in	  their	  aim	  achievement,	  in	  the	  timeframe	  of	  this	  study	  there	  were	  indications	  that	  TANs	  that	  are	  effective	  in	  achieving	  an	  acceptable	  proportion	  of	  their	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  system	  tended	  to	  exhibit	  the	  following	  attributes:	  	  
 Capability	  to	  contribute	  services	  within	  the	  international	  system	  that	  are	  commonly	  valued	  by	  the	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  system	  —	  notwithstanding	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  criteria	  are	  constantly	  in	  flux.	  Services	  that	  presently	  appear	  to	  come	  into	  this	  category	  include:	  reliable	  feedback;	  high-­‐level	  professional	  expertise,	  such	  as	  legal	  and	  diplomatic	  services;	  scholarly	  research;	  and	  corporate	  values	  and	  practices	  consistent	  with	  the	  UN’s	  accreditation	  criteria	  for	  consultancy	  status.	  Complexity	  insights	  concerning	  systemic	  feedback	  mechanisms	  indicated	  that	  TANs,	  in	  general,	  perform	  a	  ‘bellwether’	  role	  in	  the	  international	  system,	  alerting	  international	  agencies	  and	  policy-­‐making	  processes	  to	  new	  or	  developing	  concern	  issues;	  providing	  some	  indications	  (not	  necessarily	  validated)	  of	  the	  strength	  and	  scale	  of	  social	  concerns;	  contributing	  to	  knowledge	  on	  concern	  issues;	  and	  presenting	  alternative	  issue	  framings	  and	  arguments	  geared	  towards	  their	  preferred	  outcomes.	  	  
 Aims	  and	  strategies	  that	  are	  not	  overtly	  adversarial	  towards	  the	  international	  system	  qua	  system,	  nor	  present	  serious	  risks	  to	  the	  security	  and/or	  economy	  of	  any	  of	  the	  nation	  states	  in	  the	  system.	  Conversely,	  adversarial	  positions	  based	  on	  uncompromising	  ideologies	  tended	  to	  constitute	  a	  barrier	  to	  TANs	  participating	  in	  international	  debating	  processes	  and	  achieving	  negotiated	  outcomes	  in	  pursuit	  of	  their	  goals.	  The	  overtly	  confrontational	  strategies	  of	  Greenpeace	  were	  notable	  in	  this	  regard	  and	  this	  TAN’s	  international	  system	  relationships	  were	  assessed	  as	  currently	  dysfunctional.	  It	  was	  noted,	  however,	  that	  this	  was	  not	  always	  the	  case	  and	  Greenpeace	  relationships	  fluctuate,	  like	  all	  others.	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 Realistic	  aims	  that	  are	  aligned	  with	  appropriate,	  multi-­‐pronged,	  strategies	  to	  achieve	  them	  underpinned	  by	  rigorous	  research.	  	  
 Communications	  strategies	  aligned	  with	  aims	  of	  a	  communications	  nature,	  attended	  by	  understanding	  of	  the	  enablements	  and	  limitations	  of	  communications	  strategies.	  	  
 Capability	  to	  ‘scale-­‐shift’	  their	  political	  arguments	  to	  multiple-­‐levels	  of	  social	  complexity,	  including	  sound	  knowledge	  of	  the	  enablements	  and	  constraints	  prevailing	  at	  each,	  more	  challenging,	  level	  of	  complexity;	  combined	  with	  the	  capability	  to	  present	  convincing	  argumentation	  for	  specific	  pockets	  of	  resistance.	  Published	  guidance	  by	  UN	  officials	  contained	  encouragement	  for	  NGOs/TANs	  to	  adopt	  a	  non-­‐adversarial	  mien	  in	  consultancy	  relationships	  and	  so	  integrate	  and	  frame	  their	  issues	  in	  ways	  that	  resonate	  with	  the	  audiences	  they	  aim	  to	  influence.	  	  
 Capability	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  deliberative	  processes	  and	  institutional	  machinery	  of	  the	  international	  system,	  including	  capability	  to	  develop	  evidence-­‐based	  argumentation	  suited	  to	  international	  debate.	  	  
 Demonstrate	  a	  range	  of	  good	  relationship	  qualities	  in	  engagements	  with	  other	  international	  systemic	  elements,	  prioritising	  trust,	  mutual	  respect,	  mutual	  understanding	  and	  accessibility.	  The	  quality	  of	  ‘tact’,	  identified	  by	  both	  Giddens	  and	  Goffman,	  appears	  also	  to	  be	  a	  condition	  of	  good	  relationships.	  	  
 Aiding	  inter-­‐relational	  accessibility	  and	  liaison	  through	  internal	  policies	  and	  practices	  aimed	  at	  social	  boundary	  deconstruction,	  co-­‐operation	  and	  political	  issue	  scale-­‐shift	  to	  facilitate	  relationships	  at	  the	  international	  level.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  findings	  of	  the	  thesis	  was	  that	  although	  social	  boundary	  construction	  appears	  to	  aid	  brand	  differentiation	  and	  development,	  public	  fundraising	  and	  social	  group	  solidarity	  efforts,	  strong	  rejectionist	  ideology	  and	  in-­‐group	  symbolic	  interaction	  rituals	  appear	  to	  support	  observations	  on	  social	  status	  groups	  by	  Weber,	  Collins,	  Tilly,	  et	  al,	  that	  emphasising	  the	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‘otherness’	  of	  outsiders	  and	  adversaries	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  confining	  people	  in	  the	  same	  networks	  of	  status	  interactions	  and	  limits	  their	  possibilities	  to	  interact	  with	  other	  social	  networks	  perceived	  as	  different.	  Thus,	  the	  study	  found	  indications	  that	  the	  barriers	  many	  TANs	  encounter	  are	  endogenously	  produced.	  	  Further	  observations	  connected	  to	  effectiveness	  were:	  
	  
 Effective	  goal-­‐attainment	  by	  TANs	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  clearly	  influenced	  by	  numerous	  contingent	  factors,	  including	  underlying	  social	  structures,	  that	  impact	  on	  their	  network	  structures.	  This	  was	  seen	  in	  North/South	  polarisations	  resulting	  in	  representation	  imbalances,	  clumping,	  and	  under-­‐representation	  of	  significant	  regions	  of	  the	  world.	  These	  tendencies	  arguably	  reflected	  normative	  and	  cultural	  influences	  and	  differences,	  digital	  technology	  divides	  and,	  not	  least,	  patterns	  of	  ‘open	  societies’	  with	  liberal	  democratic	  political	  system	  structures,	  as	  opposed	  to	  relatively	  ‘closed’	  totalitarian	  regimes.	  An	  instance	  of	  this	  was	  seen	  in	  HRW’s	  report	  on	  North	  Korea,	  juxtaposed	  with	  its	  report	  on	  Australia.	  	  	  
 TAN	  publicity	  regarding	  the	  size	  of	  their	  individual	  supporter	  bases	  tended	  to	  be	  overestimated	  and	  unsubstantiated.	  Nevertheless,	  claims	  about	  the	  size	  of	  collectivities	  typically	  go	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  with	  statements	  about	  their	  transnational	  outreach	  and	  large	  NGOs	  invariably	  publicise	  the	  number	  of	  people	  they	  count	  as	  supporting	  their	  mission.	  However,	  this	  study	  found	  that	  taking	  supporter	  statistics	  published	  by	  TANs	  at	  face	  value	  is	  unwise.	  For	  example,	  the	  claimed	  size	  of	  a	  TAN’s	  supporter	  base	  was	  in	  no	  case	  indicative	  of	  the	  relative	  strengths	  of	  commitment;	  whether	  that	  commitment	  was	  waxing,	  waning,	  or	  even	  dormant;	  the	  length	  of	  time	  individuals	  had	  held	  their	  present	  opinions;	  the	  age	  and	  geographical	  dispersion	  of	  supporters;	  the	  voter	  status	  and	  political	  systems	  relevant	  to	  responders;	  the	  date	  on	  which	  the	  opinions	  were	  polled	  and	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  auditing	  mechanism;	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  support	  provided	  and	  its	  limitations;	  and	  the	  factors	  that	  most	  influenced	  the	  formation	  of	  opinion,	  which	  could	  be	  no	  more	  significant	  than	  impulse,	  peer	  pressure,	  complaisance,	  or	  misunderstanding.	  Moreover,	  supporter	  statistics	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supplied	  by	  TANs	  gave	  no	  indication	  of	  each	  individual’s	  willingness	  or	  capability	  to	  mobilise	  and	  become	  involved	  in	  political	  activism	  that	  extends	  beyond	  momentary	  mouse	  clicks.	  	  	  
 Due	  to	  the	  ‘clumping’	  effect	  noted	  in	  networked	  organisations	  such	  as	  TANs,	  particularly	  between	  the	  global	  North	  and	  South,	  there	  were	  signs	  that	  the	  global	  coverage	  and	  extent	  of	  influence	  in	  the	  international	  realm	  may	  be	  significantly	  more	  restricted	  for	  some	  TANs	  than	  they	  claim.	  The	  recent	  trend,	  seen	  in	  the	  three	  North-­‐headquartered	  case	  study	  TANs,	  to	  prioritise	  opening	  new	  offices	  in	  the	  global	  South,	  appeared	  to	  signal	  a	  co-­‐evolutionary	  effort	  to	  redress	  imbalances	  of	  representation	  and	  to	  a	  take	  advantage	  of	  perceived	  improvements	  in	  the	  economies	  of	  the	  BRICSAMs.	  	  
10.6	  Directions	  for	  further	  research	  	  The	  following	  patterns	  and	  tendencies	  indicated	  a	  number	  of	  pathways	  into	  promising	  areas	  for	  further	  research:	  	  
 An	  emerging	  and	  potentially	  politically	  disruptive	  feature	  of	  some	  contemporary	  TANs	  was	  seen	  in	  the	  growing	  capability	  to	  depart	  from	  the	  ideologically-­‐predetermined	  campaigning	  of	  the	  past	  to	  wage	  increasingly	  populist,	  consensus-­‐driven,	  campaigns	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  Internet	  traffic	  monitoring.	  Possibly	  signaling	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  genus	  of	  TAN,	  advocacy	  organisations	  appear	  to	  be	  increasingly	  adopting	  Internet-­‐based	  petitioning	  and	  promoting	  notions	  regarding	  the	  political	  force	  of	  ‘people	  power’.	  As	  a	  general	  trend,	  many	  TANs	  were	  observed	  moving	  towards	  greater	  use	  of	  these	  tools	  and	  tactics.	  The	  trend	  was	  evident	  to	  a	  high	  degree	  in	  the	  campaigning	  strategies	  of	  Avaaz	  and	  38	  Degrees	  but	  was	  also	  noted	  in	  the	  communications	  practices	  of	  Greenpeace	  and	  Oxfam.	  By	  virtue	  of	  recent	  Website	  traffic	  monitoring	  capabilities,	  these	  TANs	  frame	  and	  publicise	  topics	  that	  might	  concern	  individuals,	  then	  monitor	  responses,	  en	  
route	  to	  reframing	  the	  feedback	  as	  political	  issues	  and	  encouraging	  crowdfunding	  of	  the	  most	  popular	  issues	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  new	  campaigns.	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 There	  were	  signs	  of	  a	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  the	  failed	  NIEO	  campaign	  in	  recent	  political	  issue	  framing,	  cues	  and	  rhetorical	  techniques	  used	  by	  some	  TANs.	  Further	  research	  is	  needed	  to	  substantiate	  signs	  of	  a	  neo-­‐NIEO	  revival,	  which	  might	  be	  fruitfully	  investigated	  from	  a	  number	  of	  different	  research	  trajectories,	  including	  IR	  approaches	  employing	  complex	  realism.	  	  
 Reflections	  of	  Habermasian	  thought	  were	  observed	  but	  the	  extent	  of	  this	  philosopher’s	  influence,	  and	  patterns	  of	  strategic	  use,	  could	  not	  be	  established.	  Although	  Habermas	  is	  not	  particularly	  identified	  with	  the	  contentious	  international	  politics	  subset	  of	  the	  political	  sociological	  literature,	  I	  suggest	  his	  influence	  can	  be	  recognised	  in	  the	  communications	  strategies	  of	  many	  TANs,	  and	  hence	  on	  the	  subject	  matter	  on	  which	  many	  writers	  on	  contentious	  international	  politics	  focus.	  Further	  study	  is	  required	  to	  substantiate	  a	  link.	  	  	  	  
 Patterns	  were	  seen	  of	  ‘bandwagoning’664	  by	  some	  TANs.	  This	  involved	  TANs	  moving	  into	  activist	  issue	  areas	  at	  an	  advanced	  stage	  of	  campaigning	  by	  others	  and	  claiming	  victory.	  It	  was	  noted	  that	  in	  the	  months,	  or	  weeks,	  ahead	  of	  an	  anticipated	  major	  official	  announcement	  on	  an	  issue	  that	  had	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  an	  advocacy	  campaign	  extending	  back	  over	  years,	  or	  even	  decades	  of	  negotiations	  and	  lobbying,	  some	  TANs	  begin	  to	  campaign	  on	  the	  issue,	  typically	  mounting	  an	  online	  petition,	  appealing	  for	  urgent	  donations	  to	  fight	  opponents	  and,	  afterwards,	  claiming	  credit	  for	  their	  short-­‐term	  advocacy	  strategies	  and	  the	  pressure	  of	  ‘people	  power’.	  The	  Greenpeace	  Arctic	  campaign	  appeared	  to	  be	  an	  example	  of	  bandwagoning.	  Ongoing	  monitoring	  of	  this	  trend	  is	  suggested.	  	  
 Development	  of	  my	  TAN	  referent	  template	  proved	  useful	  in	  recognising	  definitive	  characteristics	  of	  TANs.	  Wider	  application	  and/or	  development	  of	  this	  tool	  is	  suggested	  to	  assess	  its	  accuracy	  and/or	  refinement;	  and	  to	  investigate	  further	  if	  the	  criteria	  point	  to	  the	  determinative	  effects	  on	  TAN	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  international	  system	  that	  is	  asserted	  by	  this	  thesis.	  Such	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
664	  The	  term	  bandwagoning	  is	  used	  here	  in	  a	  similar	  sense	  to	  that	  employed	  by	  Waltz	  (1979:126).	  
However,	  Waltz	  uses	  the	  term	  in	  reference	  to	  manoeuvring	  by	  weaker	  states	  in	  order	  to	  benefit	  from	  
alliances	  with	  stronger	  states.	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studies	  might	  cover	  case	  studies	  involving	  official	  UN	  bodies,	  such	  as	  ECOSOC	  and	  the	  NGLS.	  	  
 Further	  to	  Willetts665,	  researchers	  might	  fruitfully	  examine	  the	  relationship	  qualities	  of	  the	  few	  ‘high-­‐status’	  NGOs	  that	  are	  among	  the	  Observers	  cadre	  at	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly,	  and	  those	  participating	  in	  intergovernmental	  committees	  at	  the	  UN,	  to	  assess	  their	  relative	  values	  to	  the	  system	  and	  whether	  organisations	  demonstrating	  archetypal	  TAN	  behaviours	  are	  among	  them.	  	  
 Metatheroretical	  work	  using	  complex	  realism	  to	  advance	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationships	  between	  the	  multiple,	  micro-­‐macro,	  planes	  of	  social	  interaction	  than	  span	  multiple	  analytical	  levels	  —	  from	  agents	  representing	  the	  concerns	  and	  aspirations	  of	  vulnerable	  individuals	  and	  communities	  to	  agents	  representing	  the	  global	  priorities	  of	  states	  and	  other	  international	  communities.	  Metatheoretical	  research	  was	  also	  indicated	  to	  determine	  the	  applicability	  of	  complex	  realism	  to	  examining	  time-­‐space	  distanciation	  effects	  on	  TANs	  in	  their	  relationships	  with	  international	  institutions.	  Due	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  space	  and	  time	  constraints,	  this	  enquiry	  was	  deferred	  in	  this	  thesis	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  closer	  engagement	  with	  micro-­‐macro	  considerations,	  which	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  of	  greater	  relevance	  to	  the	  research	  question.	  	  
 Further	  investigation	  into	  the	  determinative	  effects	  of	  funding	  models	  on	  strategy	  choice,	  design	  and	  effectiveness,	  is	  suggested.	  	  
 Greenpeace	  and	  Oxfam	  both	  exhibited	  the	  contradictory	  characteristics	  that	  Giddens	  associates	  with	  ‘shell	  institutions’	  —	  bodies	  that	  retain	  an	  enduring	  outer	  brand	  identity,	  although	  they	  have	  undergone	  significant	  change	  internally	  and	  in	  their	  aims	  and	  strategies.	  This	  tendency	  appears	  worthy	  of	  further	  examination.	  	  
 A	  clear	  symbiotic	  pattern	  was	  seen	  between	  TANs’	  emergence	  and	  strategies	  and	  the	  ICT-­‐dependent	  tools	  they	  use.	  This	  shaping	  by	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
665	  Willetts	  (2011:83)	  refers	  to	  a	  small	  number	  of	  ‘high-­‐status’	  NGOs	  that	  have	  carved	  influential	  roles	  
for	  themselves	  in	  the	  international	  system.	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structural	  interaction	  effects	  of,	  inter	  alia,	  technology	  structures	  and	  political	  structures,	  is	  open	  to	  a	  wide	  spectrum	  of	  possibilities	  as	  ICT	  develops	  further.	  Ongoing	  monitoring	  of	  this	  trend	  for	  TANs	  to	  co-­‐evolve	  with	  the	  socio-­‐political	  elements	  in	  their	  fitness	  landscapes	  and	  be	  shaped	  by	  the	  communications	  tools	  they	  adopt,	  is	  suggested.	  
10.7	  Contributions	  to	  knowledge	  	  This	  thesis	  sought	  to	  make	  three	  principal	  contributions	  to	  knowledge	  in	  the	  contentious	  international	  politics	  paradigm.	  Firstly,	  it	  presented	  an	  explication	  of	  the	  complex	  interface	  between	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks	  and	  their	  relationships	  with	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system,	  which	  was	  based	  on	  a	  four-­‐year	  period	  of	  empirical	  research.	  This	  covered	  three	  interconnected	  literatures	  and	  three	  case	  studies	  and	  was	  aimed	  at	  deepening	  and	  broadening	  understanding	  of	  a	  rapidly	  proliferating	  contemporary	  phenomenon	  in	  international	  politics	  that	  is	  generally	  regarded	  by	  scholars	  as	  important.	  Secondly,	  it	  tested	  the	  premise	  that	  a	  complex	  realist	  philosophical	  and	  methodological	  approach	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  demonstrate	  new,	  theoretically	  rich,	  and	  cogent	  ways	  to	  understand	  the	  relationships	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system	  and	  to	  better	  explain	  them.	  Thirdly,	  the	  thesis	  demonstrated	  the	  value	  of	  applying	  substantive	  theoretical	  lenses	  from	  the	  Communications	  paradigm	  to	  test	  whether	  TANs	  are	  different	  to	  other	  NGOs,	  and	  why	  this	  matters	  in	  any	  attempt	  to	  evaluate	  their	  inter-­‐relationships,	  contributions	  to	  international	  system	  purposes	  (thus	  effecting	  their	  ‘place’	  and	  ‘function’),	  and	  their	  effectiveness	  in	  achieving	  their	  stated	  aims.	  It	  is	  hoped	  that	  by	  presenting	  (a)	  an	  original	  template	  for	  identifying	  the	  emerging	  NGO	  typology	  of	  TANs;	  (b)	  interrogating	  their	  political	  aims	  and	  essentially	  communicative	  strategies	  and	  functioning;	  (c)	  unlocking	  parts	  of	  the	  systemic	  complexity	  of	  their	  international	  environment;	  and	  (d)	  evaluating	  the	  quality	  of	  their	  international	  relationships,	  this	  thesis	  has	  helped	  to	  advance	  this	  serious	  and	  worthwhile	  endeavour.	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Having	  examined	  ‘What	  is	  the	  place	  and	  function	  of	  TANs	  in	  the	  contemporary	  
international	  system	  and	  how	  effective	  are	  they	  in	  achieving	  their	  aims?	  ‘,	  complex	  realism	  shows	  us	  that	  the	  answers	  to	  questions	  involving	  social	  phenomena	  and	  the	  unfolding	  of	  their	  relationships	  will	  always	  be	  contingent,	  never	  static	  or	  certain,	  and	  should	  sensibly	  conclude	  with	  the	  classic,	  contingency-­‐grounded,	  complexity	  caveat:	  ‘It	  depends	  …’	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ANNEX	  1:	  Evidence	  Tracing	  Log	  	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	  
Hypothesis	  #1:	  Contemporary	  TANs	  are	  an	  important	  NGO	  variant	  in	  
international	  politics	  that	  have	  unprecedented	  properties	  and	  powers	  
emerging	  from	  their	  advocacy	  communications,	  which	  are	  typically	  
neglected	  in	  politics	  theorising.	  	  
	  
Argument	  Summary:	  The	  essential	  characteristics	  of	  recently	  emerging	  transnational	  'advocacy'	  networks	  differentiate	  them	  from	  other	  typologies	  of	  NGO	  operating	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  These	  important,	  differentiating,	  properties	  of	  contemporary	  TANs	  notably	  arise	  from	  the	  advocacy	  function	  of	  their	  organisations,	  are	  typically	  overlooked	  by	  political	  theorists;	  and,	  therefore,	  are	  	  not	  problematised	  in	  Politics	  thinking	  and	  debates.	  This	  thesis	  addresses	  a	  lacuna	  in	  the	  political	  science	  literature.	  	  
What	  evidence	  would	  support	  this	  argument?	  Evidence	  and	  indicative	  patterns	  of	  communications/advocacy	  tools	  and	  strategies	  that	  constitute	  contemporary	  TANs	  and	  make	  them	  a	  significant	  variant	  to	  the	  traditional	  NGO	  model.	  	  
	  
 Test	  data	  generated	  by	  the	  TAN	  referent	  criteria	  developed	  for	  the	  thesis,	  showing	  that	  TANs	  typically	  and	  distinctively	  possess	  the	  following	  communicative	  properties:	  
• Distinctive,	  highly-­‐visual,	  transnational	  corporate	  identity.	  
• Demonstrable	  prioritising	  of	  self-­‐promotion.	  
• Demonstrable	  prioritising	  of	  voice-­‐amplification	  strategies	  in	  advocacy.	  
• Highly	  media-­‐savvy,	  with	  unremitting	  media	  relations	  activity.	  	  
• Demonstrable	  high	  degree	  of	  adoption	  of	  sophisticated	  public/political	  communications	  style	  and	  strategies.	  	  
• Demonstrable	  high	  degree	  of	  adoption	  of	  advanced	  information	  and	  communication	  technologies.	  	  
• Demonstrable	  high	  degree	  of	  strategic	  social	  boundary	  mechanism	  construction.	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• Demonstrable	  differentiation	  strategies	  within	  the	  NGO	  sector	  and	  within	  the	  typology	  of	  TANs.	  	  Evidence	  that	  contemporary	  TAN-­‐type	  NGOs	  possess	  unprecedented	  properties	  and	  powers	  arising	  from	  their	  advocacy	  communications	  choices	  and	  function.	  	  
 Empirical	  observations	  confirmed	  by	  the	  research	  data	  set.	  
 Validation	  by	  commentaries	  in	  discourses	  and	  the	  literature.	  	  Evidence	  that	  contemporary	  TANs	  are	  an	  important	  NGO	  variant	  in	  international	  politics.	  	  
 Evidence	  of	  the	  unprecedented	  emergence	  of	  many	  thousands	  of	  NGOs/TANs	  in	  the	  international	  political	  arena	  since	  the	  late	  1980s.	  
 Evidence,	  or	  indications,	  that	  TANs	  emerge	  in	  order	  to	  influence	  international	  politics.	  
 Evidence	  that	  NGOs/TANs	  claim	  to	  have	  changed,	  or	  intend	  to	  change,	  aspects	  of	  the	  international	  system	  and/or	  international	  policies.	  	  
 Empirical	  evidence	  that	  knowledgeable	  observers,	  from	  a	  range	  of	  perspectives,	  consider	  TANs	  to	  be	  important	  international	  political	  actors.	  Also,	  evidence	  that	  TANs	  consider	  themselves	  to	  be	  important	  actors	  in	  international	  politics.	  	  Evidence	  that	  the	  advocacy	  communications	  of	  contemporary	  TANs	  are	  typically	  neglected	  in	  politics	  theorising.	  	  
 Empirical	  observations	  confirmed	  by	  the	  research	  data	  set.	  
 Published	  comments	  to	  this	  effect	  by	  knowledgeable	  sources.	  
 Shortcomings	  in	  the	  politics	  literature	  	  
Hypothesis	  #2:	  The	  international	  system	  is	  struggling	  to	  accommodate	  TANs	  
and	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  institutions	  have	  a	  distinctively	  
troubled	  interface	  with	  modern	  TAN-­type	  NGOs.	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Argument	  Summary:	  The	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  institutions	  have	  a	  distinctively	  troubled	  interface	  with	  modern	  TAN-­‐type	  NGOs.	  Furthermore,	  these	  differentiating	  communicative	  properties	  that	  TANs	  possess	  to	  varying	  degrees,	  significantly	  influence	  the	  place,	  function	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  	  	  
What	  evidence	  would	  support	  this	  argument?	  Documents,	  discourses	  and	  signs	  that	  relationships	  are	  troubled	  and	  relationship	  quality	  is	  wanting	  between	  NGOs/	  TANs	  and	  other	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  	  
 Cardoso	  Report	  conclusions.	  
 Public	  statements	  and	  discourses	  attesting	  to	  relationship	  quality	  deficiencies.	  	  
 Clear	  indications	  that	  traditional,	  service-­‐providing,	  NGOs	  with	  no	  TAN	  characteristics,	  or	  varying	  proportions	  of	  them,	  appear	  to	  enjoy	  a	  different/more	  harmonious	  quality	  of	  relationships	  with	  other	  international	  elements,	  than	  those	  that	  have	  a	  closer	  fit	  to	  the	  archetypal	  TAN	  model.	  	  Documents,	  discourses	  and	  signs	  that	  the	  international	  system	  is	  struggling	  to	  accommodate	  NGOs/TANs.	  	  
 Cardoso	  Report	  conclusions.	  
 Public	  statements	  and	  discourses	  attesting	  to	  relational	  dysfunction.	  	  Comparison	  of	  specific	  relationship	  quality	  evidence,	  or	  indications,	  in	  light	  of	  substantive	  communications	  theory	  regarding	  relationship	  quality	  criteria,	  especially	  observations	  relating	  to	  trust,	  access,	  mutual	  respect	  and	  mutual	  understanding.	  In	  analysing	  international	  diplomatic	  situations	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  additional	  quality,	  ‘tact’,	  was	  also	  tested;	  although	  in	  the	  international	  negotiations	  culture	  this	  could	  be	  considered	  an	  aspect	  of	  mutual	  respect	  and	  mutual	  understanding.	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 UN	  ECOSOC	  statutory	  arrangements	  for	  UN	  consultancy	  accreditation	  for	  NGOs.	  
 UN	  reports	  on	  status	  of	  relationships	  with	  NGOs	  operating	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  
 Public	  statements	  and	  discourses	  attesting	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  UN/NGO	  relationships	  involving	  the	  three	  case	  study	  TANs.	  	  
Hypothesis	  #3:	  The	  adversarial	  advocacy	  strategies	  typically	  adopted	  by	  
TANs	  constitute	  a	  barrier	  to	  them	  achieving	  their	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  
policy-­making	  environment.	  	  	  
Argument	  Summary:	  In	  sharp	  contrast	  to	  the	  adversarial	  strategies	  typically	  associated	  with	  much	  TAN	  activism,	  transnational	  interactions	  in	  most	  other	  spheres	  of	  globalising	  human	  activity,	  whether	  commercial,	  political	  or	  social,	  emphasise	  relationship-­‐building	  (especially	  the	  fostering	  of	  mutual	  trust,	  respect	  and	  understanding)	  and	  conflict	  calming.	  Thucydidean	  theory,	  arguably	  the	  foundational	  proposition	  in	  International	  Relations,	  offers	  further	  strong	  support	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  a	  barrier.	  With	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  international	  system	  to	  accommodate	  greater	  numbers	  of	  non-­‐state	  entities,	  this	  thesis	  argues	  that	  Thucydidean	  theory	  nonetheless	  applies	  equally	  to	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  international	  politics	  as	  to	  state	  actors.	  The	  peremptory,	  results-­‐oriented	  and	  urgency	  imperatives	  of	  contemporary	  TAN	  advocacy	  constitute	  additional	  impediments	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  collaborative	  outcomes	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  	  	  
What	  evidence	  would	  support	  this	  argument?	  Empirical	  and	  substantive	  theoretical	  evidence	  that	  TANs	  typically	  adopt	  adversarial	  advocacy	  strategies.	  Furthermore,	  that	  these	  strategies	  are	  to	  varying	  degrees	  incompatible	  with	  the	  UN	  Charter	  and	  established	  codes	  of	  practice	  in	  the	  international	  dialectical	  environment.	  	  
 Research-­‐based	  primary	  and	  secondary	  commentaries	  attesting	  to	  the	  typical	  adoption	  of	  adversarial	  advocacy	  strategies	  by	  TANs.	  
 Published	  statements	  by	  the	  case	  study	  TANs,	  and	  other	  TANs,	  regarding	  their	  strategic	  choices.	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 Published	  commentaries	  by	  knowledgeable	  observers,	  including	  international	  officials,	  diplomats,	  academics,	  think-­‐tank	  scholars,	  journalists	  and	  traditional	  NGOs,	  attesting	  to	  the	  suitability	  and	  efficacy	  of	  typical	  TAN	  advocacy	  strategies	  in	  the	  international	  environment.	  
 Published	  statements	  by	  UN	  agencies	  regarding	  NGOs	  that	  adopt	  an	  adversarial	  mien	  that	  is	  incompatible	  with	  the	  collaborative	  Charter	  and	  practices	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  	  
 Theoretical	  support	  by	  assessing	  the	  commensurability	  of	  Thucydidean	  theory	  with	  the	  international	  practices	  of	  contemporary	  NGOs/TANs.	  	  	  	  
Hypothesis	  #4:	  A	  complex	  realist	  approach	  has	  exemplary	  merit	  in	  
approaching	  the	  subject	  area	  and	  primary	  research	  question	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  	  
Argument	  Summary:	  A	  complex	  realist	  philosophical	  and	  methodological	  approach	  has	  exemplary	  merit	  in	  approaching	  the	  subject	  area	  and	  primary	  research	  question	  of	  the	  thesis.	  First,	  by	  conceptualising	  a	  category	  of	  international	  political	  relationships	  constituted	  on	  different	  scales	  of	  complexity,	  it	  demonstrates	  a	  framework	  that	  reclaims	  structured	  macroscopic	  analysis	  as	  a	  first-­‐stage	  research	  approach	  to	  complex	  social	  relationships	  and	  appears	  to	  solve	  the	  micro-­‐macro	  problematique	  in	  political	  sociology.	  Second,	  it	  deepens	  and	  broadens	  our	  understanding	  of	  an	  important,	  emerging	  political	  phenomenon	  —	  namely,	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks	  —	  in	  the	  international	  relations/global	  politics	  paradigm.	  By	  adding	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  advocacy	  properties	  of	  TANs,	  a	  richer	  understanding	  of	  their	  outcomes	  is	  more	  evident	  than	  a	  single	  focus	  on	  their	  normative	  political	  concerns	  will	  allow.	  This	  feature,	  I	  argue,	  is	  a	  more	  compassionate	  and	  socially	  beneficial	  means	  of	  understanding	  this	  contentious	  political	  subject	  matter.	  	  	  
What	  evidence	  would	  support	  this	  argument?	  Empirical	  and	  substantive	  theoretical	  evidence	  that	  complex	  realism	  provides	  exemplary	  ontological	  and	  methodological	  frameworks	  for	  investigating	  and	  explaining	  the	  complex,	  multi-­‐dimensional,	  problem	  space	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  
 Demonstration	  of	  the	  exceptional	  explanatory	  merit	  in	  conceptualising	  the	  ontological	  reality	  of	  the	  international	  system	  as	  if	  it	  were	  a	  complex,	  multi-­‐
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dimensional	  realm	  in	  which	  the	  elements	  of	  innumerable	  intersecting	  sub-­‐systems	  are	  embedded	  in	  fitness	  landscapes.	  
 Demonstration	  of	  the	  suitability	  of	  a	  theoretically	  multi-­‐lensed	  epistemological	  approach	  to	  the	  subject	  matter,	  including	  validation	  of	  the	  theories	  selected	  for	  the	  investigation	  (i.e.	  political	  theory	  and	  communications	  theory).	  
 Demonstration	  of	  the	  different	  scales	  of	  complexity	  that	  TANs	  encounter	  in	  their	  international	  political	  relationships	  —	  ranging	  from	  the	  relatively	  micro	  level	  of	  an	  individual	  organisation’s	  relationships	  within	  its	  own	  organisational	  system	  and	  its	  sub-­‐systems,	  to	  the	  meso	  level	  of	  relationships	  with	  other	  TANs	  (considered	  as	  a	  cluster),	  and	  to	  the	  macro	  level	  of	  complexity	  comprising	  the	  TAN’s	  relationships	  with	  elements	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  	  	  
Hypothesis	  #5:	  The	  funding	  models	  TANs	  adopt	  have	  a	  determinative	  effect	  
on	  their	  advocacy	  strategies.	  	  
Argument	  Summary:	  The	  funding	  models	  TANs	  adopt	  have	  a	  determinative	  effect	  on	  their	  advocacy	  strategies	  and	  this	  factor,	  in	  turn,	  has	  a	  determinative	  effect	  on	  each	  individual	  TAN’s	  place	  and	  function	  in	  the	  international	  system	  and	  on	  their	  effectiveness	  in	  achieving	  their	  aims	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  	  	  
What	  evidence	  would	  support	  this	  argument?	  Empirical	  examination	  and	  identification	  of	  the	  different	  funding	  models	  adopted	  by	  the	  case	  study	  TANs,	  and	  other	  TANs.	  	  
 Analysis	  of	  constitutional	  funding	  commitments,	  financial	  statements,	  annual	  reports,	  etc.,	  to	  determine	  the	  funding	  model,	  relative	  financial	  wellbeing,	  resources	  and	  sources	  of	  individual	  TANs.	  	  
 Published	  research	  and	  commentaries	  regarding	  the	  determinative	  effect	  of	  NGO/TAN	  funding	  models	  on	  advocacy	  strategy	  selection.	  	  Analysis	  of	  the	  advocacy	  strategies	  chosen	  by	  the	  case	  study	  TANs,	  and	  other	  TANs,	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  their	  chosen	  funding	  models	  and	  their	  chosen	  ‘insider/outsider’	  orientation.	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 Guidance	  provided	  by	  substantive	  theory	  and	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  funding	  sources	  on	  advocacy	  strategy	  selection.	  
 Empirical	  evidence	  of	  patterns	  and	  tendencies	  that	  are	  supported	  by	  the	  substantive	  theory	  and	  show	  that	  specific	  funding	  models	  have	  clear	  links	  with	  specific	  advocacy	  strategies.	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ANNEX	  2:	  Selection	  of	  Complex	  Realism	  	  	  
Elaboration	  of	  the	  grounds	  for	  selecting	  Complex	  Realism	  in	  this	  thesis	  	  Complex	  Realism	  is	  the	  name	  given	  to	  a	  sociological	  conceptualisation	  and	  theorisation	  ‘tool’	  (Cudworth	  and	  Hobden,	  ibid:	  13),	  or	  ‘toolkit’666	  (Walby,	  ibid),	  which	  provides	  access	  to	  new	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  social	  world	  and	  conducting	  systematic	  analyses	  of	  social	  interconnections.	  Essentially,	  complex	  realism	  is	  a	  synthesis	  of	  a	  scientific/critical	  realist	  ontology	  (which,	  inter	  alia,	  understands	  reality	  as	  intransigent,	  stratified	  and	  differentiated),	  and	  complex	  systems	  theory	  (which	  understands	  the	  social	  world	  as	  composed	  of	  complex	  open	  systems).	  Furthermore,	  this	  accords	  with	  The	  Blackwell	  Dictionary	  of	  Sociology,	  which	  points	  out	  the	  ‘tendency	  for	  social	  systems	  to	  become	  increasingly	  complex	  as	  they	  develop,	  in	  particular	  through	  specialization	  […]’	  (Johnson,	  2000:88).	  This	  feature,	  I	  argue,	  is	  especially	  relevant	  for	  understanding	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  international	  system	  interface	  with	  NGOs	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  contemporary	  TAN	  social	  model,	  availing	  of	  the	  recent	  advances	  in	  affordable	  communications	  technologies	  and	  specialising	  in	  the	  advocacy	  aspects	  of	  NGO	  outreach.	  Reed	  and	  Harvey	  (1992:359)	  define	  complex	  realism	  as:	  	  […]	   a	   scientific	   ontology	   which	   fits	   Bhaskar’s	   philosophical	   framework:	   one	  which	   treats	   nature	   and	   society	   as	   if	   they	   were	   ontologically	   open	   and	  historically	   constituted;	   hierarchically	   structured,	   yet	   interactively	   complex;	  non-­‐reductive	   and	   indeterminate,	   yet	   amenable	   to	   rational	   explanation;	  capable	  of	  seeing	  nature	  as	  a	  ‘self-­‐organizing’	  enterprise	  without	  succumbing	  to	  anthropomorphism	  or	  mystifying	  animism.	  	  Complex	  realist	  approaches	  to	  social	  enquiry	  thus	  avoid	  the	  unsatisfying	  reductionism,	  fragmentation	  and	  false	  over-­‐generalisation	  that	  I,	  and	  others,	  maintain	  have	  often	  tended	  to	  distort	  postmodern	  approaches	  —	  the	  major	  alternative	  theorisation	  paradigm	  for	  the	  study	  of	  social	  relationships	  (Walby,	  ibid;	  Reed	  and	  Harvey,	  ibid;	  Byrne,	  2011:	  9;	  21-­‐23;	  Byrne	  and	  Ragin,	  2009:	  23-­‐24).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
666	  The	  ‘tool’	  connotations	  are	  most	  commonly	  encountered,	  although	  Byrne	  describes	  complex	  realism	  
as	  a	  ‘meta-­‐theoretical	  framework	  for	  methodological	  practice’	  (2011:28-­‐29),	  which,	  he	  asserts	  (ibid;	  also	  
citing	  Unger,	  1998:23-­‐24),	  resolves	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  explanatory	  frame	  of	  reference	  in	  historical	  and	  social	  
practice	  that	  is	  sensitive	  to	  structure	  but	  aware	  of	  contingency.	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  Although	  ‘complex	  realism’	  emerged	  during	  the	  social	  and	  political	  ferment	  of	  the	  1960s	  in	  response	  to	  the	  worldviews	  of	  that	  era	  (Harvey,	  2009:24),	  it	  has	  had	  to	  undergo	  a	  rigorous	  testing	  period	  in	  the	  intervening	  years,	  during	  which	  both	  realism	  and	  Waltzian-­‐style	  systems	  thinking667	  have	  taken	  a	  hammering	  within	  the	  IR	  discipline	  and	  become	  widely	  unfashionable668,	  while	  constructivist,	  Marxist	  and	  International	  Political	  Economy	  approaches	  and	  normative	  concerns	  have	  generally	  dominated	  socio-­‐political	  research	  (Adler,	  1997).	  	  	  Since	  the	  early	  90s,	  however,	  a	  new,	  complex	  systems-­‐inspired,	  worldview	  in	  social	  theory	  has	  been	  emerging.	  (Reed	  and	  Harvey,	  1992;	  Geyer	  and	  Pickering,	  2011;	  Kavalski,	  2007;	  Lehmann,	  2012;	  Sawyer,	  2005:	  1-­‐2;	  Bousquet	  and	  Curtis,	  2011;	  Rosenau,	  1990:	  9-­‐11;	  23-­‐25669).	  Some	  have	  even	  witnessed	  its	  development	  as	  a	  ‘new	  paradigm’	  (Kavalski,	  2007;	  Walby,	  2007;	  Urry,	  2003:12).	  In	  this	  intellectual	  movement,	  which	  has	  also	  been	  termed	  a	  ‘third	  wave’	  in	  systems	  thinking	  (Sawyer,	  ibid),	  there	  has	  been	  a	  reworking	  and	  revivification	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  social	  system	  	  —	  impelled,	  inter	  alia,	  by	  the	  urgency	  of	  an	  array	  of	  intractable	  global	  challenges	  and	  increasing	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  inability	  of	  IR	  theorisations	  to	  explain	  or	  address	  them.	  This	  comparatively	  quiet,	  but	  irrepressible,	  revolution	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  science	  has	  been	  energised	  by	  the	  explanatory	  power	  of	  complexity	  theory	  (vide	  Morin,	  2006;	  Bousquet	  and	  Curtis,	  
ibid;	  Rosenau,	  ibid:	  9-­‐11).	  Reed	  and	  Harvey	  (ibid)	  claim	  the	  new	  approach	  ‘promises	  to	  profoundly	  change	  how	  we	  look	  at	  the	  world	  about	  us’.	  	  Increasingly,	  therefore,	  political	  sociology	  scholars	  have	  synthesised	  the	  philosophy	  of	  critical	  realism	  (sometimes	  referred	  to	  also	  as	  ‘scientific	  realism’,	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
667	  As	  expounded	  by	  Kenneth	  Waltz,	  notably	  in	  his	  1979	  text,	  Theory	  of	  International	  Politics.	  
668	  i.e.	  unfashionable	  in	  the	  Western	  countries	  that	  dominate	  IR	  academic	  discourses.	  
669	  Although	  Rosenau	  does	  not	  put	  a	  precise	  label	  on	  the	  new	  intellectual	  wave	  that	  he	  identifies	  as	  
ushering	  in	  a	  major	  transformation	  in	  theorising	  about	  international	  relations	  and	  world	  politics	  —	  apart	  
from	  referring	  to	  it	  as	  ‘Multi-­‐level	  Theory’	  that	  is	  characterised	  also	  by	  complexity,	  dynamism	  and	  
turbulence	  (1990:23)	  —	  his	  insights	  are	  clearly	  in	  step	  those	  of	  other	  writers	  on	  complexity	  theory,	  
complex	  realism	  and	  ‘third	  wave’	  systems	  thinking.	  Notable	  in	  Rosenau’s	  text	  are	  his	  references	  to	  
multi-­‐level	  systems,	  dynamic	  and	  complex	  interactions,	  multi-­‐causal	  explanations	  for	  turbulent	  events,	  
the	  need	  for	  systems	  analysis	  in	  world	  politics	  at	  macro	  and	  micro	  levels,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  supplant	  
formerly	  unquestioned	  notions	  about	  the	  virtue	  of	  parsimony	  and	  simplicity	  in	  social	  theorising	  and	  
acknowledge,	  and	  learn	  to	  deal	  with,	  complexity	  (1990).	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’transcendental	  realism’670),	  with	  insights	  from	  complexity	  theory671,	  with	  encouraging	  results.	  This	  synthesis	  of	  conceptual	  tools	  is	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  by	  the	  contraction	  ‘complex	  realism’	  (Reed	  and	  Harvey,	  1992;	  Walby,	  2007;	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden,	  2011:14;	  Byrne,	  2011:	  21-­‐22;	  2009:102).	  	  Indeed,	  there	  is	  a	  growing	  recognition	  that	  attempts	  to	  understand	  the	  social	  world	  via	  dated	  ways	  that	  seek	  to	  mimic	  the	  linear	  approaches672	  of	  the	  conventional	  'hard	  sciences'	  are	  mostly	  useless,	  given	  the	  recent	  accumulation	  of	  knowledge	  regarding	  the	  complex	  systems	  character	  of	  society	  (Byrne,	  ibid:	  23;	  235;	  Geyer	  and	  Rihani,	  2010:5-­‐7;	  Morin,	  2006).	  However,	  elements	  of	  overlap	  and	  complementarity	  may	  be	  found	  in	  combining	  old	  and	  new	  systems	  approaches	  (Cudworth	  and	  Hobden,	  ibid:	  14).	  	  Among	  the	  contemporary	  theorists	  contributing	  in	  this	  area,	  Byrne	  argues	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  complex	  realism	  as	  ‘a	  methodological	  foundation	  for	  many	  methods	  in	  the	  investigation	  of	  reality	  in	  all	  its	  aspects’	  (Byrne,	  ibid:	  3).	  Although	  the	  literature	  reflects	  that	  scholars	  have	  approached	  this	  new	  intellectual	  path	  from	  a	  number	  of	  different	  academic	  vantage	  points	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  or	  so,	  and	  sometimes,	  understandably,	  show	  slight	  variances	  in	  their	  terminology,	  I	  suggest	  that	  theoretical	  commensurability	  is	  now	  evident	  in	  a	  significant	  body	  of	  work	  and	  the	  outlines	  of	  the	  evolving	  complex	  realist	  research	  toolkit	  and	  framework	  are	  clear	  and	  accessible	  to	  political	  sociological	  researchers.	  	  	  Byrne	  (2011:20-­‐21)	  develops	  a	  useful	  account	  of	  ‘complex	  realism’	  (that	  I	  apply	  in	  my	  present	  study),	  which	  is	  typically	  based	  on	  a	  synthesis	  of	  critical	  realist	  thinking,	  most	  commonly	  associated	  with	  the	  work	  of	  Roy	  Bhaskar	  (1979),	  and	  with	  Edgar	  Morin’s	  programme	  of	  ‘general	  complexity’	  (2006).	  	  In	  essence,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
670	  The	  terms	  critical	  realism,	  scientific	  realism	  and	  transcendental	  realism	  have	  often	  been	  elided	  by	  
scholars	  in	  referring	  to	  the	  general	  account	  of	  ontology	  conceived	  by	  Bhaskar	  (Collier,	  1994:xi).	  Bhaskar,	  
himself,	  retrospectively	  accepted	  the	  term	  ‘critical	  realism’,	  which	  had	  been	  applied	  by	  others,	  and	  
noted	  that	  the	  scientific,	  transcendental	  and	  critical	  realism	  that	  he	  expounded	  fundamentally	  
amounted	  to	  the	  same	  thing	  (Bhaskar,	  2011/1989:	  2;	  82-­‐82).	  
671	  The	  term,	  ‘dissipative	  systems’	  theory	  has	  also	  been	  used	  in,	  arguably,	  a	  synonymous	  sense	  (Reed	  
and	  Harvey,	  1992).	  
672	  For	  this	  reason,	  I	  reject	  the	  linear	  conceptualisation	  and	  argumentation	  of	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  
influential	  ‘Boomerang	  Pattern’	  representation	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  
(1989:12-­‐13).	  In	  particular,	  I	  argue,	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  constructivist	  treatment	  leads	  to	  the	  flattening-­‐
out	  and	  simplification	  of	  complex,	  international	  relationships	  and	  does	  little	  to	  explain	  the	  dynamic,	  
complex	  world	  of	  international	  politics.	  Moreover,	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink’s	  fuzzy	  conceptualisation	  of	  
transnational	  NGO	  network	  ‘pressure’	  on	  states	  (graphically	  portrayed	  by	  thick	  arrows	  presumably	  
representing	  strike	  capability,	  target	  accuracy	  and	  irresistible	  force)	  while	  admittedly	  politically	  
seductive,	  is	  arguably	  devoid	  of	  any	  explanatory	  value	  in	  the	  real	  world.	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Bhaskar’s	  critical	  realism	  (CR)	  conceives	  of	  the	  world	  as	  being	  structured,	  differentiated	  and	  changing.	  	  It	  holds	  that	  social	  phenomena,	  like	  most	  natural	  phenomena,	  are	  the	  product	  of	  a	  plurality	  of	  structures,	  and	  that	  we	  will	  only	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  —	  and	  so	  change	  —	  the	  social	  world,	  if	  we	  identify	  the	  structures	  at	  work	  that	  generate	  phenomena,	  such	  as	  events	  and	  discourses.	  To	  bring	  order	  to	  this	  research,	  critical	  realism	  provides	  a	  set	  of	  perspectives	  on	  society,	  and	  on	  nature,	  that	  helps	  to	  guide	  empirically	  controlled	  investigations	  into	  the	  structures	  generating	  social	  phenomena	  (ibid:	  2-­‐3).	  	  	  In	  a	  study	  of	  complexity	  and	  realism	  in	  the	  social	  sciences,	  which	  they	  cast	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘new	  science’	  supplanting	  the	  ‘old’,	  Reed	  and	  Harvey	  (ibid),	  point	  out	  that	  philosophical	  ontologies,	  such	  as	  Bhaskar	  has	  conceived673,	  contribute	  to	  scientific	  activity	  by	  showing	  the	  scientist	  a	  broad	  outline	  of	  what	  the	  world,	  and	  what	  his	  or	  her	  knowledge	  of	  it,	  should	  look	  like.	  	  However,	  philosophical	  ontologies	  ‘only	  describe	  the	  boundaries	  of	  an	  intellectual	  continent,	  not	  its	  surface	  details’.	  For	  this	  further	  task,	  a	  scientific	  ontology	  is	  needed	  that	  is	  compatible	  with	  Bhaskar’s	  philosophical	  framework,	  and	  this,	  these	  writers	  and	  others	  assert,	  has	  been	  accomplished	  by	  the	  advent	  of	  new	  complexity	  approaches	  to	  systems	  theory	  (Reed	  and	  Harvey;	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden,	  ibid:	  15).	  Indeed,	  Geyer	  and	  Pickering	  assert	  (2011)674:	  	  Increasingly,	  complexity-­‐based	  thinking	  is	  challenging	  the	  dominant	  rationalist,	  realist	  and	  reductionist	  international	  relations	  (IR)	  framework.	  	  	  To	  denote	  this	  practice,	  Kavalski	  (2007)	  uses	  the	  neologism	  ‘complex	  international	  relations	  theory’	  (CIR).	  	  	  While	  acknowledging	  that	  ‘complexity	  theory’	  is	  not	  a	  unified	  theory,	  but	  a	  somewhat	  contested	  term	  for	  a	  range	  of	  theories	  and	  concepts	  originating	  in	  the	  study	  of	  self-­‐organising	  physical	  systems,	  scientists	  in	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  paradigms	  are	  becoming	  increasingly	  comfortable	  with	  adopting	  its	  useful	  insights,	  metaphors	  and	  explanatory	  theories	  in	  their	  work.	  Among	  the	  complexity	  scholars	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
673	  Bhaskar’s	  oft-­‐cited	  remark	  that	  philosophy	  should	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  an	  ‘underlabourer	  for	  science’	  
is	  relevant	  here	  (Bhaskar,	  1989:	  viii;	  2).	  	  
674	  Additional	  intellectual	  weight	  might	  be	  accorded	  to	  these	  insights,	  given	  their	  inclusion	  in	  the	  	  
‘Special	  Issue:	  Complexity	  and	  international	  affairs’	  of	  the	  Cambridge	  Review	  of	  International	  Affairs	  
(2011),	  Vol.24	  (1).	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most	  frequently	  credited	  with	  making	  groundbreaking	  contributions	  to	  the	  new	  complexity	  science	  paradigm	  are	  the	  chemist	  and	  Nobel	  Laureate,	  Ilya	  Prigogine	  and	  his	  colleagues,	  and	  the	  economist	  Brian	  Arthur	  and	  cross-­‐disciplinary	  researchers	  at	  the	  Santa	  Fe	  Institute	  in	  New	  Mexico	  (Cudworth	  and	  Hobden,	  2011:	  4-­‐5;	  13;	  Byrne,	  2009:29;	  Reed	  and	  Harvey,	  ibid;	  Room,	  2011:15).	  Although	  these	  refreshing	  winds	  of	  change	  have	  only	  recently	  been	  carried	  into	  the	  silos	  of	  political	  sociology,	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  new	  approaches	  should	  be	  seen	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  evolutionary	  process,	  building	  solidly	  on	  the	  work	  relating	  to	  ‘social	  systems’,	  ‘social	  structures’,	  non-­‐linear	  ‘assemblages’	  and	  ‘international	  systems’	  theory	  of	  the	  paradigm’s	  more	  familiar	  names	  –	  Karl	  Marx,	  Emile	  Durkheim,	  Talcott	  Parsons,	  Kenneth	  Waltz	  (1979),	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Felix	  Guattari	  (1987),	  Anthony	  Giddens	  (1984:25);	  Barry	  Buzan	  and	  Richard	  Little	  (2000),	  and	  Manuel	  DeLanda	  (2006).	  	  	  In	  their	  recent	  work,	  which	  specifically	  analyses	  the	  value	  of	  complex	  realism	  approaches	  to	  international	  politics	  and	  International	  Relations675,	  Cudworth	  and	  Hobden	  (2011;	  2010)	  assert	  that	  considering	  international	  actors	  as	  elements	  (or	  units)	  in	  complex	  adaptive	  systems	  that	  interact	  with	  each	  other	  and	  have	  a	  tendency	  to	  self-­‐organise,	  opens	  a	  fruitful	  new	  route	  for	  analysing	  relations	  between	  them	  —	  whether	  they	  are,	  inter	  alia,	  states,	  international	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  (such	  as	  TANs676),	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations,	  or	  transnational	  corporations	  (2011:72).	  	  	  Epistemologically,	  complex	  realism	  enables	  investigations	  that	  delve	  beyond	  superficial	  phenomena	  (as	  in	  mainstream	  actualist	  perspectives),	  to	  see	  complex	  adaptive	  systems	  as	  having	  distinct	  properties,	  powers	  and	  causal	  effects	  (or,	  emergent	  properties)	  (ibid:14;	  Mitleton-­‐Kelly,	  2003;	  Bousquet	  and	  Curtis,	  2011;	  Geyer	  and	  Pickering,	  2011;	  Walby,	  2009:17).	  From	  this	  basis,	  arguments	  can	  be	  made	  that	  the	  international	  system	  can	  be	  envisaged	  and	  analysed	  as	  being	  embedded	  within,	  and	  intersected	  by,	  a	  range	  of	  physical	  systems,	  and	  other	  social	  systems	  —	  including	  those	  which	  reproduce	  a	  range	  of	  relations	  of	  domination,	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
675	  See	  also	  the	  recent	  journal	  article	  by	  Bousquet	  and	  Curtis	  (2011)	  for	  the	  Cambridge	  Review	  of	  
International	  Affairs	  on	  the	  growing	  interest	  in	  applying	  complexity	  approaches	  to	  international	  
relations	  theorisation.	  	  
676	  This	  author’s	  own	  emphasis.	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social	  inequality	  (such	  as	  gendered,	  racial,	  class-­‐based,	  religious,	  national,	  and	  colonial	  relations)	  (ibid,	  2010;	  Walby:	  2007).	  	  	  Importantly,	  complex	  realism	  is	  a	  flexible	  tool,	  enabling	  scientific	  inquiry	  across	  a	  range	  of	  disciplines	  in	  both	  the	  natural	  and	  social	  sciences.	  	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  it	  enables	  researchers	  to	  construct	  analytical	  frameworks	  for	  approaching	  and	  understanding,	  inter	  alia,	  the	  structural	  architecture	  of	  complex	  open	  systems	  and	  the	  ontological	  depth	  of	  systems	  of	  social	  relations;	  the	  points	  of	  intersectionality	  and	  disruption	  in	  these	  systems;	  the	  relationships	  and	  behaviours	  of	  actors	  and	  agents;	  and,	  indeed,	  better	  understanding	  social	  transformations.	  It	  is	  emphasised	  that	  this	  theoretical	  device	  is	  adopted	  in	  this	  empirically	  grounded	  dissertation	  as	  an	  approach	  to	  questions	  and	  challenges	  in	  international	  relations	  praxis,	  including	  exploring	  the	  characteristically	  adversarial	  relationships	  between	  state	  actors	  and	  civil	  society	  advocacy	  groups,	  and	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  for	  the	  resolution	  of	  	  ‘wicked	  problems’	  that	  are	  often	  the	  source	  of	  political	  differences	  between	  them	  (vide	  Chapter	  6).	  For	  these	  tasks,	  it	  is	  eminently	  suited	  (Byrne,	  ibid:	  8-­‐9;	  Walby,	  2007;	  Segal,	  2010).	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ANNEX	  3:	  ‘Networks’	  and	  ‘Transnationalism’	  
	  
Reasons	  for	  departing	  from	  the	  popular	  academic	  approaches	  of	  ‘Networks’	  and	  
‘Transnationalism’	  in	  studying	  Transnational	  Advocacy	  Networks	  
	  
 
The	  advent	  and	  influence	  of	  ‘network’	  thinking	  As	  constructivist	  thinking	  evolved	  in	  IR677,	  a	  sociological	  turn	  toward	  social	  movements	  and	  networks	  began	  to	  catch	  hold,	  especially	  the	  idea	  of	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks	  (Adler,	  ibid:	  100).	  Consequently,	  many	  scholars	  adopted	  methodological	  approaches	  to	  civil	  society	  interactions	  via	  various	  forms	  of	  social	  network	  theory	  (Diani,	  2002:173-­‐194)	  —	  particularly	  Actor	  Network	  Theory	  (Latour,	  2007;	  Law,	  2004,	  et	  al).	  As	  a	  theory	  that	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  imported	  into	  IR	  from	  organisation	  and	  systems	  theorising	  in	  contemporary	  business	  studies,	  this	  thesis	  considers	  the	  case	  for	  applying	  network	  theory	  as	  an	  analytical	  framework	  for	  the	  study	  of	  the	  international	  system	  and	  transnational	  civil	  society	  remains	  to	  be	  made.	  However,	  considering	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  thinking	  about	  new	  forms	  of	  social	  connectivity	  that	  was	  ushered	  in	  by	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  World	  Wide	  Web,	  Internet	  and	  other	  new	  telecommunications	  technologies,	  delivered	  by	  way	  of	  infrastructural	  ‘backbones’	  and	  ‘networks’,	  I	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  to	  find	  these	  then	  modish	  terms	  appearing	  metaphorically	  in	  the	  discourses	  on	  contemporary	  trends	  from	  about	  the	  1980s	  onwards,	  	  	  In	  their	  work	  on	  TANs,	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  identified	  not	  only	  transnational	  advocacy	  ‘networks’,	  but	  three	  different	  types	  of	  transnational	  network,	  which	  despite	  their	  differences	  were	  ‘characterized	  by	  voluntary,	  reciprocal,	  and	  horizontal	  exchanges	  of	  information	  and	  services’	  (see	  Section	  6.5).	  Although	  they	  considered	  networks	  were	  ‘difficult	  to	  organize	  transnationally’,	  these	  scholars	  considered	  their	  ‘agility	  and	  fluidity’	  made	  them	  particularly	  appropriate	  to	  historical	  periods	  ‘characterized	  by	  rapid	  shifts	  in	  problem	  definition’678.	  Consequently,	  they	  anticipated	  the	  role	  of	  ‘networks’	  in	  international	  politics	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
677	  See	  Chapter	  3	  for	  this	  discussion.	  
678	  This	  statement	  is	  noted	  but	  not	  contested	  in	  this	  thesis	  owing	  to	  space	  limitations.	  However,	  I	  should	  
add	  the	  comment	  that	  it	  appears	  to	  be	  nonsensical	  to	  surmise	  that	  there	  have	  ever	  been	  historical	  
periods	  characterised	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘rapid	  shifts	  in	  problem	  definition’.	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theorising	  would	  grow.	  In	  view	  of	  this	  increasing	  significance,	  the	  two	  writers	  opined,	  scholars	  of	  international	  relations	  should	  pay	  more	  attention	  to	  network	  forms	  of	  organisation	  (1998:	  200)679.	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  found	  that	  ‘networks	  have	  considerable	  importance	  in	  bringing	  transformative	  and	  mobilizing	  ideas	  into	  the	  international	  system,’	  and	  offer	  promising	  new	  directions	  for	  further	  research.	  Therefore,	  studying	  the	  trajectory	  and	  influence	  of	  transnational	  civil	  society	  via	  the	  concept	  of	  transnational	  advocacy	  networks	  could	  help	  to	  explain	  how	  issues	  get	  on	  to	  the	  international	  agenda,	  how	  they	  are	  framed	  in	  the	  ways	  they	  are,	  and	  why	  certain	  kinds	  of	  international	  campaigns,	  or	  pressures,	  are	  effective	  in	  some	  cases	  but	  not	  in	  others	  (ibid:	  217).	  	  	  Lending	  enthusiastic	  support	  for	  these	  views,	  particularly	  the	  horizontality	  aspect,	  Rosenau	  (2000:229)	  argued	  that	  while	  a	  number	  of	  dynamics	  had	  ‘contributed	  to	  the	  diminution	  of	  state	  capacities’,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  had	  been	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  a	  shifting	  balance	  between	  hierarchical	  and	  network	  forms	  of	  organisation,	  entailing	  a	  shift	  between	  vertical	  and	  horizontal	  flows	  of	  authority.	  Rosenau	  held	  that:	   	  Greatly	   facilitated	   by	   the	   Internet,	   people	   now	   converge	   electronically	   as	  equals,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  as	  superiors	  and	  subordinates.	  They	  make	  plans,	  recruit	  members,	  mobilize	   support,	   raise	  money,	   debate	   issues,	   frame	   agendas,	   and	  undertake	   collective	   action,	   amounting	   to	   steering	   mechanisms	   founded	   on	  horizontal	  rather	  than	  hierarchical	  channels	  of	  authority.	  	  	  Furthermore,	  Rosenau	  said	  he	  shared	  the	  view	  that	  in	  the	  future	  conflicts	  would	  be	  increasingly	  waged	  by	  ‘networks’,	  rather	  than	  hierarchies	  —	  meaning	  that	  	  ‘whoever	  masters	  the	  network	  form	  stands	  to	  gain	  major	  advantages	  in	  the	  new	  epoch’.	  He	  saw	  the	  advent	  of	  new	  collectivities	  based	  on	  horizontal	  structures	  of	  authority	  as	  having	  profound	  implications	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  new	  rule	  systems;	  the	  exercise	  of	  authority	  via	  electronically	  transmitted	  requests	  (rather	  than	  directives);	  the	  further	  bifurcation	  of	  global	  structures	  in	  to	  state-­‐centric	  and	  multi-­‐centric	  worlds,	  and	  ‘the	  possibility	  that	  a	  global	  civil	  society	  may	  be	  emerging’.	  This	  view	  —	  albeit	  a	  contested	  view	  —	  that	  the	  world	  may	  be	  experiencing	  the	  end	  of	  national	  sovereignty	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
679	  One	  noted	  scholar	  in	  this	  field,	  Manuel	  Castells,	  produced	  his	  seminal	  work	  The	  Rise	  of	  The	  Network	  
Society	  in	  1996	  and	  continues	  to	  publish	  consistently	  on	  the	  theme	  of	  networked	  activism	  –	  new	  
communications	  –	  contentious	  politics	  (1996,	  2004b,	  2007,	  2009,	  2012).	  His	  work	  informs	  this	  thesis	  and	  
is	  cited	  frequently.	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with	  the	  arrival	  of	  many	  new,	  fragmented,	  sub-­‐national	  and	  international	  organisations	  vying	  with	  states	  for	  authority	  has	  a	  niche	  academic	  following	  and	  has	  been	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘new	  medievalism’680	  (Smith	  et	  al,	  2008:9;	  Gilpin,	  2002:	  246).	  In	  the	  main,	  however,	  the	  research	  model	  adopted	  by	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  has	  been	  followed	  by	  a	  large	  number	  of	  scholars	  contributing	  in	  this	  field.	  In	  many	  cases,	  these	  texts	  are	  devoted	  to	  case	  studies	  of	  specific	  advocacy	  groups	  within	  networks	  and	  their	  principled	  causes	  (e.g.	  Edwards	  and	  Gaventa,	  2001;	  Khagram	  et	  al,	  2002;	  Dakroury	  et	  al,	  2009),	  with	  writers	  invariably	  concentrating	  their	  accounts	  on	  describing	  individual	  NGOs,	  their	  issues	  and	  activities,	  and	  implying	  that	  their	  significance	  relates	  to	  the	  networks	  they	  are	  connected	  to	  and	  the	  wider	  world.	  	  However,	  this	  thesis,	  guided	  by	  classical	  realism’s	  theorisations	  regarding	  political	  power	  disparities	  and	  complexity	  insights,	  is	  strongly	  at	  variance	  with	  both	  linear	  conceptualisations	  of	  complex	  social	  interactions	  and	  the	  disregarding	  of	  power	  differentials	  within	  them.	  Indeed,	  the	  above	  convictions	  about	  ‘horizontal	  exchanges’,	  horizontal	  ‘channels	  of	  authority’	  and	  the	  notion	  that	  ‘electronically	  people	  now	  converge	  as	  equals’	  are	  thus	  challenging	  to	  understand	  in	  any	  real	  sense,	  although	  they	  hint	  not	  only	  of	  the	  architectural	  language	  of	  the	  World	  Wide	  Web,	  but	  at	  the	  type	  of	  hyperbole	  often	  associated	  with	  technological	  fetishism681,	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  the	  new	  communications	  tools	  described	  in	  Section	  6.6.2.	  	  Thus,	  this	  thesis	  agrees	  with	  Mann	  (2003:144-­‐145)	  that	  the	  outlook	  	  ‘is	  not	  rosy’	  for	  redressing	  the	  presently	  observed	  imbalances	  and	  ‘clumping’	  in	  distribution,	  composition	  and	  influence	  seen	  in	  transnational	  networks,	  (Mann,	  2003:144-­‐145;	  Florini,	  2000:7).	  Mann	  takes	  issue	  with	  ‘the	  more	  enthusiastic	  of	  the	  globalists	  and	  transnationalists’,	  whom	  he	  sees	  as	  having	  little	  sense	  of	  history	  and	  global	  differentials	  in	  their	  optimism	  regarding	  the	  expansion	  possibilities	  for	  transnational	  networks.	  He	  points	  out	  that	  the	  world	  remains	  conflict-­‐ridden	  and	  beset	  with	  uncertainty	  in	  areas	  as	  diverse	  as	  eco-­‐tensions,	  rising	  ethnic	  separatism,	  power	  struggles	  between	  major	  countries	  and	  the	  proliferation	  of	  nuclear	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
680	  Coining	  of	  this	  neologism	  has	  been	  attributed	  to	  the	  realist	  international	  affairs	  philosopher	  Hedley	  
Bull	  (Gilpin,	  2002:	  237;	  243).	  
681	  See	  also	  Morazov,	  2011:303-­‐313	  and	  Dean,	  2009:31.	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weapons.	  ‘It	  is	  unlikely	  that	  militarism	  and	  war	  will	  just	  go	  away’,	  Mann	  explains,	  therefore,	  ‘all	  these	  threats	  constitute	  serious	  obstacles	  to	  the	  diffusion	  of	  transnational	  and	  universal	  global	  networks’.	  Adding	  strength	  to	  this	  argument,	  Peters	  (1998:23-­‐25)	  says	  that	  if	  networks	  are	  to	  be	  used	  as	  an	  analytical	  tool	  to	  explain	  policy	  outcomes,	  or	  intergovernmental	  relations,	  ‘or	  indeed	  anything’,	  then	  networks	  themselves	  require	  a	  collective	  explanatory	  feature,	  apart	  from	  that	  of	  the	  behaviour	  of	  individual	  organisations	  within	  the	  network.	  	  	  	  Also	  taking	  a	  less	  than	  optimistic	  view	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  networks	  in	  the	  political	  process,	  Marsh	  (1998)	  suggests	  that	  while	  the	  network	  concept	  helps	  to	  simplify	  complexity	  among	  component	  groups	  and	  aid	  the	  internal	  aggregation	  of	  information,	  it	  hampers	  external	  expression	  of	  TAN	  agency	  and	  therefore	  overall	  effectiveness.	  According	  to	  Daugbjerg	  (1998:81),	  a	  low-­‐level	  of	  institutionalisation,	  lack	  of	  cohesion	  (sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘weak	  link’	  networks),	  and	  constant	  struggles	  over	  rules,	  procedures,	  norms	  and	  resources	  further	  destabilise	  issue	  networks.	  At	  the	  same	  text,	  Daugbjerg	  and	  Marsh	  (ibid:	  71)	  caution	  against	  underestimating	  the	  limitations	  of	  network	  analysis	  in	  trying	  to	  understand	  policy	  outcomes.	  They	  claim:	  	  It	   can’t	   explain	   policy	   outcomes	   simply	   by	   reference	   to	   the	   structure	   of	   the	  network	  or	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  agents.	  We	  need	  to	  know	  why	  the	  networks	  take	  the	  form	  they	  do,	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  broader	  political	  system	  and	  how	  the	  network	  structures	  and	  actor	  behaviour	  affect	  outcomes	  and	  restructure	  networks.	  	  	  Certainly,	  they	  claim,	  there	  is	  no	  unidirectional	  link	  between	  networks	  and	  policy	  outcomes	  (ibid:	  197).	  	  	  	  Therefore,	  it	  appears	  to	  be	  axiomatic	  that	  despite	  its	  appeal	  as	  a	  description	  of	  some	  important	  realities	  in	  contemporary	  political	  systems,	  there	  are	  significant	  questions	  about	  using	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘networks’	  (Peters,	  1998:21-­‐22).	  Peters	  asserts	  that	  although	  the	  concept	  of	  using	  a	  network	  approach	  to	  examine	  the	  relationship	  between	  state	  and	  society	  is	  now	  pervasive	  in	  the	  European	  literature	  (and	  becoming	  more	  widespread	  in	  the	  U.S.),	  more	  work	  is	  needed	  to	  determine	  what	  it	  contributes	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  theoretical	  utility	  its	  advocates	  appear	  to	  assume	  (ibid).	  He	  queries	  whether	  networks	  are	  better	  understood	  simply	  as	  a	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metaphor,	  or	  as	  a	  more	  substantive	  means	  of	  explaining	  political	  interactions	  and	  policy-­‐making.	  Furthermore,	  he	  asks:	  	  Do	   networks	   exist	   in	   any	   meaningful	   sense,	   or	   are	   they	   mere	   constructs	  imposed	  by	  researchers	  for	  their	  own	  intellectual	  convenience?	  	  A	  lack	  of	  distinction	  in	  the	  literature	  between	  types	  of	  networks	  is	  also	  problematical	  in	  that	  they	  all	  appear	  to	  be	  effectively	  the	  same,	  with	  insufficient	  focus	  on	  how	  they	  exert	  influence	  (ibid:	  30).	  In	  Marsh’s	  view	  (ibid:	  118)	  both	  structural	  and	  interpersonal	  aspects	  are	  crucial	  in	  trying	  to	  explain	  the	  outcomes	  achieved	  by	  ‘networks’.	  In	  this	  context,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  consensus	  amongst	  observers	  of	  issue	  networks	  that	  internal	  conflict	  is	  inherent682,	  leading	  McAdam	  et	  
al	  to	  comment	  on	  what	  he	  called	  one	  of	  the	  ‘great	  paradoxes’	  of	  contentious	  politics	  (McAdam,	  Tarrow	  and	  Tilly,	  2001:159):	  	  […]	   how	   contingent	   assemblages	   of	   social	   networks	   manage	   to	   create	   the	  illusion	   of	   determined,	   unified,	   self-­‐motivated	   political	   actors,	   then	   to	   act	  publicly	  as	  if	  they	  believed	  that	  illusion.683	  	  	  Furthermore,	  Urry	  cautions	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  networks	  remains	  ‘underdeveloped’	  in	  the	  context	  of	  understanding	  the	  elements	  and	  behaviours	  of	  complex	  systems	  (2002:8-­‐12).	  	  When	  considering	  this	  approach,	  I	  found	  the	  network	  conceptualisation	  to	  be	  planar	  and	  unsuitably	  linear	  for	  investigating	  complex,	  non-­‐linear	  and	  intersecting	  social	  systems	  and	  their	  environments.	  Assemblages	  theory,	  as	  propounded	  by	  Deluze	  and	  DeLanda	  (2006:10)	  appeared	  initially	  to	  offer	  a	  more	  compelling	  proposition,	  in	  its	  assertion	  that	  wholes	  can	  be	  characterised	  by	  relations	  of	  exteriority	  and	  display	  emergent	  properties,	  however,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  research	  I	  found	  it	  to	  be	  more	  useful	  as	  a	  stepping-­‐stone	  to	  the	  richer	  toolbox	  of	  complexity	  theory.	  Social	  network	  theory	  was	  also	  a	  useful	  stepping	  stone,	  insofar	  as	  it	  formed	  a	  basis	  for	  Granovetter’s	  foundational	  work	  on	  weak	  link	  and	  strong	  link	  networks	  (1973;	  1978),	  which	  emphasised	  the	  need	  to	  consider	  the	  immanent	  and	  emergent	  properties	  of	  individuals,	  groups	  and	  crowds	  in	  understanding	  their	  relationships,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
682	  This	  internal	  conflict	  characteristic	  is	  clearly	  evident	  in	  the	  case	  studies	  on	  Greenpeace	  and	  Human	  
Rights	  Watch.	  
683	  See	  also	  Goffman	  (1959:	  28-­‐82)	  for	  his	  seminal	  work	  on	  ‘performativity’,	  which	  examines	  the	  self-­‐
belief	  individuals	  have	  in	  the	  social	  roles	  they	  play.	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behaviours	  and	  thresholds	  for	  action.	  Consequently,	  this	  thesis	  was	  influenced	  by	  Granovetter’s	  seminal	  work	  in	  this	  field.	  Indeed,	  I	  argue,	  that	  the	  key	  to	  better	  understanding	  the	  disparate	  degrees	  of	  effectiveness	  of	  TANs	  and	  NGOs	  is	  revealed	  when	  Granovetter’s	  theoretical	  insights	  regarding	  the	  properties	  possessed	  by	  individuals	  engaging	  in	  collective	  behaviour	  is	  synthesised	  with	  complexity	  insights	  into	  the	  properties	  of	  the	  fitness	  landscapes	  affecting	  the	  complex	  systems	  in	  which	  they	  are	  embedded.	  Moreover,	  this	  argument	  had	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  say	  about	  civil	  society	  aspirations	  in	  complex	  environments	  and	  exposes	  the	  limitation	  of	  the	  increasingly	  popular	  concept	  and	  dream	  of	  ‘people	  power’.	  	  	  Thus,	  in	  reviewing	  these	  debates,	  I	  found	  the	  more	  convincing	  arguments	  advise	  caution	  in	  assuming	  the	  influence	  of	  networks	  in	  policy	  processes,	  especially	  in	  regard	  to	  nodal	  imbalances	  and	  clumping	  in	  transnational	  network	  structures,	  assuming	  uniformity	  of	  commitment684,	  unity	  of	  collective	  purpose,	  and	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  external	  expressions	  of	  TAN	  agency	  to	  diverse	  external	  audiences.	  Certainly,	  the	  literature	  demonstrated	  a	  need	  to	  be	  more	  sceptical,	  than	  at	  present,	  in	  assuming	  the	  lines	  drawn	  on	  network	  organisational	  charts	  represent	  the	  strength,	  direction	  of	  power	  flows,	  or	  the	  value	  and	  equivalency	  of	  links.	  I	  suggest	  that	  they	  may	  be	  illusory,	  or	  indicative,	  at	  best685.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  I	  consider	  the	  analogy	  of	  	  ‘network	  ‘,	  now	  commonly	  used	  to	  frame	  TANs	  as	  coherent	  entities	  on	  the	  international	  stage	  is	  generally	  used	  unconvincingly	  to	  try	  to	  bridge	  divides	  between	  the	  domestic	  and	  international	  political	  realms.	  Therefore,	  while	  this	  thesis	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  network	  framework	  is	  popular	  in	  the	  field	  of	  NGO/TAN	  analysis,	  and	  not	  withstanding	  the	  quantitative	  research	  appeal	  of	  Actor	  Network	  Theory	  (ANT)686,	  with	  its	  possibilities	  for	  simple,	  graphic,	  tabulation	  of	  points	  of	  contact	  between	  entities,	  these	  approaches	  appear	  to	  be	  highly	  unsuited	  to	  qualitative	  depth	  analyses	  of	  the	  types	  of	  complex,	  intersecting,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
684	  See	  Granovetter’s	  work	  on	  ‘threshold	  models’	  of	  collective	  behaviour	  (especially	  his	  ‘riot’	  model),	  
which	  rejects	  the	  possibility	  of,	  inter	  alia,	  uniform	  attitudes	  and	  levels	  of	  commitment	  and	  predictable	  
behaviours	  within	  collectives	  (1973,	  1978;	  Watts,	  2011:67-­‐71).	  Kant	  famously	  expounded	  on	  the	  
impossibility	  of	  ‘subjective	  universality’	  (2008/1790:49),	  pointing	  out	  that	  there	  are	  the	  impenetrable	  
cognitive	  barriers	  to	  the	  dissemination	  of	  subjective	  definitions	  of	  objects	  that	  are	  universally	  valid	  for	  
everyone.	  	  
685	  Moreover,	  as	  I	  discuss	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  the	  scale	  and	  richness	  of	  data	  required	  to	  validate	  causal	  claims	  
at	  diverse	  levels	  of	  complexity	  is	  a	  heuristic	  impossibility.	  
686	  See	  work	  by	  John	  Law	  (2004),	  Bruno	  Latour	  (2007),	  et	  al.	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multidimensional	  systems	  and	  disparate	  power	  relationships	  that	  constitute	  the	  international	  system.	  
	  
Transnationalism	  as	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  Turning	  to	  ‘the	  transnational’	  aspect	  of	  TAN	  identification,	  this	  study	  found	  that	  the	  conceptual	  usefulness	  of	  notions	  of	  transnationality	  were	  impoverished	  in	  regard	  to	  understanding	  TANs.	  The	  crucial	  consideration	  of	  context	  is	  simply	  ignored	  and	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘transnational’	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  as	  applicable	  to	  a	  weak	  relationship	  between	  any	  two	  nations	  as	  it	  is	  to	  an	  instance	  of	  intensive	  interconnections	  between	  many	  nations687.	  Asserting	  the	  vital	  importance	  of	  context,	  Goodin	  and	  Tilly	  (2006:4),	  caution	  that	  contextual	  nuances	  disappear	  from	  large-­‐scale	  quantitative	  modeling	  and	  explanations	  based	  on	  abstract,	  general	  or	  universal	  laws	  of	  human	  behaviour.	  Social	  relations	  in	  local	  contexts	  matter,	  because:	  	  […]	   how	   political	   processes	  work	   and	  what	   outcomes	   they	   produce	   depend	  heavily	  on	  the	  contexts	  in	  which	  they	  occur.	  	  	  Moreover,	  in	  the	  modern	  era	  of	  affordable	  globe-­‐encircling	  transportation	  and	  telecommunications	  technologies,	  the	  notion	  of	  transnationalism	  is	  not	  particularly	  meaningful.	  Therefore,	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  criterion	  of	  an	  organisation’s	  ‘transnational’	  aspect	  would	  make	  very	  little	  sense	  as	  a	  main	  analytical	  framework	  in	  most	  investigations	  aimed	  at	  understanding	  political	  outcomes.	  Presumably,	  the	  work	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘transnational’	  is	  often	  meant	  to	  be	  doing	  in	  its	  common	  usage	  in	  TAN	  identification	  is	  to	  suggest	  not	  only	  that	  units,	  or	  nodes,	  of	  networks	  are	  linked	  across	  borders	  and	  geographical	  distances	  but	  that	  they	  are	  necessarily	  strengthened	  by	  their	  unity688.	  Perhaps	  the	  notion	  of	  trans-­‐national	  links	  ostensibly	  hint	  also	  of	  the	  cross-­‐cultural	  (even	  universal)	  appeal	  of	  an	  organisation’s	  ideology	  and	  mission,	  extent	  of	  influence,	  weight	  of	  numbers	  and	  political	  power.	  But	  it	  is	  an	  Aquila,	  only	  symbolic	  of	  power	  rather	  than	  possessing	  it:	  some	  TANs	  are	  huge	  and	  influential	  but	  most	  are	  not.	  And,	  as	  discussed	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
687	  See	  also	  Florini’s	  comments	  on	  the	  ‘somewhat	  ungainly	  term’	  transnational	  civil	  society	  (2000:7).	  	  
688	  This	  study	  found	  no	  instances	  in	  which	  TANs	  admitted	  that	  they	  has	  been	  weakened	  by	  their	  
expanding	  transnational	  networks,	  although	  this	  is	  common	  with	  other	  organisations,	  corporations,	  and	  
indeed	  states,	  and	  such	  a	  consequence	  seems	  to	  be	  as	  likely	  as	  not.	  Both	  Oxfam	  and	  Human	  Rights	  
Watch	  did	  admit	  to	  being	  severely	  stretched	  in	  trying	  to	  meet	  their	  expanding	  worldwide	  commitments	  
with	  available	  resources,	  and	  Oxfam	  GB	  has	  embarked	  on	  a	  programme	  of	  large-­‐scale	  staff	  cuts	  and	  
pulling	  out	  of	  some	  countries	  (The	  Guardian,	  2013;	  HRW	  Annual	  Report,	  2011:1;	  2012:43;	  2013:1).	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Section	  3.2.1,	  the	  properties	  of	  a	  fitness	  landscape	  are	  a	  crucial	  factor	  in	  a	  TAN’s	  goal	  attainment	  and	  may	  not	  necessarily	  be	  influenced	  by	  the	  size	  and	  transnational	  components	  of	  the	  TAN689.	  	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  literature	  established	  that	  most	  NGOs/TANs	  have	  their	  roots	  and	  large	  support	  bases	  planted	  firmly	  in	  the	  developed	  countries	  of	  the	  West690	  was	  a	  further	  argument	  for	  rejecting	  transnationalism	  as	  the	  primary	  research	  unit	  for	  analysing	  them	  (see	  Florini,	  2000:7;	  Tarrow:	  2005:	  42-­‐43,	  68-­‐72).	  Moreover,	  Tarrow	  is	  persuasive	  in	  his	  identification	  of	  transnational	  activists	  as	  a	  sub-­‐group	  of	  ‘rooted	  cosmopolitans’	  (ibid:42-­‐43),	  claiming	  that	  ‘most	  activists	  are	  embedded	  within	  the	  power	  structures	  of	  their	  own	  countries’	  (ibid:60)	  and	  ‘global	  thinking’,	  with	  Mittelman	  (2004),	  is	  strongly	  associated	  with	  neoliberal	  visions,	  well-­‐educated	  individuals	  and	  elites,	  and	  is	  not	  universally	  shared.	  	  	  Thus,	  it	  was	  incongruous	  that	  descriptions	  of	  domestic	  activist	  network	  nodes	  commonly	  featured	  communities	  embedded	  in	  separate,	  vastly	  different	  social	  ‘worlds’	  to	  each	  other,	  while	  the	  globe-­‐spanning	  TANs	  to	  which	  they	  were	  linked	  were	  commonly	  assumed	  to	  operate	  in	  one	  world.	  This,	  I	  held	  to	  be	  a	  superficial	  conceptualisation	  of	  TAN	  agency,	  which	  in	  a	  complex	  realist	  reading	  might	  be	  more	  usefully	  envisaged	  as	  social	  networks	  of	  complex	  intersecting	  world-­‐systems,	  because	  when	  we	  think	  in	  global	  terms	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  link	  people	  existing	  in	  entirely	  different	  worlds,	  even	  as	  they	  inhabit	  the	  Earth	  in	  the	  same	  moment.	  	  	  International	  relations	  scholars,	  anthropologists,	  human	  geographers	  and	  many	  others,	  have	  long	  identified	  at	  least	  four	  ‘worlds’.	  These	  have	  been	  held	  to	  be	  the	  notion	  emerging	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  period	  of	  (1)	  a	  First	  World,	  comprising	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  allies;	  (2)	  a	  Second	  World	  made	  up	  of	  the	  USSR	  and	  communist	  bloc;	  and	  (3)	  a	  Third	  World	  of	  non-­‐aligned	  nations.	  Some	  also	  see	  (4)	  a	  Fourth	  World	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  anti-­‐imperialist	  movements,	  who	  seek	  to	  safeguard	  alternative	  identities	  and	  futures	  for	  themselves	  other	  than	  those	  imposed	  or	  expected	  of	  them	  by	  people	  in	  the	  other	  ‘Worlds’	  (Hall,	  2003;	  Manuel,	  1974).	  In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
689See	  Mark	  Granovetter’s	  work	  for	  more	  on	  this	  (Granovetter,	  1978;	  Watts,	  2011:	  61-­‐72).	  
690	  Illustrating	  this	  point,	  quite	  fortuitously,	  the	  three	  case	  study	  TANs	  are	  all	  headquartered	  in	  the	  
developed	  Western	  world:	  Greenpeace	  International	  (Amsterdam),	  Oxfam	  International	  (Oxford,	  UK),	  
and	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  (New	  York).	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particular,	  these	  political	  advocates,	  who	  are	  increasingly	  networked	  via	  new	  communications	  technologies,	  typically	  propound	  ‘another	  world	  is	  possible’	  and	  seek	  to	  counter	  the	  hegemonic	  spread	  of	  European	  civilisation	  through	  the	  forces	  of	  globalisation	  (Hall:	  ibid).	  The	  aspirations	  of	  some	  of	  the	  many	  strands	  of	  this	  movement	  typically	  find	  their	  transnational	  expression	  in	  the	  advocacy	  communications	  of	  the	  alter-­‐globalisation	  movement.	  In	  fact,	  a	  further,	  yet	  unexplored,	  hypothesis	  that	  I	  drew	  from	  the	  research	  data,	  is	  that	  the	  digital	  divide	  appears	  to	  be	  generating	  an	  emergent	  Fifth	  parallel	  world	  that	  is	  greatly	  advantaged	  by	  the	  changing	  power	  dynamics	  enabled	  by	  digital	  technologies	  and	  is	  vastly	  overrepresented	  in	  online	  opinion	  by	  a	  social	  sector	  that	  is	  young	  adult,	  male,	  highly	  educated,	  non-­‐poor,	  urban,	  Western	  and	  white	  (see	  Hindman,	  2009:9,	  18-­‐19).	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ANNEX	  4:	  UN	  Consultation	  Criteria	  	  
	  
Implications	  for	  TANs	  in	  measuring	  up	  to	  the	  UN	  consultation	  criteria	  
	  
	  The	  implications	  of	  the	  UN’s	  1996	  accreditation	  criteria	  for	  TANs	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  1996)	  are	  evident	  on	  even	  the	  most	  cursory	  reflection.	  Applying	  these	  criteria	  to	  the	  data	  set,	  I	  prepared	  the	  following	  indicative	  list	  of	  challenges	  that,	  I	  submit,	  are	  faced	  by	  TANs	  in	  meeting	  a	  representative	  selection	  of	  the	  UN	  accreditation	  criteria:	  	  
 Must	  work	  in	  a	  field	  that	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  work	  of	  the	  ECOSOC	  —	  	  
• TANs	  generally	  form	  to	  set	  the	  agenda	  for	  political	  debate,	  prioritise	  the	  issues	  to	  be	  addressed	  by	  the	  international	  community	  and	  frame	  the	  meaning	  in	  which	  the	  issues	  should	  be	  approached	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:25,	  30),	  not	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  work	  and	  needs	  of	  an	  IGO.	  	  	  
 Must	  have	  aims	  and	  purposes	  that	  conform	  to	  the	  spirit,	  purposes	  and	  	  	  principles	  of	  the	  UN	  Charter	  	  —	  	  
• Many	  TANs	  form	  specifically	  to	  oppose,	  change	  and/or	  circumvent	  international	  policy	  and	  institutions,	  particularly	  in	  regard	  to	  addressing	  contemporary	  global	  challenges691.	  They	  often	  take	  an	  adversarial	  stance	  on	  issues	  and	  also	  contest	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  international	  system	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  2003b;	  Chandler,	  2004).	  	  
	  
 Should	  undertake	  to	  support	  the	  work	  of	  the	  UN	  and	  promote	  knowledge	  of	  its	  principles	  and	  activities	  —	  	  
• As	  above.	  Additionally,	  it	  is	  noted,	  in	  this	  context,	  that	  only	  1,300	  NGOs	  have	  signed	  up	  to	  a	  separate	  UN	  accreditation	  scheme	  operated	  by	  the	  UN’s	  Department	  of	  Public	  Information	  (UN	  data,	  2011c),	  to	  promote	  the	  exchange	  and	  dissemination	  of	  UN	  information	  among	  civil	  society.	  It	  is	  probably	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  TANs	  that	  prioritise	  their	  own	  self-­‐publicity	  and	  efforts	  to	  ‘change	  the	  behaviour	  of	  states	  and	  of	  international	  organizations’	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:2),	  are	  even	  less	  inclined	  that	  other	  NGOs	  to	  support	  the	  positions	  of	  those	  they	  regard	  as	  opponents.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
691	  These	  are	  listed	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  Chapter	  4.	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 Must	  not	  engage	  in	  a	  politically	  motivated	  act	  against	  a	  Member	  State,	  or	  promote	  activities	  that	  are	  against	  the	  UN	  Charter	  —	  	  
• As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  interpretation	  of	  what	  constitutes	  a	  ‘politically	  motivated	  act’	  may	  be	  highly	  contested.	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  regard	  all	  external	  affairs	  activities	  of	  TANs	  as	  politically	  motivated	  acts,	  and	  many	  are	  against	  the	  interest	  of	  one,	  several,	  or	  all	  UN	  Member	  States.	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  (ibid:x)	  assert	  that:	  	  	  […]	  voices	  that	  are	  suppressed	  in	  their	  own	  societies	  may	  find	  that	  networks	   can	   project	   and	   amplify	   their	   concerns	   into	   an	  international	   arena,	  which	   in	   turn	   can	   echo	   back	   into	   their	   own	  countries.	   Transnational	   networks	   multiply	   the	   voices	   that	   are	  heard	  in	  international	  and	  domestic	  policies.	  	  	  
• Such	  statutory	  obligations	  to	  help	  preserve	  the	  international	  order	  of	  sovereign	  states	  are	  clearly	  incompatible	  with	  the	  ideologies	  of	  cosmopolitanist	  TANs	  and	  pose	  insurmountable	  barriers	  to	  their	  participation	  in	  the	  contemporary	  international	  system	  via	  the	  UN.	  
• Similarly,	  TANs	  engaged	  in	  ‘politically-­‐motivated’	  acts	  against	  states,	  such	  as	  those	  exhibiting	  contempt	  for	  law	  and	  order,	  strategically	  provoking	  coercive	  powers	  of	  states	  and	  calling	  for	  civil	  disobedience,	  appear	  to	  also	  encounter	  resistances	  and	  barriers	  to	  their	  aims	  to	  influence	  the	  international	  policy-­‐making	  processes.	  	  
 Should	  be	  a	  representative	  body,	  with	  identifiable	  headquarters	  and	  an	  executive	  officer.	  It	  should	  have	  a	  transparent	  and	  democratic	  decision-­‐making	  mechanism	  and	  a	  democratically	  adopted	  constitution	  —	  	  
• Contemporary	  TANs	  connected	  in	  horizontal	  network	  organisational	  structures	  may	  have	  difficulty	  meeting	  these	  criteria.	  Linked	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  advocating	  for	  one	  or	  more	  principled	  issues,	  or	  values,	  and	  the	  exchange	  of	  information,	  they	  may	  have	  no	  hierarchy	  or	  material	  presence,	  in	  a	  traditional	  sense,	  in	  any	  one	  country.	  Furthermore,	  issue	  networks	  are	  notably	  unstable	  structurally,	  characterised	  by	  a	  low-­‐level	  of	  institutionalisation,	  lack	  of	  cohesion	  (sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘weak	  link’	  networks),	  and	  constant	  struggles	  over	  rules,	  procedures,	  norms	  and	  resources	  (Daugbjerg,	  1998:81).	  However,	  TANs	  may	  consider	  these	  network	  characteristics	  to	  be	  distinctively	  advantageous	  in	  their	  dealings	  with	  states.	  Rosenau	  (2000:229)	  contends	  that	  while	  a	  number	  of	  dynamics	  have	  ‘contributed	  to	  the	  diminution	  of	  state	  capacities’,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  has	  been	  the	  shifting	  balance	  between	  hierarchical	  and	  network	  forms	  of	  organisation,	  between	  vertical	  and	  horizontal	  flows	  of	  authority.	  Rosenau	  continues:	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   Greatly	   facilitated	   by	   the	   Internet,	   people	   now	   converge	  electronically	   as	   equals,	   or	   at	   least	   not	   as	   superiors	   and	  subordinates.	   They	   make	   plans,	   recruit	   members,	   mobilize	  support,	   raise	   money,	   debate	   issues,	   frame	   agendas,	   and	  undertake	   collective	   action,	   amounting	   to	   steering	   mechanisms	  founded	   on	   horizontal	   rather	   than	   hierarchical	   channels	   of	  authority.	  	  	  Furthermore,	  Rosenau	  says	  he	  shares	  the	  view	  that	  conflicts	  will	  increasingly	  be	  waged	  by	  ‘networks’,	  rather	  than	  hierarchies	  —	  endowing	  whoever	  masters	  the	  network	  form	  to	  gain	  major	  advantages	  in	  the	  new	  epoch.	  	  	  
 Must	  have	  authority	  to	  speak	  for	  its	  members	  —	  	  
• As	  above.	  This	  is	  a	  significant	  challenge	  for	  TANs,	  who	  try	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  ‘strategic	  portrayal’	  of	  issues	  will	  work	  for	  the	  different	  actors	  in	  the	  network	  and	  also	  for	  target	  audiences	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  ibid:8).	  This	  study	  found	  that	  this	  requirement	  often	  meant	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  form	  consensus,	  the	  strategic	  messages	  of	  networks	  were	  often	  highly	  generalised,	  even	  banal.	  This,	  and	  the	  non-­‐hierarchical	  structure	  of	  networks,	  could	  compromise	  any	  effort	  by	  any	  one	  element	  of	  an	  advocacy	  network	  to	  officially	  speak	  for	  any	  others.	  	  
 Must	  have	  appropriate	  mechanisms	  for	  accountability	  —	  	  
• As	  above.	  Additionally,	  the	  heterogeneity	  and	  relativity	  of	  transnational	  networks,	  among	  other	  things,	  make	  this	  requirement	  problematical.	  One	  might	  question,	  for	  instance:	  What	  mechanisms	  and	  levels	  of	  accountability	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  ‘appropriate’,	  and	  by	  whose	  estimation?	  Accountable	  for	  what	  and	  to	  whom,	  and	  on	  whose	  authority?	  Chandler	  (2004)	  observes	  that	  some	  approaches	  ascribe	  a	  distinctive	  radical	  ethics	  to	  global	  civil	  society	  in	  that	  its	  members	  refuse	  to	  play	  by	  the	  rules	  laid	  down	  by	  state-­‐based	  territorial	  politics.	  Chandler	  opines:	  	   Whereas	   state-­‐based	   political	   action	   is	   held	   to	   reinforce	  frameworks	  and	  hierarchies	  of	  exclusion,	  new	  social	  movements,	  said	   to	   constitute	   a	   global	   civil	   society	   ‘from	   below’,	   are	   seen	   to	  herald	  new	  forms	  of	  emancipatory	  political	  action	  that	  recognise	  and	   include	   diversity	   and	   build	   new	   forms	   of	   global	   ‘counter-­‐hegemonic’	  politics.	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 Must	  be	  funded	  mainly	  by	  its	  members	  and	  provide	  the	  Committee	  with	  its	  financial	  documentation	  and	  reports	  —	  	  
• As	  above.	  Heightened	  suspicions	  about	  NGO	  underpinnings	  and	  motivations	  during	  Cold	  War	  political	  manoeuvreing	  led	  to	  the	  review	  of	  the	  NGO	  consulting	  arrangements,	  resulting	  in	  Resolution	  1296	  (XLIV)	  of	  May	  1968	  (UN-­‐ECOSOC,	  1968;	  UN	  Report,	  2003),	  and	  the	  requirement	  for	  NGOs	  to	  submit	  regular	  reports	  of	  their	  operations	  and	  finances.	  As	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  concerns	  expressed	  in	  the	  Cardoso	  Panel	  survey	  and	  the	  Cardoso	  Report	  (UN-­‐NGLS,	  2003b;	  UN	  Report,	  2004a)	  and	  more	  recently	  by	  Zettler	  (2009),	  this	  can	  be	  problematical	  in	  situations	  in	  which	  the	  applicant	  NGO	  is	  supported	  by	  political	  opponents	  of	  the	  government	  of	  the	  Member	  State.	  Although	  the	  1968	  Resolution	  also	  specifically	  encouraged	  engagement	  with	  NGOs	  from	  developing	  countries	  (UN	  Report,	  2003),	  a	  contradiction	  exists	  today	  in	  that	  this	  stipulation	  presents	  particular	  problems	  for	  under-­‐resourced	  NGOs	  from	  the	  global	  South.	  	  
 Cannot	  be	  a	  profit-­‐making	  body.	  Individual	  companies	  cannot	  gain	  consultative	  status,	  but	  trade	  federations	  and	  commercial	  interests	  are	  recognised	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  NGOs	  —	  	  
• As	  shown	  in	  this	  thesis,	  the	  accreditation	  terminology	  can	  be	  ambiguous	  and	  open	  to	  subjective	  interpretation.	  ‘Profit-­‐making’	  and	  ‘commercial	  interests’,	  for	  example,	  can	  be	  interpreted	  both	  rigidly	  and	  in	  a	  very	  liberal	  sense.	  NGOs	  who	  see	  themselves	  as	  part	  of	  a	  civil	  society	  that	  inhabits	  a	  space	  that	  is	  non-­‐state	  and	  non-­‐market	  contest	  the	  UN’s	  acceptance	  of	  trade	  federations	  and	  commercial	  interests	  as	  part	  of	  civil	  society	  (UN	  Global	  Compact,	  1999,	  2007,	  2008)692	  and	  the	  deduction	  that	  they	  are,	  therefore,	  covered	  by	  the	  Article	  71	  provision	  for	  consultation	  with	  non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  (UN	  Charter,	  1945).	  	  	  	  
 Cannot	  use	  or	  advocate	  violence	  —	  	  
• This	  requirement	  is	  self-­‐evidently	  problematical,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  frustrations	  experienced	  by	  some	  sections	  of	  global	  civil	  society,	  such	  as	  the	  anti-­‐globalisation	  and	  anti-­‐capitalist	  movements	  (Chandler,	  2004),	  which	  have	  become	  defined	  worldwide	  by	  their	  strategic	  use	  of	  violent	  protest	  action	  and	  high	  level	  of	  media	  attention.	  Moreover,	  the	  definition	  of	  what	  constitutes	  ‘violence’	  is	  contested	  (Galtung,	  1969)	  and,	  as	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  case	  studies,	  is	  typically	  considered	  by	  individual	  TANs	  to	  be	  relative	  to	  their	  ideological	  commitments	  and	  concerns.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
692	  It	  is	  clear	  from	  [UN	  Secretary-­‐General]	  Kofi	  Annan’s	  speech	  to	  the	  first	  meeting	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  
advisory	  body,	  the	  Global	  Compact,	  that	  the	  UN	  considers	  private	  sector	  business	  executives,	  labour	  
organisations	  and	  civil	  society	  bodies	  to	  be	  covered	  by	  the	  Article	  71	  provision	  for	  non-­‐governmental	  
organisations	  (UN	  Global	  Compact,	  2008).	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 Must	  respect	  the	  norm	  of	  ‘non-­‐interference	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  states’.	  This	  means	  an	  NGO	  cannot	  be	  a	  political	  party,	  but	  parties	  can,	  like	  companies,	  form	  international	  federations.	  Similarly,	  NGOs	  concerned	  with	  human	  rights	  should	  not	  restrict	  their	  activities	  to	  a	  particular	  group,	  nationality,	  or	  country	  —	  	  
• Again,	  the	  definition	  of	  what	  constitutes	  non-­‐interference	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  states	  is	  highly	  controversial.	  It	  presents	  particular	  problems	  for	  TANs,	  which	  in	  their	  advocacy	  of	  universal	  norms	  and	  acceptance	  of	  their	  worldviews,	  arguably	  display	  characteristics	  that	  resemble	  a	  new	  form	  of	  ‘global	  political	  party’,	  albeit	  in	  an	  international	  context	  that	  has	  no	  institutional	  legislative	  mechanism	  for	  their	  participation	  beyond	  that	  of	  accredited	  consultants.	  Furthermore,	  many	  TANs	  focus	  their	  claims,	  criticisms	  and	  demands	  on	  particular	  ‘rogue’	  states	  with	  whom	  they	  have	  issues,	  particularly	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  human	  and	  animal	  rights	  and	  the	  environment.	  For	  example,	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  stakes	  its	  reputation	  on	  its	  uncompromising	  ‘interference’	  in	  the	  human	  rights	  abuses	  it	  documents	  in	  the	  world’s	  states	  (see	  Chapter	  9	  and	  HRW	  World	  Report,	  2014).	  	  
 Cannot	  be	  an	  intergovernmental	  organisation	  —	  	  
• The	  NGO	  Committee	  has	  had	  issues	  in	  the	  past	  with	  NGOs	  that	  were	  found,	  or	  suspected,	  to	  be	  puppet	  organisations	  for	  governments	  (UN	  Report,	  2003;	  Martens,	  2004),	  but	  this	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  a	  significant	  hurdle	  for	  TANs	  due	  to	  the	  staunchly	  non-­‐state	  ethos	  with	  which	  they	  characteristically	  identify.	  	  	  
 Must	  have	  been	  in	  existence	  for	  at	  least	  two	  years	  before	  applying	  —	  	  
• This	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  controversial	  requirement	  at	  the	  present	  time,	  however,	  given	  that	  TANs	  often	  mobilise	  rapidly	  in	  response	  to	  urgent	  issues	  and	  the	  process	  for	  obtaining	  an	  accredited	  voice	  in	  the	  UN	  may	  take	  several	  years,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  it	  could	  become	  one.	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ANNEX	  5:	  Communications	  Strategies	  	  This	  annex	  sets	  out	  briefly	  the	  communications	  theoretical	  background	  for	  a	  selection	  of	  public	  communications	  strategies	  and	  tactics	  often	  used	  by	  organisations	  in	  both	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sectors.	  They	  are	  customarily	  the	  product	  of	  strategic	  corporate	  decisions	  and	  are	  designed	  to	  elicit	  predetermined	  responses	  from	  targeted	  audiences	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  organisation’s	  preferred	  outcomes	  and	  goals693.	  Those	  observed	  as	  being	  used	  by	  TANs	  include:	  	  
1.	  Framing,	  priming	  and	  cognitive	  cues	  Of	  all	  the	  rhetorical	  techniques	  typically	  practiced	  by	  advocacy	  organisations,	  strategic	  framing	  and	  reframing	  of	  issues	  is	  arguably	  the	  most	  well	  known,	  even	  by	  lay	  audiences.	  The	  term	  ‘framing’	  is	  generally	  taken	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  use	  of	  interpretive	  perspectives	  and	  frameworks	  to	  customise	  selected	  facts	  or	  information	  prior	  to	  its	  distribution	  to	  intended	  audiences,	  or	  ‘publics’	  (van	  der	  Eijk	  and	  Franklin,	  2009:149;	  Kahneman,	  2011:363-­‐367;	  Miller,	  2005:275-­‐276).	  For	  example,	  packaging	  information	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘the	  crisis’	  or	  ‘catastrophe’	  is	  commonly	  seen	  in	  advocacy	  framing.	  This	  attention-­‐capturing	  device	  is	  also	  activated	  by	  purely	  symbolic	  threats	  and	  emotionally-­‐loaded	  words,	  or	  cues	  (Kahneman,	  ibid:	  301,	  367).	  By	  analysis	  of	  Website	  feedback,	  these	  techniques	  enable	  organisations	  to	  model	  their	  user	  preferences	  and	  customise	  new	  content	  that	  optimises	  the	  capture	  of	  user	  attention	  and	  reinforces	  satisfaction	  levels.	  However,	  although	  this	  form	  of	  research	  is	  useful	  for	  analysing	  information	  regarding	  already	  engaged	  audiences,	  it	  can	  tell	  strategists	  almost	  nothing	  about	  resistant	  and	  gatekeeper	  audiences.	  It	  is	  a	  tenet	  of	  modern	  communications	  practice	  that	  in	  order	  to	  influence	  others	  to	  act	  in	  desired	  ways	  and	  achieve	  one’s	  goals,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  understand	  their	  attitudes	  and	  values	  (Brook	  and	  Sha,	  2013:28,	  51;	  PRSA,	  2014).	  As	  the	  Chinese	  general	  Sun-­‐tzu	  asserted:	  ‘[…]	  he	  who	  not	  only	  is	  ignorant	  of	  the	  enemy,	  but	  also	  of	  his	  own	  resources,	  is	  invariably	  defeated’	  (2010:24)694.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
693	  This	  explanatory	  note	  is	  based	  on	  analysis	  of	  the	  academic	  and	  professional	  literature	  and	  discourses,	  
combined	  with	  a	  personal	  career	  of	  over	  30	  years	  as	  a	  senior	  communications	  executive.	  	  
694	  Commonly	  shortened	  to	  the	  well-­‐known	  aphorism:	  ‘Know	  your	  enemy.’	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Priming	  and	  cuing	  of	  audiences	  by	  using	  stock	  terminologies	  and	  familiar	  linguistic	  short	  forms,	  often	  frequently	  and	  repetitively,	  helps	  to	  simplify	  messages	  about	  complex	  subjects,	  recall	  prior	  contexts,	  prioritise	  importance	  of	  a	  topic,	  link	  to	  ideological	  biases,	  and	  reinforce	  notions	  of	  identity	  and	  solidarity	  	  (van	  der	  Eijk	  and	  Franklin,	  ibid:	  88;	  Miller,	  ibid).	  Indeed,	  as	  advocacy	  organisations,	  it	  is	  to	  be	  expected	  that	  the	  primary	  purpose	  of	  TANs	  is	  to	  strategically	  communicate	  information	  to	  the	  actors	  within	  their	  networks	  and	  to	  their	  target	  audiences	  (Brader	  and	  Valentino,	  2007:184,	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  1998:2,	  8).	  Among	  the	  cognitive	  cues	  this	  study	  found	  to	  be	  most	  in	  evidence	  in	  TAN	  communications	  were	  (i)	  stereotypes,	  which	  can	  lead	  people	  to	  habitually	  look	  for	  a	  particular	  undesirable,	  or	  desirable,	  trait	  or	  inconsistency	  in	  another;	  (ii)	  associative	  biases	  with	  things	  that	  are	  liked	  or,	  especially,	  disliked;	  and	  (iii)	  priming	  for	  receptiveness	  to	  ideas	  and	  suggestions	  (see	  Kahneman,	  2011:	  50-­‐58).	  These	  techniques	  also	  fall	  into	  the	  category	  of	  	  ‘rhetorical	  techniques’.	  	  
	  
2.	  ‘Fuzzy’	  brand	  promises	  A	  	  ‘fuzzy	  brand	  promise’	  is	  a	  promise	  that	  has	  an	  idealised	  but	  unactualisable	  goal.	  In	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  fuzzy	  brand	  promise	  delivery,	  a	  brand	  delivers	  on	  a	  fuzzy	  promise	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  brand	  universe	  encourages	  a	  form	  of	  consumer-­‐brand	  interaction,	  which	  —	  if	  adopted	  by	  the	  target	  consumer	  —	  brings	  about	  the	  promised	  future	  state	  of	  affairs	  (Anker	  et	  al,	  2012:282).	  In	  order	  to	  have	  cross-­‐cultural	  impact,	  TANs	  often	  appear	  to	  employ	  this	  communications	  technique	  of	  designing	  ‘fuzzy	  brand	  promises’	  that	  trigger	  emotional	  responses	  with	  widely	  diversified	  audiences.	  This	  can	  happen	  because	  we	  invoke	  cognitive	  shortcuts,	  based	  on	  our	  subjective	  understandings	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  world.	  Global	  commercial	  brands,	  such	  as	  Coca-­‐Cola,	  trigger	  positive	  responses	  in	  their	  audiences	  by	  linking	  their	  products	  to	  universal	  situations,	  such	  as	  the	  quenching	  of	  thirst,	  enjoyment	  of	  flavour,	  the	  excitement	  of	  sport	  and	  the	  happiness	  of	  celebrations	  with	  family	  and	  friends.	  These	  are	  simple	  messages	  calling	  for	  clear	  and	  simple	  responses.	  However,	  when	  transnational	  advocacy	  communications	  strategists	  seek	  to	  influence	  worldwide	  mass	  audiences	  concerning	  ideologies	  or	  political	  issues	  of	  extreme	  complexity,	  and	  with	  which	  the	  audiences	  have	  low	  familiarity,	  the	  message	  framing	  inevitably	  suffers	  from	  oversimplification,	  emotional	  rhetoric	  and	  attitudinal	  prompts	  such	  as	  urgency	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and	  risk	  alarms.	  In	  ‘fuzzy	  promises’	  theorisation,	  brands695	  deliver	  fuzzy,	  functional,	  symbolic,	  and	  experiential	  promises	  to	  their	  target	  consumers	  that	  result	  in	  behaviours	  that,	  inter	  alia,	  encourage	  consumers	  to	  use	  brands	  as	  narrative	  material	  to	  communicate	  self-­‐identity;	  facilitate	  courses	  of	  consumer	  action	  that	  are	  conducive	  to	  the	  promised	  functionality;	  and	  motivate	  consumers	  to	  adopt	  and	  play	  a	  social	  role	  implicitly	  suggested	  and	  facilitated	  by	  the	  brand.	  	  
	  
3.	  ‘Validity	  of	  voice’	  authentication	  Bendell	  (2006)	  has	  shown	  that	  there	  are	  five	  primary	  bases	  upon	  which	  a	  ‘voice’	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  have	  value	  in	  political	  deliberations	  —	  a	  subject	  of	  particular	  significance	  for	  those	  who	  advocate	  on	  behalf	  of	  others.	  Providing	  these	  findings	  in	  a	  UN	  Dossier	  (ibid),	  Bendell	  lists	  the	  following	  five	  evaluative	  criteria	  for	  the	  ‘validity’	  of	  the	  advocacy	  ‘voice’:	  the	  relevant	  experience	  of	  the	  speaker,	  the	  speaker’s	  expertise,	  novelty,	  content,	  and	  what	  can	  be	  called	  the	  ‘dependent	  affectedness,’	  of	  the	  voice.	  Of	  these,	  Bendell	  asserts	  that	  the	  last	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  key	  to	  effectiveness.	  His	  theory	  holds	  that	  those	  most	  affected	  by	  an	  issue	  are	  considered	  to	  have	  the	  greatest	  ‘validity	  of	  voice’	  in	  discourses	  on	  that	  subject.	  Deployment	  of	  this	  tactic	  is	  clearly	  evident	  in	  the	  strategic	  presentation	  of	  personal	  experiences	  of	  advocates,	  novelty	  such	  as	  the	  deployment	  of	  celebrity	  influencers	  including	  film	  stars,	  and	  personal	  accounts	  focusing	  on	  the	  experiences	  of	  victims	  and	  the	  relief	  provided	  to	  them.	  	  
4.	  Perlocution	  Perlocutionary	  communications	  tactics	  are	  often	  evident	  in	  TAN	  communications	  —	  that	  is,	  linguistic	  forms	  that	  have	  action	  as	  their	  aim	  and	  imply	  action	  but	  do	  not	  embody	  an	  explicit	  call	  for	  the	  receiver	  to	  take	  an	  action	  (Habermas,	  1989:133;	  Miller,	  2005:147).	  Oblique	  forms	  of	  persuading,	  or	  convincing,	  may	  fall	  into	  this	  category.	  In	  fact,	  Habermas	  (ibid)696	  discusses	  the	  role	  of	  perlocution	  in	  political	  activism,	  as	  a	  means	  of	  eliciting	  the	  cooperation	  of	  others	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  speaker’s	  imperatives.	  He	  observes	  that	  in	  the	  initial	  phases	  of	  cooperative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
695	  Apart	  from	  satisfying	  a	  consumer’s	  rational	  and	  emotional	  needs,	  successful	  brands	  are	  generally	  
conceptualised	  as	  essentially	  projecting	  some	  kind	  of	  promise,	  which	  forms	  an	  ethical	  bond	  between	  the	  
parties	  that	  has	  consequences	  if	  broken.	  Pearson	  asserts:	  ‘Frankly,	  a	  brand	  is	  a	  promise.	  And	  promises	  
are	  meant	  to	  be	  kept’	  (Pearson,	  2006:385;	  Anker	  et	  al,	  ibid;	  de	  Chernatony	  et	  al,	  2011:31).	  
696	  This	  communications	  theory	  is	  presented	  in	  Volume	  1	  of	  Habermas’s	  magnum	  opus,	  The	  Theory	  of	  
Communicative	  Action	  (1989:331).	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interpretive	  processes	  differing	  levels	  of	  information,	  interpretations	  and	  understandings	  can	  be	  a	  handicap	  to	  achieving	  coordinated	  actions.	  Thus:	  	  […]	   through	   perlocuting	   effects,	   the	   speaker	   gives	   the	   hearer	   something	   to	  understand	  which	  he	  cannot	  (yet)697	  directly	  communicate.	  In	  this	  phase,	  then,	  the	   perlocutionary	   acts	   have	   to	   be	   embedded	   in	   contexts	   of	   communicative	  action.	  	  	  Habermas	  theorised	  this	  concept	  in	  this	  diagram:	  	  	  
Habermas’s	  Theory	  of	  Communicative	  Action698	  
	  
	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  
Figure	  6.3	  Habermas	  theorised	  the	  overt	  and	  covert	  strategies	  that	  can	  be	  
used	  in	  political	  activism	  to	  elicit	  the	  cooperation	  of	  audiences	  who	  may	  
be	  unfamiliar	  with	  the	  subject	  matter	  (1989:331).	  
	  According	  to	  Habermas,	  ‘mechanisms	  of	  deception’	  need	  to	  be	  mastered	  for	  practising	  systematically	  distorted	  communications	  in	  activism	  focused	  on	  influencing	  public	  audiences.	  These	  include	  using	  language	  to	  confuse	  the	  boundaries	  between	  ‘seriousness’	  and	  ‘play’	  (ibid).	  Also:	  	  	  […]	   the	   linguistic	   construction	   of	   a	   fictive	   reality,	   wit	   and	   irony,	   transposed	  and	  paradoxical	  use	  of	   language,	   allusions	  and	   the	  contradictory	  withdrawal	  of	   validity	   claims	   at	   a	   metacommunicative	   level699	   —	   all	   these	  accomplishments	  rest	  on	  intentionally	  confusing	  modalities	  of	  being.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
697	  Parenthesis	  as	  in	  original.	  
698	  Diagram	  reproduced	  from	  Habermas,	  1989:333.	  
699	  I	  posit	  that	  an	  accessible	  example	  of	  this	  linguistic	  device	  is	  Mark	  Antony’s	  famous	  funeral	  oration	  in	  
Shakespeare’s	  Julius	  Caesar,	  during	  which	  the	  prevailing	  sentiment	  of	  a	  crowd	  is	  manipulated	  from	  one	  
extreme	  to	  another.	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An	  example	  of	  this	  tactic,	  relating	  to	  an	  anti-­‐whaling	  campaign,	  is	  shown	  in	  the	  thesis	  text.	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